Ohio’s recreational user statute, R.C. 1533.181, provides as follows:
“(A) No owner, lessee, or occupant of premises:
“(1) Owes any duty to a recreational user to keep the premises safe for entry or use;
“(2) Extends any assurance to a recreational user, through the act of giving permission, that the premises are safe for entry or use;
*203 “(3) Assumes responsibility for or incurs liability for any injury to person or property caused by any act of a recreational user.”
“Premises” and “recreational user” are defined in R.C. 1533.18(A) and (B), respectively, as follows:
“(A) ‘Premises’ mеans all privately-owned lands, ways, waters, and any buildings and structures thereon, and all state-owned lands, ways and waters leased to a private person, firm, organization, or corporation, including any buildings and structures thereon.
“(B) ‘Recreational user’ mеans a person to whom permission has been granted, without the payment of a fee or consideration to the ownеr, lessee, or occupant of premises, other than a fee or consideration paid to the state or any agency thereof, to enter upon premises to hunt, fish, trap, camp, hike, swim, or engage in other recreational pursuits.”
In Johnson v. New London (1988),
This court has previously discussed the definition of a “rеcreational user” and how a person comes within the parameters of that definition. As we said in Miller v. Dayton (1989),
In the instant case, the “essential character” of a soccer field is that of a playing area used to play soccer games. The “nature and scope of activity” in which persоns are engaged on a soccer field are much more limited than in a
Additionally, accоrding to R.C. 1533.18(B), a “recreational user” must enter the premises “to hunt, fish, trap, camp, hike, swim, or engage in other recreational pursuits.” The phrase “other recreational pursuits” only applies to activities that are of the same type and kind аs those specified. See Light v. Ohio University (1986),
Scott and his friends did not come onto the soccer field to engage in any type of recreational pursuit. Once they were on the school premises, they began to play with the soccer goal in a mannеr for which it was not intended. Roughhousing on a soccer goal is not a recreational activity of the type contemplated by the statute. Nor is it the kind of activity that comports with the essential character of the soccer field. Persons whо enter a soccer field on public school property and play with the soccer goal have not enterеd the premises to engage in a recreational pursuit and, therefore, Scott and his companions were not reсreational users under R.C. 1533.18(B), and the board has no grant of immunity pursuant to R.C. 1533.181.
The board also asserts that it is immune from liability since Scott was, at best, a licensee to whom the board had no duty to warn or protect. In Hannan v. Ehrlich (1921),
In order for Fuehrer to maintain a negligence action against the board, the boаrd first must have owed Scott a duty of care and then must have breached that duty. See Elliman v. Gombar (1949),
Scott was on public school property for his own benefit. He had not been invited there by the school or by the school board. Scott was a licensee and, as such, he entered the premises at his own peril and is owed a duty by the owner of such premises only to refrain from wanton or willful сonduct. As a licensee, Scott must take the premises as he found them. The board’s only duty to Scott was to “refrain from wantonly or wilfully injuring him.” The failure of the board to post a warning that the soccer goal could cause injury
Although Scott’s death was a tragic accident, it was not the result of negligence on the part of the board. Consequently, the board is not liable for Scott’s death and no material facts remain in dispute. For the reasons stated herein, the granting of the board’s motion for summary judgment was proper, and the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.