Lead Opinion
The community of Yorba Linda has its own elementary school district, but is part of the Fullerton Joint Union High School District (Fullerton HSD). The State Board of Education (State Board) approved a plan (the Plan) to create a new Yorba Linda Unified School District
Fullerton HSD petitioned for mandate to prevent the election. The trial court upheld portions of the State Board’s decision, but held invalid other portions, including the limitation of the franchise to Yorba Linda residents, and accordingly barred the election. Both parties appealed.
The appeal presents three issues: (1) Did the State Board comply with the requirements of Education Code section 4200, which specifies the conditions which must be met before the State Board authorizes the creation of a new school district? (2) Is the State Board’s decision invalid for noncompliance with the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21050 et seq.)? (3) Does the State Board’s decision limiting the vote to Yorba Linda residents deny the equal protection of the laws to other residents of the Fullerton HSD?
With respect to the first issue, the parties agree that a reviewing court may inquire only whether the State Board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentary support; applying that standard of review, we find that the State Board’s decision complied with section 4200. We conclude, however, that the State Board’s failure to undertake a threshold environmental study violated the California Environmental Quality Act, and that its limitation of the electoral franchise was unconstitutional.
1. Statement of facts.
The Yorba Linda Elementary School District is completely surrounded by two unified school districts: Brea-Olinda to the north, and Placentia to the west, south and east. The territory included in the Yorba Linda Elementary School District is also a part of Fullerton HSD, but being surrounded by two other districts, it is not contiguous to the remainder of Fullerton HSD. Because there is no high school in Yorba Linda approximately 1,200 Yorba Linda high school
The isolation of the Yorba Linda portion of Fullerton HSD from the remainder of the district created a number of problems. High school students had to make a lengthy round trip each day to and from school. The distance also imposed burdens on students who wanted to participate in extracurricular ac- ' tivities. In view of these facts, the Orange County Committee on School District Organization (County Committee) prepared the Plan to create a Yorba Linda Unified High School District. In effect, the Yorba Linda portion of Fullerton HSD would “secede” and become unified with Yorba Linda Elementary.
Section 4200 of the Education Code
The County Committee found that all statutory requirements were met and submitted the Plan to the State Board for approval. In addition, the County Committee determined that the election be held in the area proposed for unification only (Yorba Linda), and not throughout the entire Fullerton HSD.
Before approving the Plan, the State Board must find substantial compliance with the statutory requirements of section 4200, and it must also review the propriety of the County Committee’s designation of the territory in which the election will be held. To assist the State Board, the State Department of Education submitted a report which analyzed each of the statutory conditions, found substantial compliance, and approved limiting the election to the Yorba Linda area. At its first hearing the State Board requested further information on the racial impact of removing Yorba Linda from the Fullerton HSD, but after considering that information it voted unanimously to approve the Plan.
Fullerton HSD, which opposed the unification proposal, filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court, contending that the Plan did not meet the statutory criteria and that the election was improperly restricted to Yorba Linda. The trial court ruled that the Plan substantially met the requirements of ade
2. Compliance with section 4200.
The parties initially agree that the action in the trial court was a traditional mandate proceeding pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 and not an administrative mandamus pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. They further agree that the exercise by the State Board of the authority to approve proposals for the formation of unified school districts pursuant to the legislative directive of sections 4200-4419 is a “quasi-legislative” act.
In reviewing such quasi-legislative decisions, the trial court does not inquire whether, if it had power to act in the first instance, it would have taken the action taken by the administrative agency. The authority of the court is limited to determining whether the decision of the agency was arbitrary, capricious, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or unlawfully or procedurally unfair. (Pitts v. Perluss (1962)
Applying this test of review, we examine the State Board’s finding that the Plan substantially complies with the requirements of section 4200. That section provides in relevant part as follows:
“The State Board of Education may approve proposals for the formation of districts based upon the division of the territory of existing high school districts, provided that the board has determined, with respect to the proposal and the resulting new districts that the following conditions are substantially met:
“(a) That the new districts will be adequate in terms of number of pupils enrolled.
“(b) That the new districts will be adequate in terms of financial ability. For purposes of determining financial ability, consideration shall be given to revenue limits per pupil, assessed valuation per pupil, and tax rates. . . .
“(c) That the new districts are each organized on the basis of a substantial community identity.
“(d) That the proposal will result in an equitable division of property and facilities of the original district.
“(e) That the proposal and the formation of the new districts will not promote racial or ethnic discrimination or segregation. ...”
As we have noted, the State Board found that all five criteria had been substantially met. The trial court ruled that the last condition, i.e., that the Plan must not promote racial segregation, was not met. On appeal, the State Board contends that the Plan does not promote racial segregation, while Fullerton HSD contends that it does not comply with the conditions of adequate enrollment, financial ability and equitable division of the property.
