47 N.Y.S. 870 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1897
That it was the intention of Gannon that Mrs. McGuire should eventually and after his death become the owner of the bond and mortgage, and that this was in many ways expressed, clearly appears from the evidence.' That which concerns us, however, upon this appeal is as to whether such intention was legally effectuated so as to transfer the title of the bond and mortgage to her. Undoubtedly a bond and mortgage may be given by mere delivery without any writing, nor is it necessary that it should be a delivery directly to the donee. But some unequivocal act on the part of the donor, by which he divests himself of possession and control over the subject ■of the gift and delivers it to the donee, or to .a trustee for the donee,
This statement of what is essential to constitute a gift is recognized in and enforced by two leading cases in this State : Young v. Young (80 N. Y. 430) and Beaver v. Beaver (177 id. 428). In the former case it is said: “ To establish a valid gift, a delivery of the subject of the gift to the donee, or to some person for him, so as to divest the possession and title o£ the donor must be shown. * * * It is an elementary rule that such a gift cannot be made to take effect in possession in futuro. Such a transaction amounts only to a promise to make a gift, which is nudum paetum. * * *
There must be a delivery of possession with a view to pass a present right of property. ‘ Any gift of chattels which expressly reserves the use of the property to the donor for a certain period, or (as commonly appears in the cases which the courts have liad occasion to pass upon) as long as the donor shall live, is ineffectual.’'” And in Beaver v. Beaver (supra) it is said: “ The elements necessary to constitute a valid gift are well understood, and are not the subject of dispute. There must be, on the part of the donor, an intent to give, and a delivery of the thing given, to or for the donee, in pursuance of such intent, and on the part of the donee, acceptance. The subject of the gift may be chattels, dioses in action or any form of personal property, and what constitutes a delivery may depend on the nature and situation of the thing given. The delivery may be symbolical or actual, that is, by actually transferring the manual custody of the chattel to the donee, or giving to him the symbol which represents possession. In case of bonds, notes or dioses, in action the delivery of the instrument which represents the debt is a gift of the debt, if that is the intention ; and so, also, where the debt is that of the donee it may be given, as has been held, by the delivery of a receipt acknowledging payment.”
Applying these rules, the first question is, whether “ the constant and essential factor ” of delivery of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee is shown by the evidence to exist. It is claimed that either a delivery was made on the seventh of March, when the deed and the bond and mortgage were drawn, or that the delivery was effectuated by the order given to' Mrs. McGuire on the day before Gannon’s death, and pursuant to which she obtained the
Taking these in their order, we do not think it can he concluded, from the testimony given by the defendant’s witnesses, that at the time the bond and mortgage were executed it was intended, and that this intention was carried out, to deliver the title to the bond and mortgage to Mrs. McGuire. Because, if it was desired to clothe her with the title, the making of the bond and mortgage would have been a useless and idle ceremony. What Gannon intended, as shown by his repeated declarations, was to make a gift which should not be effectual or completed during his life, but only after his death. And this is fatal to the idea of a delivery before his death. Thus, Hogan’s testimony was, that Gannon told him that he was going to give Mrs. McGuire the house after his death; that Mr. Cushing had advised him to get a bond and mortgage from her as a protection for himself against her while he lived; that the bond and mortgage were to be left in charge of Mr. Ledwith as long as he should live, and after his death, and not before, they were to be delivered to Mrs. McGuire. Cushing’s testimony was that most favorable to the defendant, and the substance of it was that Mrs. McGuire executed the bond and mortgage and handed it to Gannon, who said, “ I am taking this to keep for you and put it in a place of safekeeping so when I die you shall have this property free and clear of any encumbrance. I am keeping it for you, and I place it in a place of safekeeping for you, to be delivered to you upon my death.” And the defendant’s husband’s testimony was that after Gannon’s death the mortgage was to be destroyed; that Mrs. McGuire was to get them after his death. The testimony of Lafavre, as shown, contained the same idea; that the bond and mortgage were to be held by Gannon as a protection to himself while he lived, and that upon his death he intended they should be destroyed or delivered to Mrs. McGuire, so that then she might have the title.
