GARCIA-SOLIS v. THE STATE.
S25A0042
Supreme Court of Georgia
January 28, 2025
320 Ga. 754
LAGRUA, Justice.
Appellant Hector Garcia-Solis appeals his convictions for malice murder and other crimes connected to the shooting death of Hall County Deputy Sheriff Blane Dixon on July 7, 2019.1 On
(a) The July 6 burglaries and initial investigation
The evidence presented at trial showed that, on the morning of July 2, 2019, two residents of Hall County discovered that their vehicles — a 2009 red Dodge Caliber and a 2002 silver Toyota Avalon — had been stolen overnight, and they reported the thefts to law enforcement. A few days later, during the early morning hours of July 6, several break-ins occurred at automobile dealerships and
While investigating the pawnshop burglaries on the morning of July 6, law enforcement officers learned that several automobile dealerships had also been broken into overnight, including Los Plebes Auto Sales, Texano Auto Sales, Texas Trucks and Autos, and Eddie’s Auto Sales.4 Francisco Cuella, the owner of Los Plebes Auto Sales, testified that, when he arrived at the dealership around 9:00 a.m. on July 6, he realized that five pickup trucks had been stolen from his lot, including a 2015 Dodge Ram 2500, which law enforcement officers later established was the pickup truck used in the burglary at Swap and Trade Pawn. Cuella testified that one of the other stolen pickup trucks was discovered later that morning in a nearby neighborhood.5 According to Cuella and law enforcement
Celia Hernandez, the office manager for Texano Auto Sales, testified that Texano was also burglarized during the early morning hours of July 6. Based on surveillance video from Texano, law enforcement officers determined that two suspects — armed with handguns and wearing dark clothing, masks, and gloves — broke into the dealership’s office, at which point, one of the suspects started going through files inside the office. When Hernandez examined the office after the burglary, she noticed that a file had been dropped on the floor that related to “an incident with [Garcia-
Holly Lester, a DeKalb County crime scene investigator who resided in Hall County at the time, testified that, between the late-night hours of July 5 and early morning hours of July 6, “crime scene investigative tools” and “various police equipment” — including a radio, gun belt, flashlight, bulletproof vest, and baton — were stolen from her county-owned van, which was parked in front of her residence. At trial, Lester reviewed images taken from the surveillance video at Double Deuce Pawn and Gun capturing the
After compiling and reviewing the surveillance videos from the impacted dealerships and pawnshops, law enforcement officers were able to establish that the same suspects likely committed all the burglaries, as they were wearing “the same masks and clothing in all of the thefts.”
Antony Macias — a friend of the co-defendants — testified at trial that, on the morning of July 6, he was watching the news when he heard that several automobile dealerships and pawnshops had been burglarized the night before. A few hours later, Macias’s friend “Adrian”6 contacted him to ask if Garcia-Solis and Velazquez could come shoot guns at Macias’s uncle’s ranch in Hall County, where Macias was staying. Not long afterward, Garcia-Solis, Velazquez, and Adrian “pulled up” to the ranch in a “red Dodge car.” When
Cruz testified that, on the night of July 6, he and his friend Jiovanny Castillo went to Adrian’s house, and they saw Garcia-Solis and Velazquez, who each had a gun. Cruz observed that Garcia-Solis was also wearing a bulletproof vest. Garcia-Solis and Velazquez told Cruz and Castillo that “they robbed a pawnshop” and “they got a truck and tied it on the door and started getting guns.” Cruz and Castillo testified that, around 10:00 p.m., Garcia-Solis gave Cruz, Castillo, and Velazquez a ride in a “four-door,” red Dodge, which
(b) The July 7 police chase, shootings, and subsequent investigation
On the afternoon of July 7, Investigator Jeremy Grindle with the Hall County Sheriff’s Department discovered the stolen red Dodge Caliber and silver Toyota Avalon parked behind the thrift store. Investigator Grindle testified that, because they “believed that the red Dodge Caliber was involved in” the burglaries, Investigator Grindle and other law enforcement officers went through the process of affixing tracking devices “to the bottom of the frame of the car[s]” to “emit[ ] a GPS signal” that law enforcement officers could monitor in the event the vehicles started moving.
