184 Iowa 793 | Iowa | 1918
This disposes of the point that the law permits a judgment over against a fraudulent transferor, if the endorsee is held to be a good-faith buyer.
II. It is, of course, true that, in an action for a simple money judgment, the defendant has a right to trial by a jury, unless such action tenders equitable issues, or unless th'e right to jury trial has been waived. See Constitution of Iowa, Art. 1, Sec. 9; Secs. 3431 and 3650, Code of 1897; Hanan v. Messenger, 168 Iowa 507. But the question is whether, as appellant claims, it was error to deny a jury trial in this particular case.
It is contended that the defendants were éntitled to jury trial, and that nothing done or omitted by them
The court held that an application for trial to a jury should be overruled, “under the issues tendered.” We-think that this ruling was right: First, because the suit finally became one seeking judgment on a promissory note, foreclosure-of a lien given to secure the payment of said note, and general equitable relief; second, because plaintiff filed a motion to transfer the cause to equity. The motion was sustained, and no exception to the ruling taken. The transfer was asked on the ground that “said cause is wholly equitable, under the present pleading.” Sustaining this without exception makes it the law of the case that the issues were wholly equitable. That being so, there was no right to jury trial to waive, because no right to such trial existed. Marquis v. Illsley, 99 Iowa 135; Wilkinson v. Pritchard, 93 Iowa 308.
2a
III. The pleadings of the appellants present a plea in abatement, because of the pendency of an appeal in some suit pending between others than the parties to this suit. But neither error points relied on for reversal nor brief points present that contention. — Affirmed.