134 Ga. 313 | Ga. | 1910
The plaintiff died Ms equitable petition and sought an injunction against defendants, Futcli and Hamilton, praying that they be enjoined from operating a ferry on the Ocmulgee river at a point less than ten and a half miles from the place at which the plaintiff was operating a public ferry, in the exercise of a franchise alleged and admitted by the defendants to be exclusive as to the territory named, and to have been duly granted to petitioner
Futch (Hamilton having been dismissed from the ease) denied, that he was preparing or intended to establish or operate either a public or a private ferry, and contended that the preparations which he was making were exclusively for the purpose of transporting, for his own private use and benefit, employees, wagons, and teams employed by him in moving lumber manufactured at his sawmill to a place at which the lumber was loaded for shipment, and that it was necessary for him to cross the river with his teams in taking them back and forth from the mill, and that it was nearer and more convenient for himself, his employees, and teams to cross the river at the ¡joint where he proposed transporting them than at the ferry operated by the petitioner.' Defendant admitted that he did not own the land on either side of the stream. He introduced no evidence other than his sworn answer. Upon the interlocutory hearing the court granted the injunction against Futch as prayed for, and also adjudged that he “be further enjoined from using said attempted ferry as prayed for by him in his answer.”
Whether the petitioner, under the grant of a franchise, had the sole and exclusive privilege of maintaining and operating a ferry within the distance of ten and a half miles on either side of the ferry established by him is not presented in this record. The petitioner’s exclusive right to operate a ferry charging toll within the designated distances was not challenged or questioned by the defendant,’ and the order of the judge granting the interlocutory injunction, restraining the defendant from operating a public or private ferry, — that is, a ferry at which tolls are charged or any part of the public transported for hire, is not excepted to; but the court’s order is broad enough to operate as an injunction against the 'employment of flat-boats to be used by the defendant as a means of transporting wagons and teams necessary in the operation and carrying on of his sawmill. In the defendant’s answer it is distinctly alleged that he intended to run and operate “said ferry” exclusively for his own private use and benefit, and for the purpose of carrying his teams across the river, as stated above. The answer also negatives any idea of carrying or transporting the public or any part thereof for hire or toll; and yet in the interlocutory order it
Judgment affirmed,, with direction.