26 Cal. 46 | Cal. | 1864
This is an action upon a promissory note for seven hundred and eighty-two dollars and ninety-two cents, executed September 1, 1862, and payable on the 15th of October of the same year, in United States coin. The defendant Lewis tendered the amount due upon the note February 1st, 1863, in United States notes. The action was brought May 13, 1863.
In Lick v. Faulkner this Court decided that the Act of Con-
In the case of Carpentier v. Atherton we decided that the Act passed by the Legislature of this State April 27, 1863, commonly called the “ Specific Contract Act,” was purely remedial in its character, and conflicted neither with the Act of Congress nor with any known public policy. In the case of Carpentier v. Atherton the note upon which the action was brought was executed after the passage of the Act of April 27, 1863 ; but in the case at bar the note was executed about five months before, and it is now insisted that the plaintiff cannot claim the benefit of that Act, on the ground that it is not retroactive in effect.
In all the cases where laws confessedly retrospective have been' declared void, it has been upon the ground that such laws were in conflict with some vested right, secured either by some constitutional guarantee or protected by the principles of universal justice. (Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch. 43.) But when an Act like the one now in question takes a contract as it finds it, and simply enforces a performance of it according to its terms, it is not liable to objection because it may have a retroactive operation by way of relation to past events. The Constitution of this State does not prohibit retrospective legislation; and the Act of 1863, instead of being opposed to the principles of essential justice, is approved of them all. When we decided, in Carpentier v. Atherton, that the Act was purely remedial, we in effect disposed of the present objection.
But it is further insisted that, inasmuch as the tender was made before thé Act of 1863 was passed, that the defendant had a vested interest in that defense, of which the Legislature could not deprive him.
The case of Carpentier v. Atherton disposes of this objection also. United States notes are lawful tender “in respect to debts that are payable in money generally, but as to the con
It was held in Brewer v. Thorp, 3 Ind. 262, that “where a contract for the future conveyance of land requires that the vendee shall labor for a specific period for the vendor, the vendee cannot entitle himself to the conveyance by tendering a sum of money as an equivalent for the non-performance of the labor.” It was not, in our judgment, the intention of the Act of Congress to interfere with the obligations of contracts. A contract payable in coin is not prohibited, nor has there as yet been any legislation on the part of the General Government discountenancing contracts of that character as being detrimental to the public good. A promissory note
The judgment is reversed, with directions to the Court below to enter a judgment upon the findings in conformity with the views expressed in this opinion.