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Fullerton Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Education
654 P.2d 168
Cal.
1982
Check Treatment

*1 Dec. No. 31415. 1982.] [L.A. DISTRICT, HIGH SCHOOL JOINT UNION

FULLERTON Appellant, Plaintiff EDUCATION, Defendant and Appellant. BOARD OF

STATE *5 Counsel Covert, Jr., Covert, H. E. for Parker Plaintiff Clayton Spencer &

Parker and Appellant. General, Warriner, Thomas E. Assistant At- Attorney Deukmejian,

George Sanders, General, John Anne S. Pressman and H. Deputy Attorneys torney Markman, Andrew V. D. Hanson for General, Arczynski Ralph L. James and Appellant. Defendant

Opinion

BROUSSARD, J. of Yorba community Linda has its own The elementary district, but is school of the part Fullerton Joint Union School High District HSD). The (Fullerton State Board of (State Education Board) approved plan Plan) (the to create a new Yorba Linda Unified School District1 and transfer for school high education of Yorba responsibility Linda students from the Fullerton HSD to the new district. The State Board directed that the proposal be in an election submitted limited to the approval residents of Yorba Linda. Fullerton HSD for mandate to petitioned prevent the election. The trial court decision, of the State portions Board’s but upheld held invalid other portions, limitation franchise to including residents, Yorba Linda and accord- barred the election. Both ingly parties appealed. three issues: Did the appeal presents State Board with the re- comply of Education Code section

quirements specifies conditions met which must be before State Board authorizes the creation of a new (2) Is school district? the State Board’s decision invalid for with noncompliance (Pub. the California Environmental Act Quality Code, Resources 21050 et § (3) Does the State Board’s decision seq.)? vote to limiting Yorba Linda residents of the laws to deny equal protection other residents of the Fuller- ton HSD? issue,

With to the first parties agree that respect court reviewing in- whether the State Board’s decision was only quire arbitrary, or en- capricious, review, that standard lacking evidentary support; applying tirely we find conclude, that the State Board’s decision section 4200. complied We however, State Board’s failure to undertake a threshold environmental *6 Act, Environmental violated the California and Quality that its study limitation electoral franchise was unconstitutional. of the 1. Statement of facts. Yorba Linda School District is Elementary

The surrounded completely north, unified Brea-Olinda west, school districts: and Placentia to two included in The the Yorba Linda territory south and east. School Elementary HSD, of Fullerton but being is also surrounded two other part District districts, to the remainder Fullerton HSD. Because there contiguous is 1,200 Yorba in Yorba Linda Linda school approximately high no school high grades kindergarten through is one which offers courses district” 1 A “unified school presently only grades Elementary kindergarten School District serves Linda Yorba twelve. through eight. miles, of Placentia Unified be bused 5 to 7 across portion must students School, District, the nearest school in the Fullerton high to Troy High School system. HSD of Fullerton HSD from of the Yorba Linda the re- portion isolation

The a number of school students had High district created problems. of the mainder to and from school. The round each distance also im- day a lengthy trip to make who wanted to in extracurricular ac- on students participate burdens posed ' facts, the Committee on School Orange County In view of these tivities. Committee) the Plan to create a Yorba (County prepared Organization District effect, In School District. the Yorba Linda High portion Unified Linda and become unified with HSD would “secede” Yorba Linda Fullerton Elementary. Education Code2 that a school 4200 of the requires organization Section plan conditions; (a) the new meet the districts will have substantially following

must enrollment; (b) the new districts will be in terms of financial adequate adequate will each have a substantial (c) (d) the new districts ability; community identity; will result in an division of and equitable property facilites of the district; (e) the formation of the new district will not racial original promote or segregation. or ethnic discrimination Committee found that all were County statutory requirements met and addition, the Plan to the State Board for In

submitted approval. County that the election be held in the area Committee determined for unifica- (Yorba Linda), and not the entire throughout tion Fullerton HSD. only Plan, the State Board must find Before substantial approving compliance of section and it must also review statutory requirements the pro- Committee’s County designation territory which the elec- priety Board, be held. To assist the State the State Department tion will Education conditions, which each of the analyzed found report statutory submitted the election to the Yorba approved limiting substantial Linda compliance, first the State Board further information on hearing requested area. At its HSD, Yorba Linda from the Fullerton removing but after con- racial impact it voted unanimously that information Plan. approve sidering HSD, the unification filed a Fullerton opposed proposal, petition *7 court, that the Plan did not meet the contending of mandate in the superior writ and that the election was restricted to Yorba Lin- improperly criteria statutory that the Plan met the substantially trial court ruled of ade- requirements da. The Code, be to the Education unless otherwise indicated. shall Education code references 2 All reorganized numbers of the code. shall be the section references Code 786 enrollment, financial ability, community identity, and adequate

quate equitable However, the trial court held that the of the State Board had property. division and acted arbitrarily (1) abused its discretion because capriciously Plan discrimination; or ethnic not intend to racial or promote segregation (2) did Act; did not with the California Environmental State Board comply Quality reasons, of the (3) for a voters entire Fullerton HSD variety should vote Plan, and their exclusion from the election violated on the their fundamental to vote. right with section 4200. Compliance

2. The action the trial court initially agree was a traditional parties to Code of Civil mandate Procedure section proceeding pursuant 1085 and not mandamus an administrative Code of Civil pursuant Procedure section further They 1094.5. the exercise agree the State for the authority formation of approve proposals unified school to the directive of legislative districts sections is a pursuant 4200-4419 “quasi- act.3 legislative” decisions,

In such the trial reviewing quasi-legislative court does not whether, instance, if it had to act in the first inquire power would have taken taken the action administrative agency. authority the court is limited to whether the decision of the determining was agency arbitrary, entirely or capricious, lacking evidentiary support, unlawfully procedural 824, (Pitts (1962) unfair. v. Perluss 58 Cal.2d ly 19, [27 83]; (1952) P.2d Brock v. Court Superior 109 Cal.App.2d 605-607 [241 283].) P.2d review, this test of we examine the State

Applying Board’s finding Plan with the substantially of section complies requirements 4200. That section in relevant as follows: part provides

“The State Board of Education may approve for the proposals formation of districts based the division of the upon territory districts, existing high school determined, that the board has provided respect and the new districts that the conditions resulting following are substantially met: limitations, 3 Subjectonly to constitutional Legislature plenary power has over the forma tion, change (Cal. Const., IX, dissolution or of boundaries of 5; school districts. art. § (1916) Worthington Dist. v. Eureka Dist. 437]; S. S. 173 Cal. 154 P. 29 Ops.Cal.Atty. [159 (1957).) power change district, “The Gen. 82 the boundaries of the as well as to [school] instance, and, legislative origin, define them in the first is of whether exercised immediately by legislature mediately by supervisors—the a board of legislature—is, local whenever exer cised, (Hughes (1892) legislative Ewing act.” 1067]; 93 Cal. P. see Antelope Val. H. Dist. v. McClellan 55 Cal.App. U. S. P. *8 in terms of number of will be adequate pupils the new districts “(a) That enrolled. of financial For ability. be in terms will adequate the new districts That

“(b) consideration shall ability, given financial determining purposes . . . valuation tax rates. pupil, assessed per per pupil, limits revenue substantial are each the basis organized the new districts “(c) That identity. community will in an division of property result

“(d) equitable That proposal district. original facilities will not and the formation of new districts pro-

“(e) That ...” segregation. or ethnic discrimination mote racial noted, Board that all five criteria had been we have the State found As condition, i.e., court ruled that the last Plan met. trial substantially was not met. On Board not racial State segregation, appeal, must promote Plan does not racial while Fullerton promote segregation, contends not with the conditions of enroll- comply adequate contends that does HSD ment, division of the ability financial and equitable property.

(a.) Specific Findings HSD that the State Board argues Fullerton action was

Preliminarily, state how the Plan because it did not specifically substantially complied invalid (a)-(e). enumerated section subdivisions Fullerton with the conditions 1094.5, section of Civil Procedure administrative man relies on Code HSD the administrative agency ad impliedly requires damus provision, “to bridge analytic to make some between findings gap decisions judicatory Assn. (Topanga decision or order.” Scenic and ultimate the raw evidence (1974) 11 Cal.3d Angeles Los County Community stated, However, have as we the Plan the approving 522 P.2d function reviewable tradi a “quasi-legislative” was exercising State Proc., 1085.) Because the decision (Code Civ. approving § mandamus. tional was Unified School District Yorba Linda create the Plan to adjudicatory in which law a re hearing of a proceeding the result made as decision taken, to be Code of Civil Procedure required and evidence be given quired are such dealing adjudicatory hearings and cases 1094.5 section inapplicable.

Furthermore, even where are findings required, the administrative agency to make formal as would be required findings in a required court of An law. administrative agency adopt findings by another prepared body. View, (Carmel Valley Ltd. v. Board 817, Supervisors Cal.App.3d The State in Board effect adopted of the findings in Committee as contained County Plan.4 These proposed are findings fully allow review of adequate meaningful judicial quasi-legislative action the State Board for the purpose determining whether action was ar or without bitrary, capricious evidentiary support.

