OPINION AND ORDER 1
Introduction
Plaintiff Edwin Garcia seeks declaratory and 'injunctive relief ordering the United States Department of Justice to produce records responsive to his Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request made to the New York Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) on December 6, 1998. The United States Department of Justice (the “Government”) has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dismissing plaintiffs complaint on the grounds that (a) the Government has identified all responsive documents that it is required to identify under FOIA and (b) the Government has withheld or redacted only those documents that it is entitled to withhold or redact under exemptions to FOIA’s disclosure requirements.
Garcia, a former New York State police officer, was convicted on November 23, 1992, of two counts of robbery in the first degree for the armed robbery of a jewelry store in the Town of Poughkeepsie and was sentenced to serve two concurrent terms of 12-1/2 to 25 years. See Sentence and Commitment, People v. Edwin Garcia, et al., Ind. No. 195/91, dated November 24, 1992 (reproduced as Exhibit A to Declaration of David J. Kennedy, dated February 28, 2001 (“Kennedy Decl.”)). During the robbery, conducted by Garcia and another individual (Lisa Seymour), Garcia placed a gun to the head of the wife of the jewelry store manager, told her not to look at his face, and struck her in the head with the gun. The robbers used duct tape to cover the woman’s eyes and to bind her hands; they also placed a rag in her mouth and made her sit on the floor with her back against the wall while Garcia robbed the store. See Bill of Particulars, People v. Edwin Garcia et al., Ind. No. 195/91 (Supreme Court, Dutchess County), dated January 29, 1992 (reproduced as Exhibit C to Kennedy Deck). Garcia also forced two customers, who arrived at the store toward the end of the robbery, to lie down on the floor at gunpoint while he took their car keys. Id.
Shortly after being imprisoned on the robbery conviction, Garcia plotted to murder Lisa Seymour, the co-perpetrator of the robbery, who had testified against Garcia at trial. See Indictment, People v. Edwin Garcia, Ind. No. 94-36 (County Court, Cayuga County), January Term, 1994 (reproduced as Exhibit F to Kennedy Deck). Garcia provided written information and a photograph of Ms. Seymour to an undercover officer who was to perform the contract killing. Id. On January 26, 1995, Garcia was convicted of conspiracy and sentenced to 7-1/2 to 15 years to run consecutively to his sentence on the armed robbery conviction. See Sentence and Commitment, People v. Garcia, Ind. No. 94-36 (County Court, Cayuga County Jan. 26, 1995) (reproduced as Exhibit D to Kennedy Deck). 2
Garcia’s FOIA Request and the FBI’s Response
By letter dated December 6, 1998, Garcia made a request pursuant to FOIA to the New York Field Office of the FBI. In that letter, Garcia requested any investigative reports pertaining to himself including “copies of any statements made by individuals where no requests of confidentiality was [sic] promised or given. And who were interviewed in reference to the investigation of my person.” Declaration of Scott A. Hodes, dated January 23, 2001 (“Hodes Deck”), ¶ 4; Exhibit A.
The FBI responded to Garcia’s initial FOIA request by letter dated January 11, 1999, asking Garcia for additional information concerning his request and seeking privacy waivers from individuals about whom he had requested information. Hodes Deck ¶ 5; Exhibit B. On January 19, 1999, Garcia provided some of the additional information, but informed the FBI that he believed it was not necessary to
On June 22, 1999, the FBI wrote to Garcia and informed him that approximately 900 pages appeared to be responsive to his FOIA request and that Garcia would be responsible for any duplication fees. Id. ¶ 11; Exhibit H. Garcia responded by letter dated June 27, 1999, that he would be willing to pay any such duplicating fees. Id. ¶ 12; Exhibit I. The FBI acknowledged receipt of this letter and informed Garcia that he would have to wait until requests ahead of his had been processed. Id. ¶ 13; Exhibit J.
