*1 THE MINNE GARDEBRING, COMMISSIONER OF SOTA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES
v. JENKINS Argued January April 86-978. 1988 Decided No. *2 J., Stevens, opinion Court, delivered the in which Rehnquist, J.,
C. and White, Blackmun, JJ., joined. Scalia, O’Connor, J., opinion filed an concurring judgment part dissenting part, J., joined, which Brennan, J., and in joined which Marshall, as to the paragraph, post, p. last J., 432. Kennedy, part took no in the considera- tion or decision of the case. Kirwin,
John L. Assistant General of Attorney Minnesota, argued cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Humphrey Hubert H. Beverly III, Attorney General, and Heydinger, Jones Assistant Attorney General.
Paul Larkin, Jr., J. argued cause for the United States as amicus curiae him urging reversal. With on the Attorney Fried, Solicitor General Assistant brief were Gen- Deputy Willard, eral Solicitor Wallace, General F. John Cordes. Laurie N. Davison argued cause for respondent. * Alan B. Morrison.
With her on the brief *A brief of urging amici curiae reversal was filed for the State of Ala- III, bama Attorney Hawaii, et al. Warren Price General of Thomas D. Farrell, Deputy Attorney General, Siegelman, Attorney Don General of Alabama, Clark, Attorney Arkansas, Woodard, Steve General of Duane Attorney Colorado, Lieberman, Joseph Attorney General of I. General of Miller, Connecticut, Bowers, John S. Michael Attorney J. General of Jones, Georgia, Attorney Idaho, James T. Hartigan, General of Neil F. Attorney Illinois, Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, Thomas J. General of Stephan, Attorney Kansas, Robert T. General of Armstrong, David L. At- torney Kentucky, Guste, Jr., General of Attorney William J. General of Louisiana, Tierney, Attorney Maine, E. James Joseph General J. Cur-
417 delivered the of the Court. opinion Justice Stevens In 1981 amended the statute Congress the Aid authorizing (AFDC) to Families with Children Dependent program that a provide in family receiving nonrecurring lump-sum come is for benefits for the ineligible number of months that the income would satisfy the standard of need. family’s §2304 of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of Budget § 602(a)(17) (1982 Stat. amended,1 U. S. C. ed. Lukhard v. Reed, see Supp. III); generally U. S. (1987) id., 368, 371-373 see (plurality opinion); also 384-386 (Powell, J., In this case the dissenting).2 United ran, Jr., Attorney Maryland, General of Kelley, Attorney Frank J. Gen- *3 Michigan, eral of McKay, Attorney Nevada, Brian Lacy General of H. Thornburg, Attorney Carolina, General of North Spaeth, Nicholas Attor- ney Dakota, Celebrezze, Jr., Anthony General of North Attorney J. Gen- Ohio, Frohnmayer, eral of Dave Attorney Oregon, General of T. Travis Medlock, Attorney Carolina, Roger General of Tellinghuisen, South A. At- torney Dakota, Wilkinson, General of Attorney South David L. General of Utah, Jeffrey Amestoy, Attorney Vermont, Mary Terry, General of Sue Attorney Virginia, General of Hanaway, Attorney Donald J. General of Wisconsin, Joseph Meyer, Attorney B. Wyoming. General of
Evelyn R. Frank a Rights Force, filed brief for the Economic Task Na- Lawyers Guild, tional urging as amicus curiae affirmance. § 2632 1 Thestatute again was amended of the Deficit Reduction Act give
of 98 Stat. option period States the of recalculating the ineligibility by of receipt lump caused of a sum three situations not rele vant here. 2Examples “lump-sum provided of income” are in the regulation federal implements Congress’ directive: income, “When the assistance applying applicable unit’s after disre- gards, family exceeds the State need receipt standard for the because of of nonrecurring lump (including AFDC, earned or unearned sum income for monthly benefits, title II and other payments retroactive in the nature windfall, g., lottery of a e. winnings, personal injury inheritances or compensation awards, worker to the extent it is not earmarked and used purpose e., for the paid, for which it is i. monies for back medical bills re- sulting injury, costs, from replacement accidents or funeral and burial repair resources, etc.), family ineligible will be for aid for the full by number of dividing months derived the sum of the sum income and Appeals Eighth held that the Court of Circuit States (the Department) Department of Human Services Minnesota respondent, against could not enforce that amendment given represents, the class she because it had not them Secretary by regulation promulgated required notice (the Secretary), Human 45 CFR of Health and Services (1987). §206.10(a)(2)(i) granted certiorari to review the We Secretary’s Appeals’interpretation regulation Court of injunction remedial decision in favor of an as well barring recouping payments made to from during period ineligibility. respondent her Because we not we do not violated, conclude that the remedy question. reach the
