76 Tenn. 635 | Tenn. | 1881
delivered the opinion of the court.
This suit is brought to recover taxes claimed to have beeu improperly assessed, the payment having been made under protest by the plaintiff.
The case is an agreed one as to the facts, and presents the following matters to be decided:
The plaintiff was owner, in 1874, of a certain hotel property in the city of Nashville, which was assessed by the city tax assessor at the sum of $39,750, the taxes being for the corporation $2 per one hundred dollars that. year. Whereas, the State and county valuation for the same property was only $35,725, and the State tax was only 40 cents on the $100, and for •county, was 75 cents on the $100.
The points of objection made in argument are, first, that the corporation cannot _ assess the property at a higher value, by the Constitution, than the value placed upon it for State and county purposes. This is maintained on the ground that the Constitution requires all property to be taxed according to its value, to be ascertained in such manner as the Legislature shall direct, so that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout the State: Art. 2, sec. 28; and in section 29 it is prescribed, that counties and incorporated towns may be authorized to levy taxes for county and corporation purposes, in such manner as may be prescribed by law, and all property shall be taxed according to its value, upon the principles established in regard to State taxation.
It is clear the Constitution prescribed' a rule for
The second question is, whether the corporation may levy a higher rate of taxation, than that laid by the. State and county, for the same year? We answer, the Constitution does not provide that the rate of taxation shall be the same, or not more than that levied by the State, for the same period, but that .the requirement is, that counties and towns shall tax on
We have been pointed to no law passed by our Legislature imposing such a restraint. Such a law, we assume, the Legislature is competent to enact, if deemed proper, but we know of none. Section 491 c, act of 1871, has no application to this case, but only to the cases provided for by the previous section, where the voters of the town are to vote a credit in aid of any “company, association or corporation;” neither does •sections 1359 a or 1361, or indeed ány other enactment, as far as we have been able to see.
The cases referred to, 1 Hum., 162, 2'Head, 363, and the like cases, have no reference to the question of taxing property, but privileges, and consequently, -need not be discussed, nor the correctness or incorrectness of those opinions examined.
The other question presented by the agreed case, is on the following state of facts. The Commercial Hotel property, including furniture, was assessed for taxation, -as we have stated, at $39,750. A license, or privilege tax, for the privilege of keeping a hotel, was imposed by an ordinance of the city, as follows: $40, -and one per cent on the actual rental or estimated value of the same. The ordinance provided, that hotels having less than ten rooms, should pay no privilege tax.
We do not see that exempting small hotels having less than ten rooms, renders this law objectionable. The city was not bound to tax all hotels the same amount for the privilege, regardless of the value ■of the privilege granted,' as measured by the amount of business done, or capable of being done, by reason of the extent of accommodations possessed. It was settled in The State v. Schlier, 3 Heis., 284-5, that the Legislature might classify parties engaged in business, and then must tax all of the class alike, but might graduate the amount of the tax applicable to each class.
All hotels having ten or more rooms are taxed for the privilege, under this ordinance, according to rental value. The fact that others not belonging to the class, are not taxed, is no more a subject of complaint, than if they were taxed at a much smaller sum, the. tax being unequal in the latter cases, and the inequal
In view of the ruling in the two cases, we take it, the principle is, that all persons in the same class must pay the same tax for the privilege; but the corporation may grade the tax, adapting it to each class, observing the principle of equality as to the member of the class. If this be sound, then a party in one class, cannot complain that another of a different class, is not taxed either as much as himself, or not taxed at all.
The result is, the judgment below is affirmed.