DEBORAH FULLER, as Administratrix of the Estate of Matthew Fuller v. LOUISVILLE METRO GOVERNMENT, et al.
Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-661-DJH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY LOUISVILLE DIVISION
June 19, 2018
David J. Hale, Judge
Plaintiff Deborah Fuller brings this action as Administratrix of the Estate of Matthew Fuller against Defendants Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government, Louisville Metro Department of Corrections Director Mark Bolton, Correct Care Solutions, LLC, and several doctors and nurses employed by Correct Care. (Docket No. 1) Fuller alleges that while in the custody of Metro Corrections, her son Matthew Fuller suffered from the defendants’ deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Id.) Louisville Metro and Metro Corrections Director Bolton move to dismiss the claims against them. (D.N. 10) Because Fuller fails to provide sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief against Louisville Metro or Director Bolton, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion.
I. Background
The following facts are set forth in the complaint and taken as true for the present motion. See Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
This action arises out of serious medical complications that Matthew Fuller developed during his incarceration in Louisville Metro Department of Corrections. (D.N. 1) Correct Care
On June 9, 2016, Matthew Fuller was arrested and admitted to LMDC. (Id., PageID # 5) In light of Fuller‘s acknowledgement that he used a 1/2 gram of heroin on a daily basis, the Correct Care employees at issue charted Fuller‘s progress on an Opiate Withdrawal Score Sheet. (Id.) Despite running a fever of 100.9 degrees, the employees removed Fuller from monitoring on June 11. (Id.) Three days later, Fuller submitted a Healthcare Request Form, in which he complained of continuing fever. (Id.) A nurse gave Fuller Tylenol, documented his fever as “routine,” and instructed him to “contact medical if symptoms reoccur.” (Id., PageID # 6) On June 17, Fuller again complained of continuing fever. (Id.) A nurse documented the complaint as “routine,” and instructed him to “contact medical if symptoms reoccur.” (Id.)
Also on June 17, Fuller submitted an additional Healthcare Request Form, in which he stated: “I have not had a bowel movement in over one week – serious pain!!” (Id.) A doctor prescribed Fuller a stool softener but took no further corrective action. (Id., PageID # 7) Thereafter, Fuller‘s condition deteriorated significantly. A Progress Note prepared on June 21, 2016, indicated that Fuller‘s vitals were abnormal. (Id.) Defendant Dr. Rozefort diagnosed Fuller with dehydration and ordered that he be administrated fluids intravenously. (Id.) On June 22, Fuller‘s pulse rate increased to 140 beats per minute, his temperature increased to 100.2 degrees, and his oxygen saturation decreased to 91%. (Id., PageID # 8) That same day, Defendant Dr. Kutnicki assessed Fuller for potential sepsis and directed that he be immediately transported to the E.R. at the University of Louisville Hospital for further testing. (Id.)
