22 S.E.2d 512 | Ga. | 1942
Where a promissory note executed and to be performed in the State of North Carolina contains the word "seal" immediately following the signature of the maker, which is sufficient to constitute the instrument one under seal under the law of North Carolina, but contains no statement in the body thereof that it is under seal, as required by the Georgia law, suit thereon in the courts of Georgia will be barred after six years from its maturity.
However, the statute of this State fixing the limitation upon actions on sealed instruments defines a sealed instrument in this language: "No instrument shall be considered under seal unless so recited in the body of the instrument." The note involved in this case, although an instrument under seal under the North Carolina law, contains no recital in its body to the effect that it is under seal as required by our statute. In 15 C. J. S. 951, § 22 (b), it is stated: "Where the remedy sought on a contract depends upon the question whether it is sealed or unsealed, the sufficiency of the seal is to be tested by the law of the forum." This rule is supported by the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in Alropa Corp. v. Rossee, 86 F.2d 118, where it was said: "The Georgia definition of a sealed instrument is a part of its limitation statute. The effect of it is as though it had been written `Actions on bonds or other instruments which recite a seal in the body of the instrument shall be brought in twenty years.' Unless the instrument sued on contains such a recital, no matter what its effect in Florida or elsewhere may be, it is not entitled to the twenty-years limitation of the Georgia law in a court in Georgia." In Coral Gables v.
Christopher,
All the Justices concur, except Hewlett, J., notparticipating.