*1 M. JAMES [¶ 28] The Honorable D.J.,
BEKKEN, sitting place of WALLE, C.J., disqualified.
VANDE
Jay Appellee GABEL, Plaintiff and
NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, Defendant Appellant.
No. 20060003. Dakota.
Supreme Court North
Aug. *2 speed
Jamestown that would and slow pass. to allowing Steele Steele reported plate also the license vehi- cle was “JAYBIRD.” Steele continued to relaying his follow location phone. dispatcher on his cell dispatch- from the was The record Kapp. er Officer does many attempted reflect how times Steele were, pass, road conditions what Gabel, long following how had been Steele at what speed attempting Steele pass Gabel’s vehicle. pаssed Kapp
[¶ 3] Officer Steele’s vehi- cle and located vehicle. Officer Gabel’s Kapp speed of Gabel’s measured vehi- at 47 in a 65 cle miles hour mile posted hour zone. There minimum After determining limit in the area. speed, Kapp stopped the vehicle’s Officer on the Gabel’s vehicle based dispatcher. she received from the Kapp independently report viewing (argued) A. Colling L. and Thomas Jodi testimony a traffic Her violation. indi- (on brief), Office, Dickson Dickson Law оr suspi- cates she did not observe erratic Bismarck, ND, plaintiff appellee. for Kapp cious driving. Officer testified she had not cross the noticed Gabel center (argued), E. Pelham Zachary Assistant line, shoulder, drive commit General, Attorney Attorney Office Gen- violation. Officer stated the Bismarck, ND, eral, ap- for defendant and stop was based on Steele’s pellant. previously sped up Gabel had own his lane, KAPSNER, making Justice. it difficult for Steele stopped, [¶ 4] When Gabel stated he Thе North Dakota [¶ 1] recently married. He admitted (“Department”) Transportation appeals drinking. had been testified judgment reversing a from a district court sobriety' she administered several field Jay hearing suspend officer’s decision failing tests with each test. Officer driving privileges ninety-one for Kapp then un- arrested Gabel days. judg- affirm the district court der the influence of alcohol. ment. hearing, At the administrative Ga-
[¶ 5] I Kapp lacked reason- bel claimed Officer able and April On argued County trаffic of his vehicle. Gabel Stutsman Sheriffs Office sent day case decided this Court message radio to Officer Elizabeth hearing precluded stating reported that Chad Steele had administrative See stopping Gabel. traveling Highway on south of officer Director, N.D. of law conclusions and order of agency supported by are N.W.2d 918. its findings of fact. hearing officer concluded the facts *3 from 7. distinguishable findings Anderson were The of fact by agency sufficiently do facts this case this case the becаuse address the presented evidence to the by arresting agency by known offi appellant. license was subse cer. driver’s suspended. quently 8. The conclusions law and order of agency sufficiently do not explain appealed hearing 6] Gabel offi- [¶ agency’s for rationale not adopting decision to court arguing cer’s the district any contrary by a recommendations that Anderson controlled and the officer hearing an officer or administrative law not have an independent sup- basis to judge. the traffic The district port stop. court § N.D.C.C. 28-32-46. decision, reversed the officer’s hearing give [¶ 8] We deference to the concluding the did not officer have the findings, sound but review requisite suspi- reasonable articulable questions of novo. Bjerklie law de v. appeal, cion Gabel’s vehicle. On Ins., Safety and 2005 ND Workforce identity argues of the 818; Gray v. N.D. Game by informant was known the officer and 204, ¶7, and Fish Dep’t, 2005 incriminating information was appeal, N.W.2d 614. In this the issue the dispatcher from to the officer making law, a question this Court distinguishable case Anderson. namely whether there existed a reasonable articulable for II to stop Gabel’s vehicle. [¶ 7] Our review of decision to justify To
suspend
governed by
driver’s license
investigation,
vehicle for
an officer
Anderson,
ch. 28-32.
N.D.C.C.