(b.) Enrollment Adequate

Fullerton HSD contends that the State Board acted in find arbitrarily Yorba Linda ing proposed Unified School District would be in adequate terms of number of enrolled. pupils 4200, (a) does

Section subdivision not itself what is meant specify “ade- mandate, of number enrolled.” Pursuant pupils terms quate statutory Code, 5, (Cal. Admin. tit. regulations the State Board adopted 18570- §§ 18574) as whether a guidelines determining to serve with proposal complies will, each Those advise that school guidelines section 4200.5 district proposed effective, be becomes if it proposal adequate substantially at the time com- standards; enrollment following plies District.............................................................3,500 Elementary District............................................................1,500 School High District..................................................................5,000 Unified Code, 5, 18573.) tit. The Plan states that attendance in (Cal. Admin. Yorba § 2,511 K-8, 1,200 school the 1976-1977 was and during year grades Linda 3,711. 9-12, for a total of grades 3,711 enrollment HSD because it

Fullerton refers objects figure time the time the Plan was not at the approved at the figures Fullerton HSD the Plan is argues, defective becomes effective. Consequently, County findings segrega did find the Committee’s the racial 4 TheState Board not at first further adequate. segregation State Board received evidence on racial fully But the tion issue issue, may be State adopted adopted the Plan. On this issue it said that the after which report Department State plan in the in the addendum findings contained Education. regulations simply guidelines for the these administrative are emphasized 5 It should development They of a do not the State Board’s plan. diminish County Committee (a) (e) of through in subdivisions section if the specified waive the criteria authority to present exceptional justify situation sufficient to the circumstances Board determines State (c).) Code, (See Admin. tit. subd. proposal. § Cal. approval of the Yorba Linda Unified School District not show that it does because 5,000 in when the Plan was intended to 1979-1980 an enrollment have would *10 for that enrollment 1979-1980 projected in fact shows effect. The evidence take 1,050 2,050 and in K-8 in grades approximately be approximately would 3,100; 3,100 HSD 9-12, Fullerton that is urges for a total enrollment grades 5,000. with the guideline substantial compliance not is less than specified guidelines, enrollment projected Although determined, discretion, its that in the exercise of well have State the Yorba Linda area residents of should not deprive low enrollment relatively school district. Yorba Linda Elementary, to form unified the opportunity under-enrolled, existed as district. In already separate somewhat although factors and of the fact that the community of the special geographic view enrollment is due to the school preexisting elementary low relatively largely district, Board acted say arbitrarily finding we cannot State met the for enrollment.6 substantially guidelines adequate enrollment projected (c.) Ability Financial Code, 5, California Administrative title the time the Plan was approved,

At 18573, will (b)(2) subdivision district affected be provided section “Each if either the revenue limit unit ability per in terms of financial adequate of the from vary attendance district does not average daily proposed limit the assessed valuation attendance daily per of average unit per revenue affected districts by all of the more than attendance daily of average unit 15%.”7 HSD that both the revenue limit unit argues per

Fullerton of average (ADA) and the assessed valuation ADA for per attendance daily proposed by Unified School District more than from those vary Yorba Linda percent Plan shows that the value per Fullerton HSD. The assessed ADA varies by for shows that the revenue limit ADA per It also deviates percent. only 29.42 HSD out that incorrect but Fullerton were used to points figures 5.27 percent, conclusion. It was inaccurate determine the deviation of at that Yorba arrive Code, (b)(1) title section subdivision has since been 6 TheCalifornia Administrative enrollment, guidelines adequate e.g., as elemen figures lower 901 for provide amended districts, 1,501 districts, figures high for unified districts. These revised 301 for school tary unreasonably guidelines high. were found to be previous suggest that (b)(2) been read: has since amended to subdivision 7 Section adequate ability in terms of financial if: “(2) affected will Each district average daily does “(A) per proposed limit unit attendance district revenue The average daily all of the per unit of attendance in affected districts revenue limit vary from the %, than 15 more territory by for the more costs to the State affected than “(B) does not increase 10%.” revenue limit from the average revenue limit of

Linda Unified School District’s Fullerton HSD and school elementary districts within its boundaries. The deviation Yorba Unified School Linda District revenue limit HSD from Fullerton revenue limit—excluding elementary school districts—in fact is 17.19 percent.8 however, us, is not Plan

The issue before whether the conforms to the ad- It whether the State ministrative Board acted guidelines. arbitrarily, evidentiary or without support concluding Plan capriciously, substantially statutory complied requirements. Despite the deviation *11 set the the administrative the figures by regulations, from record does not the that State Board acted or arbitrarily, demonstrate without capriciously, when it found that the Yorba Linda evidentiary support proposed Unified would have financial adequate School finance ability its educational District program.9 Property Division of

(d.) all real Plan proposes appraise property, improvements, personal of and funds Fullerton HSD and to divide the value of all such property proper- the of ADA ratio between the Yorba on basis Linda and the ty portion remain- of Fullerton HSD. The real and portion property improvements will ing remain located, the in that of district in which are portion they but monetary credit will be to a of the district if portion the located given property there was less its than share based ADA ratio. The proportional Plan further divides of ratio, bonded indebtedness Fullerton HSD to ADA according but provides one that district choose to of accept greater the bonded in- portion that for debtedness offset district an imbalance in charges against real proper- received that ty, improvements personal property by district. Fullerton HSD the Plan complains proposes an inequitable distribution of in violation of property section (d). subdivision Since section 4123 specifies real shall property remain the of the property located, it district in which it argues the State Board should not complex by taking calculation was obtained 8 This rather the 1976-1977 revenue limit for the District, Elementary extrapolating Yorba Linda School to determine applicable the limit if that district, comparing a unified and district became with the revenue of limit the Fullerton HSD. district, ability proposed of the financial of the Because issue unified although raised court, Appeal, not argued trial court and before the Court was before this we avoid a detailed analysis of the calculation. complains any further that the Plan provision 9 Fullerton HSD fails make for the revenue by required district as section To contrary, limit of the 4364. proposes the Plan $1,439.35 1978-1979, limit for the new district establish a revenue for year prior effective, proposal new district was to become year when the and thus requirements meets the section 4364. 4370, however, value real Section account the authorizes property. take into division of the Committee drafting property the County Moreover, “the and location of the school property.” consider value funds to division of the and facilities property 4200 mandates equitable section any were read to consideration of the preclude HSD. If section 4123 Fullerton State Board would fail its necessarily attempt the real value of property, equitably. to divide property District, School under interpretation urged Linda Unified

Yorba HSD, the one of land owned Fullerton HSD would receive parcel Fullerton Linda and a 7.8 share funds. All other real percent the Yorba area located in district all personal property all improvements, property, in- HSD. Such distribution would manifestly remain with Fullerton would Thus, did not act arbitrarily capriciously ap- the State Board equitable. to divide the values of the even property, though the Plan’s provision proving district where it is located. itself remains in portion the property indebtedness, the Plan that one *12 provides portion As to the bonded bonded share the indebtedness than its accept greater district opt owed, if order to offset the amount on account of any, share in proportional the value of the other assets. Fullerton HSD contends that this division of provi- XVI, 18, Constitution, Plan section of the California sion of the violates article education, “No . . board of that: . or pertinent part provides school district, . . . any shall incur indebtedness without assent two-thirds of thereof, electors at an election to be held for voting that qualified ...” purpose, is total

The answer this that the amount bonded indebtedness argument been voters of Fullerton HSD. qualified By has voted already by district, of a does not lose its identity of boundaries school district or change legal entity (Hughes Ewing, cease same was before. supra, 387, 419; Bates v. 89 Cal. P. Gregory Cal. see also event, made; rata that distribution be require nonpro the Plan does any In free to its share of the bonded in accept HSD is proportional Fullerton only. debtedness Fullerton HSD that the Plan does not

Finally, argues provide of the because distribution of cash division property equivalent equitable Linda’s share real proportional Linda for Yorba im property Yorba Yorba would Fullerton HSD. Linda’s financially impoverish pro provements ratios) on ADA based (7.8 share of the estimated property percent portional that, it assumed all the even if bonded in- argues $4 at million. Fullerton HSD debtedness and Yorba Linda all the gave personal property, balance owed to Linda would out its Yorba assets. wipe liquid record, the actual effect of the present On property division is quite uncertain, the values upon eventually assigned to the depending real property new Yorba Linda District as against value of that acquired retained HSD. If it turns Fullerton out the division imposes substantial HSD, on Fullerton the two districts are burdens free to make arrangements for account of the that take economic realities. All that the State Board payment did was divide the so Yorba Linda would property receive its proportional assets, of the district and such a division clearly share with the complies re- (d), of section subdivision that the be divided quirement property equitably. Ethnic

(e.) Segregation Racial or (e), Section subdivision provides that school reorganization discrimination must “not racial ethnic promote plan segregation.” The Board at issue in criterion, State determined this case met this the trial court ruled to the contrary, but Plan finding would promote an area of removing white students from an segregation “by primarily area that more becoming integrated.” is increasingly to the State