This reserving to himself the control and power of exercising dominion and ownership over the bond and mortgage during life, coupled with his repeated declarations that the gift he contemplated was not to be completed during his lifetime, is fatal to the idea of a delivery before death, and entirely destroys the inference that there
We have not in this characterization of the evidence overlooked the fact upon which the respondent places great weight; that when the bond and mortgage were delivered to Gannon by Mrs. McGuire after execution, Gannon then handed the bond and mortgage to her, and after so handing her the pajDers told her that he. would take them and keep them for her in a safe place until his death. Because that but emphasizes what we have already said, that whatever was the form of passing the papers from one to the other, there was not then the intention followed by the act of making a present gift of the bond and mortgage. This view is strengthened by the fact that Gannon did not surrender the control and possession to Mrs. McGuire, nor did he deposit them with the bank as her property, but, together with his will and the deed, he placed them with Mr. Ledwith at the bank under an arrangement that they should be delivered only upon his order. It would be impossible from such evidence to conclude that there was a completed gift, either on the seventh of March when the papers were executed, or a few days subsequently when they were by Gannon delivered for safekeeping to the bank.
This brings us to a consideration of the order which was given the day before Gannon’s death. He therein states that the deed which was deposited, and which was to be delivered to_ Mrs. McGuire, was her own property, but we find no such characterization of the bond and mortgage which, with his will, were also deposited at the bank. As to “ the deed, will and all other papers,” he says, “ I am not able to call for those papers myself at present, and, therefore, I want you to deliver them to the said Catharine McGuire. The deed belongs to her.” When we consider that this order was drawn by a lawyer, it is impossible to conclude that Gannon thereby intended to complete a delivery of the bond and mortgage so as to confer the title thereto upon Mrs. McGuire. If such had been his intention, it would only have been necessary (and he was in a position to obtain this advice from his lawyer) to make a satisfaction piece, or a receipt for the amount covered by the mortgage, or an assignment, either of which would have discharged the debt repre
If we assume, therefore, that the bond and mortgage, though not specified in the order, were included under the designation of “ other papers,” it cannot be construed into a delivery. There was no actual, nor do we think there was a constructive or symbolical delivery. To constitute the latter, regard being had to the subject of the gift, which was a chose in action, the law required, as the delivery must be secundum subjectam materiam, a receipt or a satisfaction piece, or an assignment, or the physical manual delivery of the evidence of the debt back to the donee by the donor during his lifetime to make a perfect gift inter vivos. (Gray v. Barton, 55 N. Y. 69; Champney v. Blanchard, 39 id. 111; Doty v. Willson, 47 id. 580.) Besides, it does not appear that the order was given with a view of canceling the debt due by the donee to the donor. The original intention of Gannon, as we have already concluded, in reference to the transaction of March seventh, was to make a gift which should take effect upon his death; and there is nothing in the order itself, nor in the testimony, to show that this intention or purpose was changed. The order cannot be construed into a declaration that the bond and mortgage were the property of Mrs. McGuire, but is more susceptible of the conclusion that it was an assertion of ownership by Gannon of all the papers deposited with the bank, except the deed; and that his purpose was to obtain possession of them, in that connection employing Mrs. McGuire, whom he intended to be his donee after his death, as a messenger to bring them to him. But in the order itself, or in anything he said, there is no declaration of just what he intended to do with them after he had got them again into his possession. But as the papers never reached him it is
It is unnecessary to cite authorities for the proposition that Gannon’s death ended the power given to him in his lifetime to direct what should be done with his property after his death, because no man can make such disposition of his property except by a last will. So Gannon’s death ended the agency of the depositary. We are, therefore, confronted with a case in which there is abundant evidence that it was the intention to make a gift, but that such intention was never legally carried out, because there never was an actual delivery of the subject of the gift.
It is urged, however, that apart from the theory of a gift, the defendant’s title can be supported upon the view that a declaration of trust can be spelled out, and we are referred to many cases, particularly to those known as the Savings Banh cases, the leading one of which is Martin v. Funk (75 N. Y. 134), as authority for the proposition that a declaration or direction by a party that the property shall be held in trust for the object of his bounty, though unaccompanied by deed or other act divesting himself of the legal estate, is an executed trust. The difficulty with this view is, that there is nothing in the testimony to show an intention to create any trust. The question as to how far the courts will seize upon the
Van Brunt, P. J., Williams, Patterson and Ingraham, JJ., concurred.
Judgment reversed and judgment ordéred for plaintiff, with costs in this court and in the court below.