100 F. 874 | E.D.N.Y | 1900
At about 2:30 a.-m. on April .23, 1898, a point in the Atlantic Ocean some 25 miles southeasterly from (Spndy.Hook lightship, and about tbe same distance in a southwesterly direction from Eire Island light, a collision took place between a four-masted ..schooner (the Percy Birdsall), of 1,071 tons register, 217 feet in length; laden-with coal, ahd the ship Queen Elizabeth, 1,0.99 tons register, 248 feet in length, in ballast. The ship was bound from
“ ‘Kunning free’ appears to mean not closehauled; but the phrase Is not happily chosen, to describe a ship that has the wind a point or two free, but forward of the beam.”
In The Earl of Wemys, 6 Asp. 407, the rules involved were:
“Art. 14a. A ship which is running free shall keep out of the way of a ship which is closehauled.”
“Art. 22. Where by the above rules one of- two ships is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep her course.”
It is stated in the syllabus that:
“The custom of sailors to treat sailing ships when in the trades as close-hauled ships, when they are sailing a point or two from being as closehauled as they can lie, does not affect the legal construction of the regulations; and the court will not exonerate vessels so sailing from duties applicable to sailing ships in other latitudes. Semble, a sailing ship .is closehauled, within the meaning of article 14, if she is sailing half a point free of the nearest she can lie to the wind, but not if she is two points off.”
Lord Esher says:
“Then comes another question: If a vessel is, within the meaning of rule 14, clause ‘a,’ a closehauled vessel, what is the meaning of ‘keeping her course,’ in rule 22, as- applied to that? A vessel may be closehauled; that is, sailing on the wind, with her yards not so pointed as they could be; that is to say, her yards not square, or not so placed as they would be if she was sailing free. She may be sailing on a wind, — that is, closehauled, within the meaning of the first of those rules, — although she is not as closehauled as she can possibly be; that is, jammed close to the wind. I believe that is the nautical phrase for it. If she is sailing half a point off that, the cases seem to have said that she is nevertheless closehauled, within the meaning of the rule. The phrase ‘close-hauled’ does not mean jammed close to the wind. It means more off than that. How far could she be sailing, and yet be said to be closehauled, — how far off, being close jammed to the wind? Half a point off, I think everybody is clear that she would still be a closehauled ship. I think we are told that she might be sailing a point off, and yet be considered, within the first part of that rule, a closehauled ship. Whether that would be so if she were more than that, — say, a point and a half, — I am not quite so certain; and it does not seem necessary to consider it in this case, as she was here two points off,— two points or more. I- should say she was no longer a closehauled ship.”
In The Privateer, 9 L. R. Ir. 105, cited by Mr. Marsden, it seems to have been thought that a ship with the wind about 2 points free was closehauled. Attention has been called to the Seaman’s Manual, where it is stated that a vessel is going free when she has a fair wind and her yards braced in, and that to “brace in” yards is to lay them nearly square, while to “brace up” is to lay them more fore and aft.
[Whether the vessels should have been trimmed closehauled or free, within the meaning of the rule, will be considered. The schooner’s contention is that the fact that she had her sails adjusted to a wind on her starboard quarter shows that the wind was on her starboard quarter, or abotít S. or S. by W.; but that the fact that the ship’s sails were trimmed to sail close by the wind does not show that the wind was forward of her beam, so as to permit her suitably to sail close-hauled. There is here an inconsistency of position, as the ship was of
But certain difficulties at this point beset the conclusion thus far readied. Keeping in mind that the schooner’s green light was opposed to the ship’s red light, and that neither vessel saw or could see (according to the evidence) lights, save in that relation, it results (Í) that the schooner and ship each knew that the vessels were on crossing courses; (2) that each vessel knew that the schooner ivas sailing free; (3) that the ship knew that she herself was close-hauled; (1) that the schooner, in the night, might not be able to know whether the ship was trimmed closehaulcd or free, while she was headed anywhere between W. S. up through the northwest quadrant to K. by IS. E., upon which latter beading the after screen would shut out the light, as stated by the ship’s advocate. Therefore, even if the schooner in fact were entitled to ilie right of way. she might be unable to discover whether she had such rig,lit, because she could not determine the ship’s heading, and hence whether she could sail free on a southwest wind. On account of the darkness of the night, and the inability of seeing; the loom of the ship, this fact might not be determinable by the schooner until the vessels were so near together that the discovery would not enable the schooner to hold on, even though she were entitled to do so. But there are further possibilities embarrassing to the schooner. If she luffed for the purpose of discovering the ship’s situation, two tilings might happen: First, the ship might keep on her way, and obtain tbe privilege, whether she was entitled to it or not; or, second. if the ship considered that she was not entitled to it, and she herself came up to the wind, collision would be quite sure to follow. If the schooner had a 'right to hold on, she was bound lo bold on.