Statistics the trial court presented showed that in the school the Fullerton HSD had a year 1976-1977 white enrollment of 84.6 per- cent, Yorba and that the Linda unified district would have a white *13 Fullerton enrollment of 91.6 HSD percent. presented testimony predicting that increase, of the enrollment most Fullerton HSD would minority steadily but the Yorba racial and ethnic of Linda would composition remain relatively to Additional evidence this court verified this presented stable. as of prediction; the the white Fullerton HSD November 1980 as a whole percentage has of Linda to 80 but that Yorba to 90.9 If only declined Yorba percent, percent.10 HSD, the Fullerton the remaining Linda seceded from of the portion district of 66 have a white percentage percent. would must not or “promote The racial ethnic statutory language, has not received discrimination or definition. We segregation,” judicial believe a State Board more than stringent its constitutional imposes obligation in the of to which would exist absence section 4200—not duty approve duty—a 1981, evidence, 17, produce granted June we motion of Fullerton HSD additional 10 On of additional and admitted into evidence the declaration James Bremmer. The evidence consists figures, accuracy disputed. of enrollment which is not primarily 1979 and 1980 of also Board should schools.11 State segregated of a district the creation new of both the ability Plan upon of secession effect a into the inquire of district original adapt present portion and district remaining students, and to of its implement and composition ethnic racial and anticipated Education, v. supra, (cf. integration programs voluntary of Crawford Dist. v. Johnson School (1971) Francisco San 280, 294; Cal.3d Unified 309, 669]). 479 P.2d 937, Cal.Rptr. 951-952 [92 Cal.3d of section the deci- statutory this view of purpose against Measured The Plan will carve out from increas- State Board questionable. sion of the is, remain, which a enclave and will district small 90 percent integrated ingly do not the motives those who question we propose Although white.12 it as an to isolate the white Plan, attempt in the area see students many with a number of students. significant minority Any from contact Linda Yorba to obtain a more of Yorba Linda school district balanced racially efforts future school, identification as a “white” community and to avoid body, high student and area. be frustrated small size stable likely demography will Moreover, white of the stable enrollment from Yorba Linda will the removal to a for Fullerton HSD racial and adapt changing it more difficult make difficulty result in some in that may eventually ethnic schools population, schools. minority becoming predominantly district 17 Cal.3d 303-304 v. Board Education 11 In Crawford , “|T]n determining particular ‘segregated’ a . we 28], whether school is . . we stated that P.2d established, inor percentages

do and can be absolute terms not believe set racial ethnic either in particular population. a district’s student Under the California composition terms of the racial Constitution, segregated is not Constitution is or school will as under federal ‘[w]hat particular case. In addition to the racial ethnic com necessarily depend on the facts of each and factors, such racial ethnic body, composition other as the a school’s student position of school, staff[,] community and attitudes toward the must be and the administration faculty and Supreme explained As the United States Court consideration.’ [Citation omitted.] into taken possible identify it is assignment, where “white school” ‘Independent of student . . . : staff, composition quality racial teachers simply reference “Negro school” activities, prima organization sports or the case of equipment, buildings and of school facie rights ... is shown.’ constitutional [Citation omitted.]” of substantive violation constructed, High School has been we have no informa- proposed Yorba Linda Since staff, community whether programs, and cannot determine concerning facilities its tion white, segregated institution. We likewise lack information as to how as a will view that school *14 remaining Fullerton Conse- individual schools in HSD. of Linda will affect Yorba the secession in actually segregated the Plan will result schools in either predict whether quently, we cannot the Fullerton HSD. or balance of Linda the Yorba main Supreme Court decisions hold that division of a school district to United States 12 Two (United v. violates the Fourteenth Amendment. States racially identifiable white school tain a L.Ed.2d 75, 92 (1972) 2214]; Wright 407 484 Education U.S. S.Ct. [33 Neck Bd. Scotland of 2196].) (1972) Although City Emporia 407 451 92 S.Ct. U.S. L.Ed.2d Council of of distinguishable litigation—they involved factually present from the the division of both are cases large designated white school retained a jure segregated system de ensure previously a integrated cases division an students—these demonstrate that of district proportion of white illegal segregation. constitutes off white students fence said, however, As we have the issue before us is limited to whether the State arbitrarily, acted or without capriciously, evidentiary This stan- support. of limits the our review. The severely scope dard State Board’s is finding sup- evidence that both Yorba Linda and the of remaining portion the ported white; are HSD if we presently predominantly Fullerton look to the present of the districts and future changes dismiss as composition we could speculative, Board’s decision State as classify arbitrary We therefore capricious. State finding Board’s this issue. uphold 3. with the Environmental Act. Compliance Quality California the California

Under Environmental Quality (CEQA) (Pub. Act Code, 21050 et seq.), any public Resources agency directly undertaking § have a effect on may significant the environment must first con project of such study a threshold If impact. study duct shows that the will project effect, the significant may not have a so declare in a agency brief negative declaration; effect, if it demonstrates that the have a project may significant (No Oil, an environment must Inc. agency prepare impact report. v. City Los Cal.3d Angeles 529 P.2d Plan secession in the Implementation present case involves the of a Secession will significant likely possibility impact. construction require high of a new school Yorba Linda and result in abandonment some remaining facilities in the Fullerton HSD.13 portion It will bus change schedules, and routes and affect traffic patterns. it is Although uncertain whether the total an impact significant enough require environmental will.be it is clear that it is sufficient to impact report, require least initial study to into the need for such report. inquire Board, however, ruled that it had no duty State undertake such study Plan. Judicial review its ruling

before approving governed by Public 21168.5, Code section which limits Resources judicial into “whether inquiry discretion,” abuse of was a prejudicial provides there “[a]buse if the has not agency is established in a proceeded discretion manner required if the or decision law or determination is not by substantial supported case, In the evidence.”14 present principal concerns whether controversy required grades 13 Thenew district will be to devise plan house students in 9-12. It is cur $6 rently that it will cost in excess of million to necessary estimated construct facilities. The upon testimony court relied proposed plan trial also effect would cause a reduction the number of students the Fullerton HSD which would necessitate either inefficient use closing HSD facilities or the some of Fullerton its facilities. question merely 14 The here is not whether the State Board’s determination arbitrary, was Court, (Cf. Brock Superior supra, capricious entirely lacking evidentiary support. Rather, 594.) Cal.App.2d applicable standard of review under is a much more CEQA *15 within the pur- of the Plan constitutes “project” Board’s the State approval on undisputed which can be decided is an issue of law CEQA.15 This view of of no question thus the appeal presents record on appeal; present data in the of evidence. substantiality or review of discretion agency deference an environmental CEQA’s of a concept “project” requiring We explained (1975) Com. 13 Cal.3d 263 Formation Agency v. Local Bozung study 249, with a Local Bozung Agency was concerned 529 P.2d 1017]. (LAFCO) an annexation proposal. decision approve Commission Formation of the land an following that although development argued commission effect, environmental the mere of approval have an might nexation however, notion that the We that project effect. explained, no such “[t]he had an was scotched in Friends effectively have such effect directly itself must of v. Board 8 Cal.3d Supervisors Mammoth Mammoth. [Friends of 1049).] of a conditional use P.2d The granting per (104 Cal.Rptr. affect the environment more than directly any paper—does mit—a piece Mammoth, of Friends an annexation of paper. approval—another piece culmi course, activities said that the word appears emphasize “project” (Id., environment, Italics add . .’ at 265. p. to the . nating physical changes on the impact ed.) In to that the Guidelines refer response ‘physical concept, ’ Code, 15037. environment, tit. (Cal. Admin. ultimately. directly § added.)” (13 279.) Italics We held in Bozung approval Cal.3d then p. culminate a chain which would annexation—a of events necessary step environmental impact report. on the physical environment—required impact Board, cannot its argue that the seces- consequently, approval The State is not because further decisions must be made before merely Plan a project sion constructed, changed, bus routes It actually pupils reassigned. schools are however, does, that its is not a because it project submits argue approval simply voters, the Plan as sufficiently to the and because is not approved the issue environmental study. to allow an definite adequate prejudicial inquiry to whether there was abuse of the State Board’s

stringent as discretion. showing incorrectly by be established that the State Board Such an abuse discretion with, assessed, “required (Pub. comply proper procedure did not and thus law.” Code, 21168.5) Resources § argues County agency Committee the lead responsible Board also was 15 TheState suit, study, consequently that Fullerton HSD’s because it was threshold preparation action, County days from the Committee’s was barred the statute of within 180 not filed Code, 21167.) (See agency” as public defines “lead “the CEQA Pub. Resources § limitations. (Pub. carrying approving project.” principal responsibililty for out agency has the Code, 21067.) assuming study Consequently, environmental should take Resources § opinion—the agency later in this role of lead in our election—an issue discussed place before the Plan, though County Committee formulated the Board. Even opinion falls on the State Plan, it, approve to review the and submit responsibility final had the State Board days within 180 after the State Board’s brought present action Fullerton HSD Since voters. timely. its action was approval, *16 796

The Board State first points Code, to California Administative title sec- 15037, which (b) tion in subdivision states that “[p]roject does not include . . . (4) The submittal of ato vote of the proposals of the State or people of a par- community.” ticular clear, however,

