Gilbert M. Martinez, Appellant v. Exeter Township Police Department for Berks County, Pennsylvania and WBJG Towing & Recovery Services also known as Xpressway Freight Trucking
No. 226 C.D. 2025
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FILED: July 10, 2026
Submitted: May 12, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM
Gilbert M. Martinez (Martinez), pro se, appeals from the February 10, 2025 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County (Trial Court) which dismissed, with prejudice, Martinez‘s civil complaint against Appellees Exeter Township Police Department (Police Department) and WBJG Towing & Recovery Services (WBJG Towing). Upon review, we affirm.
I. Background
On September 19, 2024, Martinez was stopped by an officer of the Police Department in the parking lot of a Kentucky Fried Chicken after grocery shopping at a nearby Walmart store. Original Record (O.R.), Item #42 at 17. The officer stopped Martinez‘s vehicle upon observing a non-Pennsylvania, “fictitious” white license plate with the word “PRIVATE.” Id.; O.R., Item #45 at 40. During the course of the traffic stop, the officer requested Martinez‘s driver‘s license, registration, and proof of insurance. O.R., Item #42 at 17. However, Martinez
After several amended complaints, Martinez filed a petition for writ of mandamus on October 7, 2024, and filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), which the Trial Court granted. See O.R., Item #8 at 11; O.R., Item #7 at 2. The petition requested several forms of relief, including (1) mandamus to mandate the release of Martinez‘s vehicle and a cease and desist from “issu[ing] traffic tickets without probable cause“; (2) injunctive relief to direct the immediate return of Martinez‘s vehicle and an order to “pay the full Kelly Blue [B]ook retail value of 3,895 dollars“;3 (3) punitive and compensatory damages totaling approximately
In response to Martinez‘s claims, both the Police Department and WBJG Towing filed preliminary objections to the complaint. O.R., Item #14 at 2; O.R., Item #22 at 4. WBJG Towing‘s preliminary objections were dismissed without prejudice due to failure to conform with Rule 1028 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure,
Martinez filed a timely notice of appeal with this Court. O.R., Item #51 at 1. In response, WBJG Towing filed a motion to quash, asserting that Martinez‘s appeal was frivolous and requesting monetary sanctions pursuant to Rule 2744 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Before this Court,7 Martinez asserts several errors, which we address as follows.8 Martinez argues that the Trial Court abused its discretion when it
WBJG Towing argues that a default judgment was improper due to Martinez‘s inadequate notice of intent to file a praecipe for default judgment and his subsequent failure to file such praecipe with the prothonotary. WBJG‘s Br. at 7 & 9. The Police Department maintains that Martinez‘s motion to recuse was properly denied because it was filed based merely on an adverse ruling. Police Department‘s Br. at 16-17. The Police Department additionally asserts that Martinez‘s failure to argue all asserted issues results in waiver of those left undeveloped. Id. at 17.
Finally, both the Police Department and WBJG Towing similarly argue that the Trial Court properly stayed the proceedings and gave Martinez adequate notice and the opportunity to defend his position before imposing sanctions in its February 10, 2025 order. Police Department‘s Br. at 11-13; WBJG Towing‘s Br. at 5-6.
A. Non-Meritorious Legal Claims
Civil Rule 1023.1 “authorizes sanctions for pleadings, written motions, and other papers directed to the court that are presented for an improper purpose[.]” Raynor v. D‘Annunzio, 243 A.3d 41, 55 (Pa. 2020) (citing
(c) The signature of an attorney or pro se party constitutes a certificate that the signatory has read the pleading, motion, or other paper. By signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating such a document, the attorney or pro se party certifies that, to the best of that person‘s knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation,
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law,
(3) the factual allegations have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual allegations are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
Here, Martinez argues that the Trial Court abused its discretion by dismissing his claims because such claims were supported by law, as well as by evidence filed at the inception of the litigation. Martinez‘s Br. at 11-13. Martinez further maintains that dismissal was improper because the Trial Court failed to provide “notice of the specific conduct [Judge Gavin] deemed to have violated Rule 1023.1(c)” upon issuing its show cause order. Id. at 11. These arguments lack merit. In its January 8, 2025 order, the Trial Court ordered Martinez to
show cause as to why he has not violated Rule 1023.1(c) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure as a result of the following specific conduct:
1. Filing [Martinez‘s] complaint against the Defendant, [Police Department] (i) that may be presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; (ii) includes claims that are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; and/or (iii) contains factual allegations that do not have evidentiary support; and/or
2. Filing [Martinez‘s] complaint against the Defendant, [WBJG Towing] (i) that may be presented for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; (ii) includes claims that are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; and/or (iii) contains factual allegations that do not have evidentiary support.
