287 N.W. 70 | Neb. | 1939
This is a suit in equity to enjoin the violation of a restrictive covenant contained in a contract made and entered into by and between plaintiff Gable and defendant Carpenter, on April 18, 1935, and to recover damages resulting from the breach thereof. The petition further alleges, with necessary particularity, that Martha Hillerege, the mother of Terry Carpenter, and George Hillerege, who is the second husband of Martha Hillerege, and Chester Guthrie conspired together with Terry Carpenter to attempt to evade the contractual provisions referred to, and, as hereinafter set forth, in violation thereof; and in furtherance of their conspiracy said defendants engaged in and carried on a gasoline and oil business in the city of North Platte, Nebraska. Issues were joined and trial had, which resulted in a finding and judgment for plaintiff, permanently enjoining the further continuance of the oil and gasoline business carried on by defendants Terry Carpenter, Martha Hillerege, George
The record before us evidences the fact that the determinant issues in this litigation are questions of fact. This being an appeal in equity, it is the duty of this court to retry the issues involved in the case upon the evidence preserved in the bill of exceptions, and, upon a trial de novo, to reach an independent conclusion as to what finding or findings are required under the pleadings and all the evidence, without reference to the conclusion reached by the district court. Comp. St. 1929, sec. 20-1925. But when the evidence on material issues so conflicts that it cannot be reconciled, this court considers the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying, and must have accepted one version of the facts rather than the opposite. Graham Ice Cream Co. v. Petros, 127 Neb. 172, 254 N. W. 869.
It must also be conceded that much important testimony in this case comes from parties closely connected by blood and affinity, and, in addition, closely associated together in business generally, as well as in the particular adventure here under investigation. Under circumstances involving principles somewhat similar, Redick, District Judge, in the opinion adopted by this court in Dvorak v. Kucera, 130 Neb. 341, 264 N. W. 737, made the following observations, viz.:
“It is extremely difficult for a reviewing court to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion when the testimony is in conflict and the principal fact to be determined rests upon the evidence of interested witnesses. In such case the judgment of the trial court who had the benefit of seeing the witnesses and observing their deportment while testifying is of considerable weight, notwithstanding the requirement of the statute that the reviewing court shall try the case de novo.”
The record supports the conclusion that this agreement was substantially performed approximately on the day of its date by the mutual transfers of the respective interests of the parties thereto as required by the terms thereof.
It seems a generally accepted principle that, “Where a contract for the sale and transfer of a business omits to mention the good-will, the presumption is that it was the intention of the parties that the good-will should pass with other assets.” 12 R. C. L. 985, sec. 8.
So, also, “On the sale or dissolution of a partnership it is usually held that the succeeding partner or partners have the right to carry on the business under the old name, and this rule has even been extended to a case where the individual’s name was the only one that appeared in the name of the firm.” 12 R. C. L. 987, sec. 10. See, also, Churton v. Douglas, John. (Eng.) 174, 28 L. J. Ch. 841.
In view of the terms of the contract in suit, including the restrictive covenant constituting an essential part thereof, it is obvious that the rights assured thereby to plaintiff herein must mean every advantage that has been acquired by the old firm in carrying on its business, whether connected with the premises in which the business was previously carried on, or with the name of the late firm, or with any other matter carrying with it the benefit of the business. And it necessarily follows that in the transaction and carrying on of the oil and gas business, so acquired by plaintiff, for the limited period and to the extent of territory in the aforesaid contract provided, and by virtue thereof, he acquired the right to use the name “Terry Carpenter” simpliciter and exclusively. The rights claimed in this proceeding being the rights created and vested by the contract in suit, the only question remaining is whether such have been substantially infringed or impaired by defendants, — a clear question of fact.
The defendant Martha Hillerege, who is the mother of Terry Carpenter, and the general manager of his business affairs, properties and enterprises generally, and exclusively so functioning in his absence, was present in Terry Carpenter’s office in Scottsbluff, Nebraska, when the discussion and negotiations were had between Carpenter and plaintiff, which terminated in the written agreement, a part of which is hereinbefore quoted. She had served in that capacity since 1933, and during this period was credited on his books with a salary running from $250 to $300 a month. She was possessed of much authority in relation to Terry Carpenter’s business. She employed and discharged employees, had authority to and did draw checks upon Terry Carpenter’s account in banks in which he had money on deposit; occasionally paid operating expenses, wages, and other bills from her private funds and reimbursed herself by merely writing a check to herself upon certain of Terry Carpenter’s bank accounts. She received credit for her regular salary continuously since 1932. However, she has withdrawn but $15 a week. The balance of her wages earned, exceeding $7,000, stands as a credit on Terry Carpenter’s books. George Hillerege is Terry Carpenter’s stepfather, and the present husband of Martha Hillerege. He has been continuously employed by Terry Carpenter since 1932, and still is so employed, on a salary basis substantially identical with that of his wife. He has also withdrawn but a small portion of his earnings, and an amount in excess of $7,000 now stands to his credit on the books of his employer. His duties consisted in having charge of Carpenter’s motive equipment for transportation, and the routing of trucks in connection with Carpenter’s business. Chester Guthrie, the defendant in the instant case who was the operator of the oil and gasoline station involved in this litigation, at North Platte, Nebraska, which it is claimed by defendants was
The foregoing constitutes the previous relation of the parties who are the defendants in this action.
The immediate events leading up to the present litigation are, viz.: In November, 1937, Terry Carpenter approached plaintiff with a proposition to lease the oil station and oil and gasoline business which plaintiff had received through the deal of April 18, 1935. The expressed purpose of Carpenter was that he might secure an additional outlet for his petroleum products. The negotiations were unavailing. Later, during the same month, Carpenter conferred in North Platte with a Mr. A. A. Hastings, a real estate dealer, who, it appears from defendants’ evidence, had long been a close personal friend and political ally of Carpenter, wherein Carpenter advised Hastings that he wanted to lease a good filling station in North Platte, Nebraska. Hastings informed him of a station then available known as the Whelan station. Upon Carpenter’s suggestion, Hastings introduced Carpenter to Whelan, and negotiations were then entered into concerning the leasing of these premises. As a result of these conversations a lease was prepared by Evans & Simon, North Platte attorneys, providing for the leasing of the Whelan filling station to George Hillerege for a term of two years. In connection with this lease another instrument was prepared, entitled “Guaranty and Ratification,” by the terms of which Terry Carpenter agreed to indemnify Whelan by reason of any default to pay the rent due or to con
In consideration of the proof in this record we keep in
We have carefully examined the subject of damages awarded by the trial court. We are convinced that the amount awarded is fairly supported by the evidence, and equally certain that an increase thereof is not justified by the record before us.
It follows that the decree of the district court is, in all respects, correct, and it is
Affirmed.