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Gaither v. City Hospital, Inc.
487 S.E.2d 901
W. Va.
1997
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*1 decision, mindful we are of the criteria listed 487 S.E.2d 901 in Carson and the of that criteria Timothy GAITHER, Plaintiff previously to our decision in Carr. As we Below, Appellant, however, explained, directly Carr cannot con- present trol the cases because different con- statutory provisions stitutional and are in-

volved. HOSPITAL, INC., CITY Defendant Below, Appellee. accordance with our to day, necessary slightly we find it modify No. 23401. syllabus point above, quoted two of Carr. As Supreme Appeals Court of syllabus point currently states: “[t]he Virginia. West position prosecuting attorney of assistant is' appointed public pursuant office and to W. Submitted Jan. 1997. Va.Code, [1967], 18-5-la person holding ineligible such office is to serve as a member Decided Feb. any county board of education.” We be language lieve the appeared better at the ease,

conclusion of that where this Court position

said: prosecuting “[T]he assistant

attorney ‘public is a officer’ within the con Va.Code,

templation [1967], of W. 18-5-la

thereby rendering ... occupy [an individual

ing position] ineligible to serve as a any county

member of board of education.” 367 S.E.2d at 229. There

fore, modify syllabus point we two of Carr to

this extent.

III.

CONCLUSION reasons, foregoing

For the we find the role

played by prosecuting an assistant attorney

is insufficient public to confer officer status purposes citizenship requirement IV,

contained Article Section of the West

Virginia Consequently, Constitution. there impediment

was no in this case to the assis- prosecuting

tant attorney appearing before grand jury, and the indictments should Therefore,

not have been dismissed. we

grant prohibition a writ of as moulded. granted

Writ as moulded. RECHT, Justice, sitting by temporary

(cid:127) assignment. *3 Rose, Associates,

Laura R. Rose & Mar- tinsburg, Appellant. for Power, Galeota, III, E. Curtis G. William Johnson, Steptoe Martinsburg, Appel- for & lee.

STARCHER, Justice: appeal by plaintiff-appellant This Timothy Gaither from an October Berkeley order the Circuit Court of Coun- ty granted summary judgment for the defendant-appellee, City Hospital, Inc. The appellant contends that the circuit court correctly apply “discovery failed rule” claim, improperly to his dismissed his action as barred agree statute of limitation. reverse the order of the circuit court.