The FOIA Action
On July 7, 2000, Garcia filed the complaint in this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief ordering the Government to produce records responsive to his request. On October 13, 2000, the FBI released 333 pages of information to Garcia. Id. ¶ 16; Exhibit M. 133 additional pages were released to Garcia on November 15, 2000, and another 217 pages were released to Garcia on November 30, 2000. Id. ¶¶ 17,18; Exhibits N, O. After the FBI released these pages, Garcia provided a privacy waiver for Manuel Alvarez. Id. ¶ 19. The FBI reprocessed all of its previous releases to take into account this new waiver. Id. n. 1.
Garcia now contests the FBI’s decision to withhold certain responsive documents and to redact portions of other responsive documents that were released to him. Correspondence between the parties has narrowed the scope of the documents currently sought by Garcia to 160 redacted pages of documents and 261 pages of withheld documents. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment dated February 28, 2001 at 8 (citing to correspondence); Exhibit K to Kennedy Decl. (copies of the documents in dispute); Memorandum of Law in Opposition of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Garcia Mem.”) at 1 (“[pjlaintiff accepts and adopts defendants [sic] exhibits as an accurate representation of the records being litigated in this matter.”); accord Exhibit J to Kennedy Decl. (letter from Garcia).
The Withheld and Redacted FOIA Material
The 421 pages at issue that were withheld or redacted by the FBI, see Exhibit K to Kennedy Decl., were withheld or redacted pursuant to the exemptions to FOIA listed below. See Rule 56.1 Statement, dated February 28, 2001 (“Gov’t Stat.”), ¶ 27 (summarizing redactions).
(1) Exemption 7(C) of FOIA: This provision exempts from disclosure information that “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
(2)
Exemption 7(D) of FOIA:
This provision exempts from disclosure information that “could reasonably be expected to dis
(3) Exemption 7(F) of FOIA: This provision exempts from disclosure information that could “endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F).
(4) Exemption S of FOIA: This provision exempts from disclosure any information “specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). The relevant statute here is Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which bars public disclosure of matters before a grand jury.
All the claimed exemptions are described in the Declaration of Scott A. Hodes, dated January 23, 2001, which serves as an index of the different exemption categories invoked by the Government in this case. The Government has essentially provided a “coded” index (commonly known as a
‘Vaughn”
index,
see Vaughn v. Rosen,
The Motion for Summary Judgment
On March 2, 2001, the Government filed the instant motion for summary judgment dismissing Garcia’s FOIA complaint on the grounds that (a) after making an adequate search, the Government has produced all responsive documents that it is required to produce under FOIA and (b) that the Government has withheld or redacted only those documents that it is entitled to withhold or redact under exemptions to FOIA’s disclosure requirements. Included with its motion papers was a Statement Pursuant to Rule 56.1, dated February 28, 2001, and a notice to the pro se plaintiff regarding the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, as required by Local Civil Rule 56.2. In response, the plaintiff submitted a memorandum in opposition along with a filing denominated “Rule 56.1 Statement.” This statement challenged many of the facts underlying the criminal charges for which he was convicted but did not otherwise controvert the allegations of the Government’s Rule 56.1 Statement. See Plaintiffs Rule 56.1 Statement, dated March 31, 2001 (“Garcia Stat.”). Following the initial submission of the Government’s reply memorandum, additional briefing from the parties was received in May and June 2001.
DISCUSSION
I. The Legal Standard for Summary Judgment in Actions Brought Pursuant to FOIA
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment in an action brought pursuant to FOIA, the Government has “the burden of showing that its search was
II. The Adequate Search Requirement
When the plaintiff in a FOIA case alleges that the agency in question “has improperly withheld documents through its failure to locate them, the agency’s burden is to establish that it conducted an adequate search that failed to producé the requested records.”
