MARIAN FUHRMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA SATELLITE SYSTEMS et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Civ. No. 24210
Third Dist.
Mar. 28, 1986.
179 Cal. App. 3d 408
[Opinion certified for partial publication.*]
Belli, Drivon & Bakerink, Belli, Shepherd & Belli, Rodney J. Shepherd, N. Kerry Rowan and Harold Seland for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant, Mary F. LeVine, Ed Weiberg, Bronson, Bronson & McKinnon, Paul H. Cyril, Elliot L. Bien, Richard R. Dale and Alexander L. Brainerd for Defendants and Respondents.
CARR, Acting P. J.—Plaintiff Marian Fuhrman appeals from a judgment dismissing her first amended complaint after the court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend. The primary issue presented on appeal is whether two settlement demand letters sent by defendants to plaintiff and several thousand other residents of Sacramento County are absolutely privileged as publications made in connection with a judicial proceeding. (
We conclude that under the present posture of the case the trial court erred in finding as a fact that the letters are absolutely privileged and on that ground sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend. As to part of the complaint, the demurrers were properly sustained without leave to amend on other grounds. Accordingly, we shall reverse in part and affirm in part.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We accept as true all material facts properly pleaded in plaintiff‘s first amended complaint. (Committee on Children‘s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214 [197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660].) Plaintiff is a resident of Sacramento County and has a television antenna on her residence which was installed prior to her occupancy. On December 6, 1983, plaintiff received a form letter from defendant Roger Stewart, an attorney representing defendant California Satellite Systems (Cal-Sat), accusing her of having a microwave antenna on her residence which is tuned to and receiving transmissions of “ON TV” television programming.1 Cal-Sat is thе sole licensee for microwave transmission of ON TV programming in the Sacramento metropolitan area. The letter further stated plaintiff was receiving the ON TV signal without paying the monthly subscriber fee and that such unauthorized reception of a pay television signal violated federal law, entitling Cal-Sat to damages of $100 per day or a minimum of $1,000, whichever is greater.
Stewart advised that Cal-Sat had instructed him to file suit against plaintiff in federal court unless plaintiff (1) removed the unauthorized equipment; (2) signed an attached agreement to stop illegal reception of the ON TV signal; and (3) paid Cal-Sat $275 by January 9, 1984, as a settlement of Cal-Sat‘s claims against plaintiff. Stewart stated this was plaintiff‘s only opportunity to settle the claim. The same letter was sent to approximately 8,700 persons.
On December 30, Michael Dawson, general manager of Cal-Sat, sent another form letter to plaintiff. Dawson reminded her of Stewart‘s previous letter and, apparently trying to cover all bases, stated that Cal-Sat had either not received a satisfactory response from plaintiff or not heard from her at all.2 Dawson stated Cal-Sat was following procedures “utilized by several other successful anti-piracy programs throughout the country” and had instructed its attorney “to pursue this piracy campaign to the fullest extent.” Dawson attached a notice from the Federal Communications Commission stating it is illegal to receive an “MDS” signal such as Cal-Sat‘s without the authorization of the sender. Dawson reiterated that January 9, 1984, was the final date on which plaintiff could settle the matter according to Cal-Sat‘s terms. Other recipients of Stewart‘s letter attempted to explain their positions but were either ignored or their explanations were summarily rejected by Cal-Sat.
On January 19, 1984, plaintiff filed an amended class action complaint on behalf of herself and all 8,700 recipients of the letters described herein. Other members of the class have either received the Cal-Sat signal but discontinued its reception, continued its reception as a subscriber, or continued its reception without subscribing.
The complaint alleges seven causes of actiоn: extortion, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy and violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (
On Mаrch 13, 1984, Cal-Sat filed a voluminous general and special demurrer to the complaint and a motion to strike the complaint. In support of the demurrer and motion to strike, Cal-Sat argued the causes of action for extortion, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy were barred by the absolute privilege which cloaks publications by parties in connection with a pending or contemplated judicial proceeding. (
On March 26, 1984, defendants Roger T. Stewart and Stewart‘s employer, the law firm of Weintraub, Genshlea, Hardy, Erich & Brown, filed a general and special demurrer to the first through sixth causes of action on grounds of absolute privilege, failure to state sufficient facts to constitute causes of action, and uncertainty and ambiguity.
