FACTS
We take the historical facts from the board's findings set out in its order. Thоse include the earlier findings of an administrative law judge (ALJ), which the board adopted along with its own factual summary.
In May 2014, claimant responded to employer's job advertisement for a truck driver position. He applied for the position by email and submitted his resume online. He also completed a drug screen and provided employer with copies of his current Commercial Driver's License, medical card, social security card, and DMV records, along with the results of the drug screen.
Soon thereafter, employer's owner, Van Hyning, had claimant come tо his office for an interview, where they discussed his application and the requirements of the job. Claimant was scheduled to take a mandatory U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) pre-employment driving test.
On June 4, 2014, claimant met with Hanson, one of employer's truck drivers, for the driving test. Claimant drove one of employer's trucks, with Hanson as a passenger, to a designated delivery location. While disconnecting hoses from the trailer at that location, claimant fell four or five feet from the truck to the ground. He landed on his left hip and experienced significant pain. Claimant's injury rendered him unable to drive the truck, and Hanson drove to the next stop, where they picked up an empty container before returning to employer's premises.
Van Hyning did not ask claimant to come back to finish the driving test. Claimant did not fill out any employment tax forms. He did not receive any written offer of employment.
After the accident, claimant sought medical treatment for his injury and was diagnosed with left hip strain. On June 10, 2014, claimant filed an injury claim with SAIF, alleging that he had injured himself on June 4, while working for employer as a truck driver. Claimant also submitted Workers' Compensation Form 801 to employer. On that form, under "date worker hired," employer wrote "preemployment driving test," because claimant had not been hired yet and the driving
As part of SAIF's investigation of his claim, claimant told a SAIF investigator that he had understood that Van Hyning had "want[ed] to evaluate me," which was why he had sent claimant with another driver. Claimant did not know whether June 4 had been considered a training day or a preemployment evaluation day. As he understood it, the agreement was that Van Hyning would аssess how he performed on June 4, and, if he passed, he would "continue working." Claimant also told the investigator that he had not received any written offer of employment nor filled out any employment tax form.
SAIF denied compensability of the claim, asserting that claimant had not been a subject worker at the time of
Claimant testified that, when hе first met with Van Hyning, he was given a job description and a schedule, and told what his pay would be. Claimant further asserted that Van Hyning had told him that he had the job before the safe driving test, did not say that claimant was being evaluated that day, and had agreed to pay claimant 25 percent of the gross profit from the delivery claimant was to complete.
The investigator's report summarized claimant's understanding somewhat differently:
"Van [H]yning 'wants to evaluate me[,]' which was the reason he sent [claimant] with another driver. [Claimant] did not receive a written job offer. Van [H]yning did not tell [claimаnt] he got the job just [he] wanted [claimant] to drive with another driver. The point was not to offer a job but to evaluate how good [claimant] can do the job. [Claimant] could not define June 4, as a training day or evaluation day. [Claimant] said that Van [H]yning was going to send [him] to work for one day to see how he does and if [claimant] did a good job he would continue working. On June 4, 2014, [claimant] said he drove the truck to a warehouse in Clackamas. [Claimant] did not fill [out] any employment tax forms. He did not receive any written job offer."
(Alterations in original.)
Van Hyning testified that he could not remember what he spеcifically had told claimant in their meeting prior to the drive, but that he had not hired claimant. He explained that it was his usual practice to tell applicants that they would be required to take an unpaid safe driving test as part of the evaluation process. According to Van Hyning, a safe driving test was required by DOT, and every driver hired by employer had to take and pass the test.
Van Hyning also explained that, if claimant had been an employee when he was injured on the delivery, he would have been paid. Van Hyning did not think that the employer had received any benefit from claimant's participation in the delivery because Hanson, who had been paid for his work that day, would have been driving the route even if claimant had not been there.
During Hanson's testimony, he estimated that claimant had driven about 30 miles before he was injured. Hanson also testified that he took a safe driving test before he was hired, and he did not think a driver could be
The ALJ affirmed SAIF's denial of the claim after determining that, at the time of his injury, claimant had not been hired and hаd not received any kind of remuneration or promise of future remuneration, and was therefore not a subject worker. In making that determination, the ALJ discredited claimant's testimony that he had been told that he would be paid twenty-five percent of the gross profit for the delivery. In that regard, the ALJ specifically stated that claimant's testimony "at [the] hearing was at odds with his prior *** statement" and "was vague or contradictory."
By contrast, the ALJ found Van Hyning and Hanson credible. The ALJ found that "Van Hyning [had] asked
Claimant sought review of the ALJ's order by the board. The board affirmed on review and on reconsideration, adopting the ALJ's findings of fact. One member dissented, explaining that she considered employer's receipt of claimant's services without remuneration unjust and would, therefore, infer the presence of an implied contract establishing claimant as a subject worker. She noted that, although not controlling, the minimum wage statutes supported finding an implied-in-law contract.
