3 Keyes 505 | NY | 1867
This is an appeal from two orders of the supreme court, made under the following circumstances:
The action was brought for the appointment of a receiver of the rents of the estate of Julianna Gardiner, deceased, pending a contest before the surrogate of Richmond county, respecting the validity of her alleged will, the probate of which was being contested by the plaintiff; and James J. Roosevelt was appointed such receiver, and qualified as such.
The surrogate having decided against the validity of the will, and refused to admit it to probate, an appeal was taken to the supreme court, and the general term in the second district reversed the decree of the surrogate, and sent the case back, with the direction that the will be admitted to probate, which was accordingly done.
At this stage in the proceedings, a motion was made in this suit by the defendants to dismiss the complaint for unreasonable neglect of the plaintiff to proceed in the action, whereupon it was, on the 2nd day of June, 1866, ordered as follows: “That the complaint in the above-en
After the above order was made, and on the 27th of November, 1800, an older was obtained whereby the receiver was directed to pass his accounts before a referee named, and to pay over and apply what the referee should certify to be due from him as receiver, to the satisfaction and payment of the unpaid taxes which were due, and a lien upon the real estate of the said Julianna Gardiner, deceased, situate in the city?" of New York, prior to her decease; and that he transfer and deliver to the defendant, Julia G-. Tyler, all deeds, leases, and property which may have come into his possession as such receiver. This order, it appeared by affidavits on the part of the defendants, was entered by consent of the plaintiff, given in open court, though not so stated in the order.
The referee therein named proceeded to take the account, and made a report -whereby he certified as remaining in the hands of the receiver the sum of $3,416.72, to be applied to the payment of taxes as directed by said order. In the statement of the account, as allowed, are several items of credit by the receiver to the estate, of rent front Gr. Bradley, of which the following is a specimen: “By cash from G-. Bradley, for rent, $1,300 and among the items allowed to the receiver are the following : “To cash paid, sundry taxable costs, charges, and disbursements, including attorney’s fees, &c.,°in five foreclosure suits,. $125 ; commissions on $13,175.93, at 5 per cent., $658.79.”
The plaintiff excepted to the allowance of five per cent, commissions upon the whole amount of the moneys received and paid out; also to the allowance of $125 costs, and attorney’s fees in five foreclosure suits, and claimed that disbursements only should have been allowed; also “that the referee has reported the sums received for rents-from G-. Bradley, when he should have reported the sums received from tenants, instead of the sums received for rents, diminished by the charges of said Bradley.”
This order of affirmance is one of the orders from which the plaintiff has appealed to this court.
In the controversy respecting the will, the judgment of the supreme court, reversing the decision of the surrogate, was, on appeal to this court, on the 2nd of January, 1867, reversed, and thereupon the plaintiff in this action moved the supreme court, at special term, on the 15th of March, 1867, for an order modifying the order of November 27, 1866, so as to direct the receiver to pay the balance in his hands to this plaintiff, instead of paying the same upon the taxes in said former order specified.
This motion was denied, and from the order denying it the plaintiff appealed to the general term, where the order was affirmed.
This order of affirmance is the other order brought here by the appeal.
The appeal from the First-mentioned order brings up for review the exceptions to the referee’s report upon the accounting of the receiver.
The exception stating “that the referee has reported the sums received for rents from Gr. Bradley, when he should have reported the sums received from tenants, instead of the sums received for rents, diminished by the charges of said Bradley,” is not founded upon any fact which, appears from the papers before us.
The statement in the account, “By cash from G. Bradley, for rent,” is the only statement of fact upon the subject, and the legitimate inference from this is that Bradley
This exception was, therefore, properly overruled.
In regard to the allowance of the charges in the receiver’s account of $125, for taxable costs, &c., in' five foreclosure suits, the exception claiming it to be erroneous, on the ground that disbursements only should have been allowed, assumes that the receiver acted as attorney in those suits, and was claiming the costs and attorney’s fees for himself as such attorney.
There is nothing to show that such was the fact, but the inference is, from the terms of the charge, that he paid that amount to some other attorney, for his services as such in the suits. It is not necessary, therefore, to examine the question whether the charge contains anything which the receiver could not properly charge if he performed the service himself, or an attorney of the court. This exception was also properly overruled.
The five per cent, allowed by the referee, as commissions upon the amount received and paid out by the receiver, was not all allowed by the court, and yet the appellant complains that it was not reduced to the rate allowed to executors and administrators, which, he insists, is the legal rate in cases of this kind also.
The statute does not fix the compensation to be allowed to receivers appointed under section 244 of the Code, as this one must have been, except that it is provided in the « said section (subd. 4) that receivers of the property, within this State, of foreign corporations, shall be allowed the same commissions as are allowed by law to the trustees of the estates of absconding, concealed, and non-resident debtors,—which is five per cent, upon the whole "sum which shall have come into their hands (2 Rev. Stat., § 31, 1st ed.).
Although in regard to the compensation of trustees, in the absence of any statutory provision therefor, it has come to be the settled rule of the courts to allow only the same commissions as the statute allows to executors and guardians for similar services, I do not think the rule ap
If the supreme court, which appointed the receiver in this case, had authority to determine the rate of his compensation, as I think it had, there is no error in its exercise, and no error in the order now under consideration.
In regard to the other order, I can discover, from the papers before us, no good reason why it should be reversed. The order of 27th of November, 1866, which the plaintiff sought to modify, directed the receiver to pay over and apply the moneys in his hands upon the unpaid taxes which were due and a lien upon the real estate of the said Julianna Gardiner, situate in the city of New York, prior to her decease; and this direction was made by consent of the plaintiff. Now the plaintiff asks the court to modify that order, and direct those moneys to be paid over to him ; and such would be the effect of a rever
Under such circumstances the supreme court was right in refusing to modify the order, as moved for by the plaintiff.
The orders appealed from should be affirmed, with $10 costs.
All the judges concurred.
Order affirmed.