I respondent’s received a 31, 1983, On October husband Security disability payment $5,752. retroactive Social Respondent pay $3,863.75 used the entire sum to ar- family’s rearage mortgage, an overdue car re- on home legal pair and a fee of and the remainder $1,366, $150, bill purchase clothing pay for her children and to other bills. days, expended.3 the entire sum had Within two been respondent reported receipt 2, 1983, On November (and Security expenditure) payment of the Social to her that under the caseworker and was advised 1981amendment ineligible her would be for benefits for the next several *4 immediately appeal months.4 She filed an administrative by monthly family other income need standard for a of that size. ...” § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(F) (1987). 45 CFR 3 prior 1981, in rule that had been effect Under family spend amount in hav had an incentive to the entire October avoid in ing any unspent amount treated as a “resource” future months because resources, income, family ineligi would make the excessive like excessive Reed, AFDC benefits. See Lukhard v. 481 U. S. 371-373 ble for (1987) (plurality opinion). 4 (which findings Appeals Referee later stated in his of fact were As the 73): Commissioner, App. adopted appeal by Deputy see on family per unit is month. Be- [Jenkins] $724 “The need standard for the overpayment, actually receive that recoupment past of a it did not cause of
419 her while the family continued to receive benefits appeal (1987). §205.10(a)(6)(i) See CFR waspending. Ap- Referee decided should not be termi- that the benefits peals nated because the received advance any Jenkinses had not notice of the the De- rule, 69-73, new but App. Id., reversed. at 73-76. partment’s Commissioner Deputy While with the expressing disagreement policy implemented amendment, the 1981 he concluded that the federal stat- ute must even the lack of though be enforced advance notice “harsh result.”5 had produced in
When the administrative review terminated proceedings the Jenkins for benefits. August, again eligible decision, however, meant Department’s benefits had been for the between improperly paid period October 1983 and 1984. May Accordingly, required by federal 602(a)(22) (1982 § statute, see U. S. C. ed. and III); Supp. 233.20(a)(13) § see also 45 (1987), CFR due course the De- County amount each month. It Agency $688 received each month. The through error, overpayments considered were made in the amount monthly November, $724 for the months of October and 1983. It deter- eligibility through March, 1984, mined that would not exist the month of April, and that if existed for it would not be for a full Id., grant.” at 71. stated, part: He County Agency
“While the should have advised the Petitioner of the any Compensation Disability sum rule and how pay- Worker’s treated, question ments would regarding does arise whether the re- cipients any differently they could have acted if had known. policy regarding payments
“The Federal the treatment of sum punitive ignores purposes the basic Program. of the AFDC We do not anything like the Order in this case and would do to avoid the harsh result. comply Agency The State must with Regulations regula- Federal as those interpreted by legal tions have been legal counsel. Neither our counsel Agency good policy, nor State staff believes this is a but we have verified interpretation Agency our with the Federal on numerous occasions. The policy deprive effect of the support Federal is to children of the minimum already grant. please available an insufficient AFDC It does not us to grant, affirm the termination of the Petitioner’s but we see no alternative policy.” Id., (emphasis original). within current Federal at 75 *5 420 benefits wrongfully paid recoupment ordered
partment monthly payment, from each future AFDC 1% by deducting § 256.73, Minn. Stat. subd. law, with state see in accordance (1986). 6 pro- of the state administrative after the conclusion