I. Background Facts and 17,1989, On October around four o’clock morning 23-year-old appellant the then single-vehicle motorcycle was involved in a accident, apparently losing control of his mo- torcycle on a rain-slick road. He sustained injuries head and a severe fracture to his right leg. Paramedics arrived at the scene several minutes after the accident and trans- ported appellant to the emergency Martinsburg, Virgi- room in West nia. He arrived at the at 4:30 a.m. City Hospital records reflect that at 9:55 hospital personnel ap- a.m. transferred the pellant Maryland to the Institute for Emer- (“Shock gency Systems Medical Services Trauma”) Baltimore, Maryland, approxi- mately away. 90 miles Because of bad transported by weather the helicopter. Upon discussing leg injury ambulance rather than ar- with the Trauma, rival at Shock doctors noted that trigger because such discussions pain would pulse in part had no the lower appellant’s leg.2 remainder right leg. performed of his The doctors vas- appellant testified he was satisfied with the surgery cular to reestablish blood flow to the City treatment Hospital; he received at leg, by evening graft but therefore, the new returning after home from Shock artery had amputated failed. Doctors then Trauma, telephoned City Hospital person- appellant’s right leg above the knee. nel to thank help. Apparently them their appellant perceived no need for his medi- According deposition testimony by request cal records did copies appellant’s parents, physi- Shock Trauma *4 facility. these records from either medical delay by City Hospi- cians told them that the transporting tal in appellant the trau- the appellant The further testified that from might ma center have caused the loss of the the early date of his accident until 1993 he appellant’s leg. parents they The testified believed that leg the loss of his was caused appellant’s were told if doctors that solely by motorcycle accident. On Janu- appellant transported had been to Shock ary appellant prosthetic visited sooner, leg Trauma the blood flow to the specialist Hogan. Hogan’s Michael J. Mr. might have Hospital been restored. records that, pursuant affidavit reflects to his routine from Shock Trauma confirm that the doctors practice, business he asked appellant appellant’s ascribed some of the adverse re- right leg “whether he lost his due to trauma sult delay bringing to the time appel- inquiry by or loss circulation.” After this lant to Shock Trauma.1 Hogan, appellant Mr. testified he dis- appellant parents The leg and his testified in cussed the reason for the loss of his with depositions their parents. appellant that the doctors his at Shock The contends it was suspicions Trauma discussed parents their about the this discussion that his him told appellant’s leg only cause of the loss of the for the first time of their conversation with parents, with the appel- Thereafter, and never physicians. with the Shock Trauma appellant’s parents say they lant. The attorney never requested copies contacted an who appellant told the appellant’s about their discussions ap- medical records. The Furthermore, with his doctors. appel- pellant testified he read his medical records parents they always lant’s testified avoided in late 19933 and learned that the doctors at discharge summary operating 1.The November appellant, on the the real (with from the Shock Trauma Center states em- appellant's “misplaced issue in this case is the added): phasis City Hospital malpractice. belief” that committed matters; operating The was taken to they room We do not address these are suited immediately after stabilization and CT scan of juiy resolution. the head which was felt to be consistent with hemorrhage, requiring intracranial cranio- Gaither, example, Faye appel- 2. For Alice tomy operating ... He went to the room for mother, deposition lant's testified at her that she attempted right revascularization of the lower comments, never told her son about the doctors' extremity initially using [which] was successful "[bjecause something it was we didn't talk about. greater saphanous graft, vein [sic] reverse it, every We still don't talk about because time evening graft but later on that thrombosed. say something, say, we would start to Tim would intraoperatively It was that the had felt 'Mom, thump.' go don't. It makes me It would leg irretrievable clots in the arteries be- thump, thump, thump. pain He's in so much delay presenta- cause time [t]he time from and we didn’t talk about it then and we don't talk tion ... about it now.” appellant alleges nearly six-hour delay by City Hospital transporting him to appellant 3. Counsel for the stated in her briefs leg. Shock Trauma contributed to the loss of his argument and at oral before this Court that it City Hospital any way denies that its conduct in nearly year appellant's took one to obtain the appellant's injuries. caused or contributed to the Further, hospital represented records. counsel argument, At oral counsel for ar- nearly purchase copies $500 that it cost gued any delay transporting nothing emergency these records. We note that we can find personnel because lizing room were stabi- appellant’s injuiy. in the record to indicate if these facts were head Counsel also injuries presented appellant’s indicated that for the can be circuit court’s consideration. However, delays by upon existing blamed on Shock Trauma Center in record these based occurrence, delay alleged Shock Trauma believed the the date of the and he by City Hospital prevented obtaining transfer contributed to the was not such infor- leg. in his by City loss circulation Hospital mation other against City malpractice filed this action entity.” The circuit court also stated the 7,1994. January Hospital on opportunity speak had full filed more than four filed within two proposition under Rule 56 of the West claims should be dismissed. discovers an Code, Civil Procedure. The The City hospital argued 55-7B-4 hospital Hospital filed for that a 423 S.E.2d maintained that because the [1986] years Because this action was and Cart v. of the date a summary judgment after the Virginia action must be cited W.Va. appellant’s Marcum, accident, Rules of for the Gaither now *5 court. tions, City Hospital on October investigation set forth court concluded that all of the claims were barred Therefore, claim did not fall within the date physicians, of his treatment the court found the granted summary judgment appeals Cart v. Marcum. The circuit with[in] two but “failed to undertake such ruling by years City 1995. Mr. appellant’s appellant’s the circuit Hospital.” from the rule as limita- (that is, injury appellant knew of his knew II. leg amputated)4 that his had in been October 1989, duty he had a to exercise reasonable Standard Review diligence determining cause controlling question The appeal is appellant per- and that the failed to summary judgment whether appropri- was any investigation form into the cause of his Syllabus ate. As we stated Point 1 of hospital ap- The contended that the Peavy, Painter v. 192 W.Va. 451 S.E.2d pellant request failed to his medical records (1994), 755 entry we review a circuit court’s hospital; from per- failed to consult with summary judgment de novo. In Painter sonnel at or Shock Trauma Peavy, again we stated the basic rule that: amputation; about the causes of his 56(c) parents failed to ask Virginia about their discus- Under Rule of the West Further, City Procedure, sions Hospi- with the doctors. Rules of summary judg- Civil position proof only tal took the no proper there was ment moving where the hospital personnel appel- genuine had obstructed the shows that there is no issue ability lant’s to discover this information. as to material fact and that is enti- City Hospital argued appellant judgment that the tled to failed as a matter of law. duty diligently investigate in his the rea- 451 S.E.2d at 758. “The leg, son for the loss of his and that he summary circuit court’s judg function at the therefore was not entitled to the benefit of stage weigh ment is not ‘to the evidence and rule. determine the truth of the matter but to accepted City The circuit court Hospital’s genuine determine whether there is a issue ” arguments appellant Id., and found citing “had for trial.’ Liberty Anderson v. Inc., available to him necessary Lobby, 242, 249, 106 all information 477 U.S. S.Ct. alleged (1986). order to malprac- discover the act of “Summary 91 L.Ed.2d by City tice Hospital, within judgment should be denied ‘even where there decision, trauma, impact leg facts would have no on our circulatory lost his rather than appel- since we find there was no reason for the problems, deposition testimony until 1993. The try January lant to to obtain these records until appellant parents suggests and his that the appellant hospital’s delay first learned the con- leg amputation tributed to his when he read his Court, argument 4. At oral before this counsel for medical records sometime in late 1993. The argument, taking added to this positions conflict between these two involves position knew in 1989 that determinations, credibility and other factual is- attempted doctors had a "revascularization." province jury. sues within the of a light knowledge, argued of this counsel it is un- say thought believable for the he fraud, evidentiary misrepresentation dispute as to the facts concealment is no only provider. to the conclusions to be material facts health care case but statutory Legislature drawn therefrom.’” Williams v. Precision The enacted this ex Coil, Inc., 52, 59, “discovery 459 S.E.2d pression recogni W.Va. rule” in Co., that, quoting actions, Pierce v. Ford Motor tion in the area of (4th denied, Cir.), cert. 190 F.2d “often the is not of the fact aware (1951). 887, 72 S.Ct. 96 L.Ed. 666 U.S. that an inflicted. In has been the area summary judgment these standards With malpractice, particularly of medical this is mind, appellant’s arguments. we address the physician’s negligence may true because the improper diagnosis consist of or im some