The matter was argued May 7, 1984, and the court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend as to the entire complaint. The court concluded “as a matter of factual finding” that the letters were subject to the absolute privilege of
I
The sole question presented by the parties on appeal is whether the letters sent by defendants are absolutely privileged under
The privilege of
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“The privilege created by
In addition to applying the privilege to a wide range of tort actions, courts “have consistently applied a liberal standard for establishing a relationship between publications made by parties and judicial proceedings.” (Izzi v. Rellas, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d at p. 262.) If the requirements of the privilege are met, the privilege applies though the publication is made outside of the courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is invoked. (Albertson v. Raboff, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 381.)
The privilege applies as well to communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding (Rest.2d Torts, § 586 & com. a., p. 247) and has been specifically applied to letters demanding settlement of a claim and warning of the alternative of judicial action. (Larmour v. Campanale (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 566 [158 Cal.Rptr. 143]; Lerette v. Dean Witter Organization, Inc., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d 573.) It is a “well established legal practice to communicate promptly with a potential adversary, setting out the claims made upon him, urging settlement, and warning of the alternative of judicial action.” (Lerette v. Dean Witter Organization, Inc., supra, at p. 577.) Any veiled threat contained in such a letter “is part of the adversary system, and, as such, is to be anticipated in the course of ‘heated
The privilege is not limitless, however. “[T]he application of the absolute privilege on certain occasions must be confined within narrow limits and the tendency of the courts is not to extend such limits unless the public policy upon which the privilege rests is found to exist in a new situation. Accordingly, while it has been held that there is a tendency to extend the absolute privilege to occasions where the communication is provided for and required by law, the class of occasions where the publication of defamatory matter is absolutely privileged is confined to cases in which the public service or the administration of justice requires complete immunity.” (Earp v. Nobmann (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 270, 283 [175 Cal.Rptr. 767]; quoting Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., supra, 30 Cal.App.3d at p. 824; original italics.) Thus, ”special emphasis must be laid on the rеquirement that [the publication] be made in furtherance of the litigation and to promote the interest of justice. Only if this requirement has been satisfied, is it appropriate for the courts to define liberally the scope of the term ‘judicial proceeding’ and the persons who should be regarded as litigants or other participants.” (Id., at p. 284, original italics.)4
In accordance with this limitation, the privilege with respect to pre-litigation communications is subject to an important qualification. “As to communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding the [privilege] applies only when the communication has some relation to a proceeding that is contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. The bare possibility that the proceeding might be instituted is not to be used as a cloak to provide immunity for defamation when the possibility is not seriously considered.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 586, com. e, at p. 248, italics added [see also, com. e to §§ 587 and 588].) This rule was applied in Herzog v. “A” Company, Inc. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 656 [188 Cal.Rptr. 155], wherein the court reversed a judgment on the pleadings in an action arising out of a letter threatening possible suit against a former employee, as the letter was “not related to a potential judicial action contemplated for legitimate purposes . . . .” (Id., at pp. 662-663.) The court stated the defendant would be able to raise the privilege “as an affirmative defense at trial, if it can show the letter was . . . a good faith communication about prospective litigation contemplated for legitimate purposes.” (Id., at p. 662, fn. 5; see also, Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc.,
Plaintiff‘s complaint raises a serious question whether the letters in this case were published in good faith and serious contemplation of litigation. The first letter is a form letter sent to approximately 8,700 residents of the county. This alone raises doubt as to the seriousness of Cal-Sat‘s threat to file suit. The letter provides no factual support for the allegations made against individual residents. It leaves no room for negotiation or explanation, but states it represents the “only opportunity to settle this claim for this amount.” When plaintiff attempted to deny defendants’ allegations, Cal-Sat simply sent a second form letter stating it had “not received a satisfactory response” or no response at all. Cal-Sat accused plaintiff of “piracy” and repeated its demands. There is no indication Cal-Sat ever considered plaintiff‘s response or attempted to verify her claims. Many other recipients of the letter attempted to explain their positions, only to be summarily rejected by Cal-Sat. The only apparent “satisfactory” response was total compliance with Cаl-Sat‘s demands. If even a small percentage of the recipients of the letters acceded to these demands, Cal-Sat would reap considerable sums of money.
