921 S.W.2d 156 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1996
Petitioner appeals from the circuit court’s judgment sustaining the Director of Revenue’s (Director) suspension of petitioner’s driving privileges and the circuit court’s order setting aside a default judgment entered against the Director. We remand in part and dismiss in part.
Petitioner’s driving privileges were suspended as a result of allegedly driving with a blood-alcohol content by weight of .10% or more. See § 302.505.1, RSMo 1994.
The default judgment was ordered set aside by Judge Quillin on November 30,1994. The trial de novo was conducted in front of a traffic court commissioner, who found that the suspension should be affirmed. The findings and recommendations of the commissioner were adopted and confirmed by Judge Quillin.
The disposition of the judgment sustaining the Director’s suspension of driving privileges is controlled by our recent case of Chamberlain v. Director of Revenue, No. 68964, 921 S.W.2d 138 (Mo.App.E.D.1996). See also State ex. rel. Coyle v. O’Toole, 914 S.W.2d 871 (Mo.App.E.D.1996). In Chamberlain, we held that a suspension/revocation judgment entered after a trial de novo before a traffic commissioner was without legal effect and that the petition remained in the circuit court. Chamberlain, 921 S.W.2d at 139.
Petitioner also addresses a point on appeal to the circuit court’s order setting aside the default judgment. We note that a motion to set aside a default judgment is an independent action, the determination of which is an independent judgment. Kueper v. Murphy Distributing, 834 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Mo.App.E.D.1992). “Setting aside a default judgment, if ordered within thirty days of the rendition of that judgment, is a discretionary act from which no appeal lies.” St. Louis County v. Taggert, 809 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Mo.App.1991).
We dismiss petitioner’s appeal of the order setting aside the default judgment and remand for a new trial de novo on petitioner’s petition seeking to set aside the Director’s suspension of his driving privileges.
. All statutory citations are RSMo 1994.
. Any appeal from an order setting aside a default before the judgment becomes final lies from the judgment on the merits, not from the order setting aside the default judgment. Taggert, 809 S.W.2d at 478.