III. proper surgery when the is uncon scious so that he is not aware that there Discussion injury.” been an v. Trustees Betha Jones appellant argues that the circuit court ny College, 177 S.E.2d improperly dismissed his claim as barred (1986). 183, 184 limitations and that the time filing limit for his claim was tolled Generally, the statute of limitations Therefore, primary rule. issue occurs; however, begins to run when a tort raised our consideration is: when does a rule,” “discovery under the the statute of plaintiff receive sufficient information under until a claimant limitations is tolled knows or “discovery trigger rule” to the statute of by diligence should know of his limitations? also maintains Marcum, Syllabus claim. Point Cart v. summary judgment inappropriate 241, 423 S.E.2d may because different conclusions be drawn recognized Sylla rule in first *6 regarding from the evidence when he first Virginia- 4 v. bus Point of Petrelli West leg may of learned loss have been the Co., 607, Pittsburgh 104 Coal 86 W.Va. S.E. malpractice by appellee Hospi- result of (1920), involving the 103 a case unlawful re tal. of coal when the defendant extended moval underground plaintiffs an mine onto the parties agree

The property. In Petrelli we held the statute of statute of limitations is found in the Medical Act, W.Va.Code, “only Liability limitations would run from the time of Professional 55- 7B-4(a) injured discovery trespass, time requires The Act an actual of the or the [1986].5 reasonably plaintiff malpractice against discovery possible.” a claim was to file a when mining trespass provider years health care within two of the was limited to Our injury, years until we extended the dis date of the or “within two of the cases when discovers, covery malpractice person date when or with the rule to certain medical such Inc., diligence, Morgan Hospital, eases. In v. exercise should have Grace (1965) 783, 144 injury, held discovered such whichever last oc 149 W.Va. S.E.2d 156 we However, object places foreign negligently that if a left in the Act also curs!.]” doctor, years body by the statute of filing patient’s limit of 10 on the a a outside claims, malpractice action be malpractice regardless of the limitations for a would medical discovery, long igno- remained date of unless is evidence of tolled so as the there W.Va.Code, whichever health care two injury, except more than ten gence, ers, event shall alleging (a)A years years section, or with the exercise of reasonable should cause of action for of the date when such of the date of such 55-7B-4 last provider arises as of the date of and must be commenced within have discovered such occurs: professional liability against provided such action [1986] after the date Provided, in subsection states: injury injury, be person commenced to a That in no or within person discov- injury. (b) dili- brought by or on behalf of a minor who was which the health care the date of such injury, shall be commenced within two tative has committed fraud under the twelfth section shall be tolled for about the er concealing (b) (c) period. A cause of action for birthday, injury. periods of age of ten misrepresenting injury, whichever limitation years at the time of such provider or prior any period during injury provides or collusion set forth in this or material to the minor's its represen- a years minor, long- facts 712 torts, statutory object. all there is a clear foreign of the unless of the existence