We conclude the court erred in finding as a fact that the letters were privileged under
II
We next consider the individual causes of action to determine if the demurrer was sustainable on any ground. Initially we note “that by statutory mandate the allegations of a complaint must be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties (
A. Class Action
“Procedurally, where there is a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the plaintiff in a class action can establish a community of interest among potential claimants, the preferred course is to defer decision on the propriety of the class action until an evidentiary hearing has been held on the appropriateness of class litigation. [Citations.] But when the complaint on its face fails to contain sufficient allegations of fact to establish a class interest, the class issue may be properly disposed of by demurrer.” (Rose v. Medtronics, Inc. (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 150, 154 [166 Cal. Rptr. 16]; Brown v. Regents of University of California (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 982, 988-989 [198 Cal.Rptr. 916].)
Similarly distinguishable is Larmour v. Campanale, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d 566. In other cases, settlement letters were sent while an action was pending. (See Asia Investment Co. v. Borowski, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d 832; Izzi v. Rellas, supra, 104 Cal.App.3d 254.)
“A class action is maintainable only when there exists a community of interest in common questions of law and fact among thе claimants to be represented, and it is likely that the combination of claims in a single action will substantially benefit both the claimants and the courts. (
Plaintiff‘s complaint is not appropriate as a class action. First, the class members are not similarly situated. Plaintiff alleges she has never received Cal-Sat‘s signal and that defendants factually erred in sending her the letters. Other members of the class, however, did receive the signal and either discontinued doing so, continued doing so as subscribers, or continued doing so without subscribing. These members would acknowledge their receipt of the signal but contend the receipt of Cal-Sat‘s signal was not illegal.
Second, the injury alleged in each of the first six causes of action is “severe intimidation, shock, distress, humiliation, alarm, frustration, harassment, embarrassment, defamation and disruption. . . .” Perhaps no cause of action is less susceptible to a class action than one for infliction of emotional distress. Recovery in each case necessarily depends on the particular characteristics of each plaintiff. Every plaintiff will have a different degree of susceptibility and emotional reaction to the conduct in question. If the legal issues were common to all class members, the individual right of each member to damages and the extent of those damages would have to be separately litigated. While each class member is similarly situated in that each received the letters in question, each member must establish his or her right to recover on the basis of facts peculiar to his or her own case. A class action is inappropriate in such a case. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 67 Cal.2d 695, 707-708; Chance v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 275, 285 [23 Cal.Rptr. 761, 373 P.2d 849].)
Plaintiff‘s action “is singularly ill-suited for prosecution as a class action, . . . Plaintiff‘s individual action provides [her] a sufficient vehicle to remedy any wrong [she] may have suffered as a result of defendant[s‘] conduct.” (Rose v. Medtronics, Inc., supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at p. 157.)
A class action may be appropriate for the seventh cause of action, violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. However, as we determine plaintiff‘s complaint irremediably fails to state a cause of action under that enactment, we do not consider this issue.
The court properly sustained Cal-Sat‘s demurrer without leave to amend as to all unnamed class plaintiffs.
B. Extortion
Plaintiff‘s first cause of action is labelled “extortion” and states defendants “have, through outrageous conduct, demanded, among other things,
In their demurrers, defendants contend “extortion” is only a crime and cannot form the basis for a civil action in tort. We disagree. However denominated (e.g., extortion, menace, duress), our Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action for the recovery of money obtained by the wrongful threat of criminal or civil prosecution. (See Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 203-204 [1 Cal. Rptr. 12, 347 P.2d 12, 77 A.L.R.2d 803]; Woodham v. Allen (1900) 130 Cal. 194, 198-200 [62 P. 398].) It is essentially a cause of action for moneys obtained by duress, a form of fraud. (Leeper v. Beltrami, supra, 53 Cal.2d at pp. 205, 207.)