Shortly already an action pending intervened respondent ceedings, lump- the Department’s Court challenging in Federal District inter- her complaint on various grounds.6 sum policy an that 20, allegation added vention, 14, respondent App. rule of the new lump-sum implementation the Department’s notice to AFDC without adequate cer- The District Court the Secretary’s regulation. violated 6 (1) policy violates the Social plaintiffs contended that the original availability the actual Security it fails to take into account Act because (2) eligibility, violates the Act be determining lump-sum funds cannot, applied members of the class who improperly to those cause it is efforts, lump period entire make their sums last for the despite good-faith (3) irrational, presumption irrebuttable that the of-ineligibility, creates an by family during the en payment would be available for use (4) applies ineligibility, process violates due because it with period of tire (5) needy notice, “punishment” children for results out advance (6) by equal protection principles improvidence, and violates parents’ their received, harshly recipient more than a treating an AFDC grant. immediately applying for an AFDC spent, lump sum before See rejected each of A-12 —A-15. The District Court Complaint, Record (4), holding that except which it did not reach due to its arguments, these Secretary’s Slaughter required regulation. v. notice was advance (Minn. 1984). 1035, 1045-1049, Levine, Supp. 1052-1055 The De 598 F. Secretary, third-party complaint against partment had also filed (1982 III) 602(a)(17) Supp. § ed. and does not claiming that U. S. C. sums, lump-sum regulations are unavailable and that HHS’ apply to they require to consider unavailable invalid to the extent States Supp., 1045-1049. The De sums; rejected. claims were 598 F. these for, granted, order that the partment also asked and was a District Court any paid as a Secretary pay benefits to class members the federal share Levine, Supp. F. Slaughter v. result of the court’s decision. 1985). (Minn. order, Secretary appeal filed an from this 1249-1250 Levine, Slaughter 801 F. 2d it. v. subsequently but withdrew See below). (CA8 1986) (ease 294, n. 8
421 summary judgment tified a class7 and entered in its favor on Slaughter Supp. the notice issue. v. Levine, F. 1984). (Minn. 1049-1052
The District Court awarded two forms of relief. it First, required Department prepare a written notice that ad- equately explained lump-sum policy and to distribute it to applicants. all current AFDC and all future Id., Department notify at Second, 1055. it ordered the all injured by Department’s class members who had been vi- they might apply payments olation that for corrective from agencies. their local welfare Ibid. The court concluded prevented ordering that the Eleventh Amendment it from any repayment improperly of benefits that had been denied, enjoining Department recouping or from ibid., from overpayments Slaughter to families like the Jenkinses. v. (Minn. 1985). Supp. Levine, 621 F. 509, 513-514 For the- purposes of relief, the District Court determined that mem- expend any portion bers of the class did who not of their they payments before received notice of the cur- lump-sum policy injured by Depart- rent had not been regulation. ment’s violation of the federal notice 598 F. Supp., at 1055.8
7It defined class as follows: “[T]hose individuals in the of eligible State Minnesota who are otherwise been, be, for ineligible AFDC benefits and who have or will found predetermined consequence AFDC benefits for a number months as a receipt sum income one of the members of an AFDC assistance they member, unit of which have been a and whose sum has or will part prior become unavailable re-eligibility to them whole or to their Supp., for benefits.” 598 F. at 1041. remaining plaintiff complaint Because the named from the initial had spent any prior receipt not her funds of notice of the De partment’s policy, plaintiffs’ counsel adequate conceded that she was not an representative reason, although respondent class. For that was an intervenor, representative. Supp., she became the class See 605 F. 1245-1247, and n. 3.
A divided
of the Court of
panel
Appeals affirmed the Dis-
trict
insofar
it
judgment
Court’s
found
violation of the
notice
and denied
relief to
monetary
members of
(CA8 1986)
v. Levine,
the class.
small
AFDC
simply requiring
as
“the state to
construed the
orally
appropriate,
publicize generally in written
and
as
form,
program
availability.”
(Fagg,
Id.,
and its
at 303
dissenting).
significance
Because of the
of the Court
J.,
holding
Appeals’
laws,
administration of welfare
States’
(1987).
granted certiorari,
we
The second brochure is a booklet entitled “Monthly Reporting: What AFDC Households Must Know”; explains recipient’s duty report it all of the household Although income month. each some the intricacies of the program explained, specifi- are AFDC it does not comment cally lump-sum using pamphlets on the rule. In addition to Department pro- these, such as relies on caseworkers to recipients vide with oral advice about the as- pects program specific of the that are relevant situations.