rant Martinez, application.” acknowledged Hundley prohibition v. of its 977, 988, 158 S.E.2d W.Va. However, recognized we (1967) discovery Morgan restricted the interpreting the rule that our cases malpractice “foreign rule in medical cases to wrong occurs often an of such object body” eases. in the reasonably plaintiff cannot character that analyzed Morgan rulings In we our ignorance claim of the existence a cause Hundley, and concluded the discov cases, the burden action. In such shifts ery extended all medical rule should be plaintiff prove entitlement the bene Syllabus malpractice actions. We stated discovery rule. fit of these circum Clarke, Point 2 of Hill v. that; stances, we held (1978) that of limi “[t]he S.E.2d 572 ignorance Mere of the existence of a cause malpractice begins run tations for when wrong- of action or of the plaintiff has reason of the knows or to know running prevent doer does not cases, alleged malpractice.” we later limitations; “discovery statute of rule” demonstrated applies only strong there is a when show- emphasized subsequently that the rule. We ing by that some action mind, plaintiffs focus is on the state of “on prevented defendant injured plaintiff whether the was aware wrong at knowing the time of the or, by reason exercise of care, should have it.” Harri able discovered Seltzer, son v. 268 S.E.2d Syllabus supra. Point This rule was crafted because some circumstances causal relationships are so well established that we have also Our cases extended the dis pleads igno- cannot who excuse covery areas of rule to other tort law. Seltzer, example, rance. in Harrison For applied legal has been mal rule 268 S.E.2d at W.Va. at we listed Loan, practice, Family Savings & Inc. v. instances where we believed “the ad- Ciccarello, 207 S.E.2d verse results of medical treatment are so grounds, overruled on other Hall v. extraordinary immediately Nichols, 184 W.Va. 400 S.E.2d 901 *7 something wrong, aware that went such that actions, (1990); liability product to Hickman begin the limitations will run statute of Grover, 249, v. 358 S.E.2d 810 extraordinary the is once result known to the (1987); privacy, to claims of and invasion of plaintiff though may not even he be aware of County Housing Kanawha and Re Slack v. precise malpractice.”6 the act of 144, Authority, development 188 423 W.Va. Syllabus proper application 2 To S.E.2d 547 Point of understand the of Marcum, actions, 241, negligence 188 Cart v. W.Va. 423 S.E.2d Cart how was (1992) case, case-by-case misapplied by 644 court in we abandoned our the circuit this Cart, discovery rule, requires of its facts. extension and held a recitation the discovery applicable agreement plaintiff the rule is to all torts. entered into an oral Jefferson, defendants, Syllabus of simply We stated Point 2 that one the to allow cut, ‘discovery generally plaintiffs rule’ is the applicable “The Jefferson to enter land to operation, triggered, paralyzed legs 6. the The statute of limitations in both after Steel v. was Casualty, patients discovery (La.App. could not benefit from rule Aetna 304 So.2d the & Life 1974). Davis, recently, patient operation underwent a in Harrison v. when: the sinus Most sight eye, applied W.Va. and lost in his left Jordan v. United 478 S.E.2d 104 we States, (6th Cir.1974); Cart v. 503 F.2d 620 the Marcum to a medical claim damage discovery applicable sciatic nerve a tonsillecto and held the rule was not suffered from foot, during my, resulting "dropped” plaintiff seriously injured delivery. in a v. Unit a Casias child States, (10th Cir.1976); injuries ed were of such a 532 F.2d 1339 wife held the serious nature, vasectomy, enough pregnant to result in of became after her husband’s serious the death child, plaintiff Lipsitz, Cal.App.3d her Christ v. 160 Cal. that a reasonable would have investigated injuries (Cal.App.1979); Rptr. under whether her were the result the cyst negligence. went a removal of a on his back and was remove, discovery origins timber. Jefferson rule has its and sell When the contract, plain- many injured party fact that times an sign refused to a written the an injury unable know of the suspicious, proper- tiff fenced his existence of became off its cause. Our Cart addresses ty, Jefferson to come and warned not onto situation, opposite plaintiff the where a does property. the onto slipped Jefferson reasonably or should know of the existence property, all of took the timber he had cut situations, injury an and its cause. In those and sold it to sawmills owned defendants take advantage Hager. Marcum and fled with Jefferson showing plaintiff strong must “make money never and was located. The record concealment, inability compre- fraudulent established that conversion the timber injury, hend the or other extreme hard- than August occurred no later 1988. The ship!;.]” 188 W.Va. at 423 S.E.2d plaintiff property August visited on Thus, question 648. at in this case is timber and first discovered the substantially different that in Cart. The 10,1990 August removed. waited until He case now us before involves an iteration of defendants, against file a at lawsuit least cases; category the former two-year day past one statute rule where the of limitation.7 We held the facts in Cart knows of the of an but existence does plaintiff suspected established that the Jef- injury any know the is the result ferson would take the timber in advance of party’s than conduct other his own. Our theft, actual “took Grover, holding in Hickman significant precautions prevent in order to (1987) S.E.2d 810 is instructive timber; stealing Mr. Jefferson from how- addressing and other situations. similar ever, precautions these were not successful.” As previously, stated Hickman we ex- at S.E.2d at 649. Based liability product tended the rule to this, upon we found that the “should plaintiff in in- actions. The Hickman was have known that Mr. Jefferson took his wood jured exploding an air Mr. Hick- tank. and he have known should it at time of man sued the of the air tank within owner injury.” Id. explosion, not amend but did City argues Hospital under Cart v. Mar- complaint to sue the air tank manufactur- cum that the knew the two-year until six after the er months (the “wrongdoer” hospital) and knew plaintiffs passed, of limitation after had However, City had an Hospi- attorney report stating received the air argument tal’s counsel conceded oral tank was defective. We allowed Mr. Hick- proceed knowledge against did not man with his action manufacturer, stating that: suggesting anything had done year wrong until less than one before injured person Justice is not done when *8 filing City Hospital the action. of this never- right loses his to sue before if he discovers argues appellant’s injured theless that the claim he was or who to sue....

