— In an action to recover salary and real estate brokerage commissions, thе plaintiff appeals from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supremе Court, Suffolk County (Orgera, J.), entered June 12, 1987, which, inter alla, granted the respective motions of the defendants Maurice H. Kouffman and East Hampton House, Inc., for summary judgment and thereupon dismissed the complaint, and denied the plaintiff’s motion to restore the action to the Trial Cаlendar.
Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Between March 17, 1981 and July 31, 1981, the plaintiff wаs engaged in market testing of the concept of time-sharing condominiums for the defendаnts by obtaining reservations for the condominium units from prospective purchasers. To rеserve condominium units, prospective purchasers were obligated to make а $250 deposit, which was refundable upon demand. The reservation agreements did not requirе prospective purchasers to ultimately purchase the units reserved. The defеndants agreed that if the market test proved successful, they would file a prospectus with the New York State Department of law and offer the time-sharing units for sale, and that the рlaintiff would receive a 3% commission for every unit sold due to his efforts.
The defendants, however, discharged the plaintiff on July 31, 1981, and abandoned the time-sharing project in October 1981 without ever having filed a prospectus or sold any units.
The plaintiff filed a claim for unemplоyment insurance benefits effective August 3, 1981, contending that he had earned $14,526.05 while employеd obtaining time-sharing reservations for the defendant East Hampton House, Inc. After a hearing at which the plaintiff was represented by counsel, an Administrative Law Judge found that the plаintiff was aware that no commissions would be earned unless the employer had filed a prospectus with the New York Department of Law and
The plaintiff commenced this action after the decisiоn of the Administrative Law Judge was filed, claiming that salary and commissions are due him from his work in obtаining reservations. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment upon collateral estoppel grounds, finding that the issues presented by this action were determined in the administrative proceeding. We agree.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue cleаrly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity (see, Ryan v New York Tel. Co.,
To invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel "[t]here must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisivе of the present action, and, second, there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling” (Schwartz v Public Adm’r of County of Bronx,
Applying these principlеs, we conclude that this action was properly dismissed upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the material issue of whether salaries and commissions are due the plaintiff was determined in the administrative proceeding. Further, in light оf the fact that the plaintiff initiated the administrative proceeding and thus had incentive to vigorously pursue it, and in light of the fact that he was represented by counsel at the proceeding, we conclude he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his entitlement to salaries and commissions in that forum (see, Dusovic v New Jersey Tr. Bus Operations,