When the 1981 enacted, amendment was prepare pamphlet. Sep- did not did, however, new It on tember send a letter to all AFDC advis- ing major changes them that there had been 19 in the AFDC program. paragraph commenting lump-sum on the new clarity,11 presumably rule not a was model of but it at least reader alerted the to the existence new rule. Since just already receiving the letter mailed those provide any family it not benefits, however, did notice to apply that did not benefits until a later date. Such a fam- ily might operation lump-sum not learn about the rule receipt reported payment until it of a to a caseworker; if, money already case, was true the Jenkins’ had been change first described the letter was the new rule. The letter stated:
“Lump Money: Sum family When a money receives such as an inheritance, Security payment, settlement, a Social back insurance gift, etc., money will grant, be deducted from the AFDC whether or not it already spent. family hás been If the sum added to other income family, totals more maximum *9 than AFDC for that size the will (and ineligible be the in possi- for month which the sum received bly months), following money for a number of spent whether not the is period ineligibility gone by. before the of has If family already the re- grant month, grant ceived an AFDC that the ‘recouped’ would be the agency.” App. welfare for to Pet. Cert. 97-98. to late for the budget it would be too
spent, obviously its normal AFDC checks. of that to money replace the use advance writ- for is not The us to decide whether question whether notice nec- or, indeed, ten notice is such desirable, 1981 statute. to the the essary accomplish purposes was intended is whether the question pre-existing regulation mandated of a implementation congressionally forestall AFDC until all re- agencies the state change provided program a rule might notice of the such change. Although with cipients that a we do fair well sound not believe represent policy, §206.10(a)(2)(i) text that conveys message. of the reading that individuals be requires It is true that the regulation form, and orally appropriate, “information in written given how hardly . . conditions of but that is one eligibility,” about. a command such condition stating every would write be before it enforced. may must be identified and explained in oral both form The reference “information” written in- seems to aspects program require various “about” a general descriptive regarding stead statement merely Thus, AFDC the plain language benefits. regarding not that information disseminated require
does requirements. change every specific it is the notice even Indeed, requirement doubtful whether appears AFDC notice provision applies recipients,12 objects Department raise this contention 12 Respondent that the did not point, did, Department Although it did elaborate on below. not toward is directed new regulation] “[b]asically, though, [the comment publicize availability of the applicants, requiring that the state in No. pamphlets.” Appellant Brief 85- program through use of for added). Moreover, (CA8), p. (emphasis 5143-MN certiorari, petition for a writ see Pet. for argument raised object, opposition, in her respondent brief in that the Cert. did not Thus, below. in accordance with our Department had not raised the claim brought “[n]onjurisdictional of this sort should be our rule that defects petition later than in to the attention no respondent’s opposition brief (1985) (emphasis Tuttle, City Oklahoma certiorari,” 471 U. S. v. to deem the defect “we consider it within our discretion original), *10 regarding “[applica in a section that rules contains various eligibility furnishing tion, of of determination assist (1987). § 206.10 speaks ance,” 45 CFR The section to how may apply general eligibility, benefits, one for conditions of eligibil the time which frame within States must determine ity, furnishing recipi basic rules about the of assistance to general procedures eligibility redetermining ents, and for changed regulation question due circumstances. The in in § 206.10(a)(2)(i), case, this both on face and context of quite plainly speaks general the section as a whole, to how program provided information about the be must to individ seeking program applicants. assistance, is, uals that See § 206.10(b)(1)(defining “applicant”). very provi next “[procedures sion the section, fact, states that shall be adopted designed recipients which are to assure that make timely reports any change and accurate of in circumstances may which affect their or the amount of assist 206.10(a)(2)(ii) added). § (emphasis ance.” words, other separately drafters this wrote about two § types of information that must be communicated: in 206.10 (a)(2)(i) providing applicants program about with informa 206.10(a)(2)(ii) § developing procedures tion, and in about recipients provide changed themselves to information about might require circumstances that affect their benefits. § 206.10(a)(2)(i) given appli ment that be information orally appropriate,” cants in form, “written as seems in require mailing fact to no all, information at but rather simply explains printed that information about access to pamphlets, flyers, AFDC benefits, booklets, such as Ibid. Finally, case, by respondent’s waived.” the issue this as raised complaint, meaning provision regulations. is the of the notice of the federal provision ger- Whether not covers as well as interpretive quest, regardless parties mane whether one of points inus that direction. information be transmitted
available, may such orally well.13 *11 to applies contends that the notice
Respondent provision as She of AFDC benefits as well applicants. appli that §206.10(a)(1)(iii), “[a]n to which points provides individual(s) of desires, if so an assisted, by cant be he may (who in of the various lawyer) aspects his choice need not be and the redetermination of eligibility the application process individual(s) in contacts such by and be may accompanied may so also be accompanied repre with the and when agency of in “redetermination eligibility” sented them.” Since and review of factors affecting eligibility volves “a § to amount,” 206.10(b)(4), clearly applies and thus payment contends that is used respondent “applicant” recipients, 206.10(a)(1)(iii) and therefore well, § to include recipients §206.10, the same inclusive meaning throughout must have the notice including provision.