should be barred under Cart because the cases, liability products statute of the plaintiff show did not that did begins plaintiff limitations to run when the anything prevent to the knows, know- by or the exercise of reasonable ing wrong (1) injury. know, of the at the time of the diligence, should that he has (2) argument injured, identity that this believe misreads and been the the maker (3) misapplies holding product, product and our Cart. the that the right bring 7. The limitation tort after shall have statute of for most actions is the to the same W.Va.Code, [1959], inju- found damages personal 55-2-12 which accrued if it for be ries; (c) states: year after the within one next right bring same if it to shall have accrued Every personal action for which no limita- that, be for other matter of such nature prescribed brought: tion be is otherwise shall die, (a) years it have right case a could not been Within two next after the accrued, by bring brought against per- at law or the same shall have if it be for common (b) damage representative. property; sonal within next holding today, In our we find on injury. to his This a causal relation had knowledge liability one that sufficient to allow the hand product cases will rule sue, period requires up- trigger limitation some plaintiffs a fair chance while thing apprehension more than a mere that purposes behind the statute something wrong. may See Hill v. be limitations. Clarke, at S.E.2d at creeping or or progressive In a disease (“[Plain, suffering and manifestation of the injury, many plaintiffs will not realize often malpractice harmful effects of medical do See, injured. they actually e.g., that were not, themselves, by running commence Trust Co. Johns-Manville Louisville limitation”). patient Even if a statute is (Ky.1979) Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 Products aware that an undesirable result has been (asbestos). plaintiffs Other will realize treatment, a reached medical claim will after injured, they but have no reason to are by not be the statute of limitations so barred See, injury. product connect long it for the is reasonable not Co., F.Supp. A.H. Robins e.g., Mack v. recognize might the condition be related that (D.Ariz.1983)(Dalkon Shield). In both hand, to the treatment. On the other we do instances, miscarriage it be a would go recognition require by so far as to justice plaintiffs to hold that the claim was negligent conduct. by the statute of A barred limitations. actions, such a standard usual is enough does not have information lay ly beyond of a comprehension person until he knows that he has been to sue actually assumes a conclusion that must injured, identity mak he knows of the properly legal by await a determination a product, er of the and he knows that the jury. requirement Such a would also result product a relation had causal to his in a situation “where the of limita the new these claims would be Under tions never accrue would almost until after protected from the bar the statute of Hickman, the suit was filed.” limitations. simply 358 S.E.2d at 814. We hold that 252-53, W.Va. at S.E.2d at 813-14. aware, reasonably once a should is that our We believe elaboration of aware, have that medical become treatment Hickman, rule in modified particular personal party has caused slightly, is also tort actions all begins. the statute including malpractice actions such as those reached like Other courts have results. Liability Medical affected Professional Supreme actions, example, For the Florida Court has Accordingly, Act. we hold that in tort injury, standing said that “the nature statutory prohibition a clear unless there is alone, may be such that it communicates application,8 under the rule its possibility negligence, of medical in which begins the statute of limitations to run when will knows, event statute of limitations immedi the plaintiff exercise of (1) ately begin upon to run diligence, should know that hand, (2) injury if itself. On the other injured, the plaintiff has been likely is such to have occurred from entity plaintiff duty who owed causes, care, begin natural the statute will not may act with due and who en run until such time as there is reason to gaged duty, in conduct that breached (3) malpractice may possi believe that medical entity that the conduct *9 bly Hartog, have Tanner v. occurred.” injury. to the causal relation This rule tolls 177, 181-82 (Fla.1993). So.2d plaintiff, the statute of limitations until a reasonable, acting diligent a person, dis eases, majority of possible great

