Garcia v. StateGarcia v. State
Lead Opinion
On February 20, 1997, an amended delinquency petition was filed in Pope County Chancery Court, Juvenile Division, charging appellant Joshua Garcia with carrying a knife as a weapon in violation of
Garcia was initially charged with carrying a knife with the purpose to employ it as a weapon against a person in violation of
At the delinquency hearing for violation of
Garcia did not call any witnesses on his behalf, and his attorney moved for a dismissal of the charge, arguing that the State was required to prove that he carried the knife with the intent to use it as a weapon and that the State’s evidence failed in this respect. The juvenile court found as follows:
I’m basing my finding on the basis of a knife with a blade three and [one] half inches or longer in his possession and the statute makes that fact a prima facie case. And there is nothing to rebut that.
The amended order which was entered stated in part:
The defendant is guilty of the offense as charged in that he had in his possession a knife having a blade three and one-half inches in length. Giving effect to the relevant statues (sic) it appears that the knife was carried with the intent to use it as a weapon against a person.
Garcia now claims on appeal that the juvenile court erred in not requiring proof of intent to possess the knife as a weapon. He points out that the amended delinquency petition asserted that he violated
(a) A person who carries a knife as a weapon, except when upon a journey or upon his own premises, shall be punished as provided by§ 5-73-121(b) .
(b) If a person carries a knife with a blade three and one-half inches (3V2") long or longer, this fact shall be prima facie proof that the knife is carried as a weapon.
Id.
Violation of
Since its enactment, this court has had few occasions to discuss the application of
A sister statute, although it constitutes a separate offense, is
A person commits the offense of carrying a weapon if he possesses a handgun, knife, or club on or about his person, in a vehicle occupied by him, or otherwise readily available for use with a purpose to employ it as a weapon against a person.
In Nesdahl v. State,
In sum, the primary differences between
In reviewing a juvenile criminal case, this court looks at the record in the fight most favorable to the State and sustains the conviction if there is any substantial evidence to support it. Nesdahl v. State, supra; Graham v. State,
Garcia’s primary contention on appeal is that the presumption set out in
The general principle is well recognized that even in criminal prosecutions, Congress or a state Legislature may with certain Hmitations enact that when certain facts have been proved they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the main fact in question. . . . The Hmitations are these: There must be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed; the inference of the existence of the ultimate fact from proof of the other fact must not be so unreasonable or unnatural as to be a purely arbitrary mandate; and the accused must not be deprived of a proper opportunity to present his defense to the main fact so presumed and have the case submitted upon all the evidence to the jury for its decision.
Stone,
This court’s precedent as evidenced in Stone v. State, supra, appears consistent with that of the United States Supreme Court. For example, in Ulster County Court v. Allen,
The most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or presumption which allows — but does not require — the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no burden of any kind on the defendant. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, [412 U.S. 837 ,] 840 n.3. In that situation the basic fact may constitute prima facie evidence of the elemental fact. See, e.g., Turner v. United States,396 U.S. 398 , 402 n.2. When reviewing this type of device, the Court has required the party challenging it to demonstrate its invalidity as applied to him. Eg., Barnes v. United States, supra, at 845; Turner v. United States, supra, at 419-424. See also United States v. Gainey,380 U.S. 63 , 67-68, 69-70 (1965). Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference. For only in that situation is there any risk that an explanation of the permissible inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused the presumptively rational fact-finder to make an erroneous factual determination.
Ulster County Court,
The threshold inquiry, accordingly, is whether the presumption in
A mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate facts. A permissive inference suggests to the jury a possible conclusion to be drawn if the State proves predicate facts, but does not require the jury to draw that conclusion.
Francis v. Franklin,
In this case, the juvenile court was the fact finder and the State was only required to prove under
We conclude that there is such a connection and that the juvenile court did not err in its finding of delinquency. Garcia had the presumptively violative knife at junior high school during school hours. Viewing the proof in the light most favorable to the State as we must, he was carrying the knife in the front pocket of his pants. Why else would he be carrying an oversized knife at school under these circumstances than as a weapon? Though the principal told the court that Garcia told him he had the knife there to give to a friend, that fact alone does mean the knife was not carried to school as a weapon. Nor does the fact that he might have been merely showing the knife to others militate against its possession as a weapon.
Garcia himself did not make any claim to innocuous uses, and the trial court alluded to that fact in its ruling. We do not see how application of the presumption to Garcia under these facts violated his due process rights when the young man had to know that possession of a knife with a three-and-one-half-inch blade in a school environment was contrary to school rules, if not the law.
Affirmed.
Notes
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. By Act 457 of 1961, the Arkansas General Assembly enacted the following law that is now codified as
Carrying a knife as a weapon.
(a) A person who carries a knife as a weapon, except when upon a journey or upon his own premises, shall be punished as provided by§ 5-73-123(b) .
(b) If a person carries a knife with a blade three and one-half inches (3V2") long or longer, this fact shall be prima facie proof that the knife is carried as a weapon.
(c) This section does not apply to officers whose duties include making arrests or keeping and guarding prisoners, nor to persons summoned by the officers to aid in the discharge of their duties while actually engaged in the discharge of their duties.