Katzman v. Freeh,
In the present case, the FBI has demonstrated that it conducted an adequate search for the documents requested by Garcia. The Government has submit
Garcia’s arguments in support of his claim that the Government failed to perform an adequate search can be summarized as follows: (1) the Government acted in bad faith in conducting its search because the Government initially claimed it had no responsive documents and did not release any documents to Garcia until he had filed “several appeals”; (2) the Government provided Garcia with additional documents from the FBI after it had moved for summary judgment, thereby “undermining] the gov’ts [sic] claims of having conducted a proper search for the documents requested, as they are obviously still searching”; (3) the Hodes declaration is insufficient on its face because it fails to provide adequate details of the search for the requested documents and Hodes himself did not personally conduct the search; (4) the Government “has in its possession records” concerning a state trooper who testified at Garcia’s trial, but “ha[s] yet to acknowledge their existence” and (5) additional documents concerning plaintiffs arrest for conspiracy “surely [were] created” due to alleged “close contact” between the “NYS Inspector General’s Office” and “the gov’t [sic] ... belittling] the go’vt’s [sic] claims that it has released all available documents pertaining to plaintiff.” See Garcia Mem. at 5-7; Garcia Stat. at ¶¶ 6,19.
Garcia’s argument regarding the Government’s initial failure to locate responsive documents is meritless. Garcia has made no showing that the Government’s initial inability to locate documents was the result of bad faith as opposed to mere administrative error.
See SafeCard,
Garcia’s complaint regarding the Government’s release of additional documents after it had moved for summary judgment is similarly without merit. These additional documents were released to Garcia pursuant to a different FOIA request made to the FBI’s Albany Field Office. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment dated April 19, 2001, at 2-3 (citing to Government’s Response to Garcia’s 56.1 Statement, Exhibit A and to Transcript of Telephone Conference Before Hon. Andrew J. Peck, January 3, 2001, at 6-7 (reproduced as Exhibit B to Government’s Response to Garcia Stat.)). Accordingly, they are not relevant to this case, which concerns only Garcia’s December 6,1998, request to the New York Field Office.
Garcia’s arguments concerning the alleged insufficiency of the Government’s description of the search are also unavailing. In order to fulfill the adequate search requirement, the Government should “identify the searched files” and “recite facts which enable the District Court to satisfy itself that all appropriate files have been searched.”
Church of Scientology v. IRS,
The Hodes Declaration describes in sufficient detail the FBI’s document search procedures and the responsive documents located in accordance with these procedures and pursuant to Garcia’s FOIA request. The Declaration describes the file systems of the FBI and the FBI’s capacity to conduct a search of such files for a particular subject. Hodes Decl. ¶¶ 20-24. It states that one file, denominated 194C-NY-231226, contained documents relating to Garcia, even though Garcia was not the main subject of the file.
Id.
¶¶ 25-26. Hodes is the Acting Chief of the Litigation Unit which processes FOIA requests,
id.
¶¶ 1-2, and therefore the appropriate individual to describe the search for responsive documents in this case.
Carney,
Finally, Garcia’s unsupported claims regarding the alleged existence of specific classes of documents — namely, those related to a witness at his robbery trial and documents concerning Garcia’s conspiracy arrest and conviction — do not overcome the presumption that the Government has made a good faith search for
III. Exemptions to FOIA
Garcia’s second argument is that even if the Government made an adequate search for documents responsive to Garcia’s FOIA request, it has improperly withheld or redacted documents. As described below, this argument is rejected.
The general purpose of FOIA is to “ensure an informed citizenry ... [which is] needed to check against corruption and hold the governors accountable to the governed.”
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,
Garcia has attacked the Government’s claimed exemptions on two grounds: (1) that the Hodes Declaration lacks the requisite specificity required of affidavits and declarations submitted in support of summary judgment motions by the Government in FOIA actions, Garcia Mem at 6-7; and (2) that the documents in question were improperly exempted under Exemptions 7(C), (D), (F) and Exemption 3 of FOIA, id. at 7-16. Garcia also has requested an in camera -review of the contested documents. Id. at 7.
A. Specificity
With regard to Exemption 7(C), the FOIA exemption claimed by the Government to withhold or redact the vast majority of documents in this case, the law is clear that the Government is not required to make a document-by-document evaluation of whether the requested docu-
B. In Camera Review
In camera
review of documents that have been withheld or redacted is disfavored.
Local 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
When a government agent can attest in a sworn affidavit that the redactions are necessary, and elaborate on the reasons for the redactions with sufficient specificity, the district court should be able to rule on the appropriateness of the redac-tions without conducting an in camera review of the redacted materials.