ND must have a
¶97, 6,
information sufficient raise reasonable in her “professional knew the informant аnd articulable is less.” Id. a criminal capacity”; she believed Miller, (citing 18 State v. (N.D.1994)). tips have from known Anderson, record. We allowed But in stop pro criminal informants though even was or could have reliable, is otherwise reliable. State Department vided sufficiently been ¶¶ 44, 2006 710 ND failed “to that the informant told establish rule, the lesser general hit in a 392. “As a suspect cones N.W.2d
437 der, any quality tip, or commit or violation. The greater of information re- quantity argue does Gabel’s suspicion.” quired to raise рer of 47 miles hour in 65 per a mile Miller, Id. at 13 510 N.W.2d at hour provides zone a sufficient basis to evaluating “In the factual basis for See, justify a stop. e.g., Johnson v. stop, must consider investigatory we Sprynczynatyk, circumstances, totality including N.W.2d (traveling 8-10 miles hour content, quantity, quality, in a 25 mile hour zone does consti degree reliability, infor- the officer’s tute Here, and quality mation.” Id. the content support stop); Brown, State v. she officer’s when (N.D.1993) (evidence justify was insufficient to traveling driver is than slower usual only vehicle. officer was able speed does not create reasonable and ar- location of suspicion); ticulable Salter North Dako plate and its but to corrobo- license unable ta Dep’t Transp., 505 activity suspicious rate or other (N.D.1993) (officer did not have reasonable *5 activity reliability that confirm the would stop a car trav nothing There tip. eling 30-35 miles hour in a 50 mile record in case that ensures infor- hour though zone even the car was weav Kapp mant did was reliable. Offiсer not lane). ing slightly within own testify reliability. about basis of [¶ 14] The testimony, nothing Given her there is argument is that traffic violation oc- suggest this record re- authority conclusion, curred. As for this garded as other Steele than a member of § the Department cites 39-10- N.D.C.C. the “criminal milieu.” Members of the 11(2), which states: “the of an over- “criminal must their reliabili- milieu” have taken give way right shall vehicle However, ty Id. at established. we favor on overtaking audible need not determine the signal not may speed increase the Steele, because, assuming even he was a completely that vehicle until driver’s informant, reliable his of a vehicle passed by overtaking Based vehicle.” down, speeding up and allow- us, on it the record we have before is not ing pass support a car to is insufficient to entirely Steele con- clear the information traffic stop absent corroboration other- veyed amounted to a violation this stat- activity wise suspicious conduct. ute. no highway suggest There was Driving slightly on a below the speed sufficiently suspicious limit is not to Steele that he signal” “audible support stop. a traffic we intended to The record have is testimony: Kapp’s limited to Officer argues
[¶ 13]
case is
than
stronger
Di
you
MR. SHARP: What information did
rector,
N.D.
patrol
receive out in the
car?
traffic violation. Officer testified she posted observed Gabel below
speed limit, MR. You noticed but she did not notice Gabel DICKSON: never line, any driving crossing cross the center drive on the shoul of the center line or WALLE, W. VANDE anything that. GERALD like on the shoulder C.J., MARING, and MARY MUEHLEN that correct? Isn’t CROTHERS, JJ., DANIEL concur. J. DEPUTY KAPP: No. Okay. You no- never MR. DICKSON: Justice, SANDSTROM, dissenting. you, yourself, ... never noticed ticed tip the respectfully dissent. The [¶ 18]I violations, you? any moving specific. was reliable and officer received KAPP: then I locked DEPUTY Other Therefore, justified. traffic 47 in a 65. him on radar Although majority ultimately declares mini- And there’s no MR. DICKSON: dicta, majority’s them statements highway, is there? speed mum on Amendment obscure established Fourth If there’s traffic be- DEPUTY KAPP: jurisprudence, blurring be- the standards him, traffic. impeding hind he’s a criminal tween a citizen Officer, there’s MR. DICKSON: suspi- informant and between reasonable highway, minimum on Then, pen- cause. in its probable cion and there? returns paragraph, ultimate to what it has told us does not matter No, not that I DEPUTY KAPP: recall. erroneously order conclude that because testified she did 15] tip, officеr did violation. observe traffic The sole justified. I would affirm. Kapp gave justifying reason Officer stop was based on Steele’s I previously sped up own his
lane, making
for Steele
it difficult
to
misstates the stan-
[¶ 19]
that this unverified
appeals.
