139 So. 2d 39 | La. Ct. App. | 1962
Lead Opinion
The plaintiff, a citizen, qualified voter, and a taxpayer of Ward 3, Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, who has a child in a school in such Ward operated by the Calcasieu Parish School Board, brought this suit for a declaratory judgment to determine the number of members of such School Board that should be elected from Ward 3. Plaintiff contends that Ward 3 of Calcasieu Parish is entitled to six members on the Calcasieu Parish School Board, whereas it is represented by only one member thereon. Made defendant herein was the Calcasieu Parish School Board, who contends that that portion of Ward 3 of Calcasieu Parish which lies outside the territory controlled by the Lake Charles City School Board is entitled to one representative on the Parish School Broad.
Made defendant herein also is Wade O. Martin, the Secretary of State. The Trial Judge rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, William A. Gamble, and from that judgment the Calcasieu Parish School Board perfected this appeal to this Court.
The determination of this question involves an interpretation of LSA-R.S. 17:52, which reads as follows:
“The membership of each parish school board shall be as follows:
“There shall be elected by the qualified voters of each police jury ward of the several parishes of the state a member of the school board of such parish for each police juror in said ward, whose term of office shall be for a period of six years.
“When the parish school board has no jurisdiction over or control of the public schools of a city in such parish, and when the limits of a ward of such parish extend beyond the limits of such city, only that part of the ward outside the limits of the city shall be represented on the parish school board, and shall have only one member of said board, who shall be an elector of the ward living outside the limits of the city, and shall be elected by the voters of the ward living and voting outside the limits of the said city.
“The election of parish school board members shall be at the congressional elections. School board members in office as of July 28th, 1948, shall serve out the terms for which they were elected; their successors and all other school board members elected in the future shall be elected for terms of six years. The parish school boards of the several parishes, as occasion may arise on account of the increase in the membership by the creation of additional wards or the increase of membership for any single ward, shall by proper resolution maintain the three divisions of the membership of the school boards existing on July 28th, 1948, as nearly equal as possible by allotting such new members to one of the three divisions, and when so allotted the term of office of such new member or members shall expire at the same time that the terms of the other members of the said division expire.
“To be a member of a parish school board one shall, in addition to the qualifications otherwise prescribed by law, be able to read and write.”
The City of Lake Charles is situated within the geographical limits of Ward 3.
By Act No. 90 of 1906 the Legislature created a separate school system for Lake Charles to be operated by a City School Board composed of five members, having all the powers of Parish School Boards within the corporate limits. Accordingly, that part of Ward 3 outside the limits of the city, for many years, has been represented on the Parish School Board by one member in accordance with the third paragraph of the above quoted statute.
As a result of subsequent extension of the city limits of Lake Charles, to include areas in which the Calcasieu Parish School Board has established and was operating schools, there are now 11 public schools within the city limits of Lake Charles which are maintained and operated by the Parish School Board. However, the Parish School Board does not operate any school within the geographical limits of Lake Charles that existed on January 1, 1946. All schools therein are still maintained and operated by the City School Board. On the other hand, all of the schools within the area taken in by extension of the city limits subsequent to January 1, 1946 are within the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the Parish School Board. The plaintiff urges that the number of school board members to which Ward 3 is entitled under the law should be determined by the second paragraph of LSA-R.S. 17:52, in which case there would be six members of the Cal-casieu Parish School Board elected from Ward 3. The Calcasieu Parish School Board urges that the third paragraph of the statute in question is applicable to the situation, and that portion of Ward 3 outside the city school system of Lake Charles should be represented on the school board by only one member of the said school board.
The Calcasieu Parish School Board’s position reflects the practice that has been followed in Calcasieu Parish for many years. Unquestionably, the third paragraph of the statute governed the situation prior to 1946 when all of the public schools within the city limits of Lake Charles were within the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the city school board. Now, how-ever, the Calcasieu Parish School Board has jurisdiction and control of public schools within a certain geographical area in such city and for this reason the plaintiff contends that the third paragraph of LSA-R.S. 17:52 is inapplicable and that the situation must necessarily be governed by the second paragraph of this section of the statute.
