228 Pa. 282 | Pa. | 1910
Opinion by
James Gardner, Anthony S. Morrow and William Jack were partners, trading and doing business in Hollidaysburg as a private banking house, under the firm name of Gardner, Morrow & Company. On May 14, 1891, Michael Morricy deposited with them $3,050, and they delivered to him a certificate, of which the following is a copy:
“No. 7582. Banking House of Gardner, Morrow & Co.
“Hollidaysburg, Pa., May 14, 1891.
“Michael Morricy has deposited in this bank three thousand and fifty dollars, payable to his order, on return of this certificate, six months after date, with interest at 4 per cent per annum.
“$3050.00. Gardner, Morrow & Co.”
On April 5, 1894, James Gardner, then a member of the said banking firm, died, and letters testamentary were duly issued to executors named in his will. After
Although the certificate of deposit issued to Morricy by the banking firm of Gardner, Morrow & Company was payable on its face to his order upon its return six months after date, it was not due so as to give a right of action upon it until payment was demanded. The rule as to a certificate of deposit issued by a banking house and payable to the order of the depositor upon the return of the certificate is that it is not due or suable until return of it and demand has been made for the money, from which time the statute of limitations begins to run; and it is no defense against a claim on such a certificate that demand had not been made within six years from its maturity: Girard Bank v. Bank of Penn Twp., 39 Pa. 92; Finkbone’s App., 86 Pa. 368; McGough et al. v. Jamison, 107 Pa. 336; Riddle v. First National Bank of Butler, 27 Fed. Repr. 503; 1 Bolles Modern Law of Banking, p. 462. If the banking firm of Gardner, Morrow & Company had continued to be a going concern up to April 28, 1909 — nearly eighteen years after the certificate of deposit was issued to Morricy — and he had then presented it to the firm and demanded payment, the statute of limitations would have been no defense to it; but this is not the situation here presented. What we are to determine is whether, under the conditions existing when the certificate of deposit was presented fox-payment to the surviving personal representative of Gardner, the deceased partner, the right to recover upon it was barred by the statute of limitations. Changed conditions at times beget new duties to parties to an existing contract, and what might not have been a duty on the part of Morricy while the banking firm continued in existence might have become so when it ceased to exist. The claim as now made by Morricy’s personal representative is against the estate of one of the deceased partners who died fifteen years before the certificate was
It would not be an unreasonable rule to hold, where there is a right to demand payment from the estate of a decedent — such right as Morricy possessed when Gardner died — that the demand ought to be made within the time contemplated by the. statutes for the settlement of decedents’ estates; but, in any event, the time within which such demand ought to be made against a decedent’s estate should not exceed the period within which a right of action is enforcible. This conflicts with no settled rule. In the case at bar Morricy had a right to demand payment six months after the certificate was issued to him. As long as those who issued it continued to live he was not called upon to make any demand to prevent the running of the statute, but when the conditions changed, when the partnership was dissolved by the death of Gardner, and his estate became at once liable to pay the depositors, it offends reason to say that, notwithstanding the right of the depositor, Morricy, to
Decree affirmed at appellant’s costs.