To be actionаble the threat of prosecution must be made with the knowledge of the falsity of the claim. (Id., at p. 204.) In her first cause of action, plaintiff does not allege defendants knew their claims were false, other than a general statement that their conduct amounted to “fraud.” This can be cured by amendment.
The fatal flaw in plaintiff‘s action is that she apparently never paid the money defendants demanded in their letters. The only actual damages plaintiff alleges are her emotional distress and attorney fees.
Attorney fees are not recoverable here, as there is no agreement for the payment of fees and no applicable statutory provision for the recovery of fees. (
The Brandt action was one against an insurer by its insured for refusal to pay benefits under a group disability policy. Three causes of action were pled, but only two were before the Supreme Court, the first for breach of an insurance contract and the second for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In the latter cause of action, attorney fees incurred in connection with the breach of contract action were sought as part of the damages. The trial court granted defendant‘s motion to strike that portion of the complaint seeking attorney fees; plaintiff successfully sought mandate to vacate the order striking the attorney fees portions of the complaint.8
Brandt is distinguishable from the present case in that in Brandt there was an underlying contractual relationship. Defendant insurer‘s unreasonable and bad faith breach of that contract compelled the incurring of legal fees to enforce the contractual rights and collect the benefits due. It is the bad faith, tortious conduct in withholding these contractual benefits which gave rise to the cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Part of the damages for that cause of action are the attorneys fees incurred or paid to enforce the contractual right. The Brandt court carefully delineated the recoverable and nonrecoverable fees: “The fees recoverable, however, may not exceed the amount attributable to the attorney‘s efforts to obtain the rejected payment due on the insurance contract. Fees attributable to obtaining any portion of the plaintiff‘s award which exceeds the amount due under the policy are not recoverable.” (37 Cal.3d at p. 819.)
In Brandt, the court as well noted the difference between the Brandt action and an action to recover only benefits allegedly due under an insurance contract and in which no bad faith in refusing such benefits is alleged, as was the situation in Lowell v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 298 [54 Cal.Rptr. 116, 419 P.2d 180]; Patterson v. Insurance Co. of North America (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 310 [85 Cal.Rptr. 665], and Carroll v. Hanover Insurance Co. (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 47 [71 Cal.Rptr. 868]. An award of attorney fees is prеcluded in those cases in which the insurer
However, no disadvantage accrues to the defendant in joining the two actions in one lawsuit, save possibly making “the identification of the allowable fees more sophisticated.” (37 Cal.3d at p. 818.)
If plaintiff had actually paid the money demanded by defendants, she would have alleged such sum as damages. An action for duress is an action for the recovery of moneys received by a defendant under the influence of duress. (See Leeper v. Beltrami, supra, 53 Cal.2d 195; Woodham v. Allen, supra, 130 Cal. 194.) As she did not pay the money demanded by defendants, plaintiff did not sustain damages cognizable in a cause of action for duress.
In the absence of actual damages, punitive damages are not recoverable. (Esparza v. Specht (1976) 55 Cal. App.3d 1, 6 [127 Cal.Rptr. 493].)
We consider next whether this cause of action can be upheld on some other theory. However labelled, plaintiff‘s first cause of action could be construed as one for the recovery of damages for the severe emotional distress caused by defendants’ “outrageous” conduct. As such, it is simply a variation of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Ribas v. Clark, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 364.) Plaintiff alleges such a cause of action later in the complaint and we consider it later. The court properly sustained the demurrers without leave to amend as to the first cause of action.
*
H. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
As a seventh cause of action against Cal-Sat and Graphic Scanning only, plaintiff alleges defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (
The general purpose of Congress in enacting the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Act) is to protect consumers who have been victimized by unscrupulous and abusive debt collectors, regardless of whether a valid debt actually exists. (Baker v. G. C. Services Corp. (9th Cir. 1982) 677 F.2d 775, 777;
The trial court sustained Cal-Sat‘s demurrer to this cause of action on the ground Cal-Sat was not a “debt collector” within the meaning of the Act. The Act subjects to liability any “debt collector” who fails to comply
*See footnote, ante, page 408.