Id. at 287 (emphasis added). As described in section III.C. below, the Hodes Declaration provides sufficient specificity to enable the Court to make a determination without conducting the requested in camera review.
The District of Columbia Circuit has held that
in camera
inspection is appropriate “when either the agency affidavits are insufficiently detailed to permit meaningful review of exemption claims or there is evidence of bad faith on the part of the agency.”
Quinon v. FBI,
C. The Claimed Exemptions
As for Garcia’s contention that the Government has improperly redacted and withheld documents under Exemptions 7(C), (D), (F) and Exemption 3 of FOIA, each is analyzed separately in order to determine whether the exemption was properly invoked.
1. Exemption 7(C)
Exemption 7(C) exempts from disclosure “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such [documents] ... could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). “Th[is] exemption applies only if the invasion of privacy that would result from release of the information outweighs the public interest in disclosure.”
Massey,
“[I]ndividuals, including government employees and officials, have privacy interests in the dissemination of their names.”
Massey,
Almost all of the disputed documents in this case contained redactions pursuant to Exemption 7(C). See Gov’t Stat. ¶¶ 27-28; Hodes Decl. ¶¶ 36-57. The Hodes Declaration notes that this exemption was used to protect several subcategories of information. One category was the “names, signatures, dates of birth, telephone numbers and Social Security numbers of FBI Special Agents who were responsible for conducting, supervising, and/or maintaining the investigative activities reported in this investigation.” Hodes Decl. ¶ 38. As noted in the Hodes Declaration:
Special Agents do not choose their assignments. Publicity (adverse or otherwise) regarding any particular investigation they have been assigned may seriously prejudice their effectiveness in conducting other investigations.... It is possible for an individual to carry a grudge which may last for years and because of this grudge they may seek revenge on the agents and other federal employees involved in the investigation. The publicity associated with the release of an agent’s identity in connection with a particular investigation could trigger hostility by an individual toward a particular agent(s).
Hodes Decl. ¶ 38. Similar considerations are cited as justifying the redaction of the names and identifying information of agents at other federal law enforcement agencies (such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms), id. ¶ 44, as well as names and identifying information of local and state law enforcement personnel. Id. ¶ 43.
Another category of information withheld was the “names, identities, addresses and information pertaining to third parties who were of investigative interest to the FBI.”
Id.
¶ 39. The Government notes that “[b]eing linked with any law enforce
Also withheld was information that would identify individuals who were “only mentioned by persons who were interviewed by the FBI.” Hodes Decl. ¶ 40. As was true for the previous category, the FBI asserts that “[djisclosure of this information could cause unsolicited and unnecessary attention to be focused on these individuals,” which could “cast them in an unfavorable or negative light to the public.” Id. The FBI argues that the privacy of these individuals far outweighs the minimal public interest in this information inasmuch as it gives virtually no information about the FBI’s performance of its official function. See id. ¶ 37; Gov. Mem at 16-17. 3
In each instance noted above, the Court agrees that there is no public interest in the identities of such individuals and what minimal interest might exist is far outweighed by the privacy interests of the persons involved.
See McErlean,
it is well-settled that the privacy interests of witnesses and investigative agents identified in agency documents are given heavy weight. See, e.g., Reporters Comm.,489 U.S. at 766 ,109 S.Ct. 1468 (“[D]isclosure of records containing personal details about private citizens can infringe significant privacy interests.”). There are three principal reasons as to why these privacy interests are given such significance. First, disclosure of the names of individuals who provided information during an investigation may subject such individuals to threats of reprisal. See Diamond v. Federal Bureau of Investigation,707 F.2d 75 , 77 (2d Cir.1983); Williams v. McCausland, No. 90 Civ. 7563, No. 91 Civ. 7282,1994 WL 18510 , at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1994). Second, disclosure of the identities of individuals whose names have turned up in the investigation could subject the individuals to the stigma of being associated with a criminal or federal investigation. See Reporters Comm.,489 U.S. at 767 ,109 S.Ct. 1468 ; Massey,3 F.3d at 624 . Third, the disclosure of the names of the law enforcement personnel involved in an investigation could possibly lead to harassment and interfere with the performance of the law enforcement officer’s duties. See Massey,3 F.3d at 622 (finding that names of FBI agents are exempt from FOIA disclosure); Doherty v. Department of Justice,775 F.2d 49 , 52 (2d Cir.1985) (stating that identities of FBI agents, personnel, and employees of government agency are embraced by Exemption 7(C)).
