Erika GALINDO, individually and as parent, guardian, and next friend of Ariana Guadalupe Galindo, a minor child; and Jose Galindo, individually and as parent, guardian, and next friend of Ariana Guadalupe Galindo, a minor child, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VALLEY VIEW ASSOCIATION, d/b/a/ Valley View Hospital, Defendant-Appellee.
Court of Appeals No. 16CA1005
Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. IV.
Announced June 1, 2017
2017 COA 78
Jaudon & Avery LLP, David H. Yun, Jared R. Ellis, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
The Law Office of Natalie L. Decker, LLC, Natalie L. Decker, Littleton, Colorado; Michael J. Norton, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Family Action
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES.
¶ 1 Plaintiffs, Erika and Jose Galindo, are the parents of Ariana Guadalupe Galindo, who died in utero. They have brought claims against Valley View Association, doing business as Valley View Hospital (the hospital), seeking damages on behalf of themselves and Ariana‘s estate. They allege that medical personnel at the hospital acted negligently in diagnosing and treating Mrs. Galindo when she went to the hospital showing signs of a ruptured placenta. They further assert that as a result of that negligence, Ariana died and they were injured.
¶ 2 The district court dismissed the claims plaintiffs assert based on Ariana‘s death and sua sponte certified its order as final under
I. Additional Background
¶ 3 Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts causes of action against the hospital for negligence on behalf of Mr. Galindo, Mrs. Galindo, and Ariana (or her estate); negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of Mrs. Galindo; loss of consortium on behalf of Mr. Galindo; and wrongful death on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Galindo. It also asserts that damages can be awarded for Ariana‘s pre-death injuries under the survival statute,
¶ 4 Shortly before trial, the district court ordered the parties to brief the issue whether an unborn fetus (who was not subsequently born alive) is a “person” within the meaning of the wrongful death and survival statutes. (The wrongful death statute,
¶ 5 The court postponed the trial. After considering the parties’ briefs, the court ruled that Ariana was not a “person” within the meaning of the statutes, and it dismissed the wrongful death claim and the negligence claim brought on behalf of Ariana‘s estate.3
¶ 6 Plaintiffs appealed the order. After the appeal was fully briefed, the clerk assigned the case to this division. The division then ordered the parties to brief the issue whether the district court had properly certified the order as final under Rule 54(b), directing them specifically to explain why there was no just reason to delay an appeal until the entire case has been resolved, and, even more specifically, to explain what hardship or injustice would result to any party if the appeal is not allowed to proceed. See Allison v. Engel, 2017 COA 43, ¶ 1, 395 P.3d 1217 (to show that there is no just reason for delay, it must appear that “a party would experience some hardship or injustice through delay that could be alleviated only by an immediate appeal“). Having considered the parties’ supplemental briefs and the record, we conclude that the district court‘s conclusory ruling that there is no just reason for delay is unsupported by the record or law.
II. The Requirements of Rule 54(b)
¶ 7 Rule 54(b) creates an exception to the rule that an appellate court has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments. Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123, 1125, 1126 (Colo. 1982). But that exception is quite limited, and it must be construed consistently with the historical policy against allowing piecemeal appeals. Allison, ¶ 31.
¶ 8 A court correctly certifies a ruling as final under the rule only if (1) it is on an entire claim for relief; (2) it ultimately disposes of the claim; and (3) the court determines expressly that there is no just reason to delay an appeal on the ruling. Lytle v. Kite, 728 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo. 1986); Harding Glass, 640 P.2d at 1125; Allison, ¶ 24.
¶ 9 In this case, we assume that the ruling satisfies the first two parts of this test.4 We focus on part three.
III. Standard of Review—No Just Reason for Delay
¶ 10 Ordinarily, we review a district court‘s determination that there is no just reason for delay for an abuse of discretion. Lytle, 728 P.2d at 308, 309; Allison, ¶ 25. We do so because determining whether there is no just reason for delay requires considering interests of judicial administration and equitable factors, see Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980); Lytle, 728 P.2d at 309, and “the district court is ‘most likely to be familiar with the case and with any justifiable reasons for delay.‘” Allison, ¶ 25 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956)).5
¶ 12 In this case, the district court didn‘t give any explanation as to why it was certifying the ruling, much less any explanation as to why there was no just reason for delay. The record doesn‘t otherwise reveal some obvious explanation.7 Thus, we will carefully scrutinize the district court‘s decision without according it deference.
