20 Fla. 171 | Fla. | 1883
delivered. the opinion of the court.
The subject matter of this controversy is a tract of land in Madison county, Florida. All of the parties, plaintiffs and defendants, except J. Leroy Gale and her husband, Frank P. Gale, and Sarah E. Ward and her husband, John E. Ward, maintain that the property is the subject of a trust under, and is controlled by the will of Andrew Hampton, who died in the State of Georgia, in the year 1840, and that under this will and a deed from Rachel Griffin, the daughter of Andrew Hampton, who had, as they allege, a life estate under the will, the present existing equitable interest in the land is divisible into six parts, one of which goes to each of the children of Hardy Griffin and Rachel Griffin. That is to say, one part each to Ella L. Harby and William L>. Griffin, children of Hardy and Rachel Griffin, one part to J. Leroy Gale, who is the sole heir of J. L. Griffin, a son of Hardy and Rachel, one part to Joseph L. Lelia and Eugene Griffin, heirs at law of A. A. Griffin, a son of Hardy and Rachel, one part to Lucia Jones and Hattie Vandiver, children of Mary E. Whitlock, a daughter of Hardy and Rachel Griffin, one part to S. Janie Hines, a child óf S. Janie McGehee, who was a daughter of Hardy and Rachel Griffin. Plaintiffs seek a partition of the land according to this view, and such is the prayer of the bill. ■ The defendant, Leroy P. Gale, on the other hand insists that the laud was the property of A. A. Griffin and Joseph L. Griffin, children of Hardy and Rachel Griffin, that they held it as tenants in common, and that she as the sole heir of Joseph L. Griffin is entitled to one-half
The Circuit Court sustained the view of the plaintiffs, and made a decree accordingly, from which only two of the defendants, J. Leroy Gale and her husband,-appealed, which appeal is entered after a severance as to the interests of E. P. Gale and wife.
The first ground of appeal is that the merits of the cause are with the appellants.
The will of Andrew Hampton and the relationship of the parties to him is not denied. The interest which went
The deed of Linton to A. A. and J. L. Griffin being absolute on its face, the next question hei’e involved is whether it can by shown by parol testimony that they purchased as trustees with a knowledge of the trust; that the cash purchase money was money realized from sales of property coming to the children under the will, aud that the subsequent payments upon the land were made from moneys realized though the cultivation of the land by slaves belonging to the trust property and derived under the will. Perry on Trusts, in treating of this subject, asks the question, “ whether trust money can be followed into land by parol evidence,” and he answers the question by stating that “ it is clearly established it may on the ground that a purchase with trust money is virtually a purchase paid (pr by the cestui que trust, and such a purchase is a trust by operation of law and not within the statute of frauds, and the fund may be followed so long as its general character can be identified.” Perry on Trusts, §§138, 127.
Sir William Grant, in Lench vs. Lench, 10 Ves., 517, speaking of this matter, says: “Then as to the other ground that the purchase was made with the trust money, all depends upon the proof the fact; for whatever doubts may have been formerly entertained upon this subject, it is now settled that money may in this manner be followed into the land in which it is invested; and a claim of this sort may be supported by parol evidence.”
Says Lewis, Justice, in Thompson’s Appeal, 22d Penn. State, 17 : “ Whenevei; a trust fund has been wrongfully
This is a resulting trust, so far as it is created by operation of law, and based upon presumed intention of the parties, and acts of A. A. and J. L. Griffin intended to be acts as trustees unaccompanied by fraud. If the purchase money belonged to the trust fund, and A. A. and J. L. Griffin knew that fact, and by virtue of their influence with their mother, Rachel Griffin, as her sons, and contrary to the understanding with her they took the deed in their own name, intending a personal gain, it is a trust as against the children, accompanied by fraud, and that is a constructive trust. From'such circumstances and relations courts of equity raise a trust by construction. “This trust they will fasten upon the conscience of the offending party and will convert him into a trustee of the legal title and order him to hold it or execute the trust in such manner as to-protect the rights of the defrauded party and promote the safety and interests of society.”
