79 Pa. 303 | Pa. | 1875
delivered the opinion of the court, January 6th 1876.
This judgment was entered under the provisions of the fifth of the rules adopted for the regulation of the practice of the court below. By the first section of this rule it is prescribed, that “ in all cases the plaintiff shall file with or before his declaration a
The material inquiry here is, whether this record shows such default on the part of the defendants as to subject them to the penalty imposed by the fourth section of the rule. It is admitted that the affidavit filed on their behalf was adequate, but it is admitted also, on the other hand, that notice of it was not given to the plaintiff. All the several provisions that have been quoted are to be considered in their connection with and their relation to each other. The first and second sections define a defendant’s duty in cases where the inquiry is confined to the validity and integrity of the plaintiff’s cause of action, in which items of claim and material averments of facts are to be “ directly and specifically traversed and denied.” In such cases the defendant is required to file his answer within the time limited in the alternative directions of the second section, and he is required to do nothing more. It is only when he presents such a defence as that to which the third section refers, that he is bound to give notice of his answer within ten days after filing it. The confusion apparently arising out of the words “ statement of defence,” is dissipated if this section is read in the light thrown upon it by the language of the first. To read the direction that the rule “ shall apply to a specification of set-off and statement of defence,” cannot be treated as requiring
In the present case no defence of the character of a set-off was alleged. The right of the plaintiff to a verdict was contested on grounds that affected the very instrument on which the suit was brought. There was nothing in the nature of a fresh or* independent demand, and nothing, consequently, to which the third section of the rule under discussion could apply. The judgment was improvidentlv entered by the prothonotary, and should have been opened by the court.
It is not designed to disturb in the slightest way the well-settled principles which recognise the inherent right of the courts of original jurisdiction to establish and enforce rules for the government of their practice. Upon the expediency of a provision that a judgment shall be the penalty for a failure to give notice to a plaintiff of a specification of set-off as a ground of defence, no opinion is expressed. In the ordinary ease, the question of expediency, in the language of Rogers, J., in Mylin’s Estate, 7 Watts 64, “ is not a question for this court, for it must be left to the sound discretion of every court to regulate its own practice.” In the ordinary ease, also, the construction of their own rules by the' courts of original jurisdiction is accepted as conclusive, for, as has been repeatedly said, they are their best exponents: Dailey v. Green, 3 Harris 118, 128. It is only where wrong is manifest that their discretion will be interfered with or invaded. The palpable error in this instance is undoubtedly attributable to inadvertence.
Judgment reversed, and procedendo awarded.