' | gDefendants/Appellants, St. Mary Parish Sales and Use Tax Department and Barry Dufrene, in his capacity as the duly appointed Director of the St. Mary Parish Sales and Use Tax Department (collectively “the Department”), appeal from a judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, GameStop, Inc., and ordering the Department to refund to GameStop the total amount that it paid under protest, plus interest and penalties. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
GameStop is a retailer that sells new and used video game hardware, software, and accessories to retail customers at stores located in St. Mary Parish, as well as other locations around the world. As part of its regular course of business, GameStop also accepts used games from its customers if it determines that the game is in a resalable or. refurbishable condition.
An Edge Card is a stored value card, obtained by a customer for free when he/ she subscribes to Game Informer magazine, which can be loaded with the customer’s trade-in credit and may be used as payment for future purchases. An Edge Card resembles a credit card, and each Edge Card has a unique number that is found on the back of the card and is also contained within the card’s magnetic | ¡¡strip. When a customer purchases a new game and applies the trade-in credit contained on his or her Edge Card, GameStop collects sales tax on the sales price of the game, minus the trade-in amount.
The Department conducted an audit of the books and records of GameStop for the tax periods December 1, 2005, through December 31, 2007, and determined that GameStop owed additional taxes, interest, and penalties. The Department issued a notice of assessment pursuant to La. R.S. 47:337.51, assessing additional taxes allegedly due for the taxable periods in the
Thereafter, GameStop paid the entire amount reflected in the revised notice of assessment to the Department under protest and notified the Department of its intention to file suit for the recovery of the entire protest ámount, plus interest. On September 9, 2011, GameStop filed a petition for declaratory judgment and refund of taxes and related amounts paid under protest. Specifically, GameStop sought a judgment declaring the rights and liabilities of GameStop and the Department with respect to the proper application of the trade-in credits in computing the taxable sales price for each of the sale transactions at issue during the taxable period; that the Department’s revised notice of assessment is erroneous, improper, illegal, and null and void; and that GameStop properly applied the trade-in credits at issue and properly computed the taxable sales price for each of the sales transactions at issue during the taxable period.
GameStop subsequently filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asserting that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law: declaring that GameStop |4properly applied the trade-in credits relating to the Edge Card transactions at issue in this matter and properly calculated the taxable sales price and resulting sales tax owed for each of the Edge Card transactions; declaring that the Department’s assessment of additional sales tax in the amount of $1,533.67 and interest in the amount of $834.43, relating to the Edge Card transactions and the application of the trade-in credits, is erroneous, improper, illegal, and null and void; declaring that the penalty in the amount of $1,314.59 is erroneous, improper, illegal, and null and void; and ordering the Department to refund the entire amount of the additional sales tax and interest assessed by the Department, which is attributable to the Edge Card transactions, and the entire amount of assessed penalties.
The Department also filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law: declaring that all of the transactions in which games were sold by GameStop and in which all or a portion of the sales price was paid with credits previously embedded on an Edge Card are fully taxable sales at retail of articles of tangible personal property, and that the sales tax due is calculated on the total sales price, without any reduction in the sales price; declaring that all sums paid under protest by GameStop are the property of the Department as the single sales and use tax collector in St. Mary Parish; and declaring that GameS-top’s suit be dismissed with prejudice.
Following a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court signed a judgment in favor of Gam-eStop, granting its motion for partial summary judgment. The district court declared: that GameStop properly applied the trade-in credits relating to the edge card transactions at issue in this matter; that GameStop properly calculated the taxable sales price and resulting St. Mary Parish sales tax for each of the Edge Card transactions at issue; and that the Department’s | ^assessment of additional St. Mary
The Department now appeals from the district court’s judgment.
DISCUSSION
A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a full scale trial when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Johnson v. Evan Hall Sugar Cooperative, Inc., 01-2956, p. 3 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/30/02),
On a motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof is on the mover. If, however, the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the mattér that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s burden on the motion does not require that all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense be negated. Instead, the mover must point out to the court that | f;there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, the adverse party must produce factual evidence sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial. If the adverse party fails to meet this burden, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the mover is entitled to summary judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2).