Germosen v. Cox,
Garcia has not demonstrated any public interest weighing in favor of the disclosure of this information. Instead, he merely claims that its disclosure would “reflect[ ] directly on how the FBI conducts its business and the public’s interest in same.” Garcia Stat. at ¶ 10; see
also
Garcia Mem. at 11 (“releasing these state actors [sic] and officer’s information would go a long way towards shedding light on their actions within the larger arena of the public corruption investigation”). The connection between the release of the information sought and “how the FBI conducts its business,” however, is extremely tenuous. It is more plausible that the information would be useful to support any private litigation Garcia intends to institute.
See, e.g.,
Garcia Mem. at 4 (“Plaintiff seeks records which he believes exist that will help him prove that his constitutional rights to a fair trial were violated.”). In the absence of any “public purpose to outweigh!] the privacy interest^]” in this case,
Triestman,
Finally, Garcia’s claims of “government” wrongdoing largely (though not exclusively,
see
Garcia Mem. at 9-10) concern the alleged misconduct of agencies and individuals affiliated with the New York state government.
See, e.g.,
Garcia Stat. ¶¶ 3, 5, 17 (complaints concerning wrongdoing by the state police);
id.
at ¶¶ 8, 14, 15, 26, 17 (complaints concerning assistant district attorney). The discovery of wrongdoing at a state as opposed to a federal agency, however, is not a goal of FOIA.
See Landano v. United States Dep’t of Justice,
Exemption 7(D) of FOIA exempts from disclosure:
[Rjecords or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ... could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D). Where, as here, the records pertain to a criminal investigation conducted by the FBI, the second clause of this exemption applies.
See Ferguson,
Pursuant to Exemption 7(D), “[a] source should be deemed confidential if the source furnished information with the understanding that the FBI would not divulge the communication except to the extent the Bureau thought necessary for law enforcement purposes.”
United States Dep’t of Justice v. Landano,
An inference of confidentiality is typically found where the crime was of a serious or potentially violent nature and the source had a close relationship to the individuals being investigated.
See, e.g., Engelking v. DEA,
In other instances, the nature of the crime itself coupled with information about the subject of the investigation provides a sufficient basis for inferring confidentiality.
See, e.g., Jimenez v. FBI,
In this case, 72 pages were redacted and 210 pages withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(D). Gov’t Stat. ¶ 28. The Hodes Declaration states that certain confidential sources implicated in these documents were given express grants of confidentiality by the FBI, and that disclosure of the redacted and withheld documents would reveal the identity of these confidential sources. Hodes Deck ¶¶ 48-49. With respect to such individuals, “[e]xpress assurances of confidentiality clearly meet the requirements of 7(D).”
Manna,
The Hodes Declaration also states that certain sources had implied grants of confidentiality. Hodes. Deck ¶¶ 50-52. With respect to the implied grant of confidentiality, the Hodes declaration makes specific allegations that relate to its investigation of Garcia. The Declaration states:
Exemption (b)(7)(D)-2 was asserted to protect the names and identities of individuals who provided information about plaintiff and/or his criminal activities. The circumstances of these individuals providing information to the FBI clearly support an implication of confidentiality. Each of these individuals protected had a specific personal or business relationship with plaintiff. Plaintiff is a former law enforcement officer who was investigated by the FBI for involvement in the corruption of state and local law enforcement officials. Plaintiff was later convicted, at the State level, for a robbery and was charged with intimidating a witness who was scheduled to testify against him at the robbery trial. Some individuals have indicated to law enforcement personnel that they fear reprisal from plaintiff. Thus, the nature of these crimes, corruption of state and local law enforcement officials, and each of the individuals’ specific relationship to plaintiff support an assumption that such information was provided on a confidential basis.