By Act 696 of 1975, the General Assembly enacted a comprehensive statute on the carrying of weapons, including knives, which, as amended, is now codified as
Joshua Garcia was shown to have “carried” a knife with a 3.5-inch blade to school. The principal testified that he believed Mr. Garcia had the knife in his right front pocket but acknowledged on cross-examination the possibility that the knife was found in a bookbag. The principal further testified that Mr. Garcia explained that he was going to give the knife to a friend. The principal conceded that there had been no suggestion that Mr. Garcia intended to use the knife to injure anyone or to use the knife as a weapon.
Nothing else was introduced by the State to show that Mr. Garcia carried the knife “as a weapon.” The Chancellor, however, determined that this element of the offense, by operation of the “prima facie proof” language of
The question that we must resolve is whether the Chancellor’s reliance on the “presumption” found in
The use of a presumption in a criminal case may violate the Due Process Clause if it permits a conviction without requiring the factfinder to conclude that the State has proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sandstrom v. Montana,
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of inferences and presumptions in our “adversary system of factfinding” and has conceded that “[i]t is often necessary for the trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of the crime — that is, an ‘ultimate’ or ‘elemental’ fact — from the existence of one or more ‘evidentiary’ or ‘basic’ facts.” County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen,
Thus, the power of legislatures or courts “to declare that one fact may be inferred from another is subject to ‘the basic requirement of Anglo-American law that no liability shall be imposed until the essential legal elements of that liability shall have been proved.’” 1 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶303[02], at p. 303-11 (1996)(footnote omitted). See also Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, § 80, at p. 381 (stating “presumptions relating to elements of the charged offense create constitutional error if they are deployed against criminal defendants in conclusive terms or use language that has burden-shifting effect”).
In the Allen case, the Court discussed the variety of presumptions that exist in the law and prescribed different rules for assessing their validity. See also Sandstrom v. Montana,
First, the Court recognized the “permissive inference or presumption,” which, the Court said,
allows — but does not require — the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no burden of any kind on the defendant. In that situation the basic fact may constitute prima facie evidence of the elemental fact.
County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen,
The use of a permissive presumption will, however, violate due process if “there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference.” Id. Thus, even with respect to permissive presumptions, there must be “a ‘rational connection’ between the basic facts that the prosecution proved and the ultimate fact presumed,” and the presumed facts must follow “more likely than not” from the basic or evidentiary facts proved by the State. Id. at 165.
The second type of presumption that the Court discussed in the Allen case is the “mandatory presumption,” which the Court described as “a far more troubling evidentiary device.” Id. at 157. As the Court observed, a mandatory presumption “tells the trier of fact that he or they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least unless the defendant has come forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts.” Id. A more stringent test must be used in determining the validity of a mandatory presumption. “[U]nless the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is sufficient for a rational jury to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt,” the use of a mandatory presumption violates the Due Process Clause. Id. at 166. The State “may not rest its case entirely” on a mandatory presumption “unless the fact proved is sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 167. See also Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, § 80, at p. 382 (stating that a mandatory presumption is valid “only if the basic facts make the presumed fact true beyond a reasonable doubt”); 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 3:4, at p. 139 (15th ed. 1997).
Thus, a significant difference between permissive presumptions and mandatory presumptions concerns the applicable “standard[ ] of proof required to establish a rational connection” between the proven “basic facts” and the presumed “ultimate facts.” Wharton’s, supra, § 3:4, at p. 138. With respect to permissive presumptions, there is a “rational connection,” and thus no constitutional infirmity, if the trier of fact could infer from the basic fact that it is “more likely than not” that the ultimate fact exists. With respect to mandatory presumptions, there is a “rational connection,” and thus no constitutional infirmity, if the trier could infer from the basic fact that the ultimate fact exists “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The majority opinion in this case mentions the two kinds of presumptions, but it does not say whether the language in question is one or the other. The significance of the distinction may be lost in this case, however, as the majority misses an important caveat in the Allen opinion. The Supreme Court limited the applicability of the more lenient “more likely than not” standard to cases in which the permissive presumption “is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt.” County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen,
The majority recognizes that the sole basis recited by the Chancellor for his finding was the length of the blade and the lack of rebuttal. The majority seems to state its own factual finding or perhaps “rationale” as follows: “Viewing the proof in the light most favorable to the State as we must, he was carrying the knife in the front pocket of his pants. Why else would he be carrying an oversized knife at school under these circumstances than as a weapon?” Many answers suggest themselves immediately, e.g., to whittle at recess or on the way home, to show the knife to a friend, to play mumbledypeg, to sharpen pencils, etc. Even if the Chancellor had recited those facts and the “why else” logic, it would have fallen far short of demonstrating that the “elemental” fact is shown beyond a reasonable doubt by proof of the “basic” fact.
According to the decisions of the Supreme Court,
... a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience. This is not to say that a valid presumption may not be created upon a view of relation broader than that a jury might take in a specific case. But where the inference is so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know them, it is not competent for the legislature to create it as a rule governing the procedure of courts.
Tot v. United State,
The only case in which § 5-73-121(b) has been recited as a basis for sustaining a conviction is Smith v. State,
I respectfully dissent.