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court’s determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Lieux v. Mitchell 06-0382, p. 9 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/28/06),
In interpreting statutes, we begin with the well-settled premise that taxing statutes must be strictly construed against the taxing authority, and where a tax statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, the construction favorable to the taxpayer is adopted. Cisco Evangeline, LLC v. Louisiana Tax
The fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation is legislative intent and the ascertainment of the reason or reasons that prompted the Legislature _J_jto enact the law. McLane Southern, Inc. v. Bridges, 11-1141, p. 6 (La.1/24/12),
The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Anthony Crane Rental, L.P. v. Fruge, 03-0115, p. 5 (La.10/21/03),
It is a recognized rule of statutory construction that the court must give the words of a law their generally prevailing meaning (except that words of art or technical terms must be given their technical meaning). La. C.C. art. 11; Cleco Evangeline, LLC, 01-0561 at p. 5,
The meaning and intent of a law is determined by considering the law in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter and placing a construction on the provision in question that is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the Legislature in enacting it. Black v. St. Tammany Parish Hospital, 08-2670, pp. 9-10 (La.11/6/09),
|sThe sales taxes at issue in the instant case are levied upon the “sales price” of each item or article of tangible personal property sold at retail by GameS-top in St. Mary Parish. See La. R.S. 47:302(A). “Sales price” is defined in La. R.S. 47:301(13)(a) as “the total amount for which tangible personal property is sold, less the market value of any article traded in.”
A “trade in” is commonly defined as “merchandise [that is] accepted as par
^Furthermore, the plain language of La. R.S. 47:301(13)(a) does not restrict the timing of the trade in nor does it suggest that a trade in must occur simultaneously with the sale. Rather, La. R.S. 47:301(13)(a) merely states that the sales price is to be based on the total amount for which tangible personal property is sold, less the market value of any article traded in. Words defining a tax should not be extended beyond their clear import. UTELCOM, Inc. v. Bridges, 10-0654, p. 7 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/12/11),
Therefore, we find that the market, value of items traded in, as contained on an Edge Card, can be excluded from the sales price of the item to which the value is subsequently applied, and GameStop was correct in calculating the sales tax owed to the Department based on the sales price of the items, minus the Edge Card credit amount.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. All costs of this appeal in the amount of $2,279.50 are assessed to St. Mary Parish Sales and Use Tax Department and Barry Dufrene, in his Capacity as the Duly | inAppointed Director of the St. Mary Parish Sales and Use Tax Department.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. GameStop also accepts used hardware and accessories; however, only transactions involving the acceptance of used video games are at issue in the instant case.
. The market value of an item traded-in is pre-determined and based on a proprietary GameStop formula. However, if the customer elects to receive cash for his trade-in, the determined trade-in amount is reduced by twenty percent. If the customer has an Edge Card, the trade-in amount is increased by ten percent.
. For purposes of the instant matter, GameS-top only disputes the amount of taxes and related interest attributable to the Edge Card transactions and penalties, which total protest amount equals $3,682.69.
. The judgment also contains a designation that the judgment is certified as a final judgment for purposes of appeal purposes pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B) after determining that there is no just reason for delay. Based on our de novo review of the matter, we find that the trial court properly certified the judgment as final for purposes of an immediate appeal. See R.J. Messinger. Inc. v. Rosenblum, 04-1664, pp. 14-15 (La.3/2/05),
. Although the sales tax at issue is a local sales tax, the definition of "sales price" has the same meaning as that provided for in La. R.S. 47:301. See La. R.S. 47:337.6(B).
. The Department relies on LAC 61:1.4301 in support of its argument that the trade in must occur simultaneously with the sale. However, as we have noted, the statutory language contains no language regarding the timing of the trade in. Tax regulations cannot extend the taxing jurisdiction of the statute, as taxes are imposed by the legislature, not the Department. See UTELCOM, Inc., 10-0654 at p. 9,