testified
dard
review administrative
¶ 8,
provided
Safety
her with sufficient infor- At
v.
citing Bjerklie Workforce
178,
impediment
Ins.,
9,
an
mation that Gabel was
ND
704 N.W.2d
2005
818,
not
N.D.
independent-
Gray
traffic. Officer
did
v.
Game and Fish
614,
204, 7,
or
Gabel
ly
speeding Dep’t,
observe
ND
2005
nor did
view
majority says,
give
down
she
the
“We
deferеnce
ability
impede
findings,
the
of others to
the
sound
but re-
upon the
But that
questions
his vehicle. Based
view
of law de novo.”
conveyed,
only possibility
in either
there is
is
the standard enunciated
func- Bjerklie
Gray.
majority’s attempt
had occurred. This
the
violation
equivalent
“possible
findings”
reckless
to limit
tional
deference
“sound
jurispru-
or drunk
held to be insuffi-
driver”
inconsistent with
Court’s
cient to
a reasonable and articu-
dence
since the standard —based on
establish
ever
2005
suspicion
separation
powers
lable
ND
constitutional
—was
Elkin,
Fuels
III
the
construing
“preponderance
In
conclude,
permit
apply
us to
totality
under
evidence” standard
16] We
circumstances,
test
weight-of-the-evidence
an
findings of
administrative
suspicion
articulable
factual
have reasonable and
independent
agency, we do
make
justify
stop
Gabel’s vehicle. We
judg-
or substitute our
judgment
findings of fact
affirm the district court’s
rein-
agency.
deter-
ment for that of
stating
driving privileges.
conclusion,
only
reasoning
reaсhing
reject
whether a
mind
mine
we
respondent’s argument
reasonably could have
determined
stop
only
cause for a
and frisk can
factual
were
conclusions reached
personal
based on the officer’s
observa-
by
weight
evidence
proved
tion,
than on
supplied
rather
entire record.
person.
tips,
another
Informants’
like all
clues and
coming
other
evidence
II
scene,
policeman
vary
to a
may
“The reasonable
[¶20]
greatly
reliability.
in their value аnd
requires
standard
than a
more
rule
simple
every
One
will not cover
hunch,’
probable
but
‘mere
less than
tips,
situation.
completely lacking
Some
v. N.D.
Lapp
cause.”
reliability,
in indicia would either war-
140, 11,
police response
rant no
fur-
require
“
‘Reasonable
investigation
ther
before a forcible
when “a
person
exists
suspect
would be
But
authorized.
position
justified by
officer’s
would be
example,
some situations —for
when
objective
suspect
some
manifestation to
the victim of a street crime seeks imme-
’”
potential
activity.”
Kappel
criminal
police
gives
diate
aid and
a description
Dir.,
Dep’t Transp.,
N.D.