Upon his arrival to U of L Hospital, Fuller was “intubated for hypoxic respiratory failure, and diagnosed with septic shock and acute infective endocarditis, a bacterial infection of the
On October 31, 2017, Deborah Fuller brought this action against Defendants Louisville Metro, Director Bolton, Correct Care, and several doctors and nurses employed by Correct Care, alleging constitutional and state-law violations. (D.N. 1) She contends that “[t]he signs and symptoms of sepsis include fever, an elevated heart rate, weakness, diarrhea and pain, all of which Mr. Fuller . . . exhibited long before he saw Dr. Kutnicki.” (Id., PageID # 8) She claims that the medical professionals failed to timely diagnose Matthew Fuller as a result of their deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Id., PageID # 9) Louisville Metro and Director Bolton now move to dismiss Fuller‘s claims against them. (D.N. 10)
II. Standard
In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‘” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). If “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the plaintiff has not shown that he is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. The complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss [the Court] must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [the Court is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Furthermore, “[w]hile a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements necessary for recovery under a viable legal
III. Discussion
A. Factual Matters Outside the Pleadings
As an initial matter, Fuller argues that Defendants improperly rely on factual matters outside the pleadings to support their motion to dismiss. (D.N. 11, PageID # 106) See also Rondigo, LLC v. Township of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 680 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Assessment of the facial sufficiency of the complaint must ordinarily be undertaken without resort to matters outside the pleadings.“). Fuller seems to take issue with Defendants’ contention that they neither “supervise [n]or establish policies for medical professionals who are employed by Correct Care Solutions.” (D.N. 10-1, PageID # 92) Even if that contention constitutes an assertion of fact outside the pleadings, Fuller‘s concern is ultimately irrelevant. In her complaint, Fuller alleges that her son‘s death resulted from “customs and practices of Defendants that were contrary to or expressly violated written policies of Correct Care and/or the Jail.” (D.N. 1, PageID # 9 (emphasis added)) Put differently, Fuller‘s municipal and supervisory claims under
In Count I of the complaint, Fuller alleges that ”Defendants’ conduct . . . was indicative of their total, deliberate and reckless disregard of and indifference to Mr. Fuller‘s life.” (D.N. 1, PageID # 9 (emphasis added)) Fuller does not clarify which individual “defendants” she refers to and thus it is unclear from the face of her complaint whether she asserts that claim against Bolton.1 For purposes of the present motions, the Court will therefore construe the complaint as alleging a deliberate-indifference claim against Bolton in his individual capacity.
“Whether a convicted prisoner or a pretrial detainee, deliberate indifference to one‘s need for medical attention suffices for a claim under
Fuller‘s sole argument in rebuttal is that “[s]he has not yet been afforded any discovery to determine whether, in fact, Bolton had . . . direct contacts with Mr. Fuller.” (D.N. 11, PageID # 108) Fuller misstates her burden, however. At this stage of the proceedings, Fuller is required to allege sufficient “factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference” that Bolton had direct knowledge of Matthew Fuller‘s serious medical needs. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Miller, 408 F.3d at 813; Blaine, 2014 WL 321142 at *2 (“Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is premature because they ‘have been afforded no opportunity to
C. Monell Liability
Fuller also asserts a municipal-liability claim against Louisville Metro. (See D.N. 1, PageID # 9) “A plaintiff raising a municipal liability claim under
In her complaint, Fuller states that
[she] believes and, after reasonable discovery, will show that Mr. Fuller‘s treatment by Defendants was the result of customs and practices of Defendants that were contrary to or expressly violated written policies of Correct Care and/or the Jail, and that such customs and practices were the “moving force” behind Mr. Fuller‘s death.
(D.N. 1, PageID # 9) Fuller‘s complaint contains no factual content upon which the Court could conclude that Matthew Fuller‘s death was the result of a policy or custom implemented by Louisville Metro, however. In the “Facts” section of her complaint, the only reference to a municipal policy is that “Defendant Louisville Metro Government and LMDC have a policy with terms that clearly embraced Mr. Fuller‘s obviously serious medical condition, but which were ignored by Jail employees whenever a medical professional . . . was on site.” (Id.) That