(a.) Specific Findings
Preliminarily, Fullerton HSD argues that the State Board action was invalid because it did not specifically state how the Plan substantially complied with the conditions enumerated in section 4200, subdivisions (a)-(e). Fullerton HSD relies on Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, the administrative mandamus provision, which impliedly requires the administrative agency in adjudicatory decisions to make some findings “to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order.” (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974)
(b.) Adequate Enrollment
Fullerton HSD contends that the State Board acted arbitrarily in finding that the proposed Yorba Linda Unified School District would be adequate in terms of number of pupils enrolled.
Section 4200, subdivision (a) does not itself specify what is meant by “adequate in terms of number of pupils enrolled.” Pursuant to statutory mandate, the State Board adopted regulations (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 5, §§ 18570-18574) to serve as guidelines for determining whether a proposal complies with section 4200.
Elementary District.............................................................3,500
High School District............................................................1,500
Unified District..................................................................5,000
(Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 5, § 18573.) The Plan states that attendance in Yorba Linda during the 1976-1977 school year was 2,511 in grades K-8, and 1,200 in grades 9-12, for a total of 3,711.
Fullerton HSD objects to the 3,711 figure because it refers to enrollment figures at the time the Plan was approved and not at the time the proposal becomes effective. Consequently, Fullerton HSD argues, the Plan is defective
Although the projected enrollment is less than specified in the guidelines, the State Board may well have determined, in the exercise of its discretion, that the relatively low enrollment should not deprive the Yorba Linda area residents of the opportunity to form a unified school district. Yorba Linda Elementary, although somewhat under-enrolled, already existed as a separate district. In view of the special geographic and community factors and of the fact that the relatively low enrollment is largely due to the preexisting elementary school district, we cannot say that the State Board acted arbitrarily in finding that the projected enrollment substantially met the guidelines for adequate enrollment.
(c.) Financial Ability
At the time the Plan was approved, California Administrative Code, title 5, section 18573, subdivision (b)(2) provided that “Each district affected will be adequate in terms of financial ability if either the revenue limit per unit of average daily attendance of the proposed district does not vary from the revenue limit per unit of average daily attendance on the assessed valuation per unit of average daily attendance in all of the affected districts by more than 15%.”
Fullerton HSD argues that both the revenue limit per unit of average daily attendance (ADA) and the assessed valuation per ADA for the proposed Yorba Linda Unified School District vary by more than 15 percent from those for Fullerton HSD. The Plan shows that the assessed value per ADA varies by 29.42 percent. It also shows that the revenue limit per ADA deviates by only 5.27 percent, but Fullerton HSD points out that incorrect figures were used to arrive at that conclusion. It was inaccurate to determine the deviation of Yorba
“(2) Each district affected will be adequate in terms of financial ability if:
“(A) The revenue limit per unit of average daily attendance of the proposed district does not vary from the revenue limit per unit of average daily attendance in all of the affected districts by more than 15 %, or
“(B) The proposal does not increase costs to the State for the affected territory by more than 10%.”
(d.) Division of Property
The Plan proposes to appraise all real property, improvements, personal property and funds of Fullerton HSD and to divide the value of all such property on the basis of ADA ratio between the Yorba Linda portion and the remaining portion of Fullerton HSD. The real property and improvements will remain in that portion of the district in which they are located, but a monetary credit will be given to a portion of the district if the property located there was less than its proportional share based on ADA ratio. The Plan further divides bonded indebtedness of Fullerton HSD according to ADA ratio, but provides that one district may choose to accept a greater portion of the bonded indebtedness to offset charges against that district for an imbalance in real property, improvements or personal property received by that district.
Fullerton HSD complains that the Plan proposes an inequitable distribution of property in violation of section 4200, subdivision (d). Since section 4123 specifies that real property shall remain the property of the district in which it is located, it argues that the State Board should not
Yorba Linda Unified School District, under the interpretation urged by Fullerton HSD, would receive the one parcel of land owned by Fullerton HSD located in the Yorba Linda area and a 7.8 percent share of funds. All other real property, all the improvements, and all the personal property of the district would remain with Fullerton HSD. Such a distribution would be manifestly inequitable. Thus, the State Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving the Plan’s provision to divide the values of the property, even though the property itself remains in the portion of the district where it is located.
As to the bonded indebtedness, the Plan provides that one portion of the district may opt to accept a greater share of the bonded indebtedness than its proportional share in order to offset the amount owed, if any, on account of the division of the value of the other assets. Fullerton HSD contends that this provision of the Plan violates article XVI, section 18, of the California Constitution, which provides in pertinent part that: “No . . . board of education, or school district, shall incur any indebtedness . . . without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof, voting at an election to be held for that purpose, ...”