It is that Board’s of the Plan approval is not from exempt CEQA merely because that bemust approval ratified the voters. As the court in ex rel. People Younger v. Local explained Agency Formation (1978) Com. 400], 81 464 in Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. holding LAFCO [146 of approval a CEQA, deannexation was proposal subject here is ‘project’ more than “[t]he ’ of Rather, the ‘submittal to a vote of the proposals it is but people. the first step statute aon deannexation required by proposal consequent substantial im- on the and human pact (81 environment.” physical at 479.) Cal.App.3d p. The State Board relies on Simi Valley also Recreation & Park Dist. v. Local (1975) Com. 51 Formation Agency Cal.App.3d 648 635], which Cal.Rptr. [124 LAFCO of an concerned election approval detach area from a recreation district. Noting asserted environmental park was impact simply of one of group managers by others who replacement hold might different future of the land in views use the court question, held that under these circumstances the LAFCO was not a approval CEQA. under “project” Com., v. Local Distinguishing Bozung Agency Formation supra, 13 Cal.3d Valley Simi stated the earlier case “dealt only with the situation where awas in the necessary LAFCO and in approval step development effect con for use for such . stituted an entitlement . . The development. evaluation [f] CEQA relates to the effect contemplated process changes make, a about agency world which is to either public authorize or physical fund, every change not to which organization personnel may affect future (51 to the environment.” relating determinations 665- Cal.App.3d pp. 666.)16 not Valley set out Simi is between

The distinction of a approval proposal an election and which does requires approval not. It is be- not, Valley course, from Simi quoted language 16 The is a test determining whether concept under governmental “project” encompasses action comes CEQA. CEQA many development, which do relate to land activities but involve some other environmental Valley Obispo County e.g., Edna Assn. v. San Luis (See, Coordinating etc. Council impact. (1977) Cal.Rptr. [approval regional Cal.App.3d transportation plan]; 444 67 665] Bridge (1976) Gate etc. v. Golden Dist. Cal.App.3d Shawn Cal.Rptr. 867] [in tolls].) bridge crease v. Education 5], The decision in Prentiss Cal.App.3d 847 [169 of a not a because the “project” the closure school is school board had not decided whether use, questionable. unlikely It single the land to different that the closure of a put significant impact apart would environmental from its elementary school have effect on the use school board in Prentiss filed negative property—the possibility declaration—but rejected categorically. cannot be *17 culminating essential which constitutes an step approval governmental tween of a reor- and (Bozung) environment approval affect the which may action (Simi the environment action affecting no particular which portends ganization Valley). v. Local Formation Bozung Agency resembles closely case more

The present Com., environmental here stems The impact 13 Cal.3d 263. supra, anticipated and consequent new school in Yorba Linda high of a from the construction is con Although of the Fullerton HSD. remaining portion in the changes Linda, it itself could build a school in Yorba high Fullerton HSD ceivable that so; to do the future Yorba Linda Unified not intend that it does is apparent Thus, hand, District, such a as a facility. on the other must construct School is an of the secession Plan essential step State Board approval matter practical it is therefore under the of reasoning environmental impact; ultimate leading CEQA. (See within the of ex Valley People Simi Bozung “project” scope and Com., 464, supra, v. Formation Local Younger Agency Cal.App.3d rel. 478.) is the State Board’s contention that an en- presented by

A closer question an before the election would The of en- study premature. timing vironmental “ can delicate ‘Statements must be writ- study present problem. vironmental information, ten contain enough development process meaningful late be written so whatever information contained they early enough but must ” Oil, (No as an into the decision input making process.’ can serve practically 5, 68, 13 Cal.3d 77 fn. Angeles, supra, Los Scientists’ City quoting Inc. of Inst, (D.C.Cir. 1973) Inc. v. Atomic Com’n. 481 F.2d Info., Energy Pub. 1079, 1094.) have been formulated for construction of a new yet high Specific plans Linda or for the education in the changes school Yorba program remaining study the Fullerton HSD. Thus an environmental until after delay portion a more study. result in useful might specific problem the election however, as a matter it alternative is that practical precludes such a delay, Once the voters the secession Plan the new quo. approve the status continuing school, Unified School District will have to build a high Linda Yorba to the loss of the Yorba Linda students. adjust will have to Fullerton HSD CEQA The fundamental is to ensure “that purpose environmental role in governmental play significant considerations decision-making” v. Board Supervisors Mammoth 8 Cal.3d (Friends 1049]). 502 P.2d it is desirable that Consequently, environmen “at the earliest tal be furnished decision-maker possible stage’’ information Com., 13 Cal.3d supra, 282). v. Local Formation (Bozung Agency In the State Board and the voters are the present setting, decision- makers; secession, whether approve must decide they ap new which entails school and other actions necessarily building high proval decision, effect. In making have an environmental State have the benefit relevant Board and the voters should data and environmental Com., v. Local Younger Agency Formation ex People supra, (See rel. analysis. *18 464,481.)17 We conclude that the initial environmental of study 81 Cal.App.3d detaching of Yorba Linda from the Fullerton HSD should have the effect been the State Board Plan and it to approved undertaken before submitted voters, in study and that to undertake State board violated the re failing CEQA.18 of quirements to

4. Limitation the election residents Yorba Linda. of of contends that the decision of Fullerton HSD the State to Board ap the election to residents of Yorba limiting Linda denies the prove equal protec tion of the laws to the residents Fullerton HSD. other this contention to step The first is determine the evaluating level applicable v. Supervisors (1972) Curtis review.19 In 7 Cal.3d 942 judicial [104 297, 537], 501 P.2d case voting similar in Cal.Rptr. rights many respects case, we that: court explained and the present United States “[T]his Court two-level test. In the apply Supreme typical equal protection [Citation.] Realty (D.C. of the District of Columbia Circuit in Income v. decision Trust Eckerd Cir. 17 The 447, presents analogy an 1977) present case. The there 564 F.2d court held that an en study precede must of a proposal Congress vironmental submission for construction of a new building though financing federal office even exact site and by would be determined following congressional By General Services Administration approval. submitting an en (EIS) impact proposal, agency vironmental statement with the would make available en juncture” information at the “critical vironmental when the relevant congressional committees 453.) proceed (P. with projects decide “whether these at all.” say Congress court went on to that “the interest of in making environmentally-informed only timely filing is not the interest at stake in the decisions of an EIS .... There is also the in- seeing agency ... itself has terest considered environmental impor- issues in this stage process. decision-making Finally, availability tant in the of an EIS can [Citation.] 453-454.) for a informed and public allow more more effective involvement . . .” (Pp. . emphasize require only study. 18 We that we an initial threshold study The result of that will impact report necessary. determine whether environmental speak inquiry of an constitutional groups 19 Somedecisions initial to determine whether the af similarly respect purpose legislation are situated fected other state action. 522, (1979) 317, (See, e.g., 549].) In re Eric J. 25 Cal.3d Cal.Rptr. 601 P.2d [159 To ask context, however, groups similarly two are situated this whether is the asking same as justified between them can be appropriate the distinction under the equal protec whether test of will groups justify Obvious between not tion. dissimilarities classification which fails strict (if scrutiny applicable) test is or lacks a rational relationship (See, to the legislative purpose. 55, (1976) People (adults Cal.3d e.g., minors); Cal.Rptr. v. Olivas 236 [131 551 P.2d 375] (1977) 620, Newland v. Board Governors 19 Cal.3d Cal.Rptr. 705 [139 566 P.2d (felons misdemeanants).) 254] bear a rational to a conceivable relationship classification need only case the hand, the other involving cases “suspect state purpose; legitimate ‘[on] interest,” on “fundamental ... the court has touching classifications” critical the classification to analysis, subjecting of active and an attitude adopted Under the standard in such strict scrutiny. applied omitted.] strict [Citations cases, establishing only the burden of that has compelling the state bears but that the drawn the law are the law distinctions interest which justifies 951-952, (7 to further its Cal.3d necessary purpose.’” pp. quoting v. 2 Cal.3d 784-785 Mihaly Cal.Rptr. Westbrook P.2d (1977) 73 County In Ventura 1019-1020 Cal.App.3d Hawn 111], of these the Court Appeal explained application prin strict standard of review has state action the franchise: limiting

ciples “[T]he *19 legislation to to which excludes certain apply voting potential been held long (1969) v. (Kramer Union District 395 U.S. from School participation. voters 583, 1886]; (1969) v. Houma Cipriano City L.Ed.2d 89 S.Ct. 395 621 [23 of Board, 647, 1897]; S.Ct. Curtis v. Supervisors U.S. L.Ed.2d 89 701 [23 of 942.) Cal.3d There has been a refinement of this 1 [supra] subsequent general analysis voting as it to classifications: an exclu legislative principle applies strict constitutional has been held to mean an scrutiny sion of voters invoking (Weber (1973) v. City class’ voters Council 9 Cal.3d 950 ‘identifiable [109 553, 601]; (1971) 513 P.2d Gordon v. Lance 403 U.S. 1 L.Ed.2d Cal.Rptr. [29 273, and, 1889]) ‘[although S.Ct. classification created ... every 91 to strict interest” measure must be if scrutiny, “compelling subject applied has a and upon a classification “real fairness appreciable impact” equality, v. 17 (Choudhry (1976) and of the electoral Free Cal.3d integrity process.’ 660, 654, 438]; P.2d Bullock v. Carter (1972) 664 552 see Cal.Rptr. [131 405 134, 92, 144 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. For legislative U.S. 92 classification [31 to avoid the test scrutiny elective strict relating process equal protec tion, minimal, if must have effect on the fundamental to ‘only any, right 661, 377, 14 (Gould (1975)] vote.’ Grubb Cal.3d 670 536 Cal.Rptr. [v. [122 1337].)” It is to note that it is the P.2d classification on important impact strict That scrutiny. heightened the electoral mode triggers process or invidious suspect is not limited to cases classifications. analysis involving the classification in the case does not involve a mere in It is clear that present on a fundamental ano v. Jobst effect marginal right (compare cidental Calif 234-235, 47, 228, 95]; L.Ed.2d 98 S.Ct. In re 434 U.S. 53-54 (1977) [54 561, 327, 568 601 559]); Cal.3d P.2d it ex 25 (1979) [159 Flodilin HSD outside Yorba Linda from Fullerton on the voting all residents cludes measure, well affect the outcome of elec an exclusion proposed (Phoenix to those Court decisions analogous Supreme case is thus tion. The 800 (1970)