It makes no difference in this case that they did not understand that the trust was for the children, and there was no life estate in the mother. If they knew it was trust money they were dealing with they are held to notice of its character whether they took the trouble to advise them
■ This leads us to an examination of the evidence. The deeds in evidence show the following transactions: That on the 10th of October, 1854, Thomas J. Linton agreed to sell Hardy Griffin a large body of land in Madison county, including nearly all of the land mentioned in the bill, for the sum of $25,000, $2,800 on the first of January of the years 1856, 1857,1858,1859 and 1860, $3,000 on the first of January, 1861, and $8,000 on the first of January, 1862, the note to draw interest at six per cent, per annum from January 1, 1855, and that Griffin was -to have possession on January 1, 1855, and was to give a mortgage on the land to secure the payment of the seven notes ; that on February 8, 1855, Linton conveyed this land to Hardy Griffin, and that Hardy Griffin gave a mortgage to him on the land to secure the payment of the notes which were given as agreed upon, Mrs. Griffin releasing her dower interest therein ; that on the 14th of March, 1856, Hard}7 Griffin reconveyed the land to Linton, stating the consideration to he a payment of $25,000, Mrs. Rachel Griffin, the witness, re-' leasing her dower interest therein ; that on the next day, the 15th of March, 1856, Linton- conveyed 1,480 acres of land included in the former transactions, and 120 acres adjacent thereto, making in all 1,600 acres to' J. Ij. and Archibald A. Griffin as tenants in common, the consideration being stated to be a payment of $12,000 ; that on the same day (March 15, 1856) Archibald A. and Joseph L. Griffin mortgage the same land to T. J. Linton,reciting an indebtedness to him shown by six promissory notes, the
This leads us to the consideration of the testimony.
Mrs. Rachel Griffin testifies that her father, Andrew Hampton, gave her and her children a place in Lawrence county, Georgia; that she sold that place and with the
These deeds are from Rachel Griffin to Ella L. Harby, S. Janie Hines, W. D. Griffin, trustee of minor children of A. A. Griffin, and W. I). Griffin in his own right, and extend in date from April 8,1875, to January 22,1877.
A deed from Sarah E. Ward, late widow of J. L. Griffin, and mother of defendant, J. Leroy Gale, who asserts the claim to one half of the land to Mrs. Rachel Griffin, is produced. It is dated the 26th of September, A. ID. 1874. It recites as a consideration the fact that her former husband had never paid for the lands described in it, and “ that the titles to said lands were made in the name of A. A. and J. L. Griffin, with the distinct and full understanding that they only held these titles to this land as the trustees for Mrs. Rachel Griffin, of the county of Madison, State of Florida.” This recital is made substantially a second time m the deed. The deed purported to convey all of the
Mrs. E. A. Spicer, witness for complainants, testifies as follows : I know all the parties to this suit. I knew Hard}*' Griffin. I think Hardy Griffin and Rachel Griffiu came to Florida in 1854, but do not know exactly. I knew A. A. and J. Leroy Griffiu ever since they were born ; they were the children of Hardy and Rachel Griffiu. When Hard}7 and Rachel Griffiireame to Florida they bad only trust property belonging to Rachel Griffin. They bought large bodies ,of land when when they came to Florida from Thomas J. Linton. They could not pay for the land in full, but what they did pay was paid out of these trust funds brought from Georgia. The deeds were first to be made to Captain Hardy Griffin, but Thomas J. Linton found out that Captain Griffin owned nothing but trust property belonging to Rachel Griffin, and was in debt. Mr. Linton f,hen told A. A. and .J. Leroy Griffiu if they would give him a mortgage for the balance due on the land he would make them a deed individually, but not as trustees. • Although A. A. and J. Leroy Griffin wanted it made that way, I mean to them as trustees, because Thomas J. Linton said to me trustees were not allowed to mortgage property under the laws of Florida. T. J. Linton told them they could, after, arrange the matter with the other children, he only wanted to be secured, and desired the mortgage from A. A. and J. Leroy
