172 N.E. 757 | Ill. | 1930
It is generally known throughout the State that a rather large building erected in Jackson Park, in the city of Chicago, as a part of the World's Columbian Exposition of 1893 and known as the Fine Arts Building, was not destroyed as most of the buildings were at the termination of the Columbian Exposition. The building was of unusual architectural design and beauty and was taken over *364
by the South Park Commissioners, and its occupation was allowed the Columbian Museum, and later the Field Columbian Museum, which was a corporation not for pecuniary profit. The Field Museum, after an occupancy of about twenty-six years, vacated the building during 1920. It had become somewhat dilapidated and in disrepair, and the South Park Commissioners, after receiving many requests from civic bodies and other organizations for the preservation of the building, resolved to preserve, repair and reconstruct it in a manner suitable for use, among other purposes, as an industrial museum. The cost of the work was to be defrayed by a bond issue of $5,000,000, which at a referendum election held in June, 1924, the people voted to issue to preserve the building for public purposes, among them a museum. In March, 1925, after the people had voted for the bond issue, William E. Furlong, who is appellant here, filed a tax-payer's bill in the superior court of Cook county to enjoin the issue of the bonds. The court dismissed the bill, and the decree, on appeal, was affirmed by this court April 23, 1926, in Furlong v. South Park Comrs.
The decree covers approximately seventy pages of the abstract, is very full, and describes minutely the museum corporation, its purposes and benefits. The decree is too long to quote in this opinion.
Appellant contends the decree was erroneous in holding that the ordinance and agreement did not violate separate section 2 or section 14 of article 2 of the constitution of the State of Illinois, that the agreement of March 20, 1929, was not void or illegal, and that the purposes mentioned in the agreement of March 20, 1929, were not illegal or unconstitutional.
In answer to appellant's contention that the ordinance and agreement of the park commissioners constitute a donation or loan of credit to the museum corporation, appellees state that the benefits accruing to the park commissioners and the public greatly outweigh any benefits accruing to the museum corporation. The museum corporation is not a corporation organized for profit. It has no stock and no member of the corporation can receive any dividends. Appellees *368
cite St. Hedwig's School v. Cook County,
The legislature of this State in 1893 passed an act entitled "An act concerning museums in public parks." (Laws *369 of 1893, p. 160.) That act authorized park commissioners to purchase, erect or maintain within a public park, edifices to be used as museums for the collection and display of objects pertaining to natural history, the arts and sciences. The act was amended several times, and in 1925 the park authorities were authorized to erect and maintain edifices to be used as aquariums or museums for purposes in the act mentioned. From 1894 to 1920 the Field Museum of Natural History, a corporation not for pecuniary profit, maintained in the Fine Arts Building here involved a museum of natural history, arts and sciences. The ordinance authorizing the Field Museum to occupy the premises required the park commissioners to pay the museum $15,000 per year so long as it was maintained in the Fine Arts Building. Pursuant to the act of 1893 and its several amendments the South Park Commissioners have levied and collected taxes and paid out large sums of money to the Art Institute of Chicago and the Field Museum of Natural History, both of which are corporations not for pecuniary profit and of great public benefit from an educational standpoint. In the construction of the constitution it is proper to consider the uniform, continued and contemporaneous construction given by the legislature and generally recognized. Boehm v. Hertz,supra.
Separate section 2 of the constitution, which provides no county, city, town, township or other municipality shall ever become subscriber to the capital stock of any railroad or private corporation or make donation to or loan its credit in aid of such corporation, seems to apply only to corporations having a capital stock or organized for profit. Murphy v.Dever,
Appellant places much reliance on Washingtonian Home v. Cityof Chicago,
Appellant contends the agreement of March 20, 1929, is void because in violation of the Corrupt Practices act. Judge Dillon, in his work on Municipal Corporations, (vol. 2, 5th ed. p. 1146,) says: "In general, the disqualifying interest must be of a pecuniary or proprietary nature." And it is said in 44 Corpus Juris, 93: "An interest to invalidate the contract must be of a personal or private nature, so that an interest incident to a membership in an association organized for the public welfare, and not for profit, will not have that effect." The five members of the South Park Commissioners were to beex-officio trustees of the museum corporation. As the trustees of the corporation, five members of which were park commissioners, were to pass on all contracts of the corporation, it is contended they cannot preserve their independence such as is required of public officials. They receive no compensation for their services. The corporation of which they are trustees has no capital stock, is not organized for profit and pays no dividend. A fairly well-reasoned case relating to this subject is Crawford v. Clifton HeightsBorough, 11 Pa. Dist. 630. Besides, appellees assert that this contention was not made below, and that assertion is not denied in the reply brief.
We are not impressed with the argument of appellant that the ordinance and agreement of March 20, 1929, are void as tending to create a monopoly.
As to the powers of the park commissioners to sell the $5,000,000 bonds and use the proceeds to restore the Fine *371
Arts Building and render it suitable for an industrial museum, we refer to our former decision in this case, (
It strikes us very forcibly in considering this case that the park commissioners were acting in the public interest. The benefits to the public of such a museum as is here proposed are not denied, and the public have the proposal of Julius Rosenwald, a public-spirited, philanthropic man, to contribute approximately $3,000,000 for the public good in collecting and conducting the museum, and we do not think the commissioners have violated any rule of law or the constitution in passing the ordinance and entering into the contract.
The decree of the superior court of Cook county is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.