The complaint shows on its face Cal-Sat is not a “debt-collector” within the meaning of the Act. Cal-Sat was directly attempting to collect money allegedly owed to it as a creditor. The first letter was written by its attorney while аcting on its behalf and in its name; the second letter was written by its general manager.
Cal-Sat is not subject to the Act and no amendment to the complaint can make it so. The court properly sustained Cal-Sat‘s demurrer without leave to amend as to the seventh cause of action.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed as to the first, second, third, and seventh causes of action, and as to the unnamed class plaintiffs. The judgment of dismissal as to the fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action is reversed with directions to vacate the order sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend and to sustain the demurrers with leave to amend as to those causes of action. Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
Sparks, J., concurred.
SIMS, J.—I concur with the thoughtful majority opinion except insofar as it concludes plaintiff cannot recover attorneys’ fees as damages in her cause
In Brandt our Supreme Court ruled a plaintiff could collect, as damages, fees paid by plaintiff to his attorneys and attributable to the attorneys’ effort to obtain benefits wrongfully withheld on an insurance contract. (37 Cal.3d at p. 819.)
The majority conclude Brandt is inapplicable to this case either because Brandt should be limited to disputes over insurance or because recovery of attorneys’ fees in Brandt was on a contract theory. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 427.)
The majority‘s latter ground for distinguishing Brandt is wholly unpersuasive. The Brandt opinion makes clear that plaintiff‘s cause of actiоn was in tort for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and the entire thrust of the case is that fees paid to plaintiff‘s attorney are recoverable as tort damages. (See Brandt, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 816-818.) Brandt‘s approval of attorneys’ fees as damages has nothing to do with any contract.
Nor does Brandt suggest that there is anything in its analysis peculiar to insurance disputes. The hard issue in the case is why
Nothing about this analysis is peculiar to insurance disputes. In my view, Brandt represents an application of the same time-honored principle that led our Supreme Court to authorize recovery of attorney‘s fees as damages in actions for false imprisonment (Nelson v. Kellogg (1912) 162 Cal. 621, 623-624 [123 P. 1115]) and malicious prosecution (Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 59 [118 Cal. Rptr. 184, 529 P.2d 608, 65 A.L.R.3d 878]). Because of its nature, some tortious conduct necessarily requires the tort victim to retain an attorney to ameliorate or defend against the wrongful conduct. Thus, in Nelson v. Kellogg, supra, plaintiff was allowed to recover damages for attorney‘s fees spent in obtaining her release from a false arrest. (162 Cal. at p. 622.) In Bertero v. National General Corp., supra, plaintiff could recover as damages attorney‘s fees paid to defend an action prosecuted maliciously against him. (13 Cal.3d at p. 59.) In Brandt, attorney‘s fees were recoverable as damages where the attorney was retained to obtain insurance procеeds tortiously withheld. (37 Cal.3d at p. 822.)
In none of these instances would we reasonably expect a lay person to be able to remedy the tortious conduct without the services of an attorney.2 Brandt‘s express analogy is appropriate: in these cases, attorney‘s fees are recoverable as damages for the same reason medical fees are recoverable in personal injury actions. (37 Cal.3d at p. 817.) The tort has made it necessary for the tort victim to obtain expert professional services to cure the wrong.