covers the essential elements a In the of action, is, duty, by that issue of a claim is barred cause of discovers whether breach, question of causation and statute of limitations is a fact for 10-year repose repose er the case, this statute of The statute found in W.Va. in this Code, 55-7B-4(a)[1986] appellant filed this would constitute such a because the action well statutory prohibition.” within "clear We do not consid- the time limit. did, plaintiff jury. question duty “The of when records earlier than he and no on part appellant’s parents knows or in the exercise of reasonable dili- to have gence to mal- has reason know medical informed their adult son of their discussions Syllabus treating physicians. practice jury.” is for the Point with his It is therefore Clarke, Hill v. 572 irrelevant whether the could have S.E.2d also, Syllabus requested spoken See Point Teter v. the records before or Co., parents Colony with his about the cause of Old S.E.2d the loss (1994) (“Where leg. Accordingly, say a cause of action of his we cannot as a fraud, plaintiff based on tort or on a claim of the matter of law that the failed to exer- begin diligence, summary does not run cise due and limitations we find that knows, injured person judgment by improper. until the or the circuit court know, diligence exercise of reasonable should today Our conclusion is based on reasons injury, determining nature judicial economy, as well as obvious con- point question that in time is a of fact to be siderations fairness. The law does not and jury.’ Syllabus answered Point require patient should not to assume that Dobson, Stemple v. provider malprac- his medical has committed (1990)”). S.E.2d 561 tice, worse, engaged conspiracy in a every

conceal some misconduct time medical IV. perfect treatment has less than results. “To require hold otherwise would that whenever Conclusion any promptly fails to treatment re- health, Applying ease, turn the full our to this necessarily attorneys experts would hire reasonably is clear that the could investigate injuries solely possibility malpractice, have believed that his were motorcycle the result of his lest the statute run. Such wasteful over- accident and his goal negligence. appellant certainly own abundance of caution is not the of our The Szpynda Pyles, in October 1989 statute of limitations.” knew of the existence of his Pa.Super. him 433 639 A.2d 1184-85 knew owed (1994).9 However, duty of due care. we find noth ing in the record appel to indicate that the acknowledge strong policy by any January lant had reason to know before Legislature peri- limiting in favor of the time City Hospital may 1993 that have breached may bring patients od in which actions for care, duty proper and failed to its exercise negligent intention medical treatment and its City Hospital’s may conduct have con providers being to assist medical free of leg. tributed to the loss of his period -claims after a of time in However, hospital any also has not shown cir- which no action is raised. we also given appel- recognize provide full cumstances should have that we must effect investigate Legislature, lant whether mal- the acts of the and mere discom- reason practice leg was a cause of the loss of his fort with the rule is not valid case, prior refusing peri- to toll limitation 1993. On the facts reason for duty part especially tolling there was no on the This is so when that affirmative od. clearly sought period applies. remarkably disability Szpynda physician plaintiff 9. The facts in are similar to er. This told the accident, hy There, was caused not the industrial but in this March facts case. on surgical procedure by improper defendant an Pyles. hand, plaintiff crushed his left wrist and against Pyles filed suit got 'caught splicing forearm when his arm in a April months later in marily 1991. The trial court sum- Pyles performed machine. Defendant recon- action, Superior and the dismissed surgery, surgery structive but the was unsuccess- reversed, holding Court was entitled ful, resulting in the loss of use of hand. The and that the to the benefit of plaintiff subsequently splicing sued the machine claim was filed within two of the first date During negotiations manufacturer. settlement knew of his and knew it was *10 manufacturer, with exam- defendant's medical treatment the result of the by physician employed by ined the manufactur- and not the industrial accident. 716 that such enactment will receive liberal discussed

Accordingly, for the reasons in furtherance of their mani- above, order construction the circuit court’s we reverse object, the same re- fest are entitled to summary judgment appellee, to the granting statutes, ought not to spect other and circuit court for as this case to the and remand explained away.” opin- be proceedings consistent with this further ion. [Sjtatutes limitations are favored ... avoided unless in the law and cannot be and Remanded.