13 points although provision originally the notice Petitioner also out (1971), Reg. 3860, simply “applicants,” to see 36 Fed. 3864 1978 referred metamorphosis. Secretary published The temporary it underwent a (1976), respond proposed rulemaking, Reg. 41 Fed. 56832 to to notice of representatives “reports recipient group from that some State and local printed public about the assist agencies have not made or oral information they ap programs persons seeking available to information unless are ance (1978). Accordingly, provision the notice plicants.” Reg. 43 Fed. 6949 specify concerning program that information shall be was “revised to it, persons provided any person requests who and all who to require programs eligibility shall be informed of the inquire about the rights obligations programs.” under the ments and the individuals Id., year, explanation, provision the notice at 6950. The next without current, Reg. original, to its form. See Fed. shifted back (1979). history agree petitioner provides strong that this We with provision not extend be support for the conclusion that the current does yond applicants. reasoning It to our in the text that also tends buttress general provision simply requirement as a the notice was intended applicants upon request, and not program information be made available to provide specific, unrequested information about as a mandate States recipi particular changes eligibility requirements to current benefits ents, or, text, applicants. as we also discuss are unpersuaded. We term used in “recipients” is in the provisions section, various other and appears simply to have juncture. been omitted at this inadvertently definition the term understood in the con “applicant,” “redetermination,” text makes this omission An “a apparent. person has, who “applicant” directly, authorized through his or where representative, incompetent or incapacitated, someone through acting responsibly for him, made assistance from application public agency administering whose has not program, application 206.10(b)(1). § been terminated.” Since redetermination only benefits affects who have already those been “de termined to be an § 206.10(a)(9), and eligible,” “applicant,” by definition, has not yet been determined it eligible, *12 would impossible therefore be for an to applicant’s case be re 206.10(a)(1)(iii) § Thus, determined. it is that plain omitted the when to “recipient” word redetermination.14 referring
Thus, a the of of the reading plain language provi- notice in sion and other the same provisions section reveals that 14 Secretary’s accompanying regulations The comments the originally as promulgated strongly support originally this proposed conclusion. As provision applicant recipient the redetermination read may “[a]n by if so be assisted he desires other individuals of his choice in the various application aspects process and eligibility the redetermination of (1970) added). Reg. 35 (emphasis provision . . . .” Fed. 18402 When the adopted later, “recipients” was several months the reference to was elimi nated, though even eligibility” reference to “redetermination of was re (1971). Reg. 36 Secretary’s tained. Fed. 3864 The explanatory acknowledge applicants comments continued to the distinction between recipients, explain and but did not “recipients” the deletion of the term “[Njotice from the text of the itself: proposed making pub rule rule was provide applicants ... to recipients public lished that for and assistance may accompanied by agency, other individuals their contacts with the Id., Thus, they history if so regulations sup wish.” at 3860. of these ports “recipient” inadvertently the conclusion the text that the word redetermination, and, referring accordingly, “appli omitted when to that cant,” provision, simply “applicant,” as used in the notice means and noth ing more.
429 re are by and not addressed recipients, only applicants, individuals be information about given that quirement provi even as to the notice Further, applicants, program. avail that information be general program sion requires only form” as able, “orally appropriate.”15 “written the regula- The who is for responsible enforcing Secretary, interpretation does with strict tion, adopted not agree that it Rather, generally the District he believes is Court. on an of the conse- explanation to oral rely appropriate when lump-sum payment recipient quences receiving We family’s recognize it caseworker.16 reports 15 only many eligibility conditions of rule one of pages meticulously in 40 of the Code of AFDC that are described benefits pages recently Regulations in 66 of Minnesota’s revised Federal (1987); Rules, ch. pt. Minn. regulations. rules and See CFR (1987). alteration, subject frequent seq. 9500.2000et conditions are only many affecting as the rule a small changes with such new (assuming minority recipients. it would be wise Unquestionably of AFDC precede every change expensive) it were and not too such feasible notice, unambigu itself adequate but does not with advance agencies. welfare ously impose any requirement on state such Secretary’s argument that the views are due defer rebutting the Secretary’s response us, points to an inter respondent from ence put by petitioner’s predecessor third-party plaintiff, rogatory himto upon Appeals relied: response the Court which §206.10(a)(2)(i) (ii) regulations require 45 CFR a State “Federal require- about agency to inform AFDC *13 obligations Program. the AFDC Under rights and under ments their policies to en- requirements, fully expected are to establish these States form, orally in provided written are information sure individuals eligibility, scope pro- coverage, of of the appropriate, about conditions generally would advis- available. This include gram and related services report obligation receipt lump to ing applicants their of of rule, income, eligibil- and the lump the sum on operation sum the of effect added). (emphasis App. ity assistance.” the indeed indicates individuals must highlighted While sentence income, lump-sum specify it does not report receipt to of whether advised e., recipi- mailings— in i. a letter to specific must be made such advisement telling receipt lump-sum income as it is re- report ents as soon them had not taken a on this Secretary position until question is However, this when it litigation. Secretary’s regula- in tion that we are and when there is no claim construing, this that the violates constitutional any Court or statu- we tory mandate, are hesitant an al- properly substitute for the unless reading Secretary’s ternative that alternative is by the or reading compelled regulation’s plain language other indications intent at the time of Secretary’s regulation’s promulgation.