According to Cruz, around 6:00 p.m. on July 7, he and Clements went to Castillo’s house, and Clements started communicating “through Snapchat” with Velazquez about “hit[ting] a lick at the pawn store” to “steal the guns and sell them.” Castillo testified that
Around 10:00 p.m., Garcia-Solis, Cruz, Velazquez, and Clements arrived at the thrift store where the stolen cars were parked. The group “gear[ed] up” by “putting on gloves, masks, [and] getting ready,” and Cruz testified that Garcia-Solis and Velazquez also had handguns with them. According to Cruz, the group “hopped in [the] gray Toyota,” and Velazquez started driving. Cruz testified that, as soon as they turned out of the thrift store and started driving up the street, a law enforcement officer pulled up behind them and “start[ed] flashing his lights.” Cruz testified that Garcia-Solis and Clements told Velazquez to keep driving, and Velazquez started “hitting . . . mailboxes” and eventually ran into a telephone
Cruz testified that Deputy Dixon was running after them, and at that point, Cruz ran and hid under a shed behind one of the houses. While Cruz was under the shed, he “heard the officer give [Garcia-Solis] instructions like put your hands up, put your hands up.” Cruz testified that “[i]t got quiet for a few seconds,” and then, he heard gunshots.
One of the law enforcement officers involved in the chase, Sergeant Charles Hewell, testified that he and Deputy Dixon were keeping a watch on the stolen vehicles that night, and as soon as the Toyota Avalon started to move away from the thrift store, he advised Deputy Dixon to follow it. Minutes later, Deputy Dixon alerted Sergeant Hewell that he was behind the Toyota Avalon. According to Sergeant Hewell, the Toyota ultimately crashed into a telephone pole, and when he reached the crash site, Sergeant Hewell saw
Sergeant Hewell started following the suspects into the adjacent neighborhood, and as he was running through the area, he heard Deputy Dixon yell, “Hey, Sarge, I have one.” Sergeant Hewell testified that he ran towards Deputy Dixon’s voice and overheard Deputy Dixon give the suspect commands. As Sergeant Hewell got closer, he heard “shots fired from the suspect.” Sergeant Hewell then heard Deputy Dixon say, “I’m hit.”
The video recordings from Deputy Dixon’s body camera, which were admitted into evidence through the testimony of GBI Special Agent Jamie Abercrombie at trial, showed that Garcia-Solis was standing at the corner of a house when Deputy Dixon made physical contact with him and that Garcia-Solis had something in his hand. Agent Abercrombie testified that the video recording also reflected that Deputy Dixon gave Garcia-Solis commands to show his hands, but Garcia-Solis did not follow the commands and walked behind
According to Sergeant Hewell, when he got to the house where Deputy Dixon had been shot, “the suspect was not there,” so Sergeant Hewell “began to run as fast as [he] could” to try and locate the suspect. As Sergeant Hewell was running, he came “face to face” with Garcia-Solis, who ran “away from [him] across the street.” Sergeant Hewell gave Garcia-Solis commands to “show [his] hands [and] stop moving,” but Garcia-Solis did not comply. Sergeant Hewell started shooting at Garcia-Solis and eventually “saw him fall.” Sergeant Hewell then called for a medical unit, and Garcia-Solis was transported to the hospital. Garcia-Solis received a
In the early morning hours of July 8, GBI agents arrived at the crime scene and discovered shell casings on the porch of a house from Deputy Dixon’s service revolver, as well as 9-millimeter shell casings, a .45-caliber shell casing, a 1911 Sig Sauer .45-caliber handgun, a key to a Dodge Caliber, and shell casings from Sergeant Hewell’s service revolver. The GBI firearms examiner testified that the .45-caliber Sig Sauer recovered at the scene had a helmet on the handle, and when she examined the fatal bullet removed from Deputy Dixon’s body during his autopsy, she established that the bullet was fired from this weapon. Law enforcement officers also confirmed that the .45-caliber Sig Sauer was stolen from Double Deuce Pawn and Gun on July 6.
At trial, one of Garcia-Solis’s trauma nurses testified that,
Garcia-Solis also testified at trial and admitted to the following: (1) he was one of the individuals who appeared in the surveillance videos presented at trial of the automobile dealership and pawnshop burglaries committed on July 6; (2) he was responsible for stealing weapons and other items during the burglaries; (3) he was armed during the burglaries; (4) Velazquez was with him during the burglaries; (5) Clements, Cruz, and Velazquez were with him on the night of July 7, and they planned to “hit a lick“; (6) he shot and killed Deputy Dixon; and (7) he committed a prior burglary at Texano Auto Sales in 2018.