On her cross-examination, she says: I am sister to Mrs. Rachel Griffin. I have been living in Florida since 1861. I moved from Albany, Dougherty county, Ga. Mrs. Rachel Griffin and I were near neighbors in Georgia, Dougherty county; our plantations joined. The plantation up there I know was my sister Rachel’s, because, my husband, as trustee, purchased the place for her. The place up there was sold to Dr. Hunt and the proceeds applied to the purchase of this place. I mean these Linton lands mentioned in this suit. The lands I referred to in my direct examination are located near Greenville, in Madison county, Fla., and are the lands mentioned in this suit for partition. In reference to that part of my direct examination, where I said J. Leroy Griffin, who was my nephew, visited me in 1856,1 do not know what the main object of his visit in that county was for, but I think he had been attending court at Hewton, and came by to see my husband, to whom, I think, he was indebted as trustee for a certain amount due from Mrs. Rachel Griffin. Ilivecl with A. A. Griffin for twelve months, during which time 1 frequently heard him say he was trustee for the property mentioned in this suit. He never claimed a foot of it, but always spoke of it as his ma’s. I have no interest in this suit whatever. In my direct examination, where I spoke of purchasing the Easter Fields, I mean that L simply agreed to do so. Ho deeds or writings wmre ever drawn up. I moved on them intending to take the place, but concluded not to do so, under the advice of Mr. Linton. In my direct examination,
Upon a subsequent examination this witness states that Mrs. Rachel Griffin’s plantation in Georgia and hers joined ; that she knew it was her sister Rachel’s, because her husband, who'was trustee for Mrs. Griffin, bought it. She says she lived with A. A. Griffin for twelve months, and frequently heard him say he was trustee for the property; that her sister, Rachel Griffin, has been living on the place all the time, claiming it as her own ; that she never heard any one, before the commencement of this suit, attempt to deny her title to the same, and that she has personal knowl
W. 0; Hampton says he knows the parties, and that Mrs. Rachel is “ the sister of my father,” B. Wade Hampton, who was trustee for the property of Mrs. Rachel Griffin, received from her father’s estate. At “ my father’s ” death, his administrator acted as her trustee, then A. Y. Hampton, her brother, was her next trustee. This was all in the State of Georgia. The next trustees who ' were appointed, or acted as trustees, were A.' A. and J. L, Griffin. Does not know that they were appointed by order of court. The first trustees were appointed by the will. He lived with Mrs. Rachel Griffin and family in Dougherty county, Georgia, before they moved to Florida. I remember their selling the place they lived on there, which place belonged as trust to Rachel Grillin. I remember their buying the premises of Thomas J. Linton, the deed being-made to IIard\’ Griffin ; that Linton was dissatisfied when he learned that Hardy Griffin was insolvent. He demanded a settlement, and they met and agreed to settle by turning over a part of the lands to Linton, and purchasing the lands that are now in dispute; that A. A. and J. L. Griffin have both told him that they were the trustees of this property in the place of A. Y. Hampton. They were here a year or more before I came to Florida. I lived in a mile of the place of Rachel Griffin, the first year I came here, and have visited the house frequently for the last twenty years, and have had dealings with Hardy, A. A. and J. L. Griffin ; that in a transaction with Mr. Lin
Mrs. Laura A. Horn, a sister of Mrs. Rachel Griffiu, testifies that she did not move to Florida until two years after her sister; that she was here on a visit when J. L. Griffin died ; that she has known the parlies to this suit all her life. She swears positively that when Hardy and Rachel Griffin moved to Florida there was no property in the hands of any of the family except trust property. She is equally related to all the children, and has no interest in the suit; that she never heard either J. L. or A. A. Griffin lay auy claim to the property, but has heard A. A. Griffin say that he was trustee for this property, and in all business transactions he always consulted his mother. Upon cross-examination, this witness says she came to Florida about nineteen years ago, but that she don’t remember dates exactly, and that the land was purchased by the proceeds of the trust fund, because they had no other property that- she knew of.
Hpon a subsequent cross-examination, the statements made, upon the direct, examination were substantially re
Dr. Jacob Cohen testifies that he has known A. A. and Rachel Griffin thirty years ; knew them in Baker, now a part of Dougherty county, Georgia ; that he lived in Lawrence county ; was a practicing physician there, and boarded with Mrs. John M. Hampton, and that he has lived in Madison county since the spring of 1862 ; that he was intimate with A. A. Griffin, and sought to buy land from him, and that Griffin informed him that he owned no land, but held some as trust property for his mother, and would lease me some land, as trustee; that he leased the laud tor five years ; that at the expiration of the lease the land and improvements should return to Mrs. Rachel Griffin ; that the lease was signed A. A. Griffin, trustee. It has been lost or destroyad ; that the land he leased was a part of the land in dispute here. Upon cross-examination, the witness says that he married Mr. Harby’s mother ; that he does not know of his own knowledge whether A. A. Griffin owed any debts or not.
