114 P. 943 | Or. | 1911
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
The real controversy at the trial was whether the description of the property sought to be recovered, as set out in the complaint, will justify a recovery without proof that it is included in the description contained in the deed from Genger to the trustees. There being no issue as to plaintiff’s ownership of the property, he confined his proof to the erection of a fence on the western line of the property and his occupancy of the premises' from the year 1888. There was no proof tending to show the location upon the ground of the west line of the tract as described in the deed; nor does it appear from the complaint that the property described in the deed from Genger to the trustees is the property known as the “Pine Grove Church Property,” but that fact appears from the evidence.
David Hunter, a witness for plaintiff, testified, in substance, that he is acquainted with the Pine Grove Church property; has known it for about 25 years; was for 15 years a trustee of the United Brethren Church; that he knows where the west boundary of the property has been during that time; that in the fall of 1888 he helped build the fence on that line (referring to the fence removed by defendants) ; that “there was an understanding with Genger. He had made some objections in regard to
“That when proprietors of contiguous estates, the boundaries of which are indefinite and unascertained, agree upon the lines dividing their estates, the calls in their respective deeds, fasten themselves upon the property to which they are thus applied, and the title passed by the conveyances covers and includes every part of the property so identified as being comprehended within the description.”
This language is quoted with approval in Lennox v. Hendricks, 11 Or. 33, 37 (4 Pac. 515.) In Egan v. Finney, 42 Or. 599 (72 Pac. 133), Mr. Chief Justice Moore holds that a division line agreed upon between adjacent owners of real property, and acquiesced in for a long time, is a circumstance tending to show that it was. built upon the true boundary.
Therefore we conclude that, under the description in the complaint, plaintiff has established a prima, facie case.
On the trial defendants admitted that they removed the fence as alleged in the complaint, and offered some evidence to establish that the true west line of the property described in the deed to the trustees is eight or ten feet east of the old location of the west fence. Germond, deputy county surveyor, is the only witness who attempts to testify upon that matter. He says that he surveyed a piece of property there for Mr. Gallagher and established the northwest corner of the church property (which is the beginning point for defendants’ fence). He testifies as to no facts in regard to the survey or the data from which he made it. This is not competent evidence of the true location of the corner or line but only his opinion.
Judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Rehearing
On Petition for Rehearing.
Opinion by
Counsel for defendant contends that the deed from Genger to Collins, through which defendant claims title, conveys all the land owned by him not conveyed to the church people, which, he says, grants the very strip in dispute. But the statement assumes that the strip in dispute is not in the tract conveyed to the church people which can be made to appear only by proof of the location of the west line of the church tract. The only evidence that that line is other than the location of the old fence is the evidence of Germond, the surveyor, which is not the evidence of any fact, but the opinion of a witness.
Defendant contends that this evidence, not being objected to, was relevant and material, and sufficient to prove the fact. He does not testify to the facts, but gives his conclusion, based upon a former survey made by himself, without the facts upon which it is based, viz., the correct starting point of the survey and the correct courses and distances. We must be enabled to follow in the footsteps of the surveyor. Aside from the authorities cited in the opinion, it is said in Stewart v. Carleton, 31 Mich. 273:
“It appears to have been supposed that the surveyors are competent, not only to testify to measurements and distances, but also to pass judgment themselves, and on
To the same effect are Radford v. Johnson, 8 N. D. 182 (77 N. W. 601); O’Brien v. Cavanaugh, 61 Mich. 368 (28 N. W. 127). In Burt v. Busch, 82 Mich. 506 (46 N. W. 790), it is said that “they (surveyors) may detail facts, but, when they have no knowledge of facts, their opinions or conjectures cannot control to establish or disturb boundaries. * * The question of location of a starting point for a surveyor is one of fact for the jury, and not one of theory to be determined finally upon the opinion of surveyors or experts.” In Olin v. Henderson, 120 Mich. 149, 154 (79 N. W. 178), the following instruction given to the jury was approved:
“It is for you to fix that (the starting point of the survey) by the evidence in this case; and the fact that a surveyor unless he has the original monument to start from has made a survey, and what he believes or claims to be the property, is no evidence of that property, except such as you may find that he has started from the original point.”
So, also, Reast v. Donald, 84 Tex. 648 (19 S. W. 795). A surveyor can testify to any fact within his knowledge, but his opinion or conclusion of facts based upon a survey made by him is not competent, at least without giving the details of the survey. Therefore, even though the evidence of the surveyor was not objected to, it was not evidence of a fact but the conclusion of the witness, and, as stated in the opinion, there is no proof that the west line of the church property is other than where the old fence was located. It necessarily follows that there
The petition is denied.
Affirmed: Rehearing Denied.