The question presented to this Court is of great concern to this Court and we feel of great concern to the residents of that portion of Ward 3 outside the city limits of Lake Charles as the city limits existed in 1946 and the Calcasieu Parish School Board. We feel that regardless of the decision of this Court that inequities will prevail. A judgment in favor of plaintiff will mean that that portion of Ward 3 of Calcasieu Parish outside of the corporate limits of the city of Lake Charles as of January 1, 1946 will be entitled to six school board members as there are six police jurors representing Ward 3, as Act No. 236 of 1914, amended Act No. 90 of 1906, and provided that electors residing in the City of Lake Charles would be ineligible to serve as members of the Parish School Board and to vote for members of the parish school board. This would in effect allocate membership on a population basis on the entire ward which would exclude members from a large portion of the ward. On the other hand, judgment in favor of the defendant would mean that residents of Ward 3, living outside of the corporate limits of the city of Lake Charles as it existed in January of 1946 are entitled to only one member on the Calcasieu Parish School Board and this Court is cognizant of the fact that the corporate limits of the city of Lake Charles have been extended since 1946 and the surrounding areas of Lake Charles in Ward 3 have grown in population immensely in the last years. However, this Court may only interpret the laws as passed by the legislature. If any inequities result as a result of the laws and our interpretation thereof they
The wording of paragraph three is clear and unambiguous. It provides that:
“When the parish school board has no jurisdiction over or control of the public schools of a city in such parish, and when the limits of a ward of such parish extend beyond the limits of such city, only that part of the ward outside the limits of the city shall be represented on the parish school board, and shall have only one member of said board, who shall be an elector of the ward living outside the limits of the city, and shall be elected by the voters of the ward living and voting outside the limits of the said city.”
This is not the case in Lake Charles. As a result of the annexation of geographical area in the city of Lake Charles subsequent to 1946 the parish school board has jurisdiction and exclusive control of 11 schools within the city limits of Lake Charles.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in the case of Avant v. Ouachita Parish School Board, 215 La. 990, 41 So.2d 854 (1949), held that:
“Section 17 of Act No. 100 of 1922 was intended to apply, we think, where a city owns, maintains and operates exclusively all of the public schools within its limits and where the parish school board’s activities are restricted to the schools of the parish located outside or beyond those limits. In that situation the parish school board would have no jurisdiction over or control of the public schools of (in) the city in such parish.
“Since the Ouachita Parish School Board has jurisdiction over and control of many of the public schools of (in) the City of Monroe, the disputed language of Section 17 is not applicable here. * * * ” (Italics by Court).
The Court further stated:
“It would seem manifestly unreasonable and unfair if the Legislature, by the language of Section 17, intended to deny to the people of a city representation on the parish school board where such board, as in the instant case, owns, maintains and operates numerous public schools within the limits of that city. Clearly, people so situated should be represented in the formulating and directing of policy, if for no other reason, with respect to the education of their children.”
Counsel for defendant argues that there is a great difference between the Monroe and Lake Charles School Systems in that the Monroe City school system and the parish school board in Ouachita have non-exclusive and 100% overlapping jurisdiction in the same area. He points out that in Monroe children may go to either the city schools or to the parish schools as they choose, while in Lake Charles the children living within the jurisdiction or limits of the city school system must go to the Lake Charles city schools while children living in the jurisdiction of the parish schools must go to the parish schools. He points out that in Lake Charles the city school system is a separate school district within a certain fixed area and the parish school system is a separate school district within another fixed area. While the two school systems differ the Calcasieu Parish School Board has jurisdiction over and control of 11 public schools in the city of Lake Charles and, accordingly, under the express terms of paragraph 3 of LSA-R.S. 17:52 is not covered by said paragraph.