This court has consistently dismissed complaints that fail to present sufficient facts to indicate that the injury at issue occurred as a result of a policy or custom implemented by the municipality. Neal v. Bolton, No. 3:17CV-P496-TBR, 2018 WL 314829, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 5, 2018) (“None of the allegations in the complaint demonstrate that any alleged wrongdoing or injury occurred as a result of a policy or custom implemented or endorsed by the Louisville Metro Government.“); Phillips v. PTS of Am., LLC, No. 3:17-cv-00603-JHM, 2017 WL 4582801, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2017) (“There are statements that suggest these policies or customs were related to the training and supervision of staff at LMDC, but the complaint contains no factual content upon which the Court could find that the plaintiffs are plausibly entitled to relief, such as what these policies or customs regarding training and supervision were, why they were inadequate, and how they contributed to the violation of [the decedent‘s] constitutional rights.“); Blaine, 2014 WL 321142 at *2 (“In her Complaint, Plaintiff clearly states that Defendant Louisville Metro Government was responsible for the policies, customs, and practices which ultimately caused [the decedent‘s] death, but fails to specifically identify the
Fuller additionally alleges that her son‘s death “resulted from the failure of . . . Louisville Metro . . . to employ qualified persons for positions of authority, and/or to properly or conscientiously train and supervise the conduct of such persons after their employment, and/or to promulgate appropriate operating policies and procedures.” (D.N. 1, PageID # 4–5) Again, Fuller fails to allege any facts to support this claim. Specifically, Fuller fails to identify the policy or custom that allegedly resulted in deficient training of the employees at issue, Phillips, 2017 WL 4582801 at *2, to provide facts regarding Louisville Metro‘s knowledge of the employees’ unfitness at the time of hiring, Jackson v. Jernigan, No. 3:16-cv-00750-JHM, 2017 WL 1962713, at *4 (W.D. Ky. May 11, 2017) (“[T]he complaint contains no allegations that there were red flags that would have indicated that either [officer] would cause the particular constitutional violations alleged by [the plaintiff].“), and to state a factual background pertaining to Louisville Metro‘s alleged failure to promulgate policies, Bradford v. Bracken Cty., No. 09-115-DLB, 2010 WL 11520681, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 1, 2010) (“Plaintiffs’ Complaint in conclusory fashion asserts that [the defendants] ‘failed’ to establish and enforce policies . . . without stating any facts to support the allegations asserted.“).
Because Fuller fails to present sufficient facts to indicate that Matthew Fuller‘s death occurred as a result of a policy or custom implemented by Louisville Metro, the Court will
D. Supervisory Liability
Fuller also asserts
In her complaint, Fuller presents no factual content to indicate that Bolton encouraged or directly participated in the officers’ conduct or that at a minimum he implicitly authorized,
More specifically, mere formulaic recitations of “failure to train” or “failure to employ qualified persons” will not suffice to establish supervisory liability. See Harper v. Conrad, No. 3:14–CV–P523–H, 2014 WL 5100625, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2014) (“Plaintiff‘s complaint is void of any allegation that Defendant Conrad directly participated or implicitly authorized, approved, or acquiesced in the alleged wrongful behavior. Accordingly, the failure-to-train claim against Defendant Conrad in his individual capacity will be dismissed from this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.“); Compton v. City of Harrodsburg, Ky., No. 5:12–cv–302–JMH, 2013 WL 663589, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 22, 2013) (“It is clear, however, that Plaintiff‘s Complaint and Amended Complaint are completely devoid of allegations that [the officer] engaged in any sexual misconduct prior to his employment, and was thus unfit for duty as a police officer. Nor does the Plaintiff allege that [the supervisor] or the
Because Fuller fails to provide facts to plausibly indicate that Bolton‘s actions constitute “active unconstitutional behavior,” the Court will dismiss her supervisory-liability claims against Director Bolton. See Peatross, 818 F.3d at 241.
E. State-Law Claims
Finally, Fuller alleges two state-law claims against Bolton: (i) negligence/gross negligence and (ii) wrongful death. (D.N. 1, PageID # 10) As an initial matter, Fuller provides no factual assertion that Bolton‘s own negligence led to Matthew Fuller‘s death. (Id.) Rather, it appears that Fuller seeks to hold Bolton liable for the alleged negligent actions of his subordinates. Under Kentucky law, “a claim against a public official must contain some allegation that the official was directly involved in the negligent acts of subordinates, otherwise, there is no vicarious liability for the public official.” Juillerat v. United States, No. 3:16-cv-00276-TBR, 2016 WL 6156179, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2016) (internal quotations omitted)
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
(1) Defendants Louisville Metro and Director Bolton‘s motion to dismiss (D.N. 10) is GRANTED.
(2) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate Louisville Metro and Metro Corrections Director Mark Bolton as defendants in the record of this matter.
June 19, 2018
David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court