117 U.S. 389 | SCOTUS | 1886
FULKERSON & Others
v.
HOLMES & Others.
Supreme Court of United States.
*395 Mr. John A. Buchanan for plaintiffs in error.
*396 Mr. Patrick Hagan and Mr. William Pinkney Whyte for defendants in error. Mr. John A. Campbell also filed a brief for same.
MR. JUSTICE WOODS, delivered the opinion of the court. He stated the case as above reported and continued:
It is first assigned for error that the Circuit Court "allowed the deed from Samuel C. Young to John Holmes to be read in evidence without instructing the jury that the recitals therein in respect to the death of Samuel Young and the heirship of Samuel C. Young were not evidence against the defendants, even if it were admissible at all, without proof of its execution or possession accompanying and held under it."
The deed of Samuel C. Young to John Holmes was rightfully admitted in evidence, as an ancient deed, without proof by the subscribing witnesses, or of possession by the plaintiffs or those under whom they claimed. When offered it was more than sixty years old; it was produced from the custody of the heirs of John Holmes, the grantee, who claimed the lands described therein. It, as well as the patent for the same land from the Commonwealth of Virginia to Samuel Young, was shown to have been found among the papers of John Holmes. The lands described therein were shown to have been listed for taxation to John Holmes, or to his heirs, for a period begining with the year 1838 down to and including the year 1875, which was after the bringing of this suit; and it appeared that during that time they had paid the taxes assessed on said lands, or the same had been released to them by law. It was further shown, that the judge before whom the acknowledgment of the deed had been made was dead; that his signature to the certificate of acknowledgment was genuine; that the deed had been recorded in the county where the lands lay for more than forty-two years before it was offered in evidence; and that before and after the deed was put upon record the lands described therein were reported to be the lands of John Holmes, the grantee, and his heirs, and were known and designated in the neighborhood where they lay as the "Holmes plantation."
This state of facts amply justified the admission of the deed *397 in evidence, as an ancient document, without other proof. Caruthers v. Eldridge, 12 Gratt. 670; Applegate v. Lexington & Carter County Mining Co., decided at the present term, ante, 255, and cases there cited.
The question is, therefore, fairly presented, whether the recitals made in the deed of Samuel C. Young to John Holmes, to the effect that Samuel Young, the patentee, had died intestate, leaving one child only, namely, the said Samuel C. Young, the grantor, were admissible in evidence against the defendants, who did not claim title under the deed.
The fact to be established is one of pedigree. The proof to show pedigree forms a well settled exception to the rule which excludes hearsay evidence. This exception has been recognized on the ground of necessity; for, as in inquiries respecting relationship or descent, facts must often be proved which occurred many years before the trial, and were known to but few persons, it is obvious that the strict enforcement in such cases of the rules against hearsay evidence would frequently occasion a failure of justice. Taylor on Evidence, ed. 1872, § 571. Traditional evidence is, therefore, admissible. Jackson v. Cooley, 8 Johns. 127; Jackson v. Browner, 18 Johns. 37; Jackson v. King, 5 Cowen, 237; Davis v. Wood, 1 Wheat. 6. The rule is that declarations of deceased persons who were de jure related by blood or marriage to the family in question may be given in evidence in matters of pedigree. Jewell v. Jewell, 1 How. 219; Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3 Wall. 175; Johnson v. Lawson, 2 Bing. 86; Vowles v. Young, 13 Ves. 140, 147; Monkton v. Attorney-General, 2 Russ. & Myln. 147, 159; White v. Strother, 11 Ala. 720. A qualification of the rule is, that, before a declaration can be admitted in evidence, the relationship of the declarant with the family must be established by some proof independent of the declaration itself. Monkton v. Attorney-General, 2 Russ. & Myln. 147, 156; Attorney-General v. Kohler, 9 H.L. Cas. 653, 660; Rex v. All-Saints, 7 B. & C. 785, 789. But it is evident that but slight proof of the relationship will be required, since the relationship of the declarant with the family might be as difficult to prove as the very fact in controversy.
*398 Applying these rules, we are of opinion that the recital in the deed of Samuel C. Young to John Holmes, supported as it was by the circumstances of the case shown by the evidence, was admissible, as tending to prove the facts recited, namely, that Samuel Young, the patentee, was dead, and Samuel C. Young, the grantor, was his only child and heir.
As the deed in which the recital was made was entitled to be admitted in evidence, it stands upon the same footing as if its execution had been proved in the ordinary way. The fact, therefore, that, on the twelfth day of July, 1819, the date of the deed, in the city of Philadelphia, before Richard Peters, United States Judge, and two other persons as witnesses, Samuel C. Young, the grantor in the deed mentioned, made the declarations in question, may be taken as established.