The answer to this argument is that the total amount of bonded indebtedness has already been voted on by the qualified voters of Fullerton HSD. By a change of boundaries of a school district, the district does not lose its identity or cease to be the same legal entity it was before. (Hughes v. Ewing, supra,
Finally, Fullerton HSD argues that the Plan does not provide for an equitable division of the property because the distribution of cash equivalent to Yorba Linda for Yorba Linda’s proportional share of the real property and improvements would financially impoverish Fullerton HSD. Yorba Linda’s proportional share of the property (7.8 percent based on ADA ratios) is estimated at $4 million. Fullerton HSD argues that, even if it assumed all the bonded in-
On the present record, the actual effect of the property division is quite uncertain, depending upon the values eventually assigned to the real property acquired by the new Yorba Linda District as against the value of that retained by the Fullerton HSD. If it turns out that the division imposes substantial burdens on Fullerton HSD, the two districts are free to make arrangements for payment that take account of the economic realities. All that the State Board did was to divide the property so that Yorba Linda would receive its proportional share of the district assets, and such a division clearly complies with the requirement of section 4200, subdivision (d), that the property be divided equitably.
(e.) Racial or Ethnic Segregation
Section 4200, subdivision (e), provides that a school reorganization plan must “not promote racial or ethnic discrimination or segregation.” The State Board determined that the proposal at issue in this case met this criterion, but the trial court ruled to the contrary, finding that the Plan would promote segregation “by removing an area of primarily white students from an area that is increasingly becoming more integrated.”
Statistics presented to the State Board and the trial court showed that in the 1976-1977 school year the Fullerton HSD had a white enrollment of 84.6 percent, and that the proposed Yorba Linda unified district would have a white enrollment of 91.6 percent. Fullerton HSD presented testimony predicting that minority enrollment in most of the Fullerton HSD would steadily increase, but that the racial and ethnic composition of Yorba Linda would remain relatively stable. Additional evidence presented to this court verified this prediction; as of November 1980 the white percentage in the Fullerton HSD as a whole has declined to 80 percent, but that of Yorba Linda only to 90.9 percent.
The statutory language, that the proposal must not “promote racial or ethnic discrimination or segregation,” has not received judicial definition. We believe it imposes on the State Board a more stringent obligation than its constitutional duty—a duty which would exist in the absence of section 4200—not to approve
Measured against this view of the statutory purpose of section 4200, the decision of the State Board is questionable. The Plan will carve out from an increasingly integrated district a small enclave which is, and will remain, 90 percent white.
3. Compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act.
Under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21050 et seq.), any public agency directly undertaking a project which may have a significant effect on the environment must first conduct a threshold study of such impact. If the study shows that the project will not have a significant effect, the agency may so declare in a brief negative declaration; if it demonstrates that the project may have a significant effect, the agency must prepare an environment impact report. (No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1974)
Implementation of the secession Plan in the present case involves the possibility of a significant impact. Secession will likely require the construction of a new high school in Yorba Linda and may result in abandonment of some facilities in the remaining portion of the Fullerton HSD.
The State Board, however, ruled that it had no duty to undertake such a study before approving the Plan. Judicial review of its ruling is governed by Public Resources Code section 21168.5, which limits judicial inquiry into “whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion,” and provides that “[a]buse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.”
We explained CEQA’s concept of a “project” requiring an environmental study in Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1975)
The State Board, consequently, cannot argue that its approval of the secession Plan is not a project merely because further decisions must be made before schools are actually constructed, bus routes changed, and pupils reassigned. It does, however, argue that its approval is not a project because it simply submits the issue to the voters, and because the Plan as approved is not sufficiently definite to allow an adequate environmental study.
It is clear, however, that Board’s approval of the Plan is not exempt from CEQA merely because that approval must be ratified by the voters. As the court explained in People ex rel. Younger v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1978)
The State Board also relies on Simi Valley Recreation & Park Dist. v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1975)
The distinction set out in Simi Valley is not between approval of a proposal which requires an election and approval of a proposal which does not. It is be
The present case more closely resembles Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra,
A closer question is presented by the State Board’s contention that an environmental study before the election would be premature. The timing of an environmental study can present a delicate problem. “ ‘Statements must be written late enough in the development process to contain meaningful information, but they must be written early enough so that whatever information is contained can practically serve as an input into the decision making process.’ ” (No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra,
Specific plans have not yet been formulated for construction of a new high school in Yorba Linda or for changes in the education program in the remaining portion of the Fullerton HSD. Thus delay of an environmental study until after the election might result in a more specific and useful study. The problem with such a delay, however, is that as a practical matter it precludes the alternative of continuing the status quo. Once the voters approve the secession Plan the new Yorba Linda Unified School District will have to build a high school, and Fullerton HSD will have to adjust to the loss of the Yorba Linda students.