Finally, on the harsh result in this respondent’s emphasis in a actually, large case17 criticism of the particular part, monthly reporting, necessary ceived and before the normal if whether —or through such could be satisfied general telling advisement notice in- report income, lump-sum income, dividuals to all of their including on a usual, fact, monthly response separate interrogatory, basis. to a Secretary explained:
“A State has development procedures considerable latitude in the it shall adopt program. to ensure effective administration of the AFDC Provi- Jp5 §206.10(a)(2)(i) require do publicize sions CFR not a State to any rule requirements sum other in specifically devel- Id., added). oped pamphlets or bulletins.” at 90-91 (emphasis support reading answer, 'This second answer tends our of the first namely, question that it is inconclusive on the notify whether States must report lump-sum immediately upon individuals advance to income its or, matter, receipt, notify for that whether States must individuals in advance about the effect of the new rule. 17 Respondent particularly deems this case harsh because an earlier family. involving her September
incident When the sent explaining lump-sum rule, 1981 letter the new the Jenkinses were receiv benefits, ing lump-sum payment year. and received later that However, obligations because of litigation, Depart incurred other yet implemented lump-sum rule, had not respondent’s ment the new lump-sum payment Accordingly, respond was treated under the old rule. contends, every ent she had reason believe that the old rule was still in effect when her husband received October 1983 Secu Social rity However, payment. respondent fails to during argument note this that she to an affidavit that department appar swore stated: “The welfare ently says got September that I explaining letter of 1981 the new I copy, letter, sum rule. been have shown a and don’t remember *14 if that even re- The record indicates rule itself. lump-sum have been rule, she would had known about spondent to avoid a $5,752 most of the payment hard not to use pressed to make home and on the mortgage foreclosure of the Further, though even to other creditors. promised payments notice, may of advance with the absence rule, combined family, result for the Jenkins a “Kafkaesque” have produced re- most families will needy irrational to assume that it is not their sum affect may receipt large alize that and that it would be benefits, prudent future spending before development inform their caseworkers of the result is some- Moreover, the harshness the money. contin- fact that the benefits family’s what mitigated by the recoup- appeal ued the administrative during each monthly subtracts 1% of only ment process actually if AFDC benefits are the further fact that check, and for another immediately eligible terminated, family may one. In all a less assistance, generous form of albeit public ways: Id., have it both Either Respondent 111. cannot receiving it.” at that, lump-sum rule argue the new she letter and can because received the good cause to applied lump-sum payment, she had was not to her late 1981 effect; or, go she did not receive going believe the not into new rule was argument. Respondent’s affi- equitable the letter this and cannot invoke argument. davit admission forecloses the former (or respondent not receive the 1981letter argument The latter did —that it) acted she and that therefore she received it but did not understand lump- that, the new general assumption in 1983under the absent notice of weight rule, some lump-sum the old rule was still in effect —carried sum Appeals. Slaughter v. the District See with both Court and the Court 2d, Levine, at Levine, Supp., 1050-1051; Slaughter F. 801 F. v. recipients in sympathetic are of those AFDC plight 295-296. We with the situation, today an endorse only and can is reiterate that our decision this notice thereof. neither new rule nor the absence of ment of authority pertinent provi Instead, merely our to determine whether regulations requires individuals ex advance written notice to sion of workings explained, of the new rule. As we have plaining the (1987) § 206.10(a)(2)(i) simply provide specific man does not 45 CFR respondent seeks. date that *15 regulation long
events, since the was written before the clearly designed rule was it enacted, was not consequences by forestall the harsh suffered the Jenkinses. analysis, agreement In the final our decision rests on our Secretary dissenting judge with the and the in the Court of Appeals regulation simply requires pub- that the the State to general description lish of the basic structure of the AFDC program availability. require We would a much precise permit more mandate to the States to courts to inter- workings governmental programs by fere with the benefits ordering taking steps.18 of certain affirmative judgment Appeals of the Court of is reversed, and the proceedings case is remanded for further consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered. Kennedy part took no the consideration or Justice decision of this case. O’Connor,
Justice with whom Justice Brennan joins, with whom Justice Marshall joins to the last para- graph, concurring judgment part and dissenting part. approach
The Court’s to this case is summarized in its Secretary’s regulation statement that “when it is the that we construing, are and when is there no claim in this Court that any statutory violates constitutional or man- properly date, we are hesitant to substitute an alternative reading Secretary’s reading unless that alternative compelled by regulation’s plain language other indi- Secretary’s regula- cations of the intent at the time promulgation.” agree tion’s prop- I Ante, at 430. with this disagree application I osition, but with the Court’s of it here. litigation, Secretary In the course of this took what I be- decision, course, Our means that may recoup the overpayment respondent. made to positions. regard
