This аppeal concerns the disqualification of the members of a law firm from further representing one of the parties to this suit. We address this opinion only to that question аnd not to the merits of the civil litigation.
Plaintiffs Business Assets Corporation and Joe Goldberg have been represented by Llewellyn Gray of the law firm Stanley, Davidoff, Long and Gray since the commencement of the suit. Defendants Mahoney Typographers, Inc. and Claire J. Mahoney were initially represented by Benjamin W. Wise of the law firm of Wise, Sayen аnd O’Connor.
From June, 1972, until May, 1974, Michael O’Connor, as a partner of Wise, Sayen and O’Con-nor, took full responsibility for conducting defendants’ defense. In June, 1974, Mr. O’Connor termi *188 nated his partnership and became associated with the law firm which represents the plaintiffs (Stanley, Davidoff, Long and Gray).
There is no contention that Mr. O’Connor has been connected with this litigation since his disassociation with the law firm which represents the defendants, nor is there any indication that Mr. O’Connor has discussed the case with Mr. Gray after becoming assoсiated with him. Mr. Gray has continued to represent the plaintiffs, and the defendants seek the disqualification of Mr. Gray and his law firm. The trial court refused to disqualify Mr. Gray. Defendants appeal.
Should a law firm be disqualified from continuing to represent a client where, during the pen-dency of the litigation, it hired an attorney who represented the oppоnent in the same case?
Defendants contend that Mr. Gray’s continued representation of the plaintiffs would be unprofessional and would create the appеarance of impropriety. Plaintiffs argue that no confidences have been or will be divulged and that Mr. O’Connor will not be involved in the litigation in any way.
We initially note that the issue raised herein is a difficult one and that our decision could be construed in an overbroad manner. Our holding is limited strictly to the facts of the instant case. Applying the apрropriate provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and prior case law relevant to this appeal, we reverse the trial court and remand for an order disqualifying Mr. Gray and the members and employees of his firm from further representing the plaintiffs in this litigation.
Defendants point to Canons 4, 5 and 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Canons (
We can find no case law which directly answers the question before us, but in
Auseon v Reading Brass Co,
DR 5-105 of Canon 5 requires refusal to continue employment if the interests of another cliеnt may impair the independent professional judgment of the lawyer. DR 5-105(D) states that "[i]f a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under DR 5-105, no pаrtner or associate of his or his firm may accept or continue such employment”. Our reasoning in Auseon and the clear language of DR 5-105(D) indicate that disqualification may arise merely through partnership or association with an attorney who is ethically prevented from continued participation in litigation.
W E Bassett Co v H C Cook Co, 302 F2d 268 (CA 2, 1962), involved a similar conflict. The issue there concerned the appropriateness of the representation of the plaintiff by a partner in a law firm which included an attorney who had reрresented the defendant in previous litigation concerning issues on which he had previously advised the defendant. Basing its decision in part on American Bar Association Canons 6 and 37, the Court found disqualification was required because of the partnership association and the prior representation and advisement.
In the case аt bar, there is no indication that confidences have actually been disclosed in violation of Canon 4 nor that any specific disciplinary rule has been violated. But in light of the apparent potentiality of even an inadvertant violation of Canon 4 and the mandate of Canon 9, the disqualification of Mr. Gray and the other members оf his firm is necessary. In Auseon, supra, we said that attorneys must not only adhere to the canons, but that they must also scrupulously avoid those sitúa- *191 tions in which it can be said that there is even an aрpearance of impropriety. This is the requirement of Canon 9. Even in a case such as this where there is no claim of specific unethical conduct, where it might аppear that impropriety exists, remedial action is required. The fact that Mr. O’Connor previously represented the defendant and is now associated with an attorney representing the plaintiffs in the same litigation raises surface appearances of impropriety. A partnership of attorneys is typically an association where close communication, cooperation and exchange of knowledge and ideas is common and necessary practice. Wherе such activity may potentially result in the revelation of the confidences of opposing litigants, there exists an appearance of impropriety which must bе eliminated.
Disqualification may seem unwarranted in a case such as this where the question of professional ethics does not involve affirmative wrongdoing or a clear conflict of interest. But involved here is a matter of maintaining the highest standards of professional conduct required to avoid the appearance of impropriety. As members of a profession in which public reliance and trust is so essential and whose members’ integrity must be assured to maintain vital public respect, we as attorneys must recognize the importance of a high standard by which our conduct is measured. Even where there is no thought of or intent to do wrong, if our conduct appears to be unethical, we weaken that respect and trust just as surely as if we had purposefully violated a specific rule.
Countless situations arise in the day-to-day practice of law which raise questions of what course the attorney should take to resolve a problem whose solution is unclear. A difficult weighing and *192 balancing of the interests of the client, the attorney, and the legal profession as a whole is required where that problem concerns a matter of professional conduct. But the bottom line should always bе this: where it is a question of ethics, the answer is "no”. There is no room for "close” questions of professional propriety, particularly at a time when public trust in and respect for the legal profession is not at its highest level.
Reversed.