History
  • No items yet
midpage
Gadon v. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK,(USA)
653 A.2d 697
Pa. Super. Ct.
1995
Check Treatment

*1 attorney’s comply essentially pro with an district failure omission Dugger’s certification]. This requirement forma v. appeal.” corrected Commonwealth properly be (1991). 599 A.2d Frankenfield, end, with that the file Toward that we direct Commonwealth (15) this Court, days filing date of this within fifteen order suppression that Opinion, explaining a certification will, fact, prosecu- terminate the substantially handicaps this order shall result Non-compliance tion. with Court’s this Court. Id. Panel present appeal being quashed by jurisdiction is retained. GADON, Appellant,

Beth

v. (USA). BANK, The CHASE MANHATTAN Deborah Lawrence GILBERT Thompkins, Appellants, David A. TRUST

GREENWOOD COMPANY. Pennsylvania. Superior Court Argued Oct. 1993.

Decided Jan. 1995. *2 Haverford, Donovan, for appellants. Michael D. Saltz, for appellees. Jeffrey Philadelphia, S. HESTER, JJ. BECK, TAMILIA and

Before HESTER, Judge: Gadon, Lawrence Beth appeal consolidated

In this plaintiffs Gilbert, Thompkins, A. who and David Deborah actions, 1993 orders from the March appeal separate orders, dis the trial court In those in both cases. entered *3 separate their instituted complaints. Appellants their missed (USA)1 , Bank, and Manhattan The Chase against actions in banks both state-chartered Company, Trust Greenwood actions, appellants respective In their (appellees). Delaware them with late overcharged illegally appellees claimed that card bal unpaid credit fees on their contingent and charges filed Appellees laws. Pennsylvania in violation of ances to failed complaints that the objections, asserting preliminary since the granted could be relief upon forth claims which set trial law. The by federal was relevant state law reverse. complaints. the We dismissed and agreed court Appellants are as follows. complaint in the allegations The cards issued Visa credit Discover and are holders of in the credit cards using and accepting After appellees. monthly in the paying were late appellants Pennsylvania, result, their accounts. As a on the minimum installments the charges imposition reflected monthly billing succeeding unpaid to the were added charges These late charges.” “late monthly billing statements on appellants’ balance reflected resulting balance. charged was on the interest then and federally formerly was a Manhattan Bank We note that The Chase 1. 21, 1990. banking until June association chartered Appel- in Delaware. state-chartered Appellees agree- to cardmember cards pursuant their credit lees issue nationwide, of Penn- including residents ments to customers if charges payment late impose separate Appellees sylvania. twenty days paid due is not within minimum payment the to the According month. date in due payment after the minimum payment pay failure agreements, cardmember and in default the customer puts due date monthly how- Appellees, contingent charge. payment the late triggers in disclosure of charges ever, not include the late do agreements, rate in their cardmember percentage annual ad- statements, forms or national billing application monthly pay- late fact, identify the separately In appellees vertising. separately agreements in the cardmember charge ment of a payment The charges. and late charges finance identify further for the extension is not a condition late itself, not, appellees’ affect and does by appellees, credit cardholders. to individual to further extend credit decision constitute imposed fees penalty that the alleged Appellants by Pennsylva- the limits delineated charges exceeding alia, (set inter forth, in the statutory nia and common.law Act, 69 Installment Sales Goods Services Pennsylvania 1965, Code of § 1101 et Banking seq., Pennsylvania P.S. Prac- Trade et Unfair seq., Pennsylvania and the P.S. § 201-1 et seq.). Law, 73 P.S. Protection and Consumer tices charges penalty that such further claim They that term is defined “interest” as included within are not Deregulation Institutions Depository section 521 (“DIDA”) *4 or 12 1831d Act of Monetary Control Hence, there is claim appellants law. under federal common fees that late authority finding for a charged to the overall interest calculating included in are by but are not by under limits set state law loan seq. et 1601, Act, § DIDA, 15 U.S.C. Lending the Truth in or circuit court a federal apply contend we should Appellees has ad- court which by every other state opinion, followed law issue, that federal the court found dressed this wherein by charged can be maximum interest that regulating 214 they rate are highest charge them to permitted

banks they in in which the law the state charge by to allowed finding that on the court’s holding premised This was located. state preempt law to banking for federal intended Congress Massachusetts, 971 Trust Co. v. See Greenwood usury laws. — denied, U.S. -, (1st Cir.1992), 113 S.Ct. cert. F.2d 818 (1993). 122 L.Ed.2d that we are bound conclude disagree. We We essentially we addressed in which en banc decision our recent in the instant case. See are raised the same issues which N.A., One, Columbus, Bank Mazaika v. (1994). Therein, that on Green we found reliance

