Petitioner-Appellant J.W. Gann (Gann) appeals the summary denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.
We reverse.
Gann raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as:
whether the post-conviction court erred in its sua sponte summary denial of Gann's petition for post-conviction relief. 1
On August 25, 1988, this court issued a memorandum decision affirming Gann's jury trial conviction for escape,
On March 28, 1989, Gann filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to request an evi-dentiary hearing to attempt reconstruction of the unavailable portions of the record. Gann's petition contained an Affidavit of Indigence and a request for legal representation by the public defender.
The State filed a response on March 29, 1989, in which it generally denied Gann's allegations. The State also raised the defenses of laches, res judicata, and waiver. On the same day, the post-conviction court sua sponte summarily denied Gann's petition stating:
Court overrules Defendant's Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
(R. 28).
Gann filed a pro se motion to correct errors on April 17, 1989. The motion was denied. On May 16, 1989, a Special Assistant to the Public Defender of Indiana entered his appearance on Gann's behalf, and thereafter filed this appeal.
Additional facts appear below as necessary.
A post-conviction court is permitted to summarily deny a petition for post-conviction relief only if the pleadings conclusively show the petitioner is entitled to no relief. Ind.Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(e). The necessity of an evidentiary hearing is avoided when the pleadings show only issues of law. Sherwood v. State (1983), Ind.,
Gann contends the pleadings raise a genuine question of material fact. We agree. In his pro se petition, Gann raised the issue of appellate counsel's effectiveness. He correctly noted his entire appeal before this court was waived because counsel did not comply with App.R. 7.2(A)(8)(c). He contended counsel knew, or should have known, reconstruction of the trial record must be attempted, or waiver will result. See Ruetz v. State (1978),
An additional reason for reversal and remand is the court's failure to provide Gann with meaningful assistance of counsel. Ind.Post-Conviction Rule 1(2) requires the court to order a copy of the petition sent to the Public Defender's Office when, as here, an affidavit of indigency is attached to the petition. Ind.Post-Conviction Rule 1(9) requires the Public Defender's Office to provide counsel.
Although the record does not indicate a copy of the petition was ever sent to the Public Defender's Office, the office did receive notice since it requested court doe-uments on April 7, 1989. However, the court's denial of the petition one day after it was filed precluded any meaningful assistance of counsel and warrants reversal and remand. See Russell v. State (1987), Ind.,
Also, we reverse because the court failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Ind.Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). Failure to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law is harmless error where claims presented would not entitle petitioner to relief. King v. State (1986),
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Notes
. We note the State failed to file a brief on appeal. When an issue is not argued on appeal, the appellant may obtain reversal of the lower court upon the establishment of prima facie error. Van Sant v. State (1988),
