320 Mass. 646 | Mass. | 1947
By this petition brought by the trustee under an indenture of trust of William S. Dexter, late of Boston, dated April 12, 1898, the trustee seeks instructions as to the proper distribution of the income from the trust estate subsequent to the death of Evangeline Hope Dexter, and as to the distribution of the principal of the trust estate at the termination of the trust — the latter a question as to future duties when the case was argued before us, but now a question as to a present duty, the trust having since terminated by reason of the death, which has been suggested to us, of the respondent Rose L. Dexter, whose administrator with the will annexed has been permitted to appear and represent her interests in the proceeding. The judge entered a decree instructing the petitioner that one half of the net income of the trust fund was payable to the then respondent Rose L. Dexter and one half to the trustees under the will of William Dexter, and that no persons claiming as legatees, devisees or appointees under the will of Evangeline Hope Dexter have any interest in the principal of the trust property in question, by reason of the will of George T. Dexter, late of
The material facts may be summed up as follows: By the indenture of trust William S. Dexter, hereinafter referred to as the donor, transferred certain personal property to trustees for the following purposes: “To hold, manage, invest and reinvest the same with the powers hereinafter set forth, to collect the income thereof and after paying the expensés of administering the trusts herein declared, to pay the net residue of said income, as often as semi-annually to my four children, Elsie Dexter, George T. Dexter, Rose L. Dexter and Philip Dexter, in equal shares during their respective lives. After the death of each of them, to pay the share of said net income which the person so dying would have received if he or she had not died, to and among the survivors and survivor. But if any of them shall leave a husband, wife or issue, other than an adopted child or children, surviving him or her, then to pay such share of said income as the person so dying would have received if he or she had not died, in such manner as he or she may have appointed by a last will made at any time after the date of these presents. . . . Upon the death of the last survivor of them, the said Elsie Dexter, George T. Dexter, Rose L. Dexter and Philip Dexter to pay over, transfer and deliver the principal or capital of the trust fund, as then existing, in the propor
Elsie Dexter died September 3, 1905, leaving no husband or issue. Philip died July 25, 1934, survived by his wife, Edith W. Dexter, who died February 17, 1942, one son, William, who died February 8,1943, and four grandchildren, Constance Y. R., Nathaniel, Philip and Mary Ann.
The issues presented for determination are whether the donor’s son George T. Dexter duly exercised the power of appointment given him by the terms of the indenture (a) as to income, and (b) as to principal, and whether his widow, Evangeline, effectively exercised the power of appointment given her by his will.
Evangeline, the widow of George, died testate on August 25 (23?), 1944. By her will she provided as follows: “Fourth: All the rest, residue and remainder of my property, including all property over which I may have any power of appointment under the will of my late husband George T. Dexter or under an Indenture of Trust of William S. Dexter dated April 12, 1898 or under any other instrument, I give, devise, bequeath and appoint first to my executors, or to any administrators with this my will annexed, such sum as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of Article Sixth hereinafter set forth, and second to my trustees
The respondents who would take in default of appointment under the indenture of trust and who seek to support the decree entered in the court below contend that the provisions of the will of George are inapt to permit a conclusion that George intended to give his wife, Evangeline, a power to appoint income of the trust fund under the indenture; that he did not intend to give her a power of appointment of a share of principal of the fund unless the trust terminated prior to her death; that in making his will he contemplated that he would survive his sister Rose and his brother Philip, both of whom were living when he executed his will (but who in fact survived him); and that it was only in the event that he survived them that he intended the power given to his wife to take effect. They also contend, in the alternative, that the will of Evangeline did not and could not effectively exercise the power given by George, and finally that the creation of the power under the will of George was invalid as an
Reading the will of George as a whole, in the light of the. circumstances known to him at the time of its execution, we are of opinion that it was his obvious intention to exercise in favor of his wife the power of appointment given to him under the indenture of trust, as to both his share of the income and of the principal of the trust fund, that his exercise of the power was valid, and that the power conferred upon his wife was effectively exercised by her.
