BLAS EDUARDO GARCIA, Petitioner, versus MERRICK GARLAND, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.
No. 19-60793
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
March 14, 2022
Lyle W. Cayce, Clerk
Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals BIA No. A095 236 911
Before JOLLY, HIGGINSON, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges.
Blas Eduardo Garcia petitions for review of two Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA“) orders denying his motions to reopen. For the reasons set forth below, we DENY his petitions.
I.
Garcia is a native and citizen of Mexico who first entered the United States in 1994. He received administrative voluntary departure in 2001 and subsequently returned to the United States without having been admitted or parоled. In 2004, Garcia was sent a notice to appear (“NTA“) charging him as subject to removal under
In September 2018, Garcia filed a motion to reopen with the BIA. He argued in part that, under both Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), and the plain meaning of
Garcia then filed a second motion to reopen seeking to apply for asylum and withholding of removal based on changed country conditions in Mexico. Garcia stated that he was recently diagnosed with HIV and was receiving antiviral treatment. He argued that country conditions and his own personal circumstances had changed since 2007 and that because of his diagnosis, he would be perceived as a member of the LGBT community and would accordingly face a substantial risk of persecution and/or torture on account of his membership in the particular social groups of: (1) “[h]omosexuals in Mexico (imputed)“; (2) “[i]ndividuals in Mexico who are HIV positive“; and (3) “HIV positive men in Mexico.” The BIA denied the motion. The BIA concluded that the motion to reopen was untimely and that the evidence Garciа submitted failed to demonstrate the kind of materially changed country conditions that would warrant an exception to the time limit for motions to reopen. Rather, the submitted documents showed the “continuation of the same or similar cоnditions or circumstances” as those existing at the time of Garcia‘s removal hearing in 2007. The BIA further determined that Garcia had “not made a prima facie showing that he will suffer mistreatment amounting to persecution in Mexico on acсount of a protected ground so as to make him eligible for asylum or withholding of removal” and that he had “not made a prima facie showing that he will more likely than not be tortured by, at the instigation of, or with consent or acquiescence of” the Mexican government.
Garcia now challenges both denials.
II.
Generally, we review only the BIA‘s decision, “unless the IJ‘s decision has some impact on the BIA‘s decision.” Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2009). Here, neither BIA decision referenced the IJ‘s decision. We review the denial of a motion to reopen “under a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Fuentes-Pena v. Barr, 917 F.3d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 2019). “However, we review the legal conclusions underlying that decision de novo and the factual findings for substantial evidence, reversing when the record compels a different finding.” Inestroza-Antonelli v. Barr, 954 F.3d 813, 815 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Fuentes-Pena, 917 F.3d at 829).
III.
Garcia has filed two petitions for review in this court. In the first, he challenges the BIA‘s denial of his first motion to reopen, renewing his argument that the NTA was “defective.” In the second, he challenges the BIA‘s determination that he did not show changed country cоnditions. We analyze each in turn.
A.
Garcia first argues that “the central issue in this case is whether Petitioner was entitled to reopening and termination of his removal order based on Pereira, 138 S. Ct. 2105.”1 Garcia claims that under both Pereira and the plain meaning of
After the Pereira decision but before the Niz-Chavez decision, this court published Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 2019). In that case, we held in part that an NTA constituted a valid charging document even without the time, date, or place of the initiаl hearing and that even if such an NTA were not sufficient, it could be cured by subsequent notices. Id. at 690-91. In reaching this outcome, we independently held that the regulations, not
Two recent cases from this court shed light on Pierre-Paul‘s continuing vitality in the aftermath of Niz-Chavez. In the first, Maniar v. Garland, 998 F.3d 235, 242 (5th Cir. 2021), we addressed Maniar‘s argument that “neither the IJ nor the BIA ever acquired jurisdiction over his removal proceedings because his notice to appear was defective” under
It is “the regulations, not
8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) , [that] govern what a notice to appear must contain to constitute a valid charging document.” And “[u]nder the regulations, a notice to аppear is sufficient to commence proceedings even if it does not include the time, date, or place of the initial hearing.”
Id. (quoting Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 693) (alteration in original). We then went on to specifically address which sections of Pierre-Paul were still good law in a footnote, explaining that Niz-Chavez involved an NTA‘s relationship to the stop-time rule, not its use as a charging document. Id. at 242 n.2. Thus, while ”Niz-Chavez undermines one of the rationales of our decision in Pierre-Paul—namely, that a two-step process comports with relevant statutory language,” the case “does not dislodge our ultimate holding in Pierre-Paul that it is the regulations, not
We further clarified our holding in Rodriguez v. Garland, 15 F.4th 351 (5th Cir. 2021). In that case, we examined
Both the recission of an in absentia order provision and the stop-time rule provision specifically reference the
§ 1229(a) notice requirements. Thе Court‘s separate interpretation of the§ 1229(a) notice requirements in Niz-Chavez thus applies in the in absentia context. The specific textual reference to§ 1229(a) distinguishes these provisions from others we have considered, including§ 1227(a)(2)(A) at issue in Maniar v. Garland . . . . [B]ecause the provision at issue in Maniar does not reference the§ 1229(a) notice requirements, we held that а single notice that did not include the date, time, and place of the initial hearing was a valid charging document because it met the regulatory requirements. Unlike the charging document at issue in Maniar, the recission of an in absentia order provision at issue here textually references§ 1229(a) . Under Niz-Chavez‘s interpretation of§ 1229(a) , we therefore require a single document containing the required information in the in absentia context.
Id. at 355.
Taken together, these cases tell us that Garcia‘s arguments regarding the deficiency of his NTA are foreclosed. Maniar addressed and rejected the argument that an NTA is defective under
B.
In supplemental briefing, Garcia argues that the BIA erred in denying his second motion to reopen based on a request for asylum and withholding of removal.
Ordinarily, a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the BIA‘s decision.
Garcia also argues that his diagnosis of HIV was an “intervening factor” that should be сonsidered a change in country conditions. However, a change of personal circumstances cannot alone, without further support from other changed conditions, qualify as changed country conditions. Nunez v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 499, 509 & n.12 (5th Cir. 2018).3
Because wе find that Garcia has failed to show that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen, we do not reach his claims concerning his eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. See Ramos-Lopez, 823 F.3d at 1026. Garcia‘s second petition is DENIED.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, both of Garcia‘s petitions are DENIED.