The fundamental purpose of CEQA is to ensure “that environmental considerations play a significant role in governmental decision-making” (Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972)
4. Limitation of the election to residents of Yorba Linda.
Fullerton HSD contends that the decision of the State Board to approve limiting the election to residents of Yorba Linda denies the equal protection of the laws to the other residents of Fullerton HSD.
The first step in evaluating this contention is to determine the applicable level of judicial review.
In Hawn v. County of Ventura (1977)
It is clear that the classification in the present case does not involve a mere incidental or marginal effect on a fundamental right (compare Califano v. Jobst (1977)
The State Board, however, contends that geographical classifications constitute an exception to the rule, that exclusion of voters because of their place or residence requires strict scrutiny only if the exclusion serves some impermissible end such as racial discrimination (see Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960)
Lockport upheld a New York law requiring that adoption of a new county charter be approved by separate majorities of city and noncity residents.
The court, however, noted that one-man, one-vote principles had little application to a single-issue referendum since the state could “determine whether its adoption or rejection will have a disproportionate impact on an identifiable group of voters” (p. 266 [
Such differences, the court held, justified the state’s decision to require concurrent majorities of city and noncity residents. The court explained that if the constitutional “. . . question were posed in the context of annexation proceedings, the fact that the residents of the annexing city and the residents of the area to be annexed formed sufficiently different constituencies with sufficiently different interests could be readily perceived. The fact of impending union alone would not so merge them into one community of interest as constitutionally to require that their votes be aggregated in any referendum to approve annexation. Cf. Hunter v. Pittsburgh,
The quoted language from Lockport makes it clear that the state can recognize that residents of different areas may have different interests and, in a single-issue referendum, can constitutionally require concurrent majorities. But nothing in Lockport endorses measures which deny the vote entirely to residents of one of the areas, nor permits such measures to escape strict judicial scrutiny.
This reading of Lockport gains support from the only California decision relating to geographical limits on voting rights. In Hawn v. County of Ventura, supra,
Distinguishing the Lockport decision, the Court of Appeal observed that “[i]t is readily apparent that the New York law involved in Lockport is quite different from the airport initiative ordinance before us. Lockport did not deal with a statute which excluded voters based on residence. On the contrary, the statute in Lockport gave equal recognition to the interests of the noncity voters in a new county charter as it did to the interests of the city voters. The rationale of Lockport lends support to the contention that the airport ordinance before us constitutes an invidious discrimination against noncity residents and voters of Ventura County . . . .” (P. 1021.)
We conclude that Lockport does not support the proposition that geographical restrictions on the franchise are immune from strict scrutiny. We therefore turn to the second case relied on by the State Board, Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, supra,
The court reviewed the voting rights cases in which it had applied strict scrutiny, and noted that the cases involved a common characteristic: “The challenged statute in each case denied the franchise to individuals who were physically resident within the geographic boundaries of the governmental entity concerned.” (P. 68 [
The State Board reads Holt as holding that geographical distinctions, unlike all other voting classifications, never require strict scrutiny. We read the case
Accordingly, we cannot avoid the requirement of strict scrutiny on the ground that the decision in question here imposes geographical restrictions on voting rather than the property or residency limitations examined in prior cases. Instead, we must determine the constitutionally relevant boundaries, “the geographic boundaries of the governmental entity concerned” (Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, supra,
In the present case, the State Board could argue that Yorba Linda, not the Fullerton HSD, is the relevant geographic area, and that the exclusion of voters outside Yorba Linda thus is not subject to strict scrutiny. The Fullerton HSD, however, is not merely a neighboring district incidentally affected by the secession of Yorba Linda, but the existing entity with legal authority over high school education in Yorba Linda; the impact of the secession is in large part the consequence of the present status and authority of the Fullerton district. For example, under the plan approved by the State Board, Fullerton HSD may incur a substantial debt to the new Yorba Linda Unified School District, a debt which will have to be paid by the residents remaining in the Fullerton HSD. Moreover, having built and staffed a high school to educate the children of Yorba Linda, among others, the withdrawal of Yorba Linda will leave the district with excess capacity and affect its educational programs. None of these effects affect neighboring districts; the impact on the Fullerton HSD and its residents is unique. We conclude that the entire present Fullerton HSD is the relevant geographic area for the purpose of applying constitutional requirements of equal protection.