Kolodziesjki 523, 399 U.S. 204 1990]; L.Ed.2d 90 S.Ct. [26 Kramer v. Union (1969) School District 583, 395 U.S. 621 L.Ed.2d 89 S.Ct. [1886]) [23 which have strict applied scrutiny invalidate restrictions on the franchise in elections, and school district our municipal decision in Curtis v. Board of 942, 7 Cal.3d Supervisors, supra, applying test to an election to incor- porate city. Board, however,

The State contends that geographical classifications con- rule, stitute that exclusion exception of voters because of their place strict scrutiny residence if the requires only exclusion serves some impermissi- (see ble such end as racial discrimination Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960) 364 125]). U.S. L.Ed.2d 81 S.Ct. They rely this [5 on two proposition Court, decisions of the United States Supreme v Lockport Com- Citizens for (1977) Action 430 U.S. munity L.Ed.2d 1047], 97 S.Ct. and Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa U.S. L.Ed.2d 99 S.Ct. 383]. As we shall explain, exception those established cases is not as broad as the State Board claims—and not broad enough permit classification at issue strict scrutiny. here escape a New York law

Lockport upheld requiring adoption of a new county charter be approved by separate majorities city noncity residents.20 When a charter was approved by residents, majority city but residents, the less numerous noncity defeated proponents of the charter *20 one-man, the claimed the statute violated one-vote principles by giving noncity voters an excessive voice. court, however, one-man,

The noted that one-vote had principles little ap- to a referendum since state the could plication single-issue “determine whether will have a its on an adoption rejection disproportionate impact identifiable 321]) of voters” 266 L.Ed.2d at (p. and its group p. election re- shape [51 The court observed if accordingly. that and city noncity had quirements voters charter, in the of the adoption rejection identical interests “any distinc- . . between voters drawn on the basis of tion . residence” would be unconstitu- 322].) if (P. tional. 268 L.Ed.2d the p. Conversely, interests of one [51 other, the the court that far the state could the outweighed implied limit group (See 321], to 266 franchise the former L.Ed.2d at group. p. p. citing Salyer [51 (1973) District Land v. Tulare Water 410 U.S. L.Ed.2d Co. however, in statute in- Lockport, S.Ct. The challenged presented decision, essentially counterpart Supreme an earlier United States 20 Lockport is the of Court 40], Hunter, Pittsburgh 207 U.S. 161 28 S.Ct. which Hunter involved [52L.Ed. v. cities, approval state merger require held that the need not of two concurrent ma aggregate differing the the vote from areas of Lockport, that state need interests. jorities; enjoyed by deciding state in they the discretion whether to total all Together, demonstrate locality. from each affected Neither approval or to insist on case involved denial together votes any locality. person residing within affected any franchise had substantial but dif- residents each city noncity and termediate situation: controversy. in the ferent interests held, differences, decision to con require court state’s justified

Such court that if the and residents. The city noncity explained of majorities current of annexation “. . were context posed pro . question constitutional and the residents of the city fact the residents of annexing that ceedings, sufficiently different constituencies with sufficiently be annexed formed area to The fact of union impending could be readily perceived. different interests one not so them into interest as constitu merge community alone would referendum to any that their votes be aggregated approve tionally require 207 U.S. that Pittsburgh, Similarly, Cf. Hunter 161. annexation. districts to form consolidated unit could join surely subject several school to voter approval each constituent school district. [1] . . . [T|n terms interests, and separate potentially opposing constituencies recognizing annex or consolidate is similar in to the decision to decision impact structural case, in New York. In voter county separate each government ap restructure the real and are based im perception long-term proval requirements of local is felt the dif restructuring government quite differently by pact similar units that a sense compete provide constituent county ferent in these units are dif directly services. Voters constituent governmental restructuring affected which ferentially county government, more remote services and less voters’ public subject make provider influence, law here in no of New York provisions question individual [f] of these in substantially than realities electoral recognize differing more to these Granting provisions constitutionality terests. presumption entitled, we are enacted state federal law unable to con every duly Protection violate Clause the Fourteenth Amend they Equal clude omitted; U.S., L.Ed.2d, (Fn. 324-325].) 271-272 at pp. at pp. ment.” Lockport from makes it clear the state can language The quoted *21 and, areas different residents of different have interests in recognize referendum, concurrent But constitutionally can require majorities. single-issue vote to in endorses measures which the residents Lockport deny entirely nothing areas, such measures to strict escape judicial scrutiny. of nor permits of one the of from the California decision Lockport gains only reading support This Ventura, on In Hawn v. voting County to limits rights. relating geographical of 1009, the an ordinance county enacted providing supra, Cal.App.3d whole or in within an part to establish located in comity airport any decision of The by city county voters. city majority must approved incorporated Force within the partially City a former Air base located to acquire undertook Court of city the limits. The partially beyond Appeal applied and Camarillo of and, ordinance the franchise to scrutiny limiting strict residents find- city in both and residents interested the issue city county directly of loca- ing airport tion, the restricted franchise invalid. held decision, of Lockport the Court observed

Distinguishing Appeal that “[i]t that the New York law involved in readily is apparent Lockport dif- quite from the initiative ordinance before us. airport ferent did not deal with Lockport on On which excluded voters based residence. statute the statute contrary, to the Lockport recognition interests gave equal noncity voters a new as it charter did interests voters. county city The rationale to the contention that lends Lockport support airport ordinance before us discrimination constitutes an invidious against noncity residents and voters of (P. 1021.) . . . .” County Ventura Lockport does not

We conclude support proposition that geographical the franchise are immune from restrictions on strict We therefore scrutiny. turn Board, Tuscaloosa, the State to the second case relied Holt Civic Club v. 60. That case 439 U.S. concerned Alabama supra, statutes which permitted their police regulation cities to extend licensing authority unincorporated city Nonresidents, however, within three miles limits. areas were im- licenses, mune from taxes business city (except at charged one-half the rate limits), within the city city zoning authority, assessed other many powers who within government. Although lived city appellants, the three-mile area limits, did not seek the beyond city directly vote in right elec- municipal tions, claimed that because they they were denied the vote the city’s exercise of extraterritorial was unconstitutional. jurisdiction court reviewed voting rights

The cases in which it had strict applied and noted that the cases involved scrutiny, a common characteristic: “The case denied challenged statute each the franchise to individuals who were within the resident boundaries of physically geographic the governmental entity 300].) at (P. concerned.” L.Ed.2d p. geographic entity involved Tuscaloosa, at was the City case hand and since the statute did not deny line, the vote within that strict anyone scrutiny was not required; “[t]he . line . . marked this Court’s voting qualifications decisions coincides with issue, boundary governmental unit at geographical and we hold that case, homes, like their falls on the (P. farther side.” appellants’ L.Ed.2d a less test—whether the p. Applying rigorous state bore a plan rational a state relationship legitimate purpose—the court upheld the challenged *22 statutes. State Holt that distinctions,

The Board reads as holding geographical unlike classifications, all other never voting strict We require scrutiny. read the case view, which with the that distinctions coincide only it holds In our differently. concerned, no one and exclude entity physical- the governmental boundaries boundaries, If, on the scrutiny. do not strict those require within resident ly to the and hand, existing entity deny carve up political the state attempts other residents—if, had denied for Holt statute example, to its some of vote who lived within the Tuscaloosa limits—then city to some persons the vote is scrutiny required. still strict on we cannot avoid of strict requirement scrutiny

Accordingly, here imposes the decision in restrictions on question geographical ground examined in residency than the limitations cases. property prior rather voting boundaries, determine Instead, relevant constitutionally we must “the (Holt governmental of the concerned” Civic Club entity boundaries geographic Tuscaloosa, 300]), U.S. at L.Ed.2d at to p. p. subject v. supra, measure which limits within those boundaries. scrutiny voting any strict case, Linda, Board could argue the State Yorba not the the present In HSD, area, and that the the relevant exclusion voters geographic Fullerton is HSD, subject scrutiny. thus is not strict The Fullerton Yorba Linda outside however, incidentally a district affected the seces- merely neighboring is Linda, entity authority but the over existing legal sion of Yorba high Linda; the of the secession in Yorba is impact large part school education of the Fullerton authority status district. For ex- consequence present Board, State Fullerton HSD a under incur plan approved ample, District, Linda Unified School a debt debt to the new Yorba substantial be the residents in the Fullerton remaining have to HSD. paid by will Moreover, built and staffed school educate the children Yor- high having Linda, others, will the withdrawal Yorba Linda leave the district among ba educational None of these effects and affect its programs. with excess capacity districts; HSD on Fullerton and its residents is impact affect neighboring the entire Fullerton HSD the relevant We conclude that present unique. constitutional applying requirements area for purpose geographic equal protection.21 on another exception requirement State Board relies primarily

The district of election limited involving special powers an scrutiny—that strict aof affect members particular group, activities disproportionately whose does not encounter strict scrutiny. the franchise to limiting group measure Land Co. Tulare Water Salyer relies in particular The State 21 Note, Right Municipal Annexations 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1571 discusses to Vote in city” may right to vote in an elec a “source denied analogous residents of issue—whether city. another The note city of that and annex approve portion detach a tion to city area to be any denying to source residents outside the measure the vote concludes that 1585-1587.) scrutiny (Pp. standard. meet the strict detached must

804

District, 410 U.S. 719, supra, the leading case this establishing exception strict scrutiny requirement.