George W. Hampton testifies that Mrs. Rachel Griffin is his aunt; has known her since he can remember ; that he lived in the family before they moved here, and has lived with them here; that he visited to Florida in 1855, and moved in 1856 ; that he brought J. L. Griffin to Florida in his buggy in the spring of 1855, after the crop was planted and growing; that he does not remember any talk then between them as to the land; that he thinks all the prop
John W. O’Neal testifies that J. L. Griffin, who wTas his guardian, stated to him that he himself had nothing except his horse and buggy, but that he would give a good bond. This conversation was had when his appointment as my guardian was suggested ; that he hoarded with Mrs. Rachel Griffin, and J. L. Griffin likewise lived with her also. Witness was about fifteen years of age when J. L. Griffin died.
' E. E. Barclay testifies that he knows the parties ; has been in Madison county twenty-four years next Februarj? ; that Hardy Griffin came in the November before; that he
W. D. Griffin, who is the brother of A. A. Griffin and J. L. Griffin, testifies that A. A. Griffin considered the property his mother’s, and did the business as trustee; has heal’d that A. A. Griffin owed debts at his death ; that he did not consider that A. A.‘Griffin owned the land described in the deed to him, of the 22d (September, 1874. The rest of his testimony concerns, principally, the matter of the division and the character of the land. He says he is the trustee for the children of A. A. Griffin, his brother.
Z. T. Hines, the husband of S. Janie Hines, who received one share in the division, swears that he is satisfied with what they got.
The foregoing embraces substantially the testimony for' plaintiffs.
For the defendants:
Joseph Bishop testifies that he knows the lands sold by Linton to the Griffins, he thinks some twenty years ago; that he did all the liewing on a double-framed house in Mr. Lee Griffin’s name, on tiie Easter place; that J. L. Griffin said it was his place; that he,. J. L. Griffin, sent him word by his father to get him 12,000 shingles; that when the shingles were ready he sent a note to J. L. Griffin for the money; that Hardy Griffin came with a wagon and paid him $20for J. L. Griffin, who was sick at the time; that a short time afterwards he went to get the balance of the money and met Hardy Griffin and Arch Griffin, and Hardy
Charles F. Bemis for defendants. This witness says he moved to Florida in 1862, and commenced merchandizing in 1865 ; that he knew Hardy Griffin, but did not know J. L. Griffin; that he sold goods to A. A. Griffin in 1865 and 1866, individually, to the amount of $1,000, which he settled. His account then ran for years, payments being made from time to time. The account was for general supplies. He lived on a part of the land and attended to the whole plantation; that he made an exchange of land with Arch. Griffin for a part of the Linton lands, with Hardy Griffin’s consent, for the reason that Hardy Griffin said he could not make a title, but Arch. Griffin could ; that some years after this land transaction A. A. Griffin made some statement to him about this trust property, but not at that
John M. Beggs, Clerk of the Circuit. Court lor Madison county, tor the defendants. Ho produces a list of unsettled judgments against A. A. Griffin, from the years 1866 to 1866, inclusive. These judgments are for various amounts, and show that A. A. Griffin was considerably in debt during the time mentioned. The objections taken to this testimony may be divided info two classes: First, as to the competency of some of the witnesses who are parties to the suit when they speak to any transaction or communication between such witness and the person at the time of such examination deceased, agai. st the heir-at-law of such deceased person. J. Leroy Gale here is ihe heir-at-law of J. L. Griffin. She is the defendant whose interests are primarily concerned, and it must be obvious that the testimony of any party to this cause which purports to speak to any transaction or communication between such party and her father, J. L. Griffin, touching the subject matter of this suit, is inadmissible. The statute prohibits the examination of a party to such transaction or communication against the heir-at-law. Whether, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the examination of a party as to the transactions and communications between such party and A. A. Griffin is prohibited by the statute, we deem it unnecessary to determine, because, treating the subject as though it was inadmissible, our conclusion is the same.
That these objections exist to the character of the testimony of the plaintiffs is true, but we think that there is sufficient legal evidence here, independent of these objections, to establish the trust and to show, independent of the question whether Mrs. Rachel Griffin had any interest in the lands or not, that the parties have the equitable interest which they claim, to wit: a one-sixth interest in the land.
