In this C.R.C.P. 106(а)(4) review, the Boulder County Court and the Honorable Thomas Reed (collectively the county court), appeal from the district court’s entry of judgment in favor of Dennis Fullerton (defendant). We reverse.
Defendant was arrested on a fugitive from justice complaint, which alleged that he was wanted in Nebraska for failure to appear. The county court set bail in the form of a “cash only” bond. Defendant subsequently posted the cash bond and was released.
Defendant then filed a cоmplaint in the district court pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), arguing the county court exceeded its jurisdiction by setting bail in the form of a “cash only” bond. The charges against defendant were later dismissed and the bond refunded.
Noting that at least two Boulder County district courts had rulеd that pretrial “cash only” bonds were impermissible, the district court determined that the county court was not authorized to set a “cash only” bond for defendant. The county court appeals.
I. Mootness
“Courts must confine their exercise of jurisdiction to сases that present a live case or controversy.”
Davidson v. Comm. for Gail Schoettler, Inc.,
Here, the undisputed facts show that a ruling by this court would have no practical legal effect on defendant. However, a court may resolve an otherwise moot ease if the matter is capable of repetition yet evades review or involves an issue of great public importance.
See Carney v. Civil Serv. Comm’n,
Bail is imposed daily in every jurisdiction statewide, and many of thеse cases involve defendants awaiting extradition. Yet, despite the frequency with which such questions arise and the apparent uncertainty as
II. Governing Statutory Provision
Section 16-4-104(1), C.R.S.2004, governs pretrial bail bond alternatives, whereas § 16-19-117(1), C.R.S.2004, sets forth the provisions for bail pending extradition. The county court did not indicate upon which statute it relied, and, in the C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) action, defendant relied on both. In its ruling, the district court concluded that “neither statute ... authorizes a cash only bond” and did not determine which statute was applicable. In their briefs on 'appeal, the parties assume the applicability of both statutes. We conclude, however, that questiоns of bail for defendants awaiting extradition prior to service of a governor’s warrant are governed exclusively by § 16-19-117(1).
The interstate extradition of accused persons, such as defendant, is controlled by federal law, pursuant to article 4, section 2 of the United States Constitution and 18 U.S.C. § 3182.
See Smith v. Idaho,
Colorado has adopted the UCEA, § 16—19—101, et seq., C.R.S.2004. No federal law has, in any manner relevant here, preempted the UCEA. Accordingly, the county court’s actions were governed, not by the provisions of § 16-4-104(1), but by the UCEA generally, and, specifically, by § 16-19-117, which expressly applies to the setting of bail pending еxtradition.
See also Johnson v. Dist. Court,
III. “Cash Only” Bonds
Thus, properly framed, the issue here is whether the county court exceeded its jurisdiction under § 16-19-117(1) when it set a “cash only” extradition bond. We conclude that it did not.
Section 16-19-117(1) states, in relevant part, that “the judge ... may admit any person arrested, held, or detained for extradition or interstate rendition to another state ... to bail by bond or undertaking, with such sufficient sureties and in such sum as such judge deems proper ” (emphasis added).
In construing a statute, we adopt the construction that best gives effect to the intent of the legislature.
See Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
A.
By its plain terms, § 16-19-117(1) provides that a court’s decision to grant or deny bail is discretionary as to a defendant pending extradition prior to service of a governor’s warrant.
See People v. Triantos,
B.
Section 16-19-117(1) also provides that, when the court allows bail for a defendant awaiting extradition, it is to be set with “sufficient sureties.” The statute is unclear, however, whether the phrase “sufficient sureties” must be read to refer only to commercial sureties or similar third-party arrangements, or may include any guarantee used to
The UCEA has been enacted by most states.
See State v. Bobo,
Nevertheless, the phrase has beеn commonly used in reference to the constitutional right to pretrial bail in almost every state for more than 200 years. The term was used in that context in the original Pennsylvania Constitution, which, in turn, became the model for numerous other state constitutiоns, including Colorado’s.
See
Colo. Const. art. II, § 19(1) (“[a]ll persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties pending disposition of charges”);
In re Losasso,
In other jurisdictions, appellate courts have examined the meaning of the “sufficient sureties” clause in their respective state constitutions to determine the legality of pretrial “cash only” bail. While here, we are not сoncerned with pretrial bail, nonetheless, these discussions are instructive.
C.
On the issue of the constitutionality of “cash only” pretrial bail, these courts are split.
Compare, e.g., State v. Brooks, supra,
However, the vast majority,- either expressly or implicitly, understand the word “sureties” in the phrase “sufficient sureties,” to encompass a variety of bond forms, including cash.
See State v. Briggs, supra,
Because the. history of the phrase in each of thе respective constitutions is similar, we are persuaded by the near uniformity of these opinions on this question. We also find particularly informative the exhaustive historical analysis done by the Iowa Supreme Court in
Briggs.
Specifically, that court not
Furthermore, in Colorado, as in most jurisdictions, the primary purpose of bail is to assure the presеnce of the accused at trial.
See People v. Sanders,
Accordingly, we agree with the majority of jurisdictions considering the issue that, in reference to bail, the term “sureties” refers to a broad range of guarantees used for the purpose of securing the appearance of the defendant. Such guarantees include, but are not limited to, bonds secured by cash.
D.
Because of the constitutional nature of the right to pretrial bail, the same jurisdictions that give a brоad meaning to the word “sureties” are, nonetheless, divided as to whether use in their respective constitutions of the qualifying adjective “sufficient” entitles an accused awaiting trial to select the type of bond,
see State v. Brooks, supra,
However, access to bail by a defendant pending extradition is allowed by statute, but not required by the Colorado constitution.
See Johnson v. Dist. Court, supra,
Thus, here, we refer only to the Colorado UCEA to resolve the question of who may select the' type of bond for a defendant pending extradition. Cf. People v. Hoover, supra, — P.3d at - (because there is no constitutional right to an appeal bond, “there is no need to reconcile statutory language with a constitutional guarantee,” and the issue “may be resolved solely by reference to [statute]”). On that point, we have little difficulty ascertaining legislative intent.
Specifically, as pertinent here, § 16—19—117(1) allows bail “with such sufficient sureties and in such sum as such judge deems proper ” (emphasis added). This is an unambiguous grant of authority to the trial court.
Furthermore, the placement of that clause immediately after the phrase “in such sum,” but not the phrase “with such sufficient sureties,” creates no uncertainty. Under well-accepted rules of statutory construction, “as such judge deems proper” refers to both antecedent phrases.
See Estate of David v. Snelson,
Therefore, we further conclude that prior to service of a 'governor’s warrant, a trial
The judgment is reversed.