Salyer a upheld franchise restricted landowners for the election of directors aof water district. The storage decision relied on the limited powers of the district, the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group, and of financing district activities solely by levies the landowners. California courts have a applied similar analysis elections concerning (Simi recreation and park district Recreation Valley & Park Dist. v. Local Com., Formation Agency supra, 648), 51 Cal.App.3d reclamation district v. Hotchkiss Tract (Philippart (1976) Reclamation Dist. 799 54 Cal.App.3d 42]) 797 and small Cal.Rptr. irrigation (Schindler district v. [127 Palo Verde (1969) Irrigation Dist. 1 831 61]). Cal.App.3d [82 Free, in Choudhry 660, Our decision v. supra, 17 Cal.3d explored the limits of this concerned a exception. Choudry statute which that directors required of District be freeholders. Imperial Irrigation noted the of opinion size largest district—the district irrigation state—its substantial its payroll, and facilities, electrical power operate power and flood acquire control and to finance ability its operations through charges such services. Dis- Salyer virtue of the by larger size and tinguishing impact on nonlandowners of District, Irrigation the court held that the Imperial restriction must be tested scrutiny. standard strict districts, broad Mindful of the school and the powers possessed impact the life of the upon community, district actions courts have consistently applied same they standards school district elections as and apply municipal District, 621, In v. elections. Kramer Union School supra, state 395 U.S. elelctions, a statute the franchise in school board limiting which involved “ stated that the Court of citizens to ‘alleged infringement right Supreme ” (P. must scrutinized.’ 626 carefully meticulously vote L.Ed.2d at [23 533, (1964) 506, 589], Reynolds Sims L.Ed.2d quoting p. U.S. Curtis v. 84 S.Ct. Our decision in Supervisors, supra, decisions, Kramer and other court high Cal.3d reviewed concluded cases, in those strict including judicial scrutiny the standards established state, restrictions, to “the government city, county, voting applied [the] district, (P. 960). agencies general power.” and other governmental school (Italics added.) note in the decision United States Court in Supreme

We particular District 397 U.S. 50 L.Ed. v. Junior 2d Hadley College man, one vote” 791], “one in an requirement which held applied S.Ct. of a district. The that “It is college opinion explained of trustees junior election *24 certain in which a State elects be some case there might that of course possible ac- governmental removed from normal are so far whose duties functionaries that a election popular affect different groups so disproportionately tivities and man, vote be might required, one requirement] with one in compliance [the that that indicates the activities in the case we see nothing present certainly but been a vital traditionally has that Education category. fit in these trustees function, are officials governmental and these trustees ... governmental (P. 51].) Salyer L.Ed.2d at In p. term.” of that relevant sense every District, 719, U.S. the court supra, Water quoted v. Tulare Land Co. fran- to its decision limited justify from Hadley upholding language foregoing 665-666].) 727-728 L.Ed.2d pp. water election. (Pp. chise in a district relies, on which the itself State Salyer, Thus it precedent appears Salyer do elections not fall within exception that school district recognizes authority impact. of limited districts Board is to the decision of State strict subject judicial We conclude that aby be sustained unless state interest. justified compelling and cannot scrutiny, Board, decision, of that that the residents of Yorba argues in defense The State high interest in the greater question establishing separate Linda have but that in that their community, preference might swamped school district interested, numerous, more of the less but residents of the the “selfish” vote Fullerton HSD. The State Board does not claim that explicitly remaining interest, state it is constitutes but nevertheless our compelling justification that matter. task into inquire is, course, clear the state

It cannot claim a interest in compelling they (Carrington voters because how vote. Rash may excluding L.Ed.2d 85 S.Ct. To the extent 380 U.S. 94 [13 Board seeks to exclude some Fullerton voters their that the State because vote secession, the State Board’s is constitu justification defeat might however, If we one of ex as tionally impermissible. rephrase justification, voters in uninterested order the interests of protect persons vitally cluding concerned, case, we a state interest which an might, encounter appropriate character. compelling achieve case. Without

This is not such a interests of Yorba Linda denigrating residents, is nonetheless Fullerton apparent remaining it HSD residents earlier, interest in the election. As we a substantial noted the seces- also have HSD, and future racial will affect Fullerton present composition sion difficult for the make more district cope and increasing We also note that the Plan number of students. the State minority approved by Fullerton a substantial debt HSD which impose Board may might require is, or a tax increase. neither consideration in our Although economies stringent in itself us overturn the enough compel State Board’s opinion, approval racial the secession and financial of that Plan proposal, impact are matters concern to the residents who will remain in the Fullerton great HSD. The *25 further indicates that the withdrawal of record the Yorba Linda students from school, School Fullerton necessitate High May Troy closing or at least a of its substantial curtailment facilities and curriculum. Such measures will the of HSD, affect education offered the seriously quality by Fullerton as well burden on its as the financial residents.22 sum, the

In we do view clasification at issue here as one which separates voters, interested and uninterested but one which divides two each with groups, a substantial different interest in the although election. In such case the state to franchise has no interest the to compelling grant one and group it to deny the Board, other. We therefore conclude that the decision the of State to the extent it Fullerton HSD excluded residents from at voting the election to approve of Yorba HSD, the secession Linda from the Fullerton denied such the of residents the laws. equal protection the court respecting

5. Conclusions trial judgement. of found State Board’s the Plan Having approval violated Education Code section the trial court issued mandate state prohibiting and local of- from taking any ficials action whatsoever the secession Plan. we Since con- Plan that the Board’s was not clude or un- approval arbitrary, capricious, evidence, we cannot with the trial by agree court’s order supported barring any Board, The further action. State our opinion, may proceed consider the Plan, CEQA so it conforms to the of as and does not long requirements exclude from Fullerton HSD residents election to any voting any the Plan. approve trial court further the relevant officials “from prohibited notic- calling, an election on March conducting other ing, any time what- submitting soever” for the of Plan the voters. purposes This portion overbroad, below is and should be modified to the order prohibit elec- only to the residents less than the entire tion limited Fullerton HSD. court the State the trial directed vacate its

Finally, approval election conducted before the any Plan and State Board had prohibited complied however, CEQA. Compliance CEQA, with is re- requirements adopted findings drafted judge promote trial counsel to the effect that the Plan 22 The would HSD, quality programs offered segregation, interfere with the Fullerton and racial To significant impact. findings, judge environmental each of these may have added in his handwriting words “the entire Fullerton District own should vote on Plan.” We share financial, racial, judge; and require of the trial environmental effect of the view Plan open to Fullerton vote all residents HSD. takes but before the State Board grants before an election place, not only quired Code, 21050.) (See The judgment the Plan. Pub. Resources § approval final accordingly. be modified should cause remanded with court is reversed the superior

The judgment with the views conformity expressed modify judgment directions substantially will afford Fullerton HSD the modified judgment Since herein. seeks, its costs on it shall recover appeal. relief J., Mosk,

Bird, J., concurred. C. *26 in the I have NEWMAN, J. reluctantly. signed concur concur- judgment I Kaus, Forced Annexation v. Local Against Agency J. ring opinion Citizens 423, 193], 654 P.2d also Formation Com. (1982) post, page Cal.Rptr. [187 I him state rationally arrange filed that the today. agree may special-issue smaller, election to the vote concerned vitally geographic group prevent of a with in from overwhelmed ballot being by contrary larger population view, so decision to do need manifestly terests more diffuse. In the state’s my “strict scrutiny not invoke review.” fact, is contra. that I Acknowledging

The lead opinion Citizens determination here that an election the entire Fuller involving in the acquiesce District is necessary. ton here have second concern relates to the deference ac- plurality