The State Board relies primarily on another exception to the requirement for strict scrutiny—that in an election involving a special district of limited powers whose activities disproportionately affect members of a particular group, a measure limiting the franchise to that group does not encounter strict scrutiny. The State Board relies in particular on Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water
Salyer upheld a franchise restricted to landowners for the election of directors of a water storage district. The decision relied on the limited powers of the district, the disproportionate effect of its activities on landowners as a group, and the financing of district activities solely by levies on the landowners. California courts have applied a similar analysis to elections concerning a recreation and park district (Simi Valley Recreation & Park Dist. v. Local Agency Formation Com., supra,
Our decision in Choudhry v. Free, supra,
Mindful of the broad powers possessed by school districts, and the impact of district actions upon the life of the community, courts have consistently applied the same standards to school district elections as they apply to municipal and state elections. In Kramer v. Union School District, supra,
We note in particular the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hadley v. Junior College District (1970)
We conclude that the decision of the State Board is subject to strict judicial scrutiny, and cannot be sustained unless justified by a compelling state interest. The State Board, in defense of that decision, argues that the residents of Yorba Linda have a greater interest in the question of establishing a separate high school district in that community, but that their preference might be swamped by the “selfish” vote of the less interested, but more numerous, residents of the remaining Fullerton HSD. The State Board does not explicitly claim that justification constitutes a compelling state interest, but it is nevertheless our task to inquire into that matter.
It is, of course, clear that the state cannot claim a compelling interest in excluding voters because of how they may vote. (Carrington v. Rash (1965)
This is not such a case. Without denigrating the interests of Yorba Linda residents, it is nonetheless apparent that the remaining Fullerton HSD residents also have a substantial interest in the election. As we noted earlier, the secession will affect the present and future racial composition of the Fullerton HSD, and may make it more difficult for the district to cope with an increasing number of minority students. We also note that the Plan approved by the State Board may impose a substantial debt on the Fullerton HSD which might require stringent economies or a tax increase. Although neither consideration is, in our
In sum, we do not view the clasification at issue here as one which separates interested and uninterested voters, but one which divides two groups, each with a substantial although different interest in the election. In such a case the state has no compelling interest to grant the franchise to one group and deny it to the other. We therefore conclude that the decision of the State Board, to the extent that it excluded Fullerton HSD residents from voting at the election to approve the proposed secession of Yorba Linda from the Fullerton HSD, denied such residents the equal protection of the laws.
5. Conclusions respecting the trial court judgement.
Having found that the State Board’s approval of the Plan violated Education Code section 4200, the trial court issued mandate prohibiting state and local officials from taking any action whatsoever on the secession Plan. Since we conclude that the Board’s approval of the Plan was not arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by evidence, we cannot agree with the trial court’s order barring any further action. The State Board, in our opinion, may proceed to consider the Plan, so long as it conforms to the requirements of CEQA and does not exclude any Fullerton HSD residents from voting in any election to approve the Plan.
The trial court further prohibited the relevant officials “from calling, noticing, or conducting an election on March 7, 1978, or at any other time whatsoever” for the purposes of submitting the Plan to the voters. This portion of the order below is overbroad, and should be modified to prohibit only an election limited to the residents of less than the entire Fullerton HSD.
Finally, the trial court directed the State Board to vacate its approval of the Plan and prohibited any election conducted before the State Board had complied with the requirements of CEQA. Compliance with CEQA, however, is re
The judgment of the superior court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to modify the judgment in conformity with the views expressed herein. Since the modified judgment will afford Fullerton HSD substantially the relief it seeks, it shall recover its costs on appeal.
Bird, C. J., and Mosk, J., concurred.
Notes
A “unified school district” is one which offers courses in grades kindergarten through twelve. Yorba Linda Elementary School District presently only serves grades kindergarten through eight.
All code references shall be to the Education Code, unless otherwise indicated. Education Code references shall be to the section numbers of the reorganized code.
Subject only to constitutional limitations, the Legislature has plenary power over the formation, dissolution or change of boundaries of school districts. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5; Worthington S. Dist. v. Eureka S. Dist. (1916)
The State Board did not at first find the County Committee’s findings on the racial segregation issue fully adequate. But the State Board received further evidence on the racial segregation issue, after which it adopted the Plan. On this issue it may be said that the State Board adopted the findings contained in the plan and in the addendum report of the State Department of Education.
It should be emphasized that these administrative regulations are simply guidelines for the County Committee in the development of a plan. They do not diminish the State Board’s authority to waive the criteria specified in subdivisions (a) through (e) of section 4200, if the State Board determines the circumstances present an exceptional situation sufficient to justify approval of the proposal. (See Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 5, § 18573, subd. (c).)
The California Administrative Code, title 5, section 18573, subdivision (b)(1) has since been amended to provide lower figures as guidelines for adequate enrollment, e.g., 901 for elementary districts, 301 for high school districts, and 1,501 for unified districts. These revised figures suggest that previous guidelines were found to be unreasonably high.