Claimant filed a petition for judicial review in the Court of Appeals. On review, claimant did not take issue with any of the board's findings of fact. Instead, he contended that the board should have looked beyond the workers' compensation statutes to the minimum wage law to determine applicability of benefits.
The Court of Appeals reversed the board, concluding that claimant indeed hаd qualified as a worker at the time of his injury because he had been "put to work" and thus was entitled to receive the minimum wage for the delivery he made. The court reasoned that, under ORS 656.005(30), a "worker" is someone who enters into a contract to work for pay. The court noted that, (1) in the absence of specific statutory exemptions, under the minimum wage statute, ORS 653.025, a person must be paid a wage for work; and (2) what claimant did for employer was "work" as a matter of law, regardless of whether employer had the subjective or even primary purpose оf evaluating him in anticipation of permanent employment. Gadalean ,
The Court of Appeals then determined that claimant had furnished services to employer requiring remuneration because employer had conceded that claimant had performed the activities of a regularly employed driver, that
SAIF petitioned for review. We allowed review to address the proper interpretation of the definition of "worker" set out in ORS 656.005(30), specifically, the meaning of the phrase "engages to furnish services for a remuneration."
ANALYSIS
In this case, neither claimant nor petitioner challenged the board's factual findings in its final order. As a result, those findings are binding for the purposes of our review. Multnomah County Sheriff's Office v. Edwards ,
SAIF argues that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that an agreement for remuneration existed between claimant and employer as a matter of law based on the minimum wage statute. SAIF reasons that, for claimant to have been a "worker" for workers' compensation purposes, ORS 656.005(30) requires a contract with an express or implied agreement between the employer and a person "who engages to furnish services for a remuneration." It argues that the Court of Appeals used the minimum wage law to find a contract implied at law, which it contends was improper because the Workers' Compensation Law is a creature of statute and, thus, common-law remedies cannot be substituted for its requirements.
Claimant responds, relying on the Court of Appeals reasoning in Amos v. SAIF ,
Claimant's reliance on Amos , however, is misplaced: even if we were to endorse the Court of Appeals' reasoning in Amos , we disagree that it applies here. In Amos , the Court of Appeals concluded that it was appropriate for the board to apply Oregon's paternity laws to determine whether a claimant was entitled to benefits as an "illegitimate child," in the absence of a statutory definition of illegitimacy under the Workers' Compensation Law.
We are thus confronted with an issue of statutory construction to determine the legislature's intended meaning of ORS 656.005(30) and, if employer had claimant perform an activity for which minimum wage law requires a wage, whether claimant therefore had "engage[d] to furnish services for a remuneration." We resolve that issue in accordance with the framework for statutory interpretation described in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries ,
Turning first to the text of ORS 656.005(30), it provides, in part:
" 'Worker' means any person, including a minor whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, who engages to furnish services for a remuneration, subject to the direction and control оf an employer ***."
That definition, in turn, uses other words that are not defined. We presume that the legislature intended those words to mean what they mean in ordinary usage. State v. Dickerson ,
The parties agree that an obligation to "furnish services" for a "remuneration" are independent elements of the statutory requirement to be a worker. SAIF argues, however, that remuneration must be a part of the agreement between employer and claimant for claimant to have been a worker. Antithetically, claimant contends that an entitlement to remuneration here, by way of the minimum wage law, is sufficient to satisfy the "for a remuneration" requirement and that the only agreement that must exist between the parties is for the claimant to be put to work.
The parties' disаgreement thus centers around what the legislature meant when it said that the services are furnished "for " a remuneration. Although "for" has many definitions, all the potentially relevant definitions connote a similar meaning: that the subject acted with an expected result. See Webster's at 886 (defining "for" as "in order to bring about or further"; "with the purpose or object of"; or "in order to obtain or gain"). The most plausible reading of
Noting that the plain text requires an expectation of remuneration, which, as noted, must be reasonable, we turn briefly to the Court of Appeals' opinion and parties' arguments as they pertain to minimum wage law. The Court of Appeals did not engage in our normal statutory interpretation framework; instead, it concluded that the minimum wage law was dispositive of claimant's status as a worker under ORS 656.005(30). That court reasoned that what claimant did for employer was "work" and that, under minimum wage law, a person must be paid for work. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded, claimant qualified as a worker, because he was entitled to remuneration under an implied-in-law contracts theory. Gadalean ,
We disagree with that approach. Under the implied-in-law theory on which the Court of Appeals rеlied, a contract implied in law creates an entitlement to remuneration. See Derenco v. Benj. Franklin Fed. Sav. and Loan ,
In this court, claimant proposes a variation of the Court of Appeals' construction. He
We disagree that minimum wage law operates to convert claimant intо a "worker" under ORS 656.005(30).
