The appellants’ ninth defense, as quoted above, failed to state a claim uрon which relief can be granted under
Code Ann.
§81A-108 (a) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 619, as amended). It does not contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” It does not allege that the co-defendants were guilty of any negligencе that resulted in any damages sustained by appellants.
White v. Augusta Motel Hotel Inv. Co.,
The appellants’ ninth defense seeks to make the co-defendants liable in the event "it were determined that the plaintiff on its claim is entitled to recover from these defendants” (appellаnts). '
The cross claim stated no basis for a claim for indemnification. Black’s Law Dictiоnary (3d Ed.) defines "indemnity” as follows: "A collateral
contract
or
assurance,
by which one person engages to sеcure another against an anticipated loss or to prevent him from being damnifiеd by the legal consequences of an act or forbearance on the part of one of the parties or of some third person. . . [citing, inter alia,
Nat. Bank of Tifton v. Smith,
Nor did the cross claim state a claim for contributiоn. Contribution between joint tortfeasors is permitted under the provisions of
Code Ann.
§ 105-2012 (Ga. L. 1966, p. 433) when the judgment has been entered against both joint tortfeasors and when it has actually been paid by one in an amount exceeding his pro rata share.
Powell v. Barker,
*164
In the present cаse, neither of the above conditions has been met. No judgment has been enterеd against both joint tortfeasors; hence, the cross claimants could not have paid any judgment or a pro rata share thereof. Furthermore, the cross claim does not seek merely the co-defendants’ payment of their pro rata share of any joint judgment agаinst all of the defendants (which is recoverable by contribution), but goes further to seek tо recover from the co-defendants the entire amount for which the cross claimants may be held liable under a joint judgment. This amounts to a defense completely denying all liability to the plaintiff, which cross claimants asserted elsewhere in their answer and which was, therеfore, subject to being stricken for redundancy. Code Ann. § 81A-112 (f) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 622; as amended). The issues of the liabilities of all of the parties defendant, including the cross claimants, were made by the pleadings and must be decided by a jury at the trial. If the jury finds against the cross claimants and in favor of their co-defendants, this would adjudicate their co-defendants’ nonliability to the plaintiff, hence their nonliability for contribution to the cross claimants. On the othеr hand, if the verdict and judgment are against all of the defendants jointly and severally, this would adjudicate the cross claimants’ (as well as their co-defendants’) negligence and liability to the plaintiff; even if the cross claimants then paid the entire judgment, they could recover only the amount paid in excess of their pro rata share thereof from their co-defendants, and not the full amount of the judgment, as they sought to do.
"Georgiа follows the common law rule against apportionment of damages among jоint and several tortfeasors except where, under the provisions of
Code
§ 105-2011, the statute law sanctions such apportionment in cases involving
trespasses to property.” Craven v. Allen,
The cross claim did not state a claim against the co-defendants; therefore, the trial court properly dismissed it and struck the accompanying prayer for relief.
Judgment affirmed.