As we construe the will of George, we think that he had in mind the possibility that he might survive his sister Rose and his brother Philip, who were living when he made his will, and also that they might survive him. Had he survived them, under the terms of his will his exercise of his power would admittedly be good. And it seems manifest that he also had clearly in mind the contingency that he might predecease his sister and brother, otherwise he would not have provided so definitely, for the enjoyment of the income from his share of the trust estate by his wife through the trustee appointed by him to receive it and to administer it in her behalf until the termination of the trust under the trust indenture. The wife of George was obviously the chief object of his testamentary bounty. In the event that she survived him, as she did, all that he had was to be hers, either outright as to the property described in the first article of his will, or equitably in beneficial enjoyment with ultimate power of appointment of his interest under the trust indenture as provided in the second article of his will. It was only in the event that she predeceased him that those provisions should not take effect. It is not without significance that, in the event that his wife died before him; the testator George gave all of his property, including that over which he “may have power of appointment,” to a trustee for the benefit of his wife’s parents, George W. Ross and Eliza A. Ross, and upon their death for the benefit of their son, his wife’s ■brother Thomas, and that until the death of the last survivor ■ of them, when the trust would terminate, no others
■ The exercise of the power by him did not exceed the limits imposed by the donor or by any principle of law. The donor merely provided the conditions upon which his children were to have the right to exercise the power of appointment conferred by him upon them. In case any of them dying left a spouse or issue, that right extended not only to the income from his or her share until the termination of the trust, but also to the share of the principal distributable then. With the exception of the provision limiting them or their appointees to income during the life of the trust, any of them dying leaving spouse or issue had as complete ultimate control as if the property had been given to him outright. It is settled in this Commonwealth and by the weight of authority elsewhere
The power thus conferred upon his wife, Evangeline, was validly exercised by her under her will. The exercise of this power by her is obviously not void for remoteness. The language employed by her considered in the light of the will as a whole, read with the terms of her husband’s will in mind, manifests an intention on her part to exercise the power. That intent is “not to be thwarted by refinements and distinctions resting upon subtlety and ingenuity or by lack of technical accuracy in the use of words or by unduly stressing the literal meaning of a few words or by attaching to them a hard and fast meaning which is not in consonance with the setting in which they were employed,” Beals v. Magenis, 307 Mass. 547, 552, even though it should appear that some of the language used was inapt. We do not concur in the argument of the appellees that the grant to her executors by Evangeline of “such sum” as may be necessary to carry out the terms of article Sixth of her will, apportioning taxes and. debts between the appointed property and her own, is inconsistent with the exercise of the power, and inappropriate to property in expectancy rather than in possession and enjoyment. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Sargent, 235 Mass. 298, 302-303. An adjustment to carry out those provisions can now be made by the trustees under her will, the trust under the indenture having terminated.
We conclude that upon the death of Evangeline and until the death of Rose L. Dexter the income from the trust fund under the indenture became payable one third to the personal representatives of the estate of Evangeline, one third to the personal representatives of the estate of William Dexter, and one third to Rose L. Dexter, and that upon the death of Rose the principal trust fund became payable and is now payable one half to the personal representatives of the estate of William Dexter, and the remaining one half to the personal representatives of the estate of Evangeline Hope Dexter. The representatives of the estate of Evangeline have requested in their answer that they be instructed as to whether the income payable to them under the will of
The decree entered in the Probate Court is reversed and instead a final decree is to be entered after rescript in accordance with this opinion. In that decree the allowances of costs and expenses made in the decree of the judge which is reversed may be included, together with allowances of costs and expenses of this appeal in the discretion of the Probate Court, to those respondents or their counsel who have participated in the proceedings before us.
So ordered.
Philip validly exercised his power of appointment under the trust indenture so far as now material, in favor of his son William.
Matter of Wildenburg, 174 Misc. (N. Y.) 503, and cases cited. Cases cited in 50 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 946. Tiffany, Real Property (3d ed.) § 693. Page on Wills, 1 1319, and cases cited. Slark v. Dakyns, L. R. 10 Ch. 35. Mays v. Beech, 114 Tenn. 544. White v. Wilson, 1 Drew. 298. Morgan v. Gronow, L. R. 16 Bq. 1. Crooke v. County of Kings, 97 N. Y. 421, 458. See also Restatement: Property, § 357; Restatement: Trusts, § 21; Scott on Trusts, § 21.