Counsel for defendant further urges that the legislature enacting the third paragraph of LSA-R.S. 17:52 meant “city school system” rather than “city”. The terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous. The courts are not at liberty to insert words into a legislative expression unless the terms of the statutes are
In addition to decreeing that Ward Three of Calcasieu Parish is entitled to have a member of the Calcasieu Parish School Board for each juror in said ward, the trial court decree also decreed that they should be elected at the next congressional election by the qualified voters of Ward Three residing outside the corporate limits of the City of Lake Charles that existed January 1, 1946. Such decree was beyond the relief requested by the prayer of the petition; and accordingly, the District Court judgment is amended so as to delete the provision relating to when and by whom the additional school board members are to be elected. As thus amended the judgment is affirmed.
Amended and affirmed.
HOOD, J., dissents and will assign written reasons.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissents and assigns written reasons).
I cannot agree with the conclusions reached by the majority in this case. I realize, as did the majority, that any decision which might be rendered on the issues presented here will result in some inequities. In construing statutes, however, the primary object is to ascertain, and if possible give effect to, the intention and purpose of the legislature as expressed in those statutes. Fruge v. Muffoletto, La., 137 So.2d 336, decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court. If inequities result from such a construction then the matter of correcting them addresses itself to the legislature rather than to the courts. In this case the majority opinion places an interpretation on the laws here being considered which in my opinion does not give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature as expressed in those statutes.
The majority states that this case involves an interpretation of LSA-R.S. 17 :- 52, which was quoted in the opinion which they rendered. I think it involves an interpretation not only of that section of the Revised Statutes, but also an interpretation of Act 39 of 1946 and the amendment to Article 12, Section 15, of the Louisiana Constitution which was adopted in 1946, LSA. My conscientious colleagues who constitute the majority have concluded that the second paragraph of LSA-R.S. 17:52 is applicable, and accordingly they have held that the membership of the Calcasieu Parish School Board must be increased to include six members from Ward 3, instead of one. In my opinion they have failed to give effect to the 1946 act and to the constitutional amendment adopted that year, and that if that act and that constitutional amendment had been given the effect which I think was intended then they would have been compelled to conclude that paragraph three of LSA-R.S. 17:52 continues to apply, as it has in the past, and that there can be only one member of the Calcasieu Parish School Board from Ward 3, until the legislature sees fit to change the law.
Also, I think the majority erred in holding that the important issue of “when and by whom the additional school board members are to be elected” is beyond the relief requested by plaintiff. That issue is so interrelated with the question of how many members from Ward 3 are to be on the Parish School Board, that it is essential
Article 17 of the LSA-Civil Code provides that “Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, must be construed with a reference to each other; what is clear in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another.” Article 18 of the Code provides that “The universal and most effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when its expressions are dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it or the cause which induced the legislature to enact it.” (Emphasis added.)
The jurisprudence of this State also has been established to the effect that all statutory provisions are to be given effect whenever possible, and that a fair and reasonable interpretation in reconciling seeming conflicts must be given. Chappuis v. Reggie, 222 La. 35, 62 So.2d 92; Comegys v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Company, 227 La. 657, 80 So.2d 110 and Roberts v. City of Baton Rouge, 236 La. 521, 108 So.2d 111.
For a proper interpretation of the statutes which are the subject of this action for a declaratory judgment, I think it is necessary to consider laws in pari materia, to construe all laws upon the same subject matter with reference to each other, to examine into the reason and spirit of those laws or the cause which induced the legislature to enact them, and to give to such laws a fair and reasonable interpretation so as to reconcile seeming conflicts, if possible.
As pointed out by the majority, a separate school system for the City of Lake Charles was created by Act 90 of 1906, and a City School Board was established as its governing authority. Since the enactment of that statute, all public schools in the area which was then included in the corporate limits of the City of Lake Charles have been under the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the City School Board. The law provides that each member of the City School Board “shall be a duly qualified elector of said municipality.”
By Act 236 of 1914, the legislature amended Section one of the 1906 act, to include the following significant provision:
“The electors residing in the City of Lake Charles shall be ineligible to serve as members of the parish board of directors of the public schools of Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, and to vote for members of said body.”
The above quoted provision of Act 236 of 1914, which amends the 1906 act, has never been repealed, and it is still the law of this State. Since 1914, therefore, the law has provided that a person could not be a member of the City School Board, or vote for a member of that board, unless he was an elector residing in the city, and also that an elector residing in the city could not serve as a member of the Parish School Board, or vote for a member of that board.