None of Martinez‘s legal contentions are “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law[.]”
Where a statute is repealed and its provisions are at the same time reenacted by the repealing act, the effect according to the great weight of authority, is that the earlier statute is not in fact repealed, but its provisions continue in active operation, so that all the rights and liabilities incurred thereunder are preserved and may be enforced.
Erie v. Piece of Land, 14 A.2d 428, 430 (Pa. 1940) (quoting Haspel v. O‘Brien, 67 A. 123, 124 (Pa. 1907)). Thus, Martinez‘s argument that the Vehicle Code no longer stands due to the repeal of Section 104 is not warranted by existing law, nor does his argument present a serious attempt to extend, modify, or challenge the law.
B. Additional Issues Raised on Appeal
As set forth above, Martinez also contends that the Trial Court “disregarded” WBJG Towing‘s default after WBJG Towing failed to file a timely answer to Martinez‘s complaint and that Judge Gavin‘s failure to grant Martinez‘s motions establishes “prima facie grounds showing a disqualifying bias [and] prejudice[.]” Martinez‘s Br. at 4. Because of our disposition as to the non-meritorious nature of Martinez‘s action, however, we do not reach Martinez‘s alternate arguments.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing discussion, the order of the Trial Court is affirmed.
Gilbert M. Martinez, Appellant v. Exeter Township Police Department for Berks County, Pennsylvania and WBJG Towing & Recovery Services also known as Xpressway Freight Trucking
No. 226 C.D. 2025
PER CURIAM
ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of July, 2026, it is hereby ORDERED:
- The February 10, 2025 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County is AFFIRMED;
- WBJG Towing & Recovery Services’ April 4, 2025 Motion to Quash is DENIED.11
Notes
- Whether the trial judge in an abuse of the courts [sic] discretion violated 231 Pa. Code Rule 1023.3 by Ordering Pltf to show cause without putting plaintiff on notice of the specific conduct that he deemed appeared to violate Rule 1023.1(c) in accordance with the statue [sic]?
- Whether the trial judge in an abuse of the courts [sic] discretion violated Pa.R.C.P. 206.5 – Note since he had failed to establish prima facie grounds for him to issue a discretionary order to show cause, and a stay of the proceedings?
- Whether the trial judge in an abuse of the courts [sic] discretion denied plaintiffs [sic] motion to vacate without affording him a chance to respond to dfts reply?
- Whether the trial judge in an abuse of the courts [sic] discretion disregarded that WBJG Towing recovery services defaulted in the case by not filing a timely answer to the complaint within the (20) days required pursuant to Pa.R.C[.]P. 1026?
- Whether the trial judge in an abuse of the courts [sic] discretion refused to recuse from the case and failed to enter an opinion deny
[sic] plaintiffs [sic] motion which clearly established prima facie grounds showing a disqualifying bias & prejudice? - Whether the trial judge in an abuse of the courts [sic] discretion deprived plaintiff of the right to the full, fair, and impartial evidentiary hearings as required by the due process clause with respect to plaintiffs [sic] preliminary injunction motion held on 10/25/2024 and order to show cause hearing held on 1/31/2025?
- Whether the trial judge in an abuse of the courts [sic] discretion violated 225 Pa Code Rule[] 401, 402 where he failed to admit plaintiffs [sic] exhibits as evidence during the 1/31/2025 hearing, and discuss in his opinion why he would reject the corroborated evidence proving wrongful tort?
- Whether the trial judge in an abuse of the courts [sic] discretion disregarded Pltf‘s repeat attempts seeking a subpoena from the court for an order directing defendant to produce the police officers [sic] body camera and patrol car video footage which was exculpatory evidence relevant to determining the 1/31/2025 evidentiary hearing?
- Whether the trial judge in an abuse of the courts [sic] discretion disregarded plaintiffs [sic] grievance to him in court on 1/31/2025 that the transcripts to Pltf‘s preliminary injunction hearing were edited to tilt the hands of justice?
- Whether the trial judge in an abuse of the courts [sic] discretion made a clear error over [sic] law where he held in his decision that Title 75 P.S. [sic] § 104 vehicle codes did not repeal the entire existing traffic law on April 28, 1978?
- Whether the trial judge in an abuse of the courts [sic] discretion fraudulently determined that [the Police Department] had probable cause to stop, and detain plaintiff without taking in any evidence that establishes a reasonable belief that a crime had been committed?
- Whether the trial judge in an abuse of the courts [sic] discretion dismissed the case with prejudice in contravention of his previous rulings where he had already considered the same identical arguments raised in the pleadings when he overruled defendant [Police Department‘s] preliminary objections?