"We think that the only reasonable deduction from the evidence is, that at the death of Andrew Hampton Hardy Griffin and Rachel Griffin were in reduced circumstances,. Hardy Griffin having been pursued by debt from State to State and his property sold under judicial process ; that the money and the property brought by these parties to Florida belonged to the trust created by the will for the benefit of the grandchildren of Andrew Hampton, the children of Hardy and Rachel Griffin; that the first sale by Linton to Griffin was rescinded after an arbitration, and that the primary causé of it was knowledge by Linton that Hardy Griffin had nothing except property belonging to the trust; that the cash purchase, money paid to Linton was derived from the trust fund ; that such fact was known to A. A. and J. L. Griffin; that A. A. and J. L. Griffin,at the time of the purchase from Linton, paid no money of their own; that their act was intended by them to be in pursuance of the trust; that the property which they had was small, and that none of it was appropriated to the payment of the trust debt, but that the debt was paid through the cultivation of
The financial condition of persons, who themselves assert, or through whom others assert a purchase in their own right as against those who claim that it is made with trust funds or with funds belonging to them, is a fact to which courts of equity universally give weight in investigations of this character. Such has been the rule from the case of Willis vs. Willis, 2 Atk., 71, in 1740, to this time. In that case, and it was the case of a resulting trust as this is, Lord Ilardwicke said, speaking of the statute of frauds: “ There is another way of taking a case out of the statute, and that is by admitting parol evidence within the rules laid down in this court to show the trust, from the mean circumstances in the pretended owner of the real estate or inheritance which makes i t impossible for him to be the purchaser.” Wilkins vs. Stevens, 1 Y. & C., Ch. Ca., 431; Lench vs. Lench, 10 Ves., 518; Benger vs. Drew, 1 P. Williams, 780; Strimpfler vs. Roberts, 18 Pa. State, 283; Baumgartner vs. Guessfield, 38 Mo., 36; Farrell vs. Lloyd, 69 Penn. State, 239; Sayer vs. Frederick, 1 C. E. Green, 205; Gascoigne vs. Thwing, 1 vroom, 366; Mitchell vs. O’Neil, 4 Fev., 504.
While the precise amount realized from the trust fund in Georgia and brought to Florida, and the exact amount
Upon the merits therefore we think the decree correct.
What has been said disposes of the first, second, .seventh, eighth and ninth grounds of appeal. The third ground of appeal is because the complainants ought not to have been allowed at the hearing of the cause upon its merits to amend their bill, so as to present an entirely difieren t cause. We have read the original bill carefully several times, and can perceive no necessity for its amendment. The claim is for the equitable -interest of the plaintiffs and the investment of the trust funds with the knowledge of the trust is set forth. The will of Andrew Hampton is set forth, and the estate which they have under it is what they demand. That they made a mistake as to the interest of Mrs. Rachel Griffin, is not material. While their interpretation of the will as to this matter is incorrect, still if the facts set forth entitle them to the relief prayed, it is sufficient. -Hor do we think that the amended bill makes a different case. The amendment by adding an allegation that the taking the deed in the name of A. A. and J. L. Griffin was through accident, fraud or mistake, is mere surplusage. Plaintiffs had already stated the facts, and whether it was an accident, fraud or mistake, was a conclusion which could well have been omitted. So, also, whether Mrs. Rachel Griffin did or did not know how the deed was made, was entirely immaterial. Her knowledge as to the form of the deed could neither create or destroy the trust.
The fifth ground is because the general charges of fraud, accident or mistake, as made in the bill, as amended, are too indefinite to sustain the cause; no specific acts of accident, fraud or mistake are alleged or proven. Such an allegation as this is as a matter of course not good pleading, but where the facts constituting the equity are set up, to state a legal conclusion is unnecessary, and if stated is simply surplusage, unnecessary aud immaterial matter.
The sixth ground is because the bill for^partition was filed March 21,1878, the amendments alleging fraud, &e., were made October 4, 1879, both of which were more than twenty-two years after the said deed ivas executed and the said claim is stale aud is- barred by the statute of limitations. The case presented by this record is that of a purchase with trust funds and acknowledgement of use of the subject matter as trustee for the time specified. There is nothing adverse here. Those who were and are in possession acknowledge and .have always acknowledged the relation and claim of the plaintiffs under the will. The stale claim or the new claim is that of the defendant J. Leroy (rale, who for the first time now denies the existence of the trust which all of her ancestors wdio knew anything of the matter, including her mother, have acknowledged for over twenty years. ■
The decree is affirmed.