Section 18573, subdivision (b)(2) has since been amended to read:
This rather complex calculation was obtained by taking the 1976-1977 revenue limit for the Yorba Linda Elementary School District, extrapolating to determine the limit applicable if that district became a unified district, and comparing it with the revenue limit of the Fullerton HSD. Because the issue of the financial ability of the proposed unified district, although raised in the trial court and before the Court of Appeal, was not argued before this court, we avoid a detailed analysis of the calculation.
Fullerton HSD further complains that the Plan fails to make any provision for the revenue limit of the proposed district as required by section 4364. To the contrary, the Plan proposes to establish a revenue limit for the new district at $1,439.35 for 1978-1979, the year prior to the year when the new district proposal was to become effective, and thus meets the requirements of section 4364.
On June 17, 1981, we granted the motion of Fullerton HSD to produce additional evidence, and admitted into evidence the declaration of James Bremmer. The additional evidence consists primarily of 1979 and 1980 enrollment figures, the accuracy of which is not disputed.
In Crawford v. Board of Education (1976)
Since the proposed Yorba Linda High School has not been constructed, we have no information concerning its staff, facilities or programs, and cannot determine whether the community will view that school as a white, segregated institution. We likewise lack information as to how the secession of Yorba Linda will affect individual schools remaining in Fullerton HSD. Consequently, we cannot predict whether the Plan will actually result in segregated schools in either Yorba Linda or the balance of the Fullerton HSD.
Two United States Supreme Court decisions hold that division of a school district to maintain a racially identifiable white school violates the Fourteenth Amendment. (United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Education (1972)
The new district will be required to devise a plan to house students in grades 9-12. It is currently estimated that it will cost in excess of $6 million to construct the necessary facilities. The trial court also relied upon testimony to the effect that the proposed plan would cause a reduction in the number of students in the Fullerton HSD which would necessitate either the inefficient use of the Fullerton HSD facilities or the closing of some of its facilities.
The question here is not merely whether the State Board’s determination was arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking in evidentiary support. (Cf. Brock v. Superior Court, supra,
The State Board also argues that the County Committee was the lead agency responsible for preparation of the threshold study, and consequently that Fullerton HSD’s suit, because it was not filed within 180 days from the County Committee’s action, was barred by the statute of limitations. (See Pub. Resources Code, § 21167.) CEQA defines “lead agency” as “the public agency which has the principal responsibililty for carrying out or approving a project.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21067.) Consequently, assuming that the environmental study should take place before the election—an issue discussed later in this opinion—the role of lead agency in our opinion falls on the State Board. Even though the County Committee formulated the Plan, the State Board had the final responsibility to review the Plan, approve it, and submit it to the voters. Since Fullerton HSD brought the present action within 180 days after the State Board’s approval, its action was timely.
The quoted language from Simi Valley is not, of course, a test for determining whether governmental action comes under CEQA. The concept of “project” in CEQA encompasses many activities which do not relate to land development, but involve some other environmental impact. (See, e.g., Edna Valley Assn. v. San Luis Obispo County etc. Coordinating Council (1977)
The decision in Prentiss v. Board of Education (1980)
The decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Realty Income Trust v. Eckerd (D.C. Cir. 1977)
The court went on to say that “the interest of Congress in making environmentally-informed decisions is not the only interest at stake in the timely filing of an EIS .... There is also the interest ... in seeing that the agency itself has considered the environmental issues in this important stage in the decision-making process. [Citation.] Finally, the availability of an EIS can allow for a more informed and more effective involvement by the public . . . .” (Pp. 453-454.)
We emphasize that we require only an initial threshold study. The result of that study will determine whether an environmental impact report is necessary.
Some decisions speak of an initial constitutional inquiry to determine whether the groups affected are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the legislation or other state action. (See, e.g., In re Eric J. (1979)
Lockport is essentially the counterpart of an earlier United States Supreme Court decision, Hunter v. Pittsburgh (1907)
Note, The Right to Vote in Municipal Annexations (1975) 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1571 discusses an analogous issue—whether residents of a “source city” may be denied the right to vote in an election to approve a proposal to detach a portion of that city and annex it to another city. The note concludes that any measure denying the vote to source city residents outside the area to be detached must meet the strict scrutiny standard. (Pp. 1585-1587.)
The trial judge adopted findings drafted by counsel to the effect that the Plan would promote racial segregation, interfere with the quality of programs offered by the Fullerton HSD, and may have a significant environmental impact. To each of these findings, the judge added in his own handwriting the words “the entire Fullerton District should vote on the Plan.” We share the view of the trial judge; the racial, financial, and environmental effect of the Plan require a vote open to all residents of the Fullerton HSD.
Concurrence Opinion
I concur in the judgment reluctantly. I have signed the concurring opinion of Kaus, J. in Citizens Against Forced Annexation v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1982) post, page 816 [
The lead opinion in Citizens is contra. Acknowledging that fact, I acquiesce in the determination here that an election involving the entire Fullerton District is necessary.