My view Yorba from departure the Board of Education’s Linda’s corded will not “promote District racial or ethnic or discrimination segrega- Fullerton Code, (Ed. (e).) subd. ...” As v. Board my McKinny tion. dissent § P.2d 31 Cal.3d 79 argued, Trustees 460] racially finding when review sensitive fact school they agen- role courts on whether or “quasi-legislative” “quasi-judicial” should not depend pro- cies 103-104). are involved Under (McKinny, pp. ceedings Crawford 28], 551 P.2d (1976) 17 Cal.3d 280 courts Cal.Rptr, Education when shows only to an commitment agency’s judgment defer to “all ending toward reasonable and segregation “meaningful progress” should, believe, direction. Judicial I in- responsibility feasible steps” administrative that no or findings exists scrutiny segregation clude special no or discriminatory segregative decision will have impact. that proposed supra, to have concluded otherwise (McKinny, seem My colleagues decisis, Therefore, because of stare I bow to the 88). again Cal.3d p. here has finding adequate support. the board’s conclusion KAUS, J., (2b, (3b), (4b), (5b), (6c), (8c), (9b), (10c)—Concurring with the agree that the State Dissenting.—I majority Board of Education with section 4200 of the substantially complied Education Code in adopting school district but that reorganization under the plan, California Environmental Act it should have conducted an Quality initial environmental review of the ef- fects of least determine whether a plan—at “negative declaration” was warranted—before final giving approval I proposal. Accordingly, concur in the judgment matter to the portion remanding board for such an en- dissent, however, vironmental review. I from the majority’s conclusion that the at issue violates the reorganization procedure equal protection clause because it limits the to vote on the reorganization to those right plan who reside in persons new district.1 for the alteration of

Proposals municipal boundary lines or the reorganization of local entities political frequently pit interests of those residents who will be most affected directly change—the residents of the area that bemay to, from, annexed or severed an existing municipality district—against the interests the current residents of the annexing entity of the remaining *27 residents of the that some entity may of its lose constituents. There are many a state choose to resolve ways may these conflicting interests to ensure that school district and lines are municipal boundary established on a well- logical, basis that serves the interests of the planned whole, as a region as well as the in- terests of the most immediately affected entities. Under the that procedures are in this case—and in challenged the companion (see case fn. ante) Citizens —this state has that once a simply provided reorganization proposal has been the regional or statewide adopted proper planning agency, the reorganiza- can take effect if it is tion a approved by of those majority persons most directly i.e., affected the residents who live in the plan, area that is to be annexed majority’s equal protection analysis 1 Mydifferences with extend well majority’s as companion Against Agency Forced Annexation v. Local reasoning Forma in the case Citizens tion Com. (1982) post, page 816 654 P.2d which concerns an annexa 193] tion, rather than a secession election. Although voting procedures quite in the two cases are similar, matters, majority opposite upholding reaches conclusions in the two the constitu Citizens, tionality procedure striking procedure in but down the here. attempts explain inconsistency majority by suggesting to this in result that the state has a “compelling” procedure interest in the annexation than the procedure, more secession but the secession, strained at best. In the case of both suggested distinction seems annexation and assuring boundary that local comparable a interest lines are drawn so govern- state has Moreover, reasonably are accessible to all citizens and are ment services cost-efficient. in both legitimate granting the state also has a interest in local instances communities some measure of destiny. over their own control believe Unlike the I do not majority, district. existing from severed to or to “strict “constitutionally suspect” subject is such a procedure who also be af areas neighboring because residents merely scrutiny” are not vote reorganization granted right manner by some fected veto, I As United on, governing the proposal.3 explain, and potentially very establish that states broad discretion enjoy Court decisions States Supreme reorganization formation or local sub for the political devising procedures divisions, which aware decision of I am this broad discre suggests no authority carefully include the limited measure of grant does not tion local want to declare their community residents of a who in autonomy to from, with, an existing Although affiliation unit. political dependence course, could, residents of areas the give choose other opportunity state I errs in believe majority suggesting equal pro block such a change, these other other grants clause constitutional presumptively persons tection veto to such power. right its in the failure to take note majority’s analysis

A flaw major adequate States Court decision Hunter v. Supreme Pittsburgh the United 40], 28 S.Ct. the seminal L.Ed. constitutional decision ad- U.S. to a state the formation and challenge procedure regulating organiza- dressing Hunter, entities. In residents Penn- governmental Allegheny, tion local of a state validity statute authorized con- challenged sylvania cities—Allegheny of two of the total Pittsburgh—if majority solidation in the a referendum two cities approved votes cast in consolidation. The out that because had a much pointed Pittsburgh greater in Hunter plaintiffs state law effectively Pittsburgh than Allegheny, permitted population any without to the wishes of the regard Allegheny Allegheny “swallow” *28 residents; that such a reorganization contended was un- they procedure patently fair and unconstitutional. require only in this does not be held 2 Actually, governing statute case election in the district, existing simply but the territory be severed from an instead authorizes relevant the organization on school to “determine if ... shall be

county district election held committee Code, (Ed. 4375.) Although county territory.” authority committee’s only § in such matter, may, is to be held as a practical permit area in which the vote commit designate the outcome, has power no claim been made that the committee’s particular to affect a election’s tee statutory aspect and I do not address this scheme. regard is itself unconstitutional in this adjoining in do not suggests point at one because residents areas vote in majority 3 The election, procedures deny at issue in this case and in Citizens or annexation secession (See directly either or their elected officials.” through “any voice to individuals] [these Citizens, however, 816.) totally ignores post, p. played the critical role in the suggestion, This county by regional planning agencies—the committee on process pertinent reorganization case, county Legislature and the LAFCO in The Citizens. reorganization in this district school membership regional agencies planning of these to assure that the consciously designed the has Code, (See regions. Ed. broadly representative of all citizens the affected agencies are 4290-4293; Code, 54780-54784.) Gov. §§ §§ Hunter court that constitutional unanimously rejected The challenge, explain- broad discretion which a state in exceedingly enjoys the for- ing regulating mation or subdivisions within its reorganization political boundaries: State, are subdivisions of the “Municipal corporations political created as con- for such of the exercising venient agencies governmental powers State as number, to them. . . . The be entrusted nature and duration of may the powers these and the territory conferred over which shall upon corporations they be ex- rests in the absolute discretion of the State. . ercised . . The State ... at its or withdraw all such modify . . . may powers or contract the pleasure expand area, territorial unite the whole or a of it with part another municipality, repeal done, All destroy the charter this be corporation. may conditionally citizens, with or without the consent of the unconditionally, or even against their In all these the State is respects and its protest. supreme, legislative body, constitution, will, action to the its state do conforming may as unrestrained by of the Constitution of the United any States. provision Although inhabitants may inconvenience, owners such suffer by changes and their property in be lessened value the burden of by increased taxation property . . . there is in Federal Constitution which them nothing protects from these injurious the State and those who power for the consequences. legislate State are alone any unjust (207 exercise of it.” responsible oppressive U.S. at 159].) L.Ed. at 178-179 pp. p. [52 cases have

Although subsequent properly recognized Hunter’s broad must a state’s necessarily fundamental language qualified constitutional (see, to avoid racial or other invidious discrimination obligation e.g., Gomillion (1960) 364 U.S. 339 L.Ed.2d Lightfoot 125]), S.Ct. recent decisions have not wavered from Court the basic Supreme proposition wide latitude ... “extraordinarily states have creating various types (Holt and conferring authority subdivisions them.” Civic upon Club v. political 292, 303, Tuscaloosa 439 U.S. L.Ed.2d 99 S.Ct. In view, the fails to give consideration to this my majority adequate fundamental which forms an point important backdrop constitutional point, case. this challenge Hunter, course,

The decision preceded voting rights cases of the decades, and 1970’s several and the has majority 1960’s apparently conclud- *29 under those cases the referendum ed that issue here is procedure constitu- because it the grants vote to some tionally suspect right individuals who will be affected the residents who live in the by proposal—the area to be severed to, from, annexed district or existing city—but not to residents other will be in areas who also some affected the way by There is a proposal. fun- however, difference, between the damental discrimination voting cases relied and the now before In cases us. by majority voting discrimination the fact that the statutes challenged claim arose from cases, the equal protection voters within a single one class of excluded, against, potential or discriminated within a ci- real owners affording entity—most property typically governmental to a matter voice than owners nonproperty respect or county greater ty (See, Kramer v. Union School District e.g., concern. governmental general 1886]; S.Ct. Curtis v. Board L.Ed.2d U.S. 621 (1969) 501 P.2d In the 7 Cal.3d (1972) 942 [104 Supervisors contrast, arises from cases, “discrimination” is only present by present localities. separate between decision-making authority allocation the state’s Linda of the Fullerton High in the non-Yorba portion who reside Individuals case, of Rancho Palos District—and, the residents School Citizens on the not barred from Verdes, city”—are voting “annexing like; do not own real or the rather the because they property reorganizations that in matters of local the more reorganization decided has Legislature districts or cities should not invariably school existing numerous populations of a smaller which wants to run its community the destiny to control be able view, decisions of the United States Court recent Supreme In my own show. such a the Constitution does prohibit procedure. clear that make it Community Action 430 U.S. 259 L.Ed.2d Lockport Citizensfor the closest case in In court point. Lockport, S.Ct. perhaps 1047] to a New York law which that a new challenge provided a constitutional faced into effect if it was in a referendum only could elec- go approved charter county city dwellers. In the majorities county’s noncity concurrent by tion charter had been a substantial ma- approved by in question, proposed election dwellers but had been defeated the less numerous narrowly by of city jority thus, voters; of the concurrent majority virtue the charter by provision, noncity failed, fact that it had been aby despite approved majority In several residents Lockport, in the election. the concur- challenged votes cast as a violation of the same equal protection, invoking requirement rent majority case. majority present They cases relied upon of voting line violated one vote giving person-one principles, claimed procedure wishes of a to thwart the less numerous power voters a noncity disproportionate of all vote. majority those affected unanimous Court, in a opinion, rejected equal protection