Reversed seeking brings so himself to do strictly exception. some It has within Justice, MAYNARD, dissenting: widely exceptions “are been held that such City Hospital, 199 I in v. dissent Gaither strictly enlarged by construed and are not (1997), 706, 487 and Chan W.Va. S.E.2d apparent upon the courts considerations of ,n - -, W.Va. cellor v. Shanno omitted). (Citations hardship.” (1997), that, in because I believe S.E.2d Chancellor, opinions, Unfortunately, this stretches the law in these Court Gaither applicable disregard in statutes has resorted to the use of smoke order Court “explained away” the of limitations. and mirrors and has of limitations. statutes both concern stat and Chancellor Gaither Although apparent limitations. not utes of Gaither, I radi In believe Court decisions, of this recent from some Court’s cally enlarges discovery rule which was of limitations continue to serve statutes Marcum, v. 188 W.Va. articulated Cart operation of the important function in order to avoid S.E.2d court has stated that basic “[t]he law. This An ex statute of limitations. is to purpose of statutes of limitations en planation of the evolution and construction of actions; courage promptness instituting rule as set forth Cart is claims; suppress stale demands or fraudulent aptly majority opinion in the discussed may and to avoid inconvenience which result note, however, here. I will not be reiterated delay asserting rights or claims when that, that in this Court stated practicable Morgan it is to assert them.” v. by declaring “discovery the existence of Inc., 791, 144 Hospital, Grace the statute of rule” we do eviscerate (1965) (citations omitted). 156, 161 S.E.2d limitations: of limitations will Lane, 578, 583, 165 Humble Oil apply handicaps unless the (1969) explained: this Court S.E.2d great of the are and are the time of limitations are statutes of Statutes largely product of the con- defendant’s object repose. compel Their is to the ex- concealing duct in either the tort or the right ercise of a of action within a reason- identity. wrongdoer’s able time. Marcum, Cart v. At one time the attitude of courts was 644, 648 The Court further S.E.2d hostile toward the enforcement of statutes stated: However, legislative policy of limitations. rule,” then, enacting “discovery recognized ap- such statutes is is to be now courts, controlling fully plied great circumspection on a case- acknowl- effect, by-case only strong edging upon their look with favor basis where there is a showing pre- as a that he was such statutes defense.... “Statutes knowing claim at the of limitations are now considered as wise vented from general rule is purpose and beneficent in their and ten- time of the dency; they ignorance of a upon are looked as statutes of that mere of the existence proper- of action or of the repose, and are held to be rules of cause * * * running ty society. wrongdoer prevent does not vital to the welfare to bene- the courts will not strain either the a statute of limitations. order While must make a or the law in aid of a statute of fit from the facts concealment, limitations, strong showing nevertheless it is established of fraudulent *11 Chancellor, inability comprehend injury, appellant to the or oth- In the was definitive- hardship: er extreme ly notified on October 1991 that a wire improperly body had been left in from her However, special .... apply rules in a previous surgery. appellant filed suit particular case involving hardship or other against doctor, hospital, the and then un- justifying circumstances different accrual known manufacturer of the wire on October rules. 1, 1993, twenty-two days year before the two (Footnotes omitted). Id. and citation statute of limitations would have run on a by I find majority the distinction made the products liability Only claim. then did the present between Cart and the ease to abe appellant began seriously to seek to deter- one, spurious simply I apply and would the identity mine the of the manufacturer. As a discovery statutorily recognized rule in result, appellant’s the complaint amended § W.Va.Code 55-7B-4 and set forth specifically naming the manufacturer of the Cart, in to the circumstances of this case. wire as a defendant filed was well outside the adopts The standard this Court here encour- year statute of limitations. The Court dilatory ages diligence than behavior rather managed grant summary reverse the of party sleep rights. and allows a his I on judgment on by behalf of the manufacturer agree appellant with the that the reasoning inquiry that steps further into the simply diligence failed to exercise reasonable by appellant’s attorney prior taken the discovering the reason for the loss of his October alluded to in an affidavit leg. In appellant October the was by appellant’s attorney, necessary filed the is leg that amputated, aware his had been summary judgment appropriate. before parents by phy- were told Shock Trauma Again, struggled way the Court to find delay City Hospital sicians that the avoid the of the of limita- transporting appellant to the trauma cen- tions. might ter caused of appel- the loss above, according As noted order leg. Nevertheless, lant’s for next three appel- from benefit years, appellant investigate failed to strong showing lant must make a of fraudu- light In reason the fact concealment, inability comprehend lent appellant apparently that is an adult and hardship. or other extreme If the average at intelligence, least I find his appellant showing, is able to make such I parents’ explanation they were unable fail why to understand did not appellant’s amputation discuss the with him present prior such evidence to the circuit addition, preposterous. ruling appellee’s summary court’s on the request failed to his medical records from the judgment motion. In the absence such hospital, speak anyone and failed to with evidence, agree I the circuit that: with court concerning or Shock Trauma [Appellant] has not shown that she acted I amputation. agree the causes of his also diligence; [Appellant] reasonable court with the circuit “had handicaps shown that the to dis- not necessary to him all available information covery identity manufacturer [the alleged malprac- to discover the act of order completely great wire] were and has by City Hospital, tice within two from handicaps failed to show that the to discov- occurrence, alleged the date of the ery of [the manufacturer] prevented obtaining such infor- product [the manufacturer’s] were by City Hospital any mation other conduct; showing what- there has been no claim, entity,” appellant’s and that concealment soever fraudulent therefore, not fall did within the [the manufacturer] [.] rule as set I forth Cart. Because believe were, therefore, sum, appellant’s claims in both and Chancellor this Gaither completely ignores barred statute of rule’s limita- Court tions, and, I grant requirement diligence, would affirm the circuit court’s law, summary judgment City on clear our case rewards behalf Hos- contravention of pital. plaintiffs ignorance. who willful exercised *12 bar, are City Hospital in the case at including § and W.Va.Code 55-7B-4

