188 Pa. 95 | Pa. | 1898
Opinion by
The plaintiff’s trade was that of supervising and directing
Gallagher continued his service under the contract until October 10, 1898, without friction, so far as appears from the correspondence. On that day, however, this explicit order was given him in writing: “ In the work at Overbrook we want you to set up the traps just as they are designed to be placed by the American District Steam Company.” To this Gallagher replied by letter of October T2, in which he says: “ Your favor of the 10th received in reference to the manner we connect our steam traps; ” he then at length states how in his opinion they should be constructed, and closes with this emphatic language: “ I do object to the criticism of any one who thinks he knows and don’t know the true principles of the subject discussed. A person should be judged more by his deeds than his words, and in conclusion would say I would not think for one moment of changing the construction of our work unless something better was offered, and must most respectfully decline to accept anything to the contrary, when I know I am right in my claims, which are the result of a profitable and extensive experience in my line of work.” To this letter, Secretary Smith replied the next day, stating he had inadvertently signed his letter of the 10th, Wendell & Smith, instead of as secretary, and further stating that he did not see that there was enough difference in the respective methods to warrant the stand taken by Gallagher, and expressing the hope that he would set the next traps just as they come, and thus save himself from the accusation of obstinacy.
There is no further correspondence, but much evidence that Gallagher persisted in setting the traps according to his methods, up until January, 1894. There was, besides, some friction between him and his employer on other subjects; on the 24th of that month, Secretary Smith, peremptorily, in writing, discharged
As to the alleged error in the admission of evidence, it is not sustained. The plaintiff denied any violation of instructions, and alleged that his discharge was prompted solely by defendant’s desire to get clear of paying his salary, "and to employ another superintendent at half what it contracted to pay him. Plaintiff offered to prove that another superintendent was immediately employed at a salary of $1,200; the court admitted the evidence, and defendant excepted. If, as plaintiff alleged, he was competent, which defendant did not deny, and if, as he further alleged, he had faithfully performed the contract on his part, his averment that his discharge was without cause was improbable, for why discharge an entirely faithful and competent officer ? He undertook to rebut the improbability by showing that it was done on the score of economy. True, the defendant replied, the new officer was to perform only half the work Gallagher contracted to do, but all the evidence on that subject was for the jury. We are of opinion that there was no error in admitting the testimony.
The remaining five -assignments, in substance, embrace but one subject, the court’s instruction on the significance of the evidence tending to show cause or want of it for the discharge. The learned judge, after referring to the agreement and correctly instructing the jury that, by its terms, if Gallagher disobeyed or did not heed the orders of his employer, it had a right to discharge him at any period of the year, and Gallagher could not sustain an action for damages, further said to them, however : “ Now, the whole question for you, therefore, so far as this disobedience is concerned, is, was there a clear, positive
We think this instruction was error, and, necessarily, did great injustice to the defendant. Mr. Smith, the secretary, was a member of the firm of Wendell & Smith, and in plaintiff’s contract he expressly agrees to take charge of any work given by them to the Wayne company, of which Mr. Smith was also secretary, and before October 10, much work was given by Wendell & Smith to the company. Doubtless, Gallagher knew the relations of Smith to both companies, and it is clear from his own letter in reply that he knew the order was from his own company, inadvertently signed by Mr. Smith, Wendell & Smith, for the firm of which he was a partner, instead of by Smith, secretary for the company of which he was an officer; for he does not intimate that the writers have no authority to direct his work, and, therefore, he declines to comply, but he declines solely because he knows best how to do the work. And then, when Mr. Smith, in the letter of October 13, points out the mistake in signature, Gallagher does not withdraw his contumacious and offensive language in his letter, but leaves it stand as the expression of his opinion that the instructions of his employer are prompted by ignorance of their business. To hold, because of the mistake in signature, this significant letter
The judgment is reversed, and a v. f. d. n. awarded.