By Act 39 of 1946 the legislature also amended Section 4 of the 1906 act, by adding a provision which reads as follows:
“Provided, further, that the jurisdiction of the school board for the City of Lake Charles, shall include only the territory within the corporate limits of said City, as of January 1st, 1946, and that said jurisdiction shall not be affected by any extension or enlargement of the corporate limits of the City of Lake Charles.”
Also, in 1946, Section 15 of Article 12 of the Constitution, which relates to the sources and management of Parish School Funds, was amended to add the following provision:
“That whenever the limits of the City of Lake Charles are extended so as to include any property theretofore*45 subject to taxation for parish school purposes, the parish Assessor shall continue to extend upon the tax rolls all taxes levied for parish school purposes against the property included in any such extension of the city limits, as though such property had not been included with the limits of the City of Lake Charles, and the Tax Collector for such parish shall collect such taxes and remit the same in full to the Parish School Board in the manner prescribed by law.” (Emphasis added.)
The above quoted amendment to Section 15, Article 12, of the Constitution was approved by the electors on November 5, 1946. By referring to the opinion of the Supreme Court in Barbe v. City of Lake Charles, 216 La. 871, 45 So.2d 62, it appears that on November 8, 1946, or just three days after the 1946 constitutional amendment was approved, the City Council of the City of Lake Charles adopted an ordinance greatly enlarging the corporate limits of the city. It is obvious from the record, from the provisions of the statutes and from the jurisprudence that Act 39 of 1946 was adopted, and the 1946 amendment to Section 15, Article 12, of the Constitution was approved, as measures incidental to the proposed action of the City to extend its corporate limits.
It seems to me that by enacting Act 39 of 1946, and proposing the 1946 amendment to Section 15 of Article 12 of the Constitution, the legislature clearly intended to provide that any. extension of the corporate limits of the City of Lake Charles would have no effect at all upon either the City school system or the Parish school system. Using the language suggested by counsel for defendants, I think the legislature in 1946 intended to “freeze” the corporate limits of the City of Lake Charles as they were on January 1, 1946, insofar as both the City school system and the Parish school system -were concerned.
There are a number of circumstances which cause me to place that interpretation on the 1946 act and constitutional amendment. One is the fact that the legislature did not see fit to repeal, amend or change Act 236 of 1946 (amending and re-enacting Section one of Act 90 of 1906) which provides that electors residing in the City of Lake Charles shall be ineligible to serve as members of the Calcasieu Parish School Board, or to vote for members of that body. If the purpose and intent of the 1946 legislation was as I interpret it, that is to provide that any subsequent extension of the corporate limits of the city would have no effect on either of these school systems, including the membership of the school boards, then there was no need or occasion to amend the 1914 act. On the other hand, if the majority opinion is correct, to the effect that the legislature intended that the later extension of the city limits does alter the composition of the Calcasieu Parish School Board, then it seems to me that the following additional, and I think untenable, conclusions are forced upon the majority: First, under Section one of Act 90 of 1906, a qualified elector of the newly annexed area (which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Parish School Board) may serve as a member of the City School Board, and may vote for members of that board, although he cannot send his children to city schools and he pays no taxes for those schools. Second, under the same section of Act 90 of 1906, as amended by Act 236 of 1914, an elector who resides in the newly annexed area of the City of Lake Charles would be ineligible to serve as a member of the Calcasieu Parish School Board, or to vote for members of that board, although he is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Parish School Board and is subject to taxation for parish school purposes. I cannot be convinced that the legislature intended any such results. Yet, if the majority opinion remains the established jurisprudence of this State, then in the subsequent litigation which I think is bound to follow the courts will be compelled either to conclude that the legislature intended that these unjust results were to take place,
A second circumstance which causes me to disagree with my colleagues is the fact that the public officials charged with the responsibility of administering the law have construed it, before and since 1946, as calling for one representative on the Calcasieu Parish School Board from Ward 3. That has been the practical construction placed on the law by public officials and by the people of Calcasieu Parish since the corporate limits of the city were extended almost 16 years ago. In Roberts v. City of Baton Rouge, supra, the Supreme Court said:
“Further, where (and of course only where) the construction or application of a statute is doubtful, great weight in the judicial interpretation thereof should be given to the construction consistently given a statute by those charged with applying it administratively. Hester v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 227 La. 1022, 81 So.2d 381; Conley v. City of Shreveport, 216 La. 78, 43 So.2d 223; Jackson v. Coxe, 208 La. 715, 23 So.2d 312; State v. Standard Oil Co., 190 La. 338, 182 So. 531.***."