The Hodes Declaration combined with Garcia’s conviction record together demonstrate that the crimes underlying the criminal investigation at issue in this case were serious and that the sources who communicated with the FBI were sufficiently close to the investigation to warrant the inference of confidentiality.
See Landano,
Garcia argues that there was a waiver of any express or implied promises of confidentiality by virtue of the public testimony at his trial. Garcia Mem. at 5, 12. However, nothing in the statute supports this doctrine of waiver and case law explicitly rejects it.
See Irons v. FBI,
Garcia has provided the Court with no basis on which to conclude that the FBI did not give either explicit or implicit assurances of confidentiality to the confidential sources in question as described in the Hodes Declaration. Accordingly, the Gov
3. Exemption 7(F)
Under Exemption 7(F), documents may be exempted from disclosure if they are “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ... could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F). The Government is entitled to invoke this exemption where the safety of the individual in question would be jeopardized if his or her identity were revealed.
See, e.g., Malizia v. United States Dep’t of Justice,
The Hodes Declaration notes that the “primary concern of the FBI in the reviewing and releasing of documents involving [Garcia] is the possibility of harassment and potential violent retaliation against sources of information.” Hodes Decl. ¶ 54. With respect to each category, the Hodes Declaration notes that “[djisclo-sure of the identities of these individuals could immediately endanger their families, lives and physical safety.” Id. ¶¶ 55-57.
The same reasons that underlay the applicability of Exemption 7(D) in this case (with regard to confidential source information) also justify the applicability of Exemption 7(F). Garcia has a history of retaliation against individuals who have provided information about him to law enforcement agencies: specifically, his conviction for conspiring to murder a witness in the robbery case against him.
See
Exhibits D, F to Kennedy Declaration. In evaluating the validity of an agency’s invocation of Exemption 7(F), the court should “within limits, defer to the agency’s assessment of danger.”
See Linn v. Dep’t of Justice,
4. Exemption 3
Exemption 3 of FOIA exempts documents from disclosure where such disclosure is exempted by another statute. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Fed R. Crim P. 6(e) represents such a statute and, thus, documents related to the grand jury process are exempt from disclosure under Exemption 3.
See, e.g., Local 32B-32J, Serv. Employees Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. GSA,
The Government withheld two documents pursuant to Exemption 3, see Gov’t Stat. ¶ 27, because the information constituted grand jury materials. Hodes Decl. ¶ 35. Accordingly, the two documents in question were properly withheld pursuant to Exemption 3.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Government’s motion for summary judgment is granted in its entirety. Judgement shall be entered dismissing the complaint.
SO ORDERED.
. On September 29, 2000, the parties consented to this matter being determined by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Notes
. Garcia denies his guilt in these cases, stating that he was a victim of a "miscarriage of justice.”
See
Plaintiffs Rule 56.1 Statement, dated March 31, 2001, ¶ 4. Garcia, however, is collaterally estopped from further litigating this issue as he was convicted in both cases.
See, e.g., Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co.,
. A final category of redactions was names of individuals who supplied information under an express or implied grant of confidentiality. Hodes Decl. ¶¶ 41-42. This category is discussed further infra with respect to Exemption (b)(7)(D).
. Garcia’s allegations of improprieties relating to the investigation of his conduct do not alter this analysis. It is established that "once the government has demonstrated that
. While Hodes states that Garcia was "charged with intimidating a witness who was scheduled to testify at his trial,” Hodes Decl. ¶ 50, Garcia's conviction record shows that he was convicted of conspiracy to murder a witness who testified at his trial (namely, Lisa Seymour, who was the co-perpetrator of the armed robbery that formed the basis for his robbery conviction). See Kennedy Decl., Exhibits D and F. If anything, the conviction for conspiracy to murder provides an even stronger basis for concluding that Garcia represents a danger to witnesses who provide adverse information about him.