A.2d 640 Massachusetts, misplaced was since supra, wood Trust Co. in section 85 of narrowly “interest” the term Congress defined therefore, not did Act, 12 U.S.C. National Bank generally the field so occupy intent to unequivocal an express altogether. The definition state laws preempt as to must be preemption federal addressing used when interest Congress law since in law and not state federal that described power over legislative preemptive the federal delegate cannot national Mazaika involved Although the states to one state. narrowly applies is defined banks, that interest holding its case since the this as state appellees to forth in both allowable set of the interest highest definition Act, 12 U.S.C. Bank 85 of the National section DIDA, in perti 1831d of Section virtually DIDA is identical. part, provides: nent against State-char- discrimination prevent

In order institutions, including insured sav- depository insured tered banks with banks, foreign or insured branches ings bank or such rates ... such State to interest respect receive, take, ... foreign branch of a bank insured made, upon reserve, loan or discount any debt, note, evidence of exchange, or other bill centum excess per at a rate of not more than at in effect paper commercial ninety-day discount rate on district in the Federal Reserve Federal Reserve bank foreign of a insured branch such bank or such where State

215 the the laws of rate allowed or at the is located bank located, is which- where the bank State, territory, or district may greater.2 be ever include the undertakes

Yet, statute neither numerical its at issue within penalty charges late contractual Therefore, in Mazaika holding our “interest.” of definition of the to the extent only usury law is that state controlling. of interest is narrow definition relin- Jurisdiction Case remanded. reversed. Judgment quished.

BECK, Concurring Opinion.' a J. files BECK, concurring. Judge, to make only I majority separately write join opinion.

I the One, Columbus, v. Bank by which Mazaika clear the (No. N.A., Philadelphia 0231 1994) (en banc) case. to this applies filed December banks, and as Mazaika, national the defendants were In Act, Bank by the National governed such were national (“NBA”). exportation authorizes the The NBA Pennsyl- other states such as “interest” to bank’s home state held, however, that we in Mazaika In our decision vania. consumer all state preempt NBA—did not federal law—the charging of limiting laws protection in the Instead, “interest” as used the term late fees. charged to the rate percentage NBA means more, any meaning broader notwithstanding nothing loan Mazaika, supra at may allow. national bank’s home state 101, 653 A.2d at 646. similarly provides: pertinent part,

2. 12 U.S.C. receive, reserve, take, or loan Any association notes, made, exchange, evidence upon any or other bills discount State, debt, Territory, by the laws of the interest at the rate allowed located, per centum in or at a rate of 1 where the bank is or District paper in effect at ninety-day commercial of the discount rate on excess where the bank the Federal reserve district the Federal reserve bank in located, greater, more.... may be the and no whichever is insured state federally case, the defendants In this institutions, Depos- governed and as such are chartered *6 Act of Monetary Control Deregulation Institutions itory (“DIDA”). of the term usage The 1831d as in the NBA. is the same in this federal statute “interest” Mazcdka, then, analysis preemption to our By Pennsylvania’s defini- authority preempts exportation DIDA’s the exis- Notwithstanding only narrowly. tion of “interest” “interest,” Pennsyl- home state definitions tence of broader still control these charges and late vania’s laws Pennsylvania. do business they when to the lower court’s decision reverse the I therefore would contrary. Pennsylvania, Appellee,

COMMONWEALTH Montano, Appellant. MONTAVO, Minguel Minguel a/k/a Pennsylvania. Superior Court of 30, 1994. June Submitted 10, 1995. Decided Jan.

Case Details

Case Name: Gadon v. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK,(USA)
Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Jan 5, 1995
Citation: 653 A.2d 697
Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.