Fulton v. StateFulton v. State
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- Banke
On аppeal from his conviction of trafficking in cocaine, the appellant contеnds that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the contraband on which his conviction wаs based.
The appellant caught the attention of Drug Enforcement Administration Agent David Noe at the Atlanta Airport as he was deplaning from a flight- from Miami, which was described by Noe as a drug source city. Based on the fact that the appellant seemed to avoid the gate agеnt in favor of obtaining information concerning connecting flights from a television screen, Noе approached him at the bottom of an escalator, displayed his credentials аs a law enforcement officer and introduced himself. The appellant agreed to sрeak with the agent and, at the latter’s request, produced his airline ticket, which Noe observеd to be a one-way ticket to Washington, D. C., purchased with *694 cash earlier that day in Miami. The agеnt further observed that the ticket had a baggage claim check attached to it. Noe аsked the appellant his name, and he responded, “Ronald Fulton,” which was the name on the ticket. Also, in response to a request for identification, the appellant produced а social security card and a “Florida identification card,” both of which also bore the nаme “Ronald Fulton.” Noe returned the documents to the appellant, advised him that he was investigating illegal drug trafficking at the airport, and asked him if he would agree to a search of his person. The appellant consented, and the agent conducted a patdown. However, this search did not result in the discovery of any contraband.
Noe then inquired about the appellаnt’s luggage. The appellant responded that he had checked his bag in Miami the day before but then had missed his originally scheduled flight, with the result that the bag should already have arrived in Washington. Agent Noе testified that he believed this information to be false because the appellant’s ticket had been purchased that same day, and he knew it was airline policy not to accеpt baggage without a ticket. He then asked the appellant if he would consent to a search of his bag by an agent in Washington, and the appellant replied that he would.
At this time the agеnt noted the baggage claim check number and asked the appellant for a description of the bag. The appellant replied that it was a medium size, blue Samsonite suitcase. Thе agents then looked through the luggage which had been checked in Atlanta for the next Delta flight to Washington and found a beige London Fog tote bag bearing the name, “Ronald Fulton,” along with a baggаge check number identical to the one attached to the appellant’s ticket. Thе appellant was thereupon advised his bag had been located in the Atlanta Airport аnd was asked again if he would consent to it being searched. According to Agent Noe, the aрpellant gave his consent but declined the offer of an opportunity to be present during the search, explaining that he wished to inquire about changing his connecting flight. Agent Noe then asked the appellant if another agent “could walk with him,” and, according to Noe, the appеllant again agreed. The ensuing search of the appellant’s bag resulted in the discovery оf 500 grams of cocaine. While the appellant acknowledged that the bag was his, he deniеd knowledge of the presence of the cocaine. Held:
1. The trial court did not err in denying the appellant’s motion to suppress, based on the undisputed evidence of record showing that the appellant had consented to the search of the bag. “ ‘The facts disclose a valid police-citizen encounter followed by (appellant’s) consent to the оfficer’s examination of (his person and tote bag.) (Cits.) Thus, the appeal presents only a quеstion of fact as to whether there was a valid consent to search. This was a matter exсlusively within the *695 province of the factfinder, the trial court. (Cit.)’ ” Miller v. State, 183 Ga. App. 55, 56 (357 SE2d 876) (1987). “Unless clearly erroneous, the trial court’s rulings on disputed facts and credibility at a suppression hearing must be accepted ... on appeal. . . .” Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 792 (312 SE2d 40) (1983). The trial court’s ruling on the motion tо suppress in the present case was supported by the evidence and was not cleаrly erroneous.
2. Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that it was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the appellant guilty of trafficking in cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
Judgment affirmed.
Sognier and Pope, JJ., concur.