185 Mo. App. 138 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1914
Ejectment. Plaintiff sought to recover the possession of land in Jasper county, together with damages and the alleged value of monthly rents and profits. Defendants for answer admitted plaintiff’s title to the land, but denied its right to possession on the ground that they had theretofore entered upon said land with- the knowledge, permission and consent of the plaintiff to dig for ores and in good faith dug and opened shafts and extended and operated shifts therefrom and assembled machinery for carrying on mining operations, and thus acquired rights under section 8409, Revised Statutes 1909; that they
The evidence shows that the G-. M. Mining Company, the plaintiff and appellant herein, was the owner in fee of the land described m the petition, including lot 36 mentioned in the answer, at all times mentioned in the recoiff; that on June 12, 1912, the O. M. Mining Company executed a mining lease to S. T. Ramage for a term of ten years from that date on said land; that Ramage entered into possession of the land, under the lease about that time and platted the ground into mining lots for miners to enter thereon and mine, but posted no rules governing such mining. Ramage continued mining operations oh a portion of the land, through his superintendent, W. B. Shackleford, and in this connection pumped water from the ground and operated a mill thereon. About the sixth or seventh day of July, 1913, while Ramage was still operating under his lease, the defendants entered upon lot 36 of the Ramage plat thereof, with the permission and consent of Shackleford, superintendent for Ramage, and engaged in mining on said lot under the terms of section 8409, Revised Statutes of Missouri 1909.
Mrs. Henrietta Glenn was at all times mentioned in the record the president and general manager of the plaintiff, G. M. Mining Company, and seemed to have entire charge and control of its affairs.
Some few days prior to August 18, 1913, W. B. Shackleford, for and on behalf of S. Y. Ramage, notified Mrs. Glenn when she was bn the leased premises that Mr. Ramage was going to abandon the lease and surrender back the premises. The president of the plaintiff company made no objection to this, and in nursuance of this determination, the Ramage people
The appellant’s principal contention is that defendants never entered lot 36 under it, but that the entry was made under Eamage from whom defendants verbally leased the lot; that their shaft was sunk, the drift run into ore, and the mine opened up under Eamage; that the most they claim is that they continued to mine the lot for a few days after the forfeiture and surrender of the Eamage lease with the consent of the plaintiff; and that this does not entitle the defendants to a statutory mining right of three years.
The briefs filed give prominence to the question of our jurisdiction to hear and determine this appeal, the point being raised in appellant’s motion to transfer the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that the title to real estate is involved. Defendants in their answer disclaimed title to the lot in question, and at no place in the record is there any intimation that
Section 8409, Revised Statutes .1909, insofar as it is material here, provides: “Whenever any such owner or lessee of real estate shall permit any person or persons, ... to enter and dig for lead ore or other minerals on such real estate, with his consent, but without such owner or lessee complying- with the provisions of section 8408, and such person or persons having so entered upon said lands by the permission and consent of snck owner or lessee as aforesaid, and having in, good faith dug or opened any shaft, mine, quarry, prospect or deposit of mineral, or extended or opened from any shaft or mine any room, drift, entry or other excavation, he or they shall have the exclusive right as against such owner or lessee, ... to continue the work, mine and dig such shaft, mine, prospect or deposit of mineral so dug or opened by him or them as aforesaid, in said real estate, with a right of way over such lands for the purpose of such mining, for the term of three years, from the date of the giving of such consent or permit. . . .”
There was sufficient evidence to support the verdict as to the permission and consent of the plaintiff for defendants to work the ground.
Respondents in their brief contend that plaintiff cannot maintain ejectment against them as licensees, hut as we have disposed of the case on another point it will not be necessary to discuss that question.
The judgment is affirmed.