“‘When both are running free, with the wind on.different sides, the vessel which has the wind on the port side, should keep out of the way of the other,’ and each vessel, for the purpose of fulfilling this rule, must discover at her peril how the sails of the opposing vessel should be trimmed.”
A similar state of facts was presented in The Theodore H. Band (decided by the house of lords in 1887) 12 App. Cas. 247. Of two sailing vessels, approaching one another between 4 and 5 o’clock on the morning of February 3d, the Statesman was running free, and the Theodore H. Band was closehauled on the port tack. It was therefore the duty of the Theodore H. Band to keep her course, in accordance with articles 14 and 22 of the regulations for preventing, collisions at sea (1884); but those navigating the Theodore H. Band, in the belief that the Statesman was closehauled on the starboard tack, ported, whereby a collision occurred. Held (affirming the decision of the court of appeal),, that since, with ordinary skill, and by the exercise of reasonable care, those navigating the Theodore H. Band could not have ascertained that the Statesman was running free, the Theodore H. Band was not to be deemed to be in fault, within Merchant Shipping Act 1873, § 17 (36 & 37 Yict. e. 85). Lord Herschell adopts the view and language of Lord Esher, the master of the rolls, in The Beryl, 9 Prob. Div. 137, 138, which is as follows:
“When you speak of rules which are to regulate the conduct of people, those rules can only apply to circumstances which must or ought to be'known to the parties at the time. You cannot regulate the conduct of people as to unknown circumstances. When you instruct people, you instruct them as to what they ought to do under circumstances which are, or ought to be, before them. When you say that a man must stop and reverse, or, I will say, slacken his speed, in order to prevent risk of collision, it would be absurd to suppose that it would depend upon the mere fact that there was risk of collision, if the circumstances were such that he could not know there was risk of collision. I' put some instances during the argument to show that this was so. * * * How can you regulate their' conduct, if neither can see the other until they are close together? It is absurd to suppose that you could regulate their conduct, not with regard to what they can see, but to what they cannot see. Therefore the consideration must always .be, in these cases, not whether the rule was in fact applicable, but were the circumstances such that it ought to have been present to the mind of the person in charge that it was applicable?”
Lord Fitz Gerald, in The Ceto, 14 App. Cas. 670, 691, also approves of this statement. Lord Herschell further states the rule as follows:
“The ilext question that arises is whether those in charge of the Theodore H. Rand ought to have known that the Statesman was running free, or, in other words, whether they could, with ordinary skill, and by the exercise of reasonable care, have ascertained what the fact was.”
Lord Fitz Gerald put the rule as follows:
“The Statesman was not to blame. The Theodore H. Rand caused the calamity. It lay on her owners to establish that she was not to blame, by clear*881 and satisfactory proof that it was impracticable for the officer in charge, using his utmost care and diligence, to make out the situation he had. to deal with in relation to the Statesman, and that, being placed in circumstances of great difficulty, he had acted to the best of his skill and judgment.”