It is not disputed that when, upon the trial of the case in the Circuit Court in October, 1880, the deed containing the recitals was offered in evidence, the declarant, Samuel C. Young, was dead. It only remained, therefore, to offer some evidence that the declarant, Samuel C. Young, was related to the family of Samuel Young. One circumstance relied on to show his relationship was the similarity of names. This, after the lapse of so great a time, was entitled to weight. Another fact was that the patent to Samuel Young for the land in controversy was found with the deed of Samuel C. Young to John Holmes among the papers of the latter after his death. The well-known practices and habits of men in the transfer of title make it clear that the patent was delivered to Holmes by Samuel C. Young, when the latter delivered his own deed to Holmes for the premises conveyed by the patent. There was, therefore, persuasive proof that on January 12, 1819, Samuel C. Young had in his possession, claiming it as a muniment of his title, the patent issued by the Commonwealth of Virginia to Samuel Young; and the presumption is that his possession of the patent was rightful. The fact that Samuel C. Young, representing himself to be the son and heir of Samuel Young, had in his rightful possession the title papers of the latter to a valuable estate, is a fact tending to prove the truth of his asserted relationship.
*399 Another circumstance of weight is that Samuel C. Young, having assumed, as the son and sole heir of Samuel Young, to convey the landed estate of the latter, and his grantees having for more than sixty years claimed title under his conveyance, the right of Samuel C. Young to make the conveyance has never, so far as appears, been questioned or challenged by any other person claiming under Samuel Young.
After a lapse of sixty-one years we think these circumstances were sufficient to prove that Samuel C. Young was of the family of Samuel Young, and that the declaration of the former, deliberately made in an ancient writing, signed, sealed, witnessed, acknowledged, and recorded, to the effect that the declarant was the only child and heir of Samuel Young, and that the latter was dead, was of right admitted in evidence, as tending to prove the facts so recited. This conclusion is sustained by the case of Deevy v. Cray, 5 Wall. 795, which is directly in point. See also Carver v. Astor, 4 Pet. 1; Crane v. Astor & Morris, 6 Pet. 598; Garwood v. Dennis, 4 Binn. 314; Stokes v. Daws, 4 Mason, 268; Jackson v. Cooley, 8 Johns. 127. In view, therefore, of the circumstances of the case, there was no error in the refusal of the court to instruct the jury that said recital was not evidence against the defendants.
The next and only other ground of error alleged by the defendants is, that the court refused to charge the jury on the question of forfeiture. We think there was no error here.
The forfeiture of the lands in controversy is alleged to have occurred by virtue of the provisions of the second section of the act of February 27, 1835. Two classes of lands were declared subject to forfeiture by this act. The first was lands which had never been entered upon the books of the commissioners of revenue for the county in which the lands lay.
There is a failure to show that the lands in question had never been listed for taxation upon the books of the commissioners of Lee County, within whose limits they were included. It is true the certificate of the Auditor of Public Accounts, introduced by the defendants, states that the records of Lee County prior to 1827 are missing. But it can hardly be maintained that when a party shows his inability to prove *400 an essential fact, the fact may be inferred from his inability to prove it.
But the same certificate shows that the lands of Samuel Young were placed on the books of the commissioners of Lee County for six years, namely, from 1827 to 1832 inclusive, and that the taxes on the same lands had been paid up to and including the year 1832. Upon the showing of the defendants themselves, it appears that the lands in question do not belong to the class which had never been entered upon the books of the commissioners of revenue.
Nor are the defendants any more successful in showing that the lands in controversy fell within the second class liable to forfeiture, namely, those which for many years previous to February 27, 1835, the date of the act declaring the forfeiture, had not been entered upon the books of the commissioners of revenue. For, referring to the second section of the act of March 10, 1832 (Laws of Virginia, 1832, ch. 73, p. 67), it appears that only those tracts of land on which the unpaid taxes exceeded $10 were liable to forfeiture under the act of February 27, 1835. There is no proof that the taxes and damages on the lands in question exceeded that amount. On the contrary, if the table of lands showing the taxes thereon for the years 1827 to 1832 inclusive, certified by the Auditor of Public Accounts, includes the lands in controversy, as the defendants contend, the taxes thereon for all the years stated amounted to only 38 cents, and the taxes were, therefore, released and relinquished by the second section of the act of March 10, 1832. And if this table did not include the lands in controversy, then there is an entire failure to show what the taxes were. The defendants, therefore, have failed to prove that the lands in controversy were liable to forfeiture under the act of February 27, 1835.
But there is affirmative proof that no forfeiture could have occurred, for the time for entering the lands on the commissioners' books for taxation and for paying the taxes, and thereby preventing forfeiture, was extended, as has been stated, to the first day of July, 1838, and it was shown by the certificate of Crabtree, the deputy sheriff, that as early as December 14, *401 1837, the lands in controversy were placed upon the tax-books and the damages thereon taxed; and it was further shown that the State of Virginia never claimed the lands as forfeited, but from the year 1838 down to the beginning of this suit, a period of more than thirty-three years, had assessed and collected taxes therefor from the plaintiffs and those under whom they claim. It follows that the failure to show a forfeiture of the lands under the act of February 27, 1835, was complete. It would, therefore, have been the duty of the court, if it gave any instruction upon this branch of the defence, to say to the jury that the defendants had failed to maintain it. It can hardly be urged by them, as a ground for the reversal of the judgment, that the court did not so charge. Brobst v. Brock, 10 Wall. 519; Phillips Construction Co. v. Seymour, 91 U.S. 646.
Judgment affirmed.