lieve are Because I two inconsistent Secretary’s position later as far less than his ear- reasonable position, I him lier would hold to his earlier and better interpretation. respondent Kathryn applied
In November Jenkins they disabled, for AFDC benefits. Mrs. Jenkins’ husband is eligible children, have five minor and the was found for benefits. October Mr. Jenkins received retro- *16 Security disability payment. family active The Social imme- diately lump-sum payment pay used the bulk of this their provisions overdue bills. Under the of a federal statute adopted using lump-sum payment way the this family ineligible any during rendered the AFDC benefits promptly reported the next several months. Mrs. Jenkins receipt expenditure, of the sum, and its to her case- ineligibility worker. The caseworker informed her of the day. rule, and a written notice followed the next Mrs. Jen- appeal suspend kins took an administrative of the decision to monthly payments ap- benefits, her and continued while peal pending. The of Human Minnesota (the ultimately Department) upheld ineligibility Services recoupment payments determination and ordered the Jen- during appeal process. kins had received regulation provides The federal at issue in this case that applicants for AFDC benefits “shall be informed about the el- requirements rights igibility obligations and their and under 206.10(a)(2)(i)(1987). § program.” regula- CFR goes specify applicants given that are in- tion on to to be orally appropriate,'” form, “in and as formation, written about including aspects program, rights certain of the “the and responsibilities applicants for of assistance.” reading language suggests appli- Ibid. A natural of this that provided cants with information sufficient to enable should be rights responsibilities fulfill their them to exercise their program. very regulation under the at the Thus, least, given suggests enough that in- should be written formation to warn them of the circumstances under which they explanations program’s should seek further oral operation person requirements. A reasonable would be unlikely suspect lump-sum payment should not be pay family’soutstanding used to off the debts. For that rea- Department’s notify applicants son, the failure to for AFDC persons benefits of the new rule was sure to affect some Appeals “truly Kafkaesque.” manner that the Court of called 1986) (CA8 Slaughter below). (opinion Levine, v. 801 F. 2d Secretary regulation contends that the notice at issue require any warning lump- does not about the effects of the recipient reports receipt sum rule until an after of a appropriate agency. By sum to the state time, family suggests, may with incident the Jenkins it bewell warnings any empha- too late for ofbe use. As the Court language regulation general sizes, however, the is so hardly Secretary’s interpre- that one could conclude that the strictly incompatible language. tation is with that Thus, if all we had us before was itself Secre- *17 tary’s interpretation might agree I it,of have to that we Secretary’s regu- should to defer the construction of his own interrogatory very In lation. answer to an filed in case, this Secretary position however, the took different than the one he now maintains: § 206.10(a)(2)(i) regulations
“Federal at 45 CFR and (ii) require agency applicants a State to inform AFDC recipients eligibility requirements about and their rights obligations Program. under the AFDC Under requirements, fully expected these are States to establish policies provided to ensure that individuals are informa orally appropriate, tion in form, written about coverage, eligibility, scope program conditions gen and related services This available. would include advising erally applicants recipients obliga their report receipt operation tion to income, sum eligibility as on rule, sum and the effect added).* (emphasis App. 89 sistance.” majority, I cannot 429-430, n. ante, see Unlike Secretary’s highlighted cur sentence with reconcile imply that individuals position. I that sentence read rent given lump-sum may should be rule affected who be using against enough them advance, to warn information, way, pay out one’s viz., in the normal income position than standing far more reasonable That is a debts. adopted, Secretary I hold him to and would later the one the interpretation. Bowen v. Ameri Cf. and better his earlier (1986)(plural Hospital 610, 646, n. 34 476 U. S. Assn., can agency’s interpretation ‘has ity opinion): “The fact that substantially longstanding . . . nor neither consistent been agency’s] pres given [the to be deference diminishes the Community interpretation of the statute.’ Southeastern ent College v. Davis, U. S. [397,] 412, n. 11 [1979] (citing (1976)).” 125, 143 Gilbert, 429 U. S. Electric Co. v. General Appeals Accordingly, to the ex I affirm the Court of would regulation. the federal notice a violation of that it found tent granted was too broad. case, however, in this The relief Department “to forthwith ordered the Court The District § 206.10(a)(2)(i) (1987) only “appli refers regulation at CFR *The § 206.10(a)(2)(ii) regulation at 45 CFR cants,” “recipients.” not to (1987) adopted designed to assure that which are says: “Procedures shall be any change in circum timely reports of and accurate recipients make or the amount of assistance.” may their which affect stances text, Secretary to have read the two seems quoted the answer rule, informed about the require applicants provisions to about the rule when were not informed require that who and to only possible this is not the also be informed. While they were *18 applicants if new regulations, it is not unreasonable: interpretation of the rule, certainly recipi lump-sum current the new informed about need to be the old to the fact that greater even need to be alerted have an ents would event, lump-sum rule any just before the new changed. being rule was notify recipients effect, in fact all AFDC Department did take the was to rule. about the new
