There may be more than a modicum of truth in tbe assertion of tbe plaintiffs tbat tbe defendant enacted tbe ordinance аnd its amendment for tbe coercive purpose of inducing Eulgbum to abandon bis water service to tbe inhabitants of Selma Mill Villаge and transfer bis pipe lines to tbe defendant at less than their value. Be this as it may, we must remember tbat bard cases arе tbe quicksands of tbe law and confine ourselves to our appointed task of declaring tbe legal rights of tbe parties.
Tbe crucial question raised by tbe appeal is this: Does tbe evidence of tbe plaintiffs suffice to show tbat Eulgbum has tbe lеgal right to compel tbe Town of Selma to supply water to him at tbe rates charged consumers within its corporatе limits for resale beyond its boundaries ?
Tbe plaintiffs insist initially tbat this question must be answered in tbe affirmative on tbe ground tbat tbe contract made by Eulgbum with tbe Town of Selma in 1946 gives Eulgbum this legal right.
This contention does not take certain controlling factors into accоunt. Tbe evidence discloses tbat Eulgbum and tbe Town of Selma did not fix tbe time for tbe duration of tbe contract; tbat there was nоthing in tbe inherent nature of tbe contract or tbe surrounding circumstances to indi
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cate tbat Fulghum and the Town of Selma intended thе contract to be perpetual or to continue for any ascertainable period of time; that the Town of Selma manifested its intention to put an end to the contract by adopting the ordinance and the amendment in contrоversy; and that the Town of Selma gave Fulghum due notice of its intention to terminate the contract. This being true, the evidence of the plaintiffs affirmatively reveals that the contract invoked by them has been lawfully terminated under this rule: Where the pаrties to a contract calling for a continuing performance fix no time for its duration and none can be implied from the nature of the contract or from the surrounding circumstances, the contract is terminable at will by either party on reasonable notice to the other.
Joliet Bottling Co. v. Joliet Citizens’ Brewing Co.,
The precise question now before us was presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court upon virtually identical facts in
Childs v. Columbia,
The plaintiffs maintain secondarily that their evidence is sufficient to establish a legal right in Fulghum to the relief sought irrespective of the matter of contract right. They argue in this connection that when the Town of Selma established its water works and undertook to distribute water for compensation, it became the legal duty of the Town of Selma to supply Fulghum water for any purpose at the same rаtes as those charged consumers residing within its corporate limits.
This position is clearly insupportable if Fulghum is assigned the status of a nonresident because of his business activities in Selma Mill Village.
A municipality which operates its own water works is under no duty in thе first instance to furnish water to persons outside its limits. It has the discretionary power, however, to engage in this undertaking. G.S. 160-255. When a muniсipality exercises this discretionary power, it does
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not assume the obligations of a public service corporation toward nonresident consumers. G.S. 62-30 (3); 67 C.J., Waters, section 739. It retains tbe authority to specify the terms upon which nonresidents mаy obtain its water.
Construction Co. v. Raleigh,
The rates fixed by the ordinance and the amendment for water supplied by the Town of Selma for consumption outside its corporate limits arе not discriminatory in a legal sense. They apply alike to all nonresidents who purchase town water. The Town of Selma was empowered by law to make these rates different from those charged within its corporate limits. Since a nonrеsident must pay the uniform rates fixed by the Town of Selma for other nonresidents in order to obtain town water, it is immaterial that he deems such rates to be exorbitant or unreasonable. Construction Co. v. Raleigh, supra; Childs v. Columbia, supra.
The legal positiоn of Eulghum is not bettered a single whit on the present record if he is assigned the status of a resident of the Town of Selma becаuse his home is within its boundaries.
When a municipality engages in supplying water to its inhabitants, it owes the duty of equal service in furnishing water оnly to consumers within its corporate limits. It is under no legal obligation to supply water to a resident for resale to othеrs either within or without its municipal limits.
Brand v. Board of Water Commissioners of Town of Billerica,
Eulghum does not seek to have the water in controversy furnished to him as a consumer residing within the boundаries of the Town of Selma. His sole purpose is to resell the water to persons living outside its corporate limits. This being true, he cannot complain of the refusal of the Town of Selma to furnish him the water in controversy at the same rate charged resident consumers of the same quantity of water.
We cannot take judicial notice of municipal ordinanсes. 31 C.J.S., Evidence, section 27. In consequence, we have ignored the ordinance allegedly adopted by the defеndant on 7 November, 1952.
Our decision on the compulsory nonsuit precludes a discussion of the other questions debated by the parties.
For the reasons given, the compulsory nonsuit is
Affirmed.