In Mars. Mar. Coll. (4 th Ed.) 450, 451, there is the following statement:
“Before altering her helm, a ship must ascertain what course the other ship is upon, and how she has the wind. Her duty is to wait until she knows what the regulations require her to do. A wrong step taken by a ship in ignorance of the other’s course will cause her to be held in fault if a collision ensues. Hence arise cases of great perplexity to seamen. A ship, A., closehauled on the port tack, sees a red light of another, B., ahead, and a point or two on his starboard bow. He cannot make out what is B.’s course. Not knowing which article of the regulations applies to his case, A. stands on, and at the last moment bears up, thinking erroneously that B. is closehauled on the starboard tack. At the same moment B., who has the wind free, bears up. A collision follows, for which A. is probably held in fault, because he did not keep his course. The temptation for A., on first seeing B., to bear up, go about, wear, or to take oilier steps which lie thinks will avoid risk of collision, without regard to the regulations, is strong. The following illustration may be suggested: The wind being north, a ship closeiiauiled on the port tack, and heading E. N. E., sees, within a quarter of a mile, and on her lee bow, a red light,. The vessel to which It belongs may be either in stays, and heading N., or she may be closehauled on the starboard tack, and heading from N. W. to W. N. W., or, again, she may have the wind free, and be heading from W. N. W. to W. by S. In the first case supposed, the rapid alteration in the bearing of the light as it crossed her bows would assist her in arriving at the conclusion that the other ship was closehauled on the starboard lack, and heading about N. W., and in this case the duty of the first ship is clear, —to keep out of the way. On the other hand, if the ship to which the red light belonged were light, under low sail, and making considerable leeway, the alteration in the bearing of the light would be very slow, and it might easily be mistaken for the light of a ship having the wind free. In this case it would be very difficult for the ship on the port tack to appreciate the actual circumstances of the situation in time to comply with the regulations so as to avoid a collision.”
. These illustrations present eases where the doctrine of The Sand decision might be invoked. But in the case at bar the schooner failed in preliminary vigilance. Although the ship’s red light was iu order and burning properly, the lookout on the schooner did not discover the same until the vessels were in close proximity; and upon such discovery the Birdsall at once assumed that it was her duty to keep out of the way, and in recognition thereof she immediately changed her course. The Sand was vigilant to discover the situation of the opposite ship, and failed. Hence she was excused. The schooner was so careless that she did not discover that there was an opposite ship until it was too late to attempt any study of her situation. It may appear now that such earlier study would have been ineffectual, but the fact cannot be known, and the court is deprived of the means of such knowledge by the schooner’s inattention. In any case diligence in seeking knowledge of the ship’s heading is a condition precedent to relief from the strict enforcement of the rule. Therefore, in view of her imperfect watch, and subsequent action, it is considered that it is not shown that she used ordinary skill aud exercised reasonable care to ascertain the situation of the opposite vessel. This view is strengthened by the
Again, it may be suggested that the schooner, if headed N. E., could not have been sailing with her booms on her port side and her foresails drawing, if the wind was in the southwest. Where a finding of fact has been reached, it is not necessary to reconcile with it all the evidence that may have been given in the case.' But with reference to this objection it may be stated that it is not thought that the schooner was headed N. E. A N. E. heading was apparently not the proper one for a vessel bound for Providence, especially if she were desirous of making the most advantageous voyage. Such a course would have brought the schooner on Long Island, and no adequate reason is given for such heading. Again, the Morse, bound for Lynn, Mass., and sailing in the company of the schooner past Barnegat, was shown to be heading N. E. by E., and such a course, or one further eastward, would have been more available for the Birdsall, and therefore the one presumably pursued. The log book of the schooner does show that she was on a N. E. course; but it was made up after the collision, and'it will be observed that it is almost the only occasion during the use of the log book where the heading of the vessel has been properly entered under the column provided to indicate the course. This precision, under the circumstances, is of doubtful aid.
The evidence that the Birdsall was sailing on a N. E. course, with her foresails drawing, is possibly explained by the following facts: At 4 p. m. of the previous day, at Sandy Hook lightship, the wind was southeast. It was sou Hi at 8 o’clock, and reached southwest by 10 o’clock. Hence its. course was continually to the westward after 4 p. m. of April 22d. The observations at Barnegat also showed a continuing change of the wind to "westward from the afternoon of April 22d. Therefore it may be inferred that the schooners Birdsall and Morse sailed on the afternoon of April 22d on courses of about N. E. or N. E. by E., and that as the night advanced the shifting of the wind to .the westward was not observed by the Birdsall, but her heading was modified to take advantage of the changed wind, which tended to bring her more to the eastward, and upon her proper course. It is considered that the Birdsall was not steered nicely by the compass. The captain did not seem to know, what was meant by the deviation of a compass, although he had often compared it with the compasses of other ships, and, as he said, never found any disagreement. This indicates a crude knowledge of the compass, and, while he could doubtless use it for general- directions, it would be quite unsafe to depend upon his knovdedge and use for close ascertainment.
Numerous arguments oilier than those considered have been presented by the advocates in support of their various contentions, and they have been carefully examined, but the basis of decision employed seems less conjectural; and to furnish. the safer and more practicable ground for settling the question of the direction of the wind. It is considered that the ship carried the wind 'sufficiently