The Supreme outset, the court explained equal protection prin- At the “[t]he contention. the fairness of an election the choice of involving in gauging ciples applicable [i.e., the one vote are of limited person-one representatives cases] legislative distinctive voter in- the propriety recognizing ... in analyzing relevance referendum, the In a of voter expression referendum. in a ‘single-shot’ terests that the voters’ views will be ade- direct, no need to assure and there is iswill *30 their in the The through representatives legislature. policy quately represented of a referendum is also different kind from the of impact choosing impact of off to the state sending legislators to vote on capítol representatives—instead issues, the referendum one discrete issue to puts multitude of the voters. That least, analyzed at of to determine whether being issue is its capable, adoption have a on an identifiable will of disproportionate impact voters. rejection group found to have such disproportionate impact, question If it is then is that either by a State can the franchise to recognize impact limiting whether (430 affected or their votes a by giving special voters specially weight.” those at L.Ed.2d p. U.S. p. New York could believe that reasonably county that charter concluding

After have a differential dwellers impact city noncity because might revisions transfer some functions or duties from revisions would towns frequently such court went on to the constitutionali- county, Lockport uphold cities to the that has language particular significance the challenged procedure of ty Because of its I at some before us. pertinence, quote passage the cases whether, stated: “The ultimate then is the dif- question given The court length. voters in the of a new noncity of city adoption county interests fering York, differences are sufficient under the Protec- those Equal in New charter made New York law. . . . that the classification Clause to justify tion If annexation in the context proceedings, were posed question of fact the area to be annexed and the residents annexing city residents of formed of with sufficiently constituencies interests could sufficiently different different union alone would not so impending merge be readily perceived. fact of as that their constitutionally interest community require one into them annexation. Cf. Hunter v. approve in any aggregated be votes referendum several school districts Similarly, 161. 207 U.S. Pittsburgh, join each constituent form a consolidated school district. unit [1] could . . . surely [I]n terms subject recognizing to voter approval constituen- interests, the structural decision to and potentially opposing cies separate to the decision to restructure county in impact is similar or consolidate annex case, voter requirements York. In each separate approval in New government of a restructuring that the real and long-term impact on the perception are based the different constituent differently by county is felt quite of local government similar services. Voters governmental compete provide in a sense units that affected the restruc- and differentially are directly units constituent in these services make the provider public county government, turing more remote and less subject to the voters’ individual influence. [1] Theprc..- the realities no more than recognize law here question York New sions to these Granting provisions interests. electoral differing substantially these enacted state and every duly to which constitutionality presumption federal violate the Protection entitled, they Equal to conclude are unable we law is

813 omitted; added; 430 U.S. (Italics fns. Amendment.” Fourteenth of the Clause 324-325].) at L.Ed.2d pp. 271-273 at pp. [51 First, it in a number of respects. is instructive Lockport from passage

This for annexation pro- a referendum procedure in fashioning that clear makes be annexed of an area to that residents recognize may a state properly ceedings, have and “separate will entity very frequently annexing residents that—contrary annexation and in the proposed interests” opposing potentially which between distinguishes electoral process suggestion—an the majority’s to of constitutionality.” retains its “presumption affected groups differently these electoral that a state devise its decision establishes Second, Lockport entities, and may interests separate political the distinct to protect procedures even if this defeats the entity prevail of a less-populous the views permit the decision. by who will be affected of all persons of a majority wishes course, in the cases before us the electoral procedures in Lockport, Unlike veto, but limit the instead entity residents of each separate give do not area to be annexed or severed. Supreme voters of the referendum U.S. 60 Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa 439 in Holt decision Court’s however, 383], to rest claim that this difference lays any S.Ct. L.Ed.2d At issue in that case was an Alabama unconstitutional. renders procedure to vote for a city’s legislators only which granted right scheme statutory boundaries, but at the same time gave city the city within residing persons certain governed and other regulations to enact authority police Holt, of an limits. The residents city areas outside plaintiffs populated Tuscaloosa, contended that this scheme denied statutory on the outskirts area that because were affected they directly asserting protection, them equal residents—should have the city’s right regulations they—like city’s police in its elections. vote claim, the constitutional that its Court rejected emphasizing

The Supreme the vote to recognized legitimacy limiting cases had all voting rights past vested with the entity authority residents of the political who were those persons decision. The court observed that many legislative a particular to make outside the boundaries of the but have effects municipality, decisions municipal been considered sufficient bestow nonresi- have never effects such vote in elections. municipal Spuming suggestion right a constitutional dents to vote to some affected right persons which denies system any test, under a strict Holt scmtiny must be evaluated decision municipality’s that states have “extraordinari- Hunter with approval—reaffirmed court—citing subdivisions and con- various creating types political ... wide latitude ly 303]) U.S. at L.Ed. 2d at (439 p. p. them” authority ferring upon was whether the scheme statutory question simply protection equal held (Id., to a state legitimate rational relationship purpose.” some p. “bear[s] *32 302].)4 at p. L.Ed.2d Holt, case, as in the scheme is not statutory constitutionally In this suspect the because it limits the vote to residents of area to be annexed or simply be a yet this area not may technically political severed. enti- Although separate that its residents’ interests are Lockport sufficiently makes clear ty, different a affected the that state can it as a properly from others treat proposal distinct Furthermore, for there is rational basis the clearly statutory classifica- entity. here: the state could decide—as a reasonably tion at issue matter substantive regional when a statewide policy—that planning agency con- reorganization is in the that a best interest of the reorganization proposal region cludes and af- entities, when the residents of the local community fected local whose af- is to be altered desire the individuals change, living filiation other local areas not have the block the state reorganization. should the could power Although that another was decision-making have concluded there process preferable, cer- irrational in the at here. is issue tainly nothing procedure Hunter, sum, the combined Lockport In and Holt teachings demonstrate election before us is not the unconstitutional. The procedure majority’s in- that of the standard is not true to these scrutiny vocation strict cases and reads into for preference the clause constitutional centralized protection decision- equal As warranted. one federal court recently observed in making simply an annexation to that issue procedure comparable here: upholding “[A]nnex- cons, its and . . . under our ation has pros Constitution’s principle federalism, it is the of the individual states resolve the prerogative conflicting in annexation as see fit. disputes interests involved . . . The they Constitu- . enacts neither of consolidated principles tion . . metropolitan government nor in the Holt absolutely nothing opinion support majority’s 4 Ifind claim that that decision authorizes, beyond state-prescribed or even a court requires, to look boundaries of a local unit in governmental constitutionally order “determine the relevant . . boundaries . and sub (Ante, scrutiny any voting measure which limits ject to strict within those p. 803.) boundaries.” Holt contrary, just specifically rejected such an approach, holding On the Alabama were to under though they statutes be measured the rational basis test even denied the vote to city’s city directly legislative who were affected nonresidents acts. the Holt decision regard, directly reasoning undermines In this of the earlier Court Ap County in Hawn Ventura Cal.App.3d peal decision Cal.Rptr. 111], 1009 [141 Hawn, heavily majority relies. In upon applied scrutiny which the court the strict standard in county gave incorporated residents striking city ordinance of an opportunity down an any “in airport borders, to locate whole or in part” city’s vote on within the but comparable noncity might not afford a vote to which did voters who also live in the vicinity of a Holt, however, airport. light scrutiny In strict test appears inappropriate; Hawn, Holt, police airport proposal regulations like although may have directly af residents, voting Holt makes clear that that is not suffi nonvoting as well as fected nonresidents Instead, process constitutionally suspect. Holt establishes that a state the electoral cient to render city’s reasonably permit a electorate to decide may city matters which affect but which also effec have some extraterritorial ts . (Moorman and towns.” v. Wood government villages of decentralized those 467, 473, 477.) 1980) 504 F.Supp. (E.D.Ky. attributable to an concern underlying conclusion is perhaps majority’s case, electoral favor reorganiza-

that, procedure the facts this In on school other integration. will have an adverse impact tional proposal however, which the ma- arrangement the consolidated voting settings, factual effect; favored will have opposite constitutionally precisely holds is jority of a Board of Education approved expansion the State if, example, an area with a minority district to include predominantly white school largely *33 greater majority’s in order to promote desegregation, ap- population school the residents of the “white” provide consistently applied—would proach—if This demonstrates reorganization. to veto the example with the power district on school plan desegregation entirely of a reorganization the effect on seces- of an annexation validity of the general distinct issue from the question view, the majority’s clause. In my under the sion equal protection procedure is not constitutional controlling to the latter question supported approach the state’s ability experiment substantially impair and will authorities and accommodate the of checks and balances protect systems different in local contravenes. inevitably reorganization that are present interests diverse J., Richardson, concurred.

Case Details

Case Name: Fullerton Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Education
Court Name: California Supreme Court
Date Published: Dec 2, 1982
Citation: 654 P.2d 168
Docket Number: L.A. 31415
Court Abbreviation: Cal.
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