SAIF therefore is correct that claimant's proposed application of the minimum wage statute would improperly substitute the definition of "employ" under minimum wage law for the legislature's chosen definition of "worker" in the workers' compensation scheme. See generally ORS 653.025 (no employer shall "employ" or agree to employ at wages lower than those required under the statutory scheme);
The context of ORS 656.005(30) supports our understanding that, to qualify as a worker, a claimant must engage to furnish services reasonably expecting remuneration. Relevant context "includes other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes." PGE ,
In the Workers' Compensation Law, the legislature chose to define "employer" as "any person *** who contracts to pay a remuneration for *** the services of any person." ORS 656.005(13)(a). That is, to establish that an employer is subject to the act, the claimant need only demonstrate that, with respect to at least one person, there is a contract for remuneration in exchangе for that person's services to the employer. Notably, the legislature's use of "contracts" to define "employer" under ORS 656.005(13) -but not "worker" under ORS 656.005(30) -indicates that the legislature intended the definition of "worker" to require something different from a contract. Although the definition of "worker" in ORS 656.005(30) includes all the requisite elements of a contract-and, as explained below, has long been construed as requiring a contract-the legislature chose to define "worker" with emphasis on the claimant's engagement, i.e. the claimant's taking on of an obligation that meets the statutory requirements. It is thus consistent with that claimant-focused inquiry to interpret the definition of "worker" as requiring a determination of the claimant's reasonable
Prior to the enactment of the Workers' Compensation Law, the employer-employee relationship was defined and used at common law primarily to establish vicarious liability against an employer by a third party. Lex K. Larson, 7 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law §§ 60.01, 60.04 (Matthew Bender rev.
In enacting the Workers' Compensation Law, the legislature expanded on the common-law definition of "employ" to bring a claim within the scope of the act, requiring evidence of the elements of a contract as well as requiring a right to control. ORS 656.005(30) ; see also Vient v. State Indus. Acc. Commission ,
Following adoption of the Workers' Compensation Law, the legislature made several amendments, which provide some insight into the legislature's intended meaning of ORS 656.005(30). Prior to 1959, the Workers' Compensation Law provided that a worker was one who "engages to furnish his services, subject to the direction and control of an employer." Former ORS 656.002(15) (1957).
Our analysis of the text and context ultimately leads us to conclude that a variety of scenarios could implicate ORS 656.005(30). For example, a claimant may take on an obligation to provide services having expressly
APPLICATION
Returning to this case, the board found that employer had told claimant that he would not be paid for the pre-employment drive test and discredited claimant's assertion that he would be paid 25 percent of the gross profit for the delivery. As the board stated, "[T]he record only establishes that claimant had a possibility of employment dependent on whether he passed the safe driving test, which he did not." Because the board found, based off the ALJ's determination, that claimant had been told by employer that he was to perform the test and to do so without remuneration, claimant did not qualify as a "worker" under ORS 656.005(30) for the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The order of the Workers' Compensation Board is affirmed.
Notes
Van Hyning testified (and SAIF argues on review) that federal rules promulgated by the federal DOT require the safe driving test to occur before a driver can be hired.
The ALJ's findings of fact did not state whether Van Hyning had been asked about claimant's charge that he would be paid a percentage of the profit for the delivery.
In an implied-in-fact contract, the parties' agreement is inferred, in whole or in part, from their conduct. Larisa's Home Care, LLC v. Nichols-Shields ,
We need not-and do not-decide whether claimant was entitled to minimum wage.
In light of our conclusion, explained below, that claimant did not prove a reasonable expectation of remuneration, we do not decide today whether-once a claimant has taken on an obligation to provide servicеs for a remuneration-an injury sustained prior to the start of the remunerable duties might be compensable.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency notes that, for liability to be imposed, a servant need not know the identity of the principal, so long as the principal "consent[s] to receive the service and has the power of direction over the servant's conduct to the same extent" as if the principal's identity were known to the servant. § 220-224 (1958).
In 1959, ORS 656.002(15) (1957) was amended by Oregon Laws 1959, chapter 448, section 1, to become ORS 656.002(16) (1959). The statute was subsequently renumbered as ORS 656.005 in 1975 and then again amended by Oregon Laws 1977, chapter 804, section 1.
When compared to other amendments to ORS 656.005(30), it is evident that the 1959 amendment narrowed the circumstances in which a claimant could be a worker. For example, in 1967, the legislature amended the statute to "includ[e] minors whether lawfully or unlawfully employed." Former ORS 656.002(21) (1967). In doing so, the legislature broadened the scope of employees who could potentially be "workers" without altering the requisite relationship that must exist between employer and employee for an employee to qualify as a "worker." By contrast, by adding the phrase "for a remuneration," the legislature narrowed the nature of the relationship.