In the instant case, plaintiff, a lay person, has pleaded that, as a consequence of defendants’ continuing threats to sue her, she had to obtain the services of attorneys. Because the tortious conduct consisted of wrongful threats to sue plaintiff in a court of law, plaintiff was clearly required to obtain the services of attorneys to defend against and ameliorate the continuing tortious conduct. I do not see why, if plaintiff could have recovered, as damages, attorney‘s fees spent to defend an action prosecuted malicious-
Since plaintiff should recover, as damages, amounts paid to her attorneys, as outlined above, her cause of action for extortion should survive. As the majority point out, our Supreme Court has recognized that a cause of action in tort, in the nature of duress, is maintainable where one is compelled to pay money to another upon the wrongful threat of prosecution of civil legal action. (See Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 203-205 [1 Cal.Rptr. 12, 347 P.2d 12, 77 A.L.R.2d 803].) In Leeper, the money was paid under duress to a defendant. (Id., at p. 202.) However, that fact is immaterial. A cause of action consists of a primary right held by a plaintiff, a primary duty devolving upon a defendant, and the delict or wrong done by the defendant. (Lodi v. Lodi (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 628, 631 [219 Cal.Rptr. 117]; 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 23, pp. 66-67.) Here plaintiff has a right to live her life free of attempts to extort money from her. She has sufficiently alleged that defendants, by threatening suit without any cause, wrongfully breached a tort duty owed to her. She is entitled to be made whole for her damages regardless of whether her money was paid directly to defendants or to her attorneys. Since plaintiff‘s first cause of action sufficiently pleads that she suffered damage as a consequence of defendants’ wrongful attempts to extort money from her, her first cause of action should survive.
Petitions for a rehearing were denied April 25, 1986, and the petitions of all parties for review by the Supreme Court were denied July 17, 1986.
ROGER T. STEWART, ESQ.
Attorney At Law
California Satellite Systems
3332 Mather Field Road, #115
Rancho Cordova, CA 95670
(916) 369-1601 43-8161
DECEMBER 6, 1983
M FUHRMAN
7530 GARDENGATE DR
CITRUS HEIGHTSCA 95610
CASE #: 850347
I represent California Satellite Systems, the sole licensee for microwave transmission of ON TV programming in the Sacramento metropolitan area.
A recent and on-going survey of your neighborhood reveals that you still have a microwave antenna on your residence which is tuned to and receiving ON TV programming.
A check of my client‘s paid subscriber rolls indicates that you are receiving this signal without paying the monthly subscriber fee. THE UNAUTHORIZED RECEPTION OF A PAY TV SIGNAL IS IN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL LAW (
California Satellite Systems has instructed me to file suit against you in Federal Court unless ALL of the following THREE STEPS take place:
- Remove the unauthorized equipment; and
- Sign the enclosed agreement to stop your illegal reception of the ON TV signal; and
- Return this agreement with your check or money order for $275, made payable to California Satеllite Systems no later than JANUARY 9, 1984. A return envelope is enclosed for this purpose. This amount is considered to be an out-of-court settlement of all prior claims against you.
If you fail to settle this claim by JANUARY 9, 1984 , my client‘s suit in Federal Court will be for considerably more damages. This is your only opportunity to settle this claim for this amount.
Please contact us without further delay.
Very truly yours,
Roger T. Stewart, Esq.
Attorney At Law
RTS/mg
Enclosures
CALIFORNIA SATELLITE SYSTEMS
3332 Mather Field Road #115
Rancho Cordova, CA 95670
(916) 369-1601
DECEMBER 30, 1983
M FUHRMAN
7530 GARDENGATE DR
CITRUS HEIGHTSCA 95610
CASE #: 850347
On DECEMBER 6, 1983 our attorney, Roger T. Stewart, notified you of our intent to stop the unauthorized interception of California Satellite Systems’ over-the-air signal in the Sacramento area. As of the date of this letter, we have either not received a satisfactory response from you or we have not heard from you at all.
Piracy of pay-TV signals is a nationwide problem. CAL SAT is following the procedures utilized by several other successful anti-piracy programs throughout the country. We have instructed our attorney to pursue this piracy campaign to the fullest еxtent.
Recently, you may have heard claims that “the airwaves are free” and that, therefore, CAL SAT has no right of action against those who intercept signals. Enclosed is a notice from the Federal Communications Commission which clearly states that it is illegal to receive MDS signals without the authorization of the sender. CAL SAT‘s signal is an MDS signal.
As outlined in our attorney‘s letter, JANUARY 9, 1984 is the final date upon which you may settle this matter by the prescribed three steps. I sincerely hope we can settle this unfortunate matter within the next few days. As these anti-piracy programs continue, they only become more costly and create more hardships.
Very truly yours,
CALIFORNIA SATELLITE SYSTEMS
Michael D. Dawson
General Manager
Enc: FCC Notice