Also, in State ex rel. Guillot v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 143 La. 1053, 79 So. 857, 859, the Supreme Court held that:
“ ‘The practical construction given to a doubtful statute by the public officers of the state, and acted upon by the people thereof, is to be considered; it is perhaps decisive in case of doubt. This is similar in effect to a course of judicial decisions. The Legislature is presumed to be cognisant of such construction, and after long continuance, without any legislation evincing its dissent, courts will consider themselves warranted in adopting that construction.’ Sutherland on Statutory Construction, par. 309.” (Emphasis added.)
The construction which I think should be placed on LSA-R.S. 17:52 has continued for many years not only without legislative dissent, but with obvious legislative consent, because as recently as 1960 the legislature re-enacted that section of the Revised Statutes without making a change in language insofar as it relates to the issue presented here. Act 539 of 1960.
A third circumstance which causes me to disagree with the majority is the fact that in 1946 the population of Ward 3 outside the corporate limits of the City of Lake Charles was not sufficient to warrant a conclusion that the legislature in 1946 intended that there should be a substantial increase in the number of representatives from that ward on the Parish School Board. The record does not show the population of Ward 3 in 1946, but it does show what it was in 1950 and its present estimated population. Assuming, however, that the population in 1946 was the same as it was in 1950, an assumption which is most favorable to plaintiff, I feel that the legislature that year would not have considered increasing the representation from Ward 3 on the Parish School Board to the extent which plaintiff urges here. A substantial part of plaintiff’s argument in this case has been to the effect that there has been a tremendous increase in the population of Ward 3 since 1946, and for that reason he argues that there should be a greater representation from that ward on the Parish School Board. I agree that the population has increased during the past few years and that Ward 3 is not adequately represented on the School Board, but it is not our function or prerogative to change or amend the law simply because there has been an increase in population.
A fourth, and final, circumstance which convinces me that the majority has erred is the fact that I do not believe that the legislature intended that representation from Ward 3 on the Calcasieu Parish School Board should be based on the number of Police Jurors from that ward. The number of police jurors from Ward 3 of Calcasieu Parish is determined by the population of that ward, including the population of the City of Lake Charles. See LSA-R.S. 33:1222 and 1223. Section 15, of Article 12, of the Constitution provides that insofar as school funds are concerned “ * * * Monroe, in Ouachita Parish, and Lake Charles, in Calcasieii Parish, and Bogalusa, in Washington Parish, and no other, shall be regarded as, and treated upon the same basis and shall have the same authority in respect to this section as though they tvere separate parishes instead of municipalities.” As has already been pointed out, the City School Board has exclusive jurisdiction of all public schools within the old city limits, and Act 90 of 1906, as amended in 1914, provides that an elector residing in the City of Lake Charles shall be ineligible to serve as a member of the Parish School Board, or to vote for a member of that board. In view of these other laws, it seems illogical to me that the legislature would intend that the representation on the Calcasieu Parish School Board from Ward 3 should be based on a population count which includes the residents of the City of Lake Charles.
In my opinion, under the present law, Ward 3 is entitled to one representative on the Calcasieu Parish School Board. This representative must be a qualified elector of Ward 3, living outside the limits of the City of Lake Charles as they existed on January 1, 1946, and he shall be elected by the voters of that ward living and voting outside the limits of the city as those limits existed on January 1, 1946.
For the reasons herein assigned, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
Rehearing
On Application for Rehearing.
En Banc. Rehearing denied.
SAVOY, J., recused.
HOOD, J., is of the opinion that a rehearing should be granted.