75 W. Va. 134 | W. Va. | 1914
The judgment for $3450.00, complained of here, was recovered in an action of assumpsit, founded upon a contract for the construction of a certain railroad, a branch line of the Coal and Coke Railway, running from Gassaway to Wolf Creek.
The declaration contained five counts, but the evidence adduced' tends to sustain only two of them, the common count for work and labor and a special count for the price or value of certain kinds of excavation, in excess of the price specified in the contract, the claim for which is founded upon alterations in the location of the road, made after the contract had been signed and, it is charged, in violation of its terms.
The correctness of the estimate of the quantity of work done is not challenged and the entire compensation, at the price stipulated in the contract, has been paid. Though the declaration, in one or more counts, claims damages for delay occasioned by failure of the defendant to provide plans, plats and specifications, as needed, the claim fails for want of
In support of the defendant’s claim of right to make the alterations complained of, the following stipulations of the. contract, among others, are invoked:
‘ ‘ Contractors must satisfy themselves of the nature' and location of the work they bid for, of the general form of the surface of the ground, of the quantity of-material required for forming embankments or other work, and all other matters that can in any way influence their contract, and no information upon any such matters derived from maps, plans, profiles, drawings or s'pecifications, or from the engineer or his assistants, will in any way relieve the contractor from all risks, or from fulfilling the terms of this contract. ’ ’
“The quantities and disposition of excavations, masonry, brick work and bridging may be changed during the progress of the work at the pleasure of the chief engineer, by. alterations in the line of the railroad, or in the grades, curves or dimensions in length of the section, for the purpose of more nearly equalizing or balancing the cuttings and fillings, and the calculation of quantities will be made anew for final settlement with the contractor.”
“No extra charges will be allowed on account of any change that may be made during the progress of the work, or before commencing the same, cither in the alignment of grade, slope or dimensions of the road. The prices named in the contract are to. be taken and considered as full compensation for all the various kinds of work determined by their measurement herein agreed upon to be performed. ’ ’
“The quantities marked on profile are only approximate and will have no bearing on monthly or final estimates. ’ ’
“The work shall be done in strict conformity with such lines, levels, stakes, profiles, plans, maps, drawings, specifications and instructions as shall from time to time be given by the Company’s Engineers- as herein provided, for the guidance and direction of the Contractor.”
“The company shall have the right to make any alterations that may be hereafter determined upon as necessary or
The burden of the complaint is the character of the ground on which the alterations were made, occasioning the alleged necessity of excavating more solid rock than was contemplated by the contract. The variations are fully proven. Indeed, they are not denied. The defendant, insisting that the contract authorized them, and, moreover, that they inflicted no practical injury upon the plaintiff, admits them.
Four civil engineers, Whitaker who made- the original location, two Aldens who successively made subsequent locations, under the direction of Pembroke, and Curtis who did no work on the line, but went over it after its completion, at the instance of the plaintiff, to obtain information for his testimony as a witness, all say the alterations increased the excavation and that the increase was practically all solid rock. Two of them estimated such increase at about 40,000 cubic yards. Whitaker says his estimate of about 143,000 cubic yards for the entire work was based upon such location as would balance the excavation and filling, so that the excavation on the hillsides would produce, as nearly as possible, the amount of the material needed for the fill on the lower side. This, he admits, necessitated some slight departures from his survey, but such alterations were taken into consideration in his estimate of yardage. He further says his survey would have put the road back into the hill on solid ground at such points as required such location, by reason of inability to obtain footings for the fills. All of these witnesses say it was practicable to build the line on the Whitaker survey, .though they all seem to think the road was put on a much better foundation by the departures from it.