My second concern relates to the deference that the plurality here have accorded the Board of Education’s view that Yorba Linda’s departure from the Fullerton District will not “promote racial or ethnic discrimination or segregation. ...” (Ed. Code, § 4200, subd. (e).) As my dissent in McKinny v. Board of Trustees (1982)
My colleagues seem to have concluded otherwise (McKinny, supra,
Proposals for the alteration of municipal boundary lines or the reorganization of local political entities frequently pit the interests of those residents who will be most directly affected by the change—the residents of the area that may be annexed to, or severed from, an existing municipality or district—against the interests of the current residents of the annexing entity or of the remaining residents of the entity that may lose some of its constituents. There are many ways a state may choose to resolve these conflicting interests to ensure that school district and municipal boundary lines are established on a logical, well-planned basis that serves the interests of the region as a whole, as well as the interests of the most immediately affected entities. Under the procedures that are challenged in this case—and in the companion Citizens case (see fn. 1, ante) —this state has simply provided that once a reorganization proposal has been adopted by the proper regional or statewide planning agency, the reorganization can take effect if it is approved by a majority of those persons most directly affected by the plan, i.e., the residents who live in the area that is to be annexed
A major flaw in the majority’s analysis is its failure to take adequate note of the United States Supreme Court decision in Hunter v. Pittsburgh (1907)
Although subsequent cases have properly recognized that Hunter’s broad language must necessarily be qualified by a state’s fundamental constitutional obligation to avoid racial or other invidious discrimination (see, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960)
The decision in Hunter, of course, preceded the voting rights cases of the 1960’s and 1970’s by several decades, and the majority has apparently concluded that under those cases the referendum procedure at issue here is constitutionally suspect because it grants the right to vote to some individuals who will be affected by the proposal—the residents who live in the area to be severed from, or annexed to, an existing district or city—but not to residents of other areas who also will be in some way affected by the proposal. There is a fundamental difference, however, between the voting discrimination cases relied on by the majority and the cases now before us. In the voting discrimination
Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action (1977)
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, rejected the equal protection contention. At the outset, the court explained that “[t]he equal protection principles applicable in gauging the fairness of an election involving the choice of legislative representatives [i.e., the one person-one vote cases] are of limited relevance ... in analyzing the propriety of recognizing distinctive voter interests in a ‘single-shot’ referendum. In a referendum, the expression of voter will is direct, and there is no need to assure that the voters’ views will be ade
After concluding that New York could reasonably believe that county charter revisions might have a differential impact on city and noncity dwellers because such revisions would frequently transfer some functions or duties from towns or cities to the county, the Lockport court went on to uphold the constitutionality of the challenged procedure in language that has particular significance for the cases before us. Because of its pertinence, I quote the passage at some length. The court stated: “The ultimate question then is whether, given the differing interests of city and noncity voters in the adoption of a new county charter in New York, those differences are sufficient under the Equal Protection Clause to justify the classification made by New York law. . . . If that question were posed in the context of annexation proceedings, the fact that the residents of the annexing city and the residents of the area to be annexed formed sufficiently different constituencies with sufficiently different interests could readily be perceived. The fact of impending union alone would not so merge them into one community of interest as constitutionally to require that their votes be aggregated in any referendum to approve annexation. Cf. Hunter v. Pittsburgh,
This passage from Lockport is instructive in a number of respects. First, it makes clear that in fashioning a referendum procedure for annexation proceedings, a state may properly recognize that residents of an area to be annexed and residents of the annexing entity will very frequently have “separate and potentially opposing interests” in the proposed annexation and that—contrary to the majority’s suggestion—an electoral process which distinguishes between these differently affected groups retains its “presumption of constitutionality.” Second, the Lockport decision establishes that a state may devise its electoral procedures to protect the distinct interests of separate political entities, and may permit the views of a less-populous entity to prevail even if this defeats the wishes of a majority of all persons who will be affected by the decision.