prepare explaining policy.” Slaughter a notice sum 1984). (Minn. Supp. only Levine, v. 598 F. Not provided applicants, this notice to all it was also recipients again provided all be mailed to current recipients to all each six months. Ibid. The District Court specified provide thorough also that the notice “should ex- planation [lump-sum] of the mechanics of the rule.” Ibid. Secretary suggested interpretation has never an ofthe regulation justify proce- notice that would such elaborate although Secretary I First, dures. believe that the did con- persons lump- clude that affected should be notified of the suggested repeated rule, sum he never notifications were Department called for. The in fact mailed a letter about recipients shortly new rule to all then-current AFDC before rule went into effect. That letter was sufficient notice to the individuals Furthermore, who received it. the Secre- tary interrogatory answered an in this case with the follow- ing statement: development
“A State has considerable latitude procedures adopt it shall to ensure effective adminis- program. tration of the AFDC Provisions at 45 CFR 206.10(a)(2)(i) § require publicize do not a State to any eligibility requirements sum rule or other specifically developed pamphlets App. or bulletins.” 90-91.
Reading light regulation this statement in and the quoted Secretary other answer I above, concludethat in- terpreted require, applicants, his as to future only Department general that the add a statement about new rule informational materials soon as reasonably practicable. Department Because the failed to years advise about the rule for several it after into effect, came the District Court could also have required by informing to cure that error affected about the rule. To the extent that the *19 required Department go District Court how- further, by giving repeated by distributing ever, written notice and developed pamphlets “specifically or bulletins,” that court unduly infringed regulation the discretion that the was in- responsible agencies. tended to leave state ordering also District Court was mistaken the De- partment provide, writing, “thorough explanation a lump-sum Secretary quite the mechanics” of the rule. The reasonably argues requirement easily prove that such a could counterproductive complexity because of the of the mechan- explanation given Indeed, ics involved. the detailed in the Department’s September quoted 1981, ante, 424, letter of at might immediately intelligible 11, n. which not be even to a lawyer, suggests explanations trained that oral of the rule’s operation way provide would be best effective notice. Department steps Had the taken reasonable to inform all explanation the need to seek an oral at appropriate purpose time, would my simple In view, have been satisfied. following statement like the “Anytime you lump-sum receive a would suffice: (such payment Security pay- inheritance, as an a Social back etc.) gift, you ment, settlement, an insurance should inform your you spend money pay caseworker or use it to before your off debts.” Appeals
The Court of also concluded that the enjoined recouping payments could be from that were period respondent during that her made to Jenkins ineligible provisions under the of the new rule. “[b]y failing comply that, The court reasoned with the no- regulation, Department] legal [the failed to tice institute a change 2d, rules.” 801 F. 301-302. This clearly inconsistent with conclusion was federal law. Congress provided adopting rule, the new that it 1, 1981,” “shall effective on October or that if con- become necessary, forming changes in state law were then it “willbe- legis- month after the first state come effective” as first ending lative Budget on or 1, session after October 1981. Omnibus § 97-35, Act of Reconciliation Pub. L. *20 Minnesota, Stat. For an 859-860. result was effective February (dissenting date of 1982. See F. 2d, below). opinion Congress gave no indication whatsoever lump-sum that the effective date for the new rule couldbe de layed by agencies. action or inaction state Whether or Secretary’s not received Jenkins notice accord with the regulation, applied therefore, rule to her when payment disability her husband received the retroactive Department accordingly required 1983. The federal overpayments recoup during law to that she her received appeal Department’s apply lump- decision to the new § 602(a)(22)(1982 sum rule in her case. 42 U. See S. C. ed., (a)(13)(i)(1987). § 233.20 III); Supp. 45 CFR disagreement my In sum, with the Court’s decision is rela- tively regula- I narrow. would hold notice federal interpreted by Secretary, requires Depart- tion, as give ment to for AFDC benefits written notice at least of the existence of the rule and of need for recipients spending any to consult with a socialworker before they might I sum receive. therefore think that the properly District Court could have ordered steps to take reasonable to include this information pamphlets, steps standard bulletins or and to take reasonable provide the same information to who deprived improperly they ap- were of this information when plied Appeals for benefits. To the extent that the Court approved agree judg- relief in this I case, additional that its ment must be reversed.