On the other hand, Pembroke, chief engineer of the company, and Chapman and Venable, civil engineers of recognized ability, testifying as experts, say the road could not have been built safely or economically on the Whitaker location ; not safely because one side of the track would have been
The legal propositions declared in Henderson Bridge Co. v. McGrath, 134 U. S. 260; Woods v. Fort Wayne, 119 U. S. 312; Wolff v. McGavock, 29 Wis. 290 and Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 Fed. Rep. 457, and invoked by the plaintiff, are stated as follows in the last named case:
“The stipulation, common to corporation agreements for work and labor, that contractors may be required to perform extra work connected with that described in the contract, at the price named in the agreement or fixed by an engineer, is limited, by the subject-matter of the contract and the intention of the parties, to such proportionally small amounts of extra work as may be necessary to the completion of. the undertaking contemplated by the parties when the contract was made; and work which does not fall within this limitation is new and different work, not covered by the agreement, and for which contractors may recover upon a quantum meruit.”
As the evidence adduced by the plaintiff clearly tends to make a ease within the principles above stated, it was proper for the court to grant the prayers of the plaintiff for the three instructions given at his instance, declaring hypothetically a right of recovery in him. They are objected to, not for lack of formality or for inaccuracy of statement, but upon the ground of their submission to the jury of an inapplicable legal principle. This tendency of the evidence justified the court, also, in the refusal of instruction “A” asked for by the defendant which, if given, would have directed the jury not to « consider the Whitaker location. The modification of the defendant’s instruction No. 1, by change of the word “been” to “come” was immaterial and not at all prejudicial. The modification of the defendant’s instructions Nos. 2, 3 and 4', limiting the right of alteration without liability for increased compensation, to such deviations as should have come within the contemplation of the parties under the terms of the contract, were fully justified. Defendant’s instructions. Nos. 6, 7, and 8, if given would have told the jury, each in its owm terms, that, if they believed the plaintiff was .entitled to recover, they could not ascertain the amount of his recovery by deduction of the Whitaker estimate from the final estimate and allowance of compensation for the difference. The cpurt refused Nos. 7 and 8, and modified No. 6 so as to inhibit the adoption of such measure of compensation and advise resort to all the evidence in the case for ascertainment of the amount of extra compensation to which the plaintiff was
The exception founded upon the admission of the plaintiff’s evidence the general character of which has been indicated is untenable for reasons already stated.
The correctness of the rulings so far considered does not preclude inquiry as to the soundness of the ruling by which the motion to set aside the verdict was denied. Evidence that will not sustain a verdict, on account of its weakness, may nevertheless justify the giving of instructions. State v. Clifford, 59 W. Va. 1, 19; Carrico v. W. Va. Cent. & P. R’y Co., 39 W. Va. 86; Hopkinson v. Richardson, 9 Gratt. 485. Notwithstanding sufficiency of the evidence to warrant instructions for both parties, the verdict should be set aside, if it is not, sustained by evidence sufficient in law, or if it is contrary to the decided weight and preponderance of the evidence. Jaeger v. City Railway Co., 72 W. Va. 307; State v. Clifford, 59 W. Va. 1.
Though the evidence adduced for the plaintiff was as broad as the issue, in its scope, and direct in its tendency to maintain it, there was a marked degree of uncertainty and indefiniteness in the data upon which the opinions and calculations of the witnesses were founded. At the time 'Whitaker made the survey and estimate, the ground upon which it was proposed to build the road had not been cleared and prepared for grading. Its true character was less apparent and its adaptability less obvious then than they were when all the timber and brush had been removed, and the work of final and definite location was under way. In his testimony he exhibited no cross-section maps and gave no figures or measurements in support of his statement that he had balanced the ratting with the filling. His testimony was founded almost entirely upon a comparison of the profiles, of the two locations and his recollection as to what he had done.
In our opinion, there is a very decided preponderance of evidence against the verdict. The physical facts established clearly outweigh the ill-founded estimates and opinion evidence submitted by the plaintiff.
Hence the judgment must be reversed, the verdict set aside and a new trial awarded.
Reversed and New Trial Awarded.