IV. Analysis—No Just Reason for Delay
¶ 13 The hospital concedes that the district court improperly certified the ruling. It gleans from the court‘s ruling and the court‘s decision to stay the proceedings pending this appeal that the court sought to avoid multiple trials, and it recognizes that Allison holds that that reason is “plainly insufficient to justify certification because the same could be said about any case involving multiple claims or parties as to which a dispositive ruling is entered on one claim, or as to one party, before trial.” Allison, ¶ 40.
¶ 14 Plaintiffs, however, try to justify the court‘s certification in four ways.
¶ 15 First, they argue that unlike the situation in Harding Glass, the claims the court dismissed in this case are “entire stand-alone claims.” But that goes mainly to the first two parts of the Rule 54(b) certification test, not the issue whether there is no just reason for delay.8
¶ 16 Second, and similarly, plaintiffs argue that this case is not like Allison, where the court had dismissed one counterclaim while various claims and counterclaims remained pending. That‘s true, but the difference is merely one of degree, not kind. That this case involves dismissal of a greater percentage of claims says nothing about whether there is no just reason for delay, or even more specifically about whether any party will suffer hardship or injustice unless this appeal proceeds.
¶ 17 Third, plaintiffs assert that this appeal involves “an issue of first impression” that we “will inevitably have to address.” Many cases, however, involve issues of first impression. Plaintiffs haven‘t cited any authority for the proposition that the presence of such an issue justifies Rule 54(b) certification, and we haven‘t found any. See Braswell Shipyards, 2 F.3d at 1336 (deeming that reason insuffi
¶ 18 Moreover, the assumption that we will have to decide the “person” issue at some point in this case may prove incorrect. If a fact finder determines that the hospital wasn‘t negligent, and that finding is affirmed on appeal, that would be an independent basis for affirming the judgment on the wrongful death claim and the negligence claim brought on behalf of Ariana‘s estate pursuant to the survival statute. Because all of the claims are premised on exactly the same allegations of negligence, the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion would thus bar relitigation of the matter of the hospital‘s negligence, even if we decided the “person” issue differently. See Argus Real Estate, Inc. v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 109 P.3d 604, 608 (Colo. 2005) (claim preclusion); Bebo Constr. Co. v. Mattox & O‘Brien, P.C., 990 P.2d 78, 84-85 (Colo. 1999) (issue preclusion).10 In any event, the fact that we may be called on to decide the issue at some point doesn‘t mean that any party will suffer hardship or injustice if we don‘t decide it now.
¶ 19 Fourth, plaintiffs assert in purely conclusory fashion that dismissing the appeal will be “harmful to the parties” and “the justice system as a whole.” We don‘t see how. Requiring all issues in the case to be resolved before an appeal in no way hinders any party‘s access to justice. Rather, it promotes such access in a more efficient fashion.
¶ 20 The district court‘s ruling is inappropriate for certification under Rule 54(b) for the added reason that the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims are closely interrelated. See Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 10 (a court should consider “the interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent piecemeal appeals in cases which should be reviewed only as single units“); Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 167; Braswell Shipyards, 2 F.3d at 1337; Consol. Rail Corp., 861 F.2d at 326; Solomon, 782 F.2d at 62; see also 10 Moore‘s Federal Practice § 54.23[1][a]; 10 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2659, at 108-10. The operative facts of all of the claims are the same. Mr. and Mrs. Galindo remain parties to the unadjudicated claims. See Consol. Rail Corp., 861 F.2d at 326 (“Application of Rule 54(b) is particularly inappropriate ‘when the contestants on appeal remain, simultaneously, contestants below.‘” (quoting Spiegel v. Trs. of Tufts Coll., 843 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1988))). And, as discussed, the key issue common to all the claims is whether the hospital was negligent. So while the dismissed claims may be separate from the other claims asserted by Mr. and Mrs. Galindo individually, all the claims are so closely interrelated that allowing piecemeal appeals would be counterproductive. Cf. Clark v. Baka, 593 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2010) (in action seeking damages for injuries caused to child during birth at hospital, district court improperly certified judgment in favor of one defendant, a hospital management company, where claims against the remaining health care providers arose out of the same facts).
V. Conclusion
¶ 21 The appeal is dismissed.
JUDGE GRAHAM and JUDGE WELLING concur.
JUDGE J. JONES