Opinion
Pеtitioner, Garden Grove Police Department, argues the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the police department to disclose the birth dates of three police officers to the Orange County District Attorney for the purpose of running criminal records checks. The police department contends the court should hаve required the defendant to comply with the Pitchess process (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974)
I
James Carl Reimann was arrested and charged with сausing bodily injury to another person while driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, §23153, subds. (a) & (b)), with an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury on another (Pen. Code, § 12022.7). During the course of discovery, Reimann asked the district attorney to run criminal records checks on the officers involved in Reimann’s arrest. When the district attorney declined, Reimann filed a motion requesting the information.
The police department asked the court for the opportunity to appear and to brief the issue. The police department аnd the district attorney filed oppositions.
The court ordered the district attorney to run criminal records checks on the officers. Because the district attorney needed the officers’ birth dates to run the criminal records checks, the court ordered the police department to disclose the birth dates to the district attorney. The court left the determination whether the evidence was material or favorable to the district attorney for later. It refused to hold an in camera hearing or allow thе disclosure of the records checks to Reimann.
The court based its order on Penal Code section 1054.1
The police department argues the trial court should have required Reimann to comply with the Pitchess process because hе sought confidential information from the officers’ personnel files. We agree.
“In 1978, the California Legislature codified the privileges and procedures surrounding what had come to be known as ‘Pitchess motions’ [citation] through the enactment of Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 [and] 1045.” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989)
Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 do not limit discovery of confidential information from police officer personnel files to altercations between poliсe officers and arrestees. (People v. Memro (1985)
Reimann argues the information he requested is not covered by Pitchess and Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 because he is not seeking confidential information but only the officers’ birth dates from their files.
Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (a) provides, “In any case in which discovery or disclosure is sought of pеace officer personnel records
Penal Code section 832.8 definеs “ ‘personnel records’ ” as “any file . . . containing records relating to any of the following: HQ (a) personal data, including marital status, family members, educational and employment history, home addresses, or similar information, [f] . . . [^] (f) Any other information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” (Italics added.)
A birth date is personal data. The Legislature’s inclusion of the term “similar information” signifies its intent to include other things relating to the listed items, such as birth dates and Social Security numbers, which are not expressly listed. “ ‘[Pеrsonnel records’ ” include information “the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The disclosure of birth dates and Social Seсurity numbers could lead to an invasion of personal privacy because they could lead to other sensitive information.
In his motion, Reimann also sought other confidential information that would be found in an officer’s personnel file. He requested information regarding “specific acts of misconduct” including “excessive force, false reрorts, dishonesty, or other bad acts.” This information, as dictated by Evidence Code section 1045,
Reimann’s motion circumvented the Pitchess process by requesting the officers’ criminal records from the district attorney and not from the police
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding the trial court to vacate its order releasing the officers’ birth dates and to allow Reimаnn to file a discovery motion in accordance with Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045.
Beds worth, Acting P. J., and Moore, J., concurred.
The petition of real party in interest for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 8, 2001.
Notes
Penal Code section 1054.1 provides in pertinent part: “The prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant or his or her attorney all of the following materials and infоrmation, if it is in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or if the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the possession of the investigating agencies: [ID ... [H] (d) The existence оf a felony conviction of any material witness whose credibility is likely to be critical to the outcome of the trial, [fl] (e) Any exculpatory evidence.”
The court relied on Brady v. State of Maryland (1963)
Reimann argues, “The dates of birth are not treated as confidential by the police officers themselves. They appear on driver’s licenses, birth certificates, credit card and loan applications and Vons cards.” He misses the point. The issue is not whether a police officer can disclose his or her own birth date; clearly, the officer can. The issue is whether the court, without complying with Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, can order the police department to disclose an officer’s birth date to the distriсt attorney so the district attorney can run a criminal records check on an officer.
Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (a), permits a party to discover confidеntial information from a police officer’s personnel file “provided that such information is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.” Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part: “In determining relevance the court shall examine the information in chambers . . . and shall exclude from disclosure: [H] (1) Information cоnsisting of complaints concerning conduct occurring more than five years before the event or transaction which is the subject of the litigation . . . [1[] (2) In any criminal procеeding the conclusions of any officer investigating a complaint filed pursuant to section 832.5 of the Penal Code, ffl] (3) Facts sought to be disclosed which are so remote аs to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit.”
The police department stated it could have provided the same information to Reimann if he would have complied with the Pitchess process because they have greater access to the information than the district attorney.
Brady v. State of Maryland, supra,