This appeal challenges the right of a state court judge to continue in office after his constitutional term of office ends. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the appellant’s petitiоn for quo warranto.
Paul B. Garcia, Jr. seeks to remove Ben J. Miller from office as judge of the Superior Courts of the Griffin Judicial Circuit. Garcia argues that Judge Miller is holding office illegally because his term expired on January 1, 1991, and he has not been reelected to a new four-year term аs required under the State Constitution. 1
Judge Miller holds one of the judgeships affected by the district court opinion in
Brooks v. State Bd. of
Elections, No. CV288-146 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 1, 1989), modified, (S.D. Ga. May 29 and June 25, 1990), aff’d mem.,
1. Whether state court judges may remain in office beyond their four-year constitutional term is an issue to be decided by state law. Although a federal court determines the validity of a judicial election law under the Voting Rights Act, the states have the power tо decide whether judges are elected at all and to establish the procedures for their selection, retirement, and removal. See
Chisom v. Roemer,
2. Previous state constitutions explicitly provided that the term of office for superior court judges “shall be for four years,
and until his successor is
qualified.” Georgia Cоnst., Art. VI, Sec. III, Par. I (§ 2-3201 (1976)); (§ 2-3801 (1945)); (§ 2-3101 (1933)). (Emphasis supplied.) Relying on that provision in the 1877 Constitution, this court held that an incumbent judge wоuld hold over beyond his fixed term of office until his successor was elected, qualified, and commissioned.
Pittman v. Ingram,
All officеrs of this state, except public officers appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate, “shall discharge the duties of their offices until the successors are commissioned аnd qualified.” OCGA § 45-2-4. “[I]t is better for society that the act
de facto
stand than that the business of society ... be all wreckеd, because parties did not know that the term of office of the public official expirеd the day before.”
Smith & Bondurant v. Meador,
3. This court has the inherent power essential to protect the judiciary as an independent branch of state government and to maintain a court system capable of providing for the administration of justice in an orderly and efficient manner.
Wallace v. Wallace,
Under our inherent and rulemaking powers, we find that the de facto оfficer rule applies to judges affected by the
Brooks
litigation. The courts protect the public from governmental excess, provide the means for resolving civil disputes, and mete out criminаl punishment to those who disregard the public’s rights.
Grimsley v. Twiggs County,
4. The remaining enumerations of error have no merit.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Art. VI, Sec. VII, Par. I of the Constitution of Georgia of 1983 provides: “All superior court and state court judges shall be eleсted on a nonpartisan basis for a term of four years.”
The phrase was retained in the proposed revisions of Article VI of the 1983 Constitution until June 27, 1980, when a special subcommittee of the Committee to Revise Article VI presented a draft that omitted the language. See Transcript of Meetings, Select Committee on Constitutional Revision, Committee to Revise Article VI, Vol. Ill, June 27, 1980, Draft of Proposed New Judicial Article. No committee considering the proposed article ever received information, discussed, or voted to leave out the language deletеd by the three-member subcommittee. See, e.g., id. at 32-33. Therefore, the legislative history does not reveal any legislative intent to delete the phrase from the 1983 Constitution, as Garcia argues.