Gardner v. DerwinskiGardner v. Derwinski
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Nebeker
Appellant, Fred P. Gardner, seeks reversal of a January 26, 1990, Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ (BVA) decision denying him entitlement to Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) benefits. The BVA ruled against appellant pursuant to
Appellant, a veteran of World War II, underwent back surgery for a non-service-connected back condition in June of 1986 at *586a VA medical facility. R. at 1. He asserts that his left leg suffered severe nerve and muscle damage as a result of surgery. On November 18, 1988, he filed a claim for compensation, under
ANALYSIS
Resolution of appellant’s claim requires the Court to focus on whether
Where any veteran shall have suffered an injury or an aggravation of an injury, as the result of hospitalization, medical or surgical treatment, or the pursuit of a course of vocational rehabilitation . . . not the result of the veteran’s own willful misconduct, and such injury or aggravation results in additional disability to or the death of such veteran, disability or death compensation . . . shall be awarded in the same manner as if such disability, aggravation, or death were service-connected.
The regulation at
Compensation is not payable for either the contemplated or foreseeable after results of approved medical or surgical care properly administered, no matter how remote, in the absence of a showing that additional disability or death proximately resulted through carelessness, negligence, lack of proper skill, error in judgment, or similar instances of indicated fault on the part of VA. However, compensation is payable in the event of the occurrence of an “accident” (an unforeseen, untoward event), causing additional disability or death proximately resulting from VA hospitalization or medical or surgical care.
Section 7261(a)(3)(C) (formerly § 4061(a)(3)(C)) of title 38 requires the Court to “hold unlawful and set aside . . . rules and regulations issued or adopted by the [Secretary] . . . found to be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, . . . or in violation of a statutory right.” Determining whether
THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE
Determining a statute’s plain meaning requires examining the specific language at issue and the overall structure of the statute. Bethesda Hospital Assn. v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 403-405, 108 S.Ct. 1255, 1258-1259, 99 L.Ed.2d 460 (1988). Here, the language of the statute provides that any veteran who has a disability incurred or aggravated during the course of a VA-authorized health examination, treatment, or vocational rehabilitation is entitled to have that disability treated as service-connected. Both the parties and amici agree that, under a literal reading, the statute’s language does not indicate an element of fault. Appellee’s Response to Order of the Court to File a Supplemental Memorandum (App.Resp.) at 4, and brief of J. Michael Hannon, amicus curiae (Hannon brief) at 5. This plain meaning must be given effect unless a “literal application of *587[the] statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.” Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982).
The Secretary focuses on the language “injury resulting in additional disability” to support the argument that giving full play to the plain meaning of
The “absurd result” exception to the plain meaning rule is, however, narrow and limited to situations “where it is quite impossible that Congress could have intended the result . . . and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone.” Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-71, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 2574-75, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Absent an absurd result, the plain meaning of the statute will be applied unless such an application is contrary to the apparent intention of Congress. Thompson/Center Arms Co., A Div. of the K. W. Thompson Tool Co. v. United States, 924 F.2d 1041, 1044-45 (Fed.Cir.1991) (“[o]nly very clear evidence of contrary legislative intent can displace the plain meaning of a statute”).
Furthermore, as Amicus Hannon points out, it is not unlikely that Congress designed a no-fault statute given its experience in enacting legislation concerning both common law negligence and the no-fault approach to liability. Hannon brief at 5. See, e.g.,
The Secretary argues that the language of the statute indicates an intent to limit the applicability of
The Secretary further argues that
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Where a statute’s language is plain, and its meaning clear, no room exists for *588construction. There is nothing to construe. See Lewis v. United States, 92 U.S. 618, 23 L.Ed. 513 (1876). Yet, the Secretary urges us to peruse the legislative history of
Finally, the Secretary asserts that congressional failure to modify the VA’s interpretation when it amended
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY’S INTERPRETATION
The last step of the Court’s inquiry involves examining the administrative agency’s interpretation of
Given that authority, the Secretary encourages the Court to defer to the VA’s interpretation of
Therefore, given the plain meaning of
SPECIAL APPRECIATION
The Court is indebted to Mr. J. Michael Hannon, esq., of Thompson, McGrail, *589O’Donnell & Harding, who, on the court’s request, wrote an amicus brief and presented oral argument. His superb analysis of the issues involved was of tremendous value to the Court and refuted the argument, often advanced by attorneys unfamiliar with veterans’ benefits law, that the complexity of the law places them at a considerable disadvantage. The Court also expresses its thanks to counsel for the Secretary and to the Paralyzed Veterans of America, the National Veterans Legal Services Project, and the Vietnam Veterans of America for their significant contributions.