In W.Va.Code hospitals. non-profit clearly expressed public, 55-2-12, Legislature § above, As noted limit lawsuits. its will that unfair- figures illustrate The above impor- serve several of limitations statutes in damage awards hospitals to ly exposing recognition which is the one of purposes, tant really expired, have claims which tort at some things should be over fact that threatening the health and Court could be actions, legal the world of Even in point. small, struggling hos- many very existence of percep- finality. public there should be of access to will be a loss pitals. The result long, take too cost legal actions tion is that Virginia’s count- care in West quality medical much, Decisions such and never end. too par- could be This less rural communities. only to encour- serve and Chancellor Gaither simply tially if the Court would prevented reasons, I believe For these age that belief. wisely en- of limitations uphold the statutes to so bla- this Court improper that Legislature. acted of stat- ignore legislative enactments tantly would “evis- denied Cart The Court limitations. utes of I think of limitations. the statute cerate” Also, help but think I cannot guts out the means to cut that word eagerness disregard the statute Court’s so, limitations If our statute of disembowel. at least in in stemmed limitations Gaither slaughterhouse, the inside of a now looks like the defendant was from the fact that part splat- guts of the statute blood and with the is to trans- The trend in this Court hospital. Court, deci- everywhere. This with its tered companies and into insurance hospitals form Chancellor, have in sions Gaither everyone on the make them the insurers our statute of an abattoir out of created this is that problem with premises. One ground up jurisprudence and have limitations Virginia longer no hospitals in most West judicial sausage. it into the statute and made According deep pockets. Center have today Development, there for Rural Health repre- thirty-one hospitals rural small

are hospitals all in West

senting about half of hospitals are charac-

Virginia. rural Small beds, than 100 those with fewer

terized as 5,000 annually, and fewer than admissions 487 S.E.2d 913 community than in a rural with fewer located McKINNEY and Sandra Charles small, 10,000 group, rural persons. As McKinney, K. Plaintiffs profit Virginia in showed a hospitals West Below, Appellants, 1993, in in in -1.6% of -1.7% 0.1% in This is not to in 1994 and 3.7% 1995. 1.8% larger hospitals in the state suggest INC., INTERNATIONAL, FAIRCHILD deeper pockets. For the significantly Below, Appellee. Defendant hospitals in the state period, time all same 23467. No. profit in 1.7% in showed a of -0.6% 2.1% in and 4.5% -0.2% Supreme Appeals Court facili- Thirteen of the 55 acute care 1995. Virginia. West money with 33 ties the state lost Jan. 1997. Submitted earning average state- of the 55 below the really profit margin.1 “Profit” is not wide May Decided probably a accurate term and is bad word day Virginia present use because West unfairly given

profit been a bad connota- Further, many hospitals, of the state’s

tion. Hospitals concerning Development Rural titled hos- Health 1. Some of the above information (October report pitals Virginia Making in West is contained in a Virginia: the transition West Virginia Hospital compiled Associa- the West 1996). cooperation with the Center for Rural tion in

Case Details

Case Name: Gaither v. City Hospital, Inc.
Court Name: West Virginia Supreme Court
Date Published: Feb 24, 1997
Citation: 487 S.E.2d 901
Docket Number: 23401
Court Abbreviation: W. Va.
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