1. Garcia-Solis contends that the evidence was insufficient to
When assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, the evidence presented at trial is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the crimes of which he was convicted. In making this determination, we do not evaluate witness credibility, resolve inconsistencies in the evidence, or assess the weight of the evidence; these tasks are left to the sole discretion of the jury. The jury’s verdicts will be upheld as long as some competent evidence, even if contradicted, supports each fact necessary to make out the State’s case.
Ridley v. State, 315 Ga. 452, 455 (2) (883 SE2d 357) (2023) (citation omitted) (citing Jones v. State, 304 Ga. 594, 598 (2) (820 SE2d 696) (2018)). See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Applying that standard here and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient as a matter of constitutional due process to support Garcia-Solis’s conviction for malice murder.
“A person commits the offense of murder when he unlawfully
For a malice murder conviction, the requisite criminal intent is that of malice, which incorporates the intent to kill. The malice necessary to establish malice murder may be formed in an instant, as long as it is present at the time of the killing. Whether a killing was intentional and malicious is for the jury to determine.
Scoggins v. State, 317 Ga. 832, 836 (1) (a) (896 SE2d 476) (2023) (citation omitted; emphasis supplied) (citing Benton v. State, 305 Ga. 242, 244 (1) (a) (824 SE2d 322) (2019)).
In this case, the evidence established that, after committing a series of burglaries in which ammunition and a large number of firearms were stolen, Garcia-Solis armed himself and traveled in a stolen vehicle with his co-defendants to continue “hit[ting] licks.”
Additionally, at trial, one of Garcia-Solis’s treating nurses testified that, while Garcia-Solis was in the hospital, he divulged his group’s plan to drive around in a stolen vehicle on the night of July 7 to “hit[ ] a lick,” and he confided that, after the car chase began, they planned to leave one guy to shoot, while the others ran away. Garcia-Solis told the nurse that he was the one who stayed behind and shot Deputy Dixon. Garcia-Solis also admitted at trial that he committed the crimes leading up to the car chase and crash, and he shot and killed Deputy Dixon.
In short, Garcia-Solis’s admission that he intentionally shot Deputy Dixon to help his co-defendants get away and the video
2. Garcia-Solis next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to transfer venue under
“To succeed on a motion for change of venue, ‘a defendant must show either that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial or that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice to a degree that rendered a fair trial impossible.‘” Moss v. State, 305 Ga. 878, 881 (2) (828 SE2d 309) (2019) (quoting Heidt v. State, 292 Ga. 343, 348 (4) (736 SE2d 384) (2013)). To demonstrate “inherent prejudice,” the “record must establish that the publicity contained information that was unduly extensive, factually incorrect, inflammatory or reflective of an atmosphere of hostility.” Heidt, 292 Ga. at 348 (4) (citation and punctuation omitted). As to actual prejudice, the question for the Court “is not the number of jurors who had heard about the case or had knowledge of those involved in the case,” but “whether those jurors who had heard about the case could lay aside their opinions and render a verdict based on the evidence.” Moss,
Garcia-Solis contends that, here, venue should have been moved both because the setting was inherently prejudicial and because the jury selection led to actual prejudice. Both contentions fail.
With respect to inherent prejudice, Garcia-Solis argues that Macias and Hernandez, two of the State’s witnesses at trial, testified that they saw news coverage regarding Deputy Dixon’s death the day after the shooting occurred. But, because Macias and Hernandez were witnesses in this case, changing venue would not have made any difference. And Garcia-Solis has not shown or even argued that any of this purported news coverage “contained information that was unduly extensive, factually incorrect, inflammatory or reflective of an atmosphere of hostility.” Heidt, 292 Ga. at 348 (4). As such, Garcia-Solis has made no showing of “inherent prejudice,” and the record does not otherwise support such a claim. Id.
A “trial court is not required to strike for cause a potential juror who simply questions his or her impartiality or expresses reservations about his or her ability to set aside personal experiences.” Anderson v. State, 276 Ga. 389, 390 (2) (578 SE2d 890) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted). And “it is well settled that a trial court is permitted to objectively question prospective jurors in a manner calculated to determine if they are unalterably prejudiced against the defendant.” Heidt, 292 Ga. at 349 (5). Here, when questioned further by the trial court, the two jurors at issue
More generally, during voir dire, the trial court asked prospective jurors the proper, statutory questions in determining whether they could be fair and impartial in this case. As a result of that process, only one juror was excused for cause because of his feelings about the case. See Heidt, 292 Ga. at 349 (4) (concluding that “an excusal percentage of approximately ten percent is well below the rate that would indicate actual prejudice rendering a fair trial impossible“). And, in denying Garcia-Solis’s motion to transfer venue, the trial court, in assessing whether actual prejudice existed, observed that the jury questionnaires revealed most of the jurors
We thus conclude that these circumstances are “not indicative of such prejudice that the trial court’s denial of a change in venue was an abuse of discretion,” Moss, 305 Ga. at 881 (2), and this claim fails.