Unlike in Lockport, of course, in the cases before us the electoral procedures do not give the residents of each separate entity a veto, but instead limit the referendum to the voters of the area to be annexed or severed. The Supreme Court’s decision in Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa (1978)
The Supreme Court rejected the constitutional claim, emphasizing that its past voting rights cases had all recognized the legitimacy of limiting the vote to those persons who were residents of the political entity vested with the authority to make a particular legislative decision. The court observed that many municipal decisions have effects outside the boundaries of the municipality, but that such effects have never been considered sufficient to bestow on nonresidents a constitutional right to vote in municipal elections. Spuming a suggestion that any system which denies the right to vote to some persons affected by a municipality’s decision must be evaluated under a strict scmtiny test, the Holt court—citing Hunter with approval—reaffirmed that states have “extraordinarily wide latitude ... in creating various types of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon them” (
In this case, as in Holt, the statutory scheme is not constitutionally suspect simply because it limits the vote to residents of the area to be annexed or severed. Although this area may not yet technically be a separate political entity, Lockport makes clear that its residents’ interests are sufficiently different from others affected by the proposal that a state can properly treat it as a distinct entity. Furthermore, there is clearly a rational basis for the statutory classification at issue here: the state could reasonably decide—as a matter of substantive reorganization policy—that when a regional or statewide planning agency concludes that a reorganization proposal is in the best interest of the region and affected local entities, and when the residents of the local community whose affiliation is to be altered desire the change, individuals living in other local areas should not have the power to block the reorganization. Although the state could have concluded that another decision-making process was preferable, there certainly is nothing irrational in the procedure at issue here.
In sum, the combined teachings of Hunter, Lockport and Holt demonstrate that the election procedure before us is not unconstitutional. The majority’s invocation of the strict scrutiny standard is not true to these cases and reads into the equal protection clause a constitutional preference for centralized decision-making that simply is not warranted. As one federal court recently observed in upholding an annexation procedure comparable to that at issue here: “[A]nnexation has its pros and cons, and . . . under our Constitution’s principle of federalism, it is the prerogative of the individual states to resolve the conflicting interests involved in annexation disputes as they see fit. . . . The Constitution . . . enacts neither principles of consolidated metropolitan government nor
The majority’s conclusion is perhaps attributable to an underlying concern that, on the facts of this case, the electoral procedure may favor a reorganizational proposal that will have an adverse impact on school integration. In other factual settings, however, the consolidated voting arrangement which the majority holds is constitutionally favored will have precisely the opposite effect; if, for example, the State Board of Education approved the expansion of a largely white school district to include an area with a predominantly minority school population in order to promote greater desegregation, the majority’s approach—if consistently applied—would provide the residents of the “white” district with the power to veto the reorganization. This example demonstrates that the effect of a reorganization plan on school desegregation is an entirely distinct issue from the question of the general validity of an annexation on secession procedure under the equal protection clause. In my view, the majority’s approach to the latter question is not supported by the controlling constitutional authorities and will substantially impair the state’s ability to experiment with different systems of checks and balances to protect and accommodate the diverse interests that are inevitably present in local reorganization contravenes.
Richardson, J., concurred.
My differences with the majority’s equal protection analysis extend as well to the majority’s reasoning in the companion case of Citizens Against Forced Annexation v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1982) post, page 816 [
The majority attempts to explain this inconsistency in result by suggesting that the state has a more “compelling” interest in the annexation procedure than the secession procedure, but the suggested distinction seems strained at best. In the case of both annexation and secession, the state has a comparable interest in assuring that local boundary lines are drawn so that government services are reasonably accessible to all citizens and are cost-efficient. Moreover, in both instances the state also has a legitimate interest in granting local communities some measure of control over their own destiny.
Actually, the governing statute in this case does not require that the election be held only in the territory to be severed from an existing district, but instead simply authorizes the relevant county committee on school district organization to “determine if ... the election shall be held only in such territory.” (Ed. Code, § 4375.) Although the county committee’s authority to designate the area in which the vote is to be held may, as a practical matter, permit the committee to affect a particular election’s outcome, no claim has been made that the committee’s power in this regard is itself unconstitutional and I do not address this aspect of the statutory scheme.
The majority suggests at one point that because the residents in adjoining areas do not vote in the secession or annexation election, the procedures at issue in this case and in Citizens deny “any voice to [these individuals] either directly or through their elected officials.” (See Citizens, post, p. 816.) This suggestion, however, totally ignores the critical role played in the reorganization process by the pertinent regional planning agencies—the county committee on school district reorganization in this case, and the county LAFCO in Citizens. The Legislature has consciously designed the membership of these regional planning agencies to assure that the agencies are broadly representative of all citizens of the affected regions. (See Ed. Code, §§ 4290-4293; Gov. Code, §§ 54780-54784.)
I find absolutely nothing in the Holt opinion to support the majority’s claim that that decision requires, or even authorizes, a court to look beyond the state-prescribed boundaries of a local governmental unit in order to “determine the constitutionally relevant boundaries . . . and subject to strict scrutiny any measure which limits voting within those boundaries.” (Ante, p. 803.) On the contrary, Holt specifically rejected just such an approach, holding that the Alabama statutes were to be measured under the rational basis test even though they denied the vote to nonresidents of the city who were directly affected by the city’s legislative acts.
In this regard, the Holt decision directly undermines the reasoning of the earlier Court of Appeal decision in Hawn v. County of Ventura (1977)