The dispute in this case arises from the proposed development of the 47 acres of land surrounding the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) Lindbergh Station. MARTA initiated the project by issuing á Request For Proposal (RFP), which solicited plans from prospective developers. The RFP did not include the submission of bids as a criterion for selection and did not express MARTA’s intention to dispose of the property. Instead, MARTA noted its preference for a ground lease, but its willingness to consider other business arrangements. Although the RFP did not state that MARTA would make any capital contribution, MARTA subsequently committed $40 million of its funds toward improvement of the property. The size of the development, including the density, was left open for negotiation. Two developers submitted proposals and, after negotiations, MARTA selected Carter & Associates (Carter). Appellants oppose the project and brought suit to prevent MARTA from implementing its agreement with Carter. After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied Appellants’ motion for an interlocutory injunction, and they appeal from that ruling.
1. The trial court based its denial of injunctive relief upon several findings, one of which was Appellants’ failure to show “a substantial likelihood that [they] will succeed on the merits of their claims.” Appellants urge that the trial court erred in requiring that they make such a showing as a prerequisite to obtaining a preliminary injunction.
Although the merits of the case are not controlling, they nevertheless are proper criteria for the trial court to consider in balancing the equities.
If the trial court determines that the law and facts are so adverse to a plaintiff’s position that a final order in his favor is unlikely, it may be justified in denying the temporary injunction because of the inconvenience and harm to the defendant if the injunction were granted. [Cit.]
Lee v. Environmental Pest & Termite Control,
Under the principle of balancing equities, ... an interlocu tory injunction should be refused where its grant would operate oppressively on the defendant’s rights, especially in such a case that the denial of the temporary injunction would not work “irreparable injury” to the plaintiff or leave the plaintiff “practically remediless” in the event it “should thereafter establish the truth of (its) contention.” [Cits.]
McKinnon v. Neugent,
The record further shows that, in making its ruling, the trial court adhered to the principle that, “[w]hen there is no material conflict in the evidence, the applicable rules of law cannot be avoided on the basis of discretion. [Cit.]”
American Buildings Co. v. Pascoe Building Systems,
2. The provision of the Georgia Constitution which authorizes the creation of MARTA provides that “the acquisition, establishment, operation or administration of a system of public transportation of passengers for hire within the metropolitan area . . . is an essential governmental function and a public purpose. . . .” Art. XVII, Sec. I, Par. I of the Ga. Const, of 1945. Because this constitutional provision “created or authorized the creation of [a] metropolitan rapid transit authorit[y]” and was “in force on the effective date of [the 1983] Constitution,” it “continued in force as a part of [that] Constitution . . . .”
The constitutional provision “shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose. . . .” Art. XVII, Sec. I, Par. V of the Ga. Const, of 1945. Moreover, it authorizes the General Assembly to grant
MARTA “such other powers as may be
necessary or convenient
for the accomplishment of the aforesaid function and purpose.” (Emphasis supplied.) Art. XVII, Sec. I, Par. II of the Ga. Const, of 1945. In the exercise of that broad authority, the General Assembly has empowered MARTA to “lease (as lessor), transfer, or dispose [of real property] whenever same is no longer required for [its] purposes. . . .” Ga. L. 1965, pp. 2243, 2253, § 8 (c). The 47-acre tract surrounding the Lindbergh Station is a MARTA asset, but MARTA has no present need to possess the entirety of that parcel in order to accomplish its rapid transit purpose. By leasing the property to Carter, MARTA intends to convert the real estate into an income-producing asset, with the resulting rent used to fund its existing operations and future expansion. Increasing MARTA’s revenue base through the lease of surplus property is in furtherance of its underlying purpose of providing the metropolitan Atlanta area with a functioning rapid transit system. See
Concept Capital Corp. v. DeKalb County,
MARTA is authorized to exercise only those powers “ ‘such as are expressly given or are necessarily implied from express grant of other powers, and if there is a reasonable doubt of the existence of a particular power, this doubt is to be resolved in the negative. (Cits.)’ [Cit.]”
Local Div. 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. MARTA,
3. Appellants maintain that, even if MARTA has the general constitutional and statutory authority to lease its real property, the agreement with Carter is still invalid because MARTA cannot engage in an independent enterprise of the type usually pursued by private individuals. Ga. L. 1965, pp. 2243, 2256, § 8 (p);
Woodard v. Smith,
4. Appellants further contend that MARTA is not authorized to expend $40 million of its funds in connection with the project. The evidence shows that the money will be used for infrastructure and amenities which will enhance the over-all value of the property itself and improve the utilization of the rapid transit station, thus generally benefitting MARTA riders and particularly those who use the Lindbergh Station. MARTA is vested with broad discretion to address “whether the factors of cost, convenience and safety should be weighed in favor of the patrons of the system . . . .”
Concept Capital Corp. v. DeKalb
County, supra at 454 (5). The use of MARTA’s funds to increase the value of its property for the benefit of its ridership is an expenditure in furtherance of a valid public purpose. See
5. Appellants assert that project cannot go forward because, prior to entering into the agreement with Carter, MARTA did not adhere to the competitive bidding procedure mandated by statute. The MARTA Act provides generally that “[a]ll such acquisitions, dispositions and contracts involving $100,000 or more shall be awarded only after” MARTA conducts a competitive bidding process in accordance with a detailed specified procedure. Ga. L. 1965, pp. 2243, 2268, § 14 (b); Ga. L. 1998, pp. 4450, 4451, § 2. However, a subsequent subsection of the statute addresses the limited issue of contracts for the disposition of real property, and that provision states that
[cjontracts for the sale, lease or other disposition of real property owned by [MARTA] shall be awarded only after competitive bidding and to the highest responsible bidder in a manner similar to that required in subsection (b).
(Emphasis supplied.) Ga. L. 1965, pp. 2243, 2269, § 14 (g). There is an obvious distinction between a provision which applies to any transaction, whether by purchase or sale, involving undesignated forms of property in general, and one which specifically addresses a transaction involving the disposal of real property. “For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent. [Cit.]”
Vines v. State,
The purpose of the competitive bidding process is to protect the public coffers and assure that taxpayers receive the best possible price.
City of Atlanta v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co.,
6. Appellants contend that the trial court erroneously relied upon federal, rather than state, law. A review of the order shows that the court did not cite federal law as controlling authority. It merely noted that federal law was consistent with the provisions and mandate of the applicable law of Georgia. Having correctly applied the law of this state to the facts, the trial court was authorized to deny Appellants’ application for an interlocutory injunction.
Judgment affirmed.