3. Finally, Garcia-Solis contends that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to life without the possibility of parole because (1) he was 17 years old at the time of the offenses in this case; (2) “[t]he State failed to show that [he] is irreparably corrupt“; (3) he admitted to the jury that he shot and killed Deputy Dixon and committed the other crimes in this case, which revealed “his capacity for remorse and rehabilitation“; (4) he conceded at trial that, given his age, “he did not think through the danger of his actions“; and (5)
As an initial matter, after the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98 (141 SCt 1307, 209 LE2d 390) (2021), this Court overruled Veal. See Holmes v. State, 311 Ga. 698 (859 SE2d 475) (2021). In Holmes, we concluded that, given the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, Veal was wrongly decided, and “to the extent that Veal suggested a requirement that sentencers provide explicit, on-the-record explanations regarding determinations of permanent incorrigibility and the characteristics
In Sillah, after determining that “youth [is] akin to a mitigating circumstance,” we held that sentencing courts have “wide discretion in determining the weight to give relevant mitigating evidence without having to make particular factual findings about those mitigating circumstances.” Sillah, 315 Ga. at 752-753 (4) (citation and punctuation omitted). We further held that, “unless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise, the trial court will be deemed to have considered the relevant criteria, such as mitigating circumstances, enumerated in the sentencing rules” in sentencing the defendant. Id. at 753 (4) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, there is no evidence that the trial court “misapplied the
Accordingly, given that (1) the trial court was not required to make the explicit findings it made regarding the “permanent incorrigibility” and/or “irreparabl[e] corrupt[ion]” of Garcia-Solis before “imposing a discretionary [life without parole] sentence,” Sillah, 315 Ga. at 752 (4); (2) the trial court was not required to explain “its reason[ing] for imposing” such a sentence, id.; and (3) the trial court has “wide discretion in determining the weight to give relevant mitigating evidence without having to make particular factual findings about those mitigating circumstances,” id. at 752-753 (4); we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Garcia-Solis to life without the possibility of parole in this case, despite his age at the time he committed the crimes at issue.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Garcia-Solis’s convictions in this case.
Decided January 28, 2025.
Murder. Hall Superior Court. Before Judge Deal.
Nicole E. Baker, Ralph J. Villani, for appellant.
Lee Darragh, District Attorney, Harold A. Buckler, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Elizabeth Rosenwasser, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Notes
Cruz entered a guilty plea to Counts 4 and 5 and testified for the State at trial. Garcia-Solis, Velazquez, and Clements were jointly tried from June 21 to July 8, 2021. The jury found Garcia-Solis guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Garcia-Solis to life in prison without the possibility of parole on the malice murder count (Count 1), plus a total of 35 consecutive years to serve for Counts 5 and 7-15. The trial court merged the aggravated assault count (Count 4) and purported to merge the felony murder counts (Counts 2 and 3) into the malice murder conviction (Count 1), but the felony murder verdicts were actually “vacated by operation of law.” Graves v. State, 298 Ga. 551, 556 (4)
Garcia-Solis filed a timely motion for new trial, which he amended through new counsel. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court denied the motion on November 4, 2022. Garcia-Solis filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court, and the case was docketed to the term beginning in December 2024 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
[t]he defendant, in any criminal case in which a trial by jury is provided, may move in writing for a change of venue, whenever, in the defendant’s or defense counsel’s judgment, an impartial jury cannot be obtained in the county where the crime is alleged to have been committed. Upon the hearing of the motion it shall not be necessary to examine all persons in the county liable to serve on juries, but the judge shall hear evidence by affidavit or oral testimony in support of or against the motion. If, from the evidence submitted, the judge is satisfied that an impartial jury cannot be obtained to try the case, the judge shall grant a change in venue. The judge shall transfer the case to any county that may be agreed upon by the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or the defense counsel, to be tried in the county agreed upon. The judge has the discretion to reject any county agreed upon; if a county is not thus agreed upon, or if the judge, in the exercise of discretion, rejects a county agreed upon, the judge shall select such county as in the judge’s judgment will afford a fair and impartial jury to try the case and have it transferred accordingly.