assailant,
of his
or when a
infor-
credible
Fargo
441 Dir., activity or suspicious Anderson v. N.D. of otherwise majority answered the conduct.” 696 918. This case N.W.2d is Anderson, of whether the informant was re- question different which the re- negative in the it said the when officer, liable port “possible communicated to the was the information insufficient. quality driver,” reсkless driver or drunk was con- required when the Validation clusory nature, lacking any specified i.e., reliability, of the informa- quality Anderson, conduct. As in Anderson, poor. tion See ND ¶ was case reliable. See added) (emphasis (the tip greater was of because (“In evaluating the factual basis for an deputy “the was aware before the vehicle investigatory must consider the stop, we stop that the informant could be identified circumstances, totality of the including the dispatch becаuse had described the infor- content, quality, quantity, degree and or him, addition, mant’s vehicle to and in information.”). reliability, of the officer’s pull observed the informant’s vehicle over stopped as he Anderson and he knew an 15, states, majority, 25] The assisting interviewing officer was the infor- independently did not ob- “Officer mant”). Here, dispatcher communicat- speeding up or corroborate serve Gabel name and ed nor she view and down Kapp. to Officer Officer knew who ability pass of othеrs to his impede was, again allowing informant confuses the her to meas- vehicle.” Also, credibility. apply tip’s standards that to a citizen informant ure the infor- car, a criminal informant and to a known following pro- mant was anonymous tip. and an viding dispatcher, more information to the could base and artic- her reasonable and was available to be interviewed after information provid- ulable Thus, the traffic made. the tip Furthermore, by the ed informant. case, greater reliability. ¶ 15, states, majority, upon “Based Anderson, however, unlike the informa- conveyed, only pos- there is dispatcher tion sibility that a occurred. violation had This Kapp specific, providing was far more equivalent ‘possible is the functional officer with a reasonable driver’ reckless driver or drunk held to (“the suspicion. See id. at communi- insufficient....” the reasonable- Under deputy cation however, standard, “possibili- ‘possible the bare assertion of reckless ty” required of violation is all that is as driver,’ is not of drunk sufficient “as ‘a long person the offi- quantity ar- provide position justified by cer’s would be some sufficient to ticulable objective suspect potential manifestation to vehicle”). Here, stop of Offi- Anderson’s ” activity.’ criminal Kappel, vehicle, Kapp was told that “the JAY- cer Ovind, N.W.2d 718 1998 BIRD, up, would slow [and] majori- not allow Mr. Steele to him.” would *9 ty has confused the standards for a known specific This information con- addressed citizen and a criminal informant. duct, lending reliability to the infor- more tip.
mant’s The conduct also described a TV specific driving: impeding a type of erratic faster car’s lawful Section majority wrongly concludes 26] [¶ N.D.C.C., 39-10-11(2), indistinguishable specifically requires that this case is from mov- V car allow a faster that an overtaken pass: ing car to Ultimately, Kapp was Officer 27] [¶ a known specific, tip rehable given on overtaking passing Except when scene, Upon informant. arriving at of an permitted, the driver right forty- driving Kapp observed Gabel Officer way to thе give overtaken vehicle shall sixty-five hour in a mile- seven miles overtaking vehicle right in favor zone, which, although illegal, per-hour signal may not increase on audible the con- logically unusual and would be until speed of that driver’s might if someone be observed duct ve- passed by overtaking completely driving slowly, up pre- speeding were hicle. again. pass, slowing and then down vent spe- ignore attempts however, logically expect, cannot One cific, by stating, at erratic pre- sрeeding would continue us, it on the record we have before “Based arrived on after officer had vent entirely clear information Steele is not Therefore, scene. corroboration of this conveyed amounted to a violation of, in conduct Gabel was accused exact sug- There was information to statute. unlike- being unnecessary, addition gest signal’ Steele an ‘audible have to ly happen. did not pass.” every intended to The fact that con- tip corroborate the or observe been may of the violation not have element duct to have reasonable and however, met, is irrelevant when measur- tip alone was suspicion; reliable ing Kapp’s and articula- enough. re- suspicion, because she was not
ble know, fact, quired to for a that Gabel VI job a violation. Her committed I court would reverse the district specific tip to a known respond order. and reinstate driving. of erratic When Officer arrived, driving forty- she observed Gabel Dale V. 29] Sandstrom sixty-five mile- seven miles hour speed- If per-hour zone. “JAYBIRD” was
ing up a slow logically suspicious
would conduct tip. was more
than the “functional equivalent”
in Anderson.
