Frosti v. CreelFrosti v. Creel
WELLS, J.
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Frosti v. Creel, 943 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). The district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Mills v. Martinez, 909 So. 2d 340, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). The conflict issue is whether a motion for attоrney fees and costs predicated upon a rejected proposal for settlement must be denied where the proposal was filed in the trial court prior to entry of judgment. We have jurisdiction.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On February 24, 2000, Sandra Frosti filed a complaint against William H. Houk, seeking damages from an automobile accident that occurred on or around February 27, 1996. On March 22, 2001, Frosti served on Houk a proрosal for settlement in the amount of $17,999. On June 3, 2004, Frosti served a second proposal for settlement. This proposal specified that $1 was demanded to settle the punitive damages claim and that the $1 punitivе damage offer was contingent upon acceptance of the total offer of $24,999 to settle all claims. Neither proposal was accepted. A jury trial was held August 9-12, 2004. On August 12, 2004, the jury returned a verdict in favоr of Frosti, awarding $20,670.66 in compensatory damages and $73,800 in punitive damages, for a total verdict of $94,470.66.
On August 19, 2004, Frosti filed her proposals for settlement in the trial court. On September 13, 2004, she filed a motion for judgment in accоrdance with the jury verdict and a motion for attorney fees and costs. The motion for fees and costs argued that Frosti was entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to
On December 10, 2004, Frosti filed a motion for relief from judgment because Frosti and her counsel were not informed оf the trial court‘s judgment until November 30, 2004. Frosti also filed a motion for extension of time in which to file a motion for attorney fees and costs. On December 23, 2004, the trial court denied by an order Frosti‘s motion for attorney fees. However, on March 22, 2005, the trial court granted Frosti‘s motion for relief from judgment and vacated both its September judgment and its December order denying Frosti‘s motion for attorney fees. On April 6, 2005, the trial court enterеd an amended judgment for Frosti in the amount of $94,470.66 and again reserved jurisdiction
On June 21, 2005, the trial court denied Frosti‘s motion for attorney fees because it found that her proposals for settlement and her motion for attorney fees and costs were filed prematurely. Frosti v. Houk, No. 00-1365-CI-13 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. order dated June 21, 2005) (Order Denying Plaintiff‘s Motion for Fees). The trial court found, on the basis of the Second District‘s decisions in Bottcher v. Walsh, 834 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), and Browning v. Scott, 884 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), that the proposals were filed prematurely. On the basis of the Seсond District‘s decision in Lyn v. Lyn, 884 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), the trial court further found that the motion for fees and costs was filed prematurely.
Frosti appealed to the Second District the trial court‘s order denying her motion. The Second District affirmed the trial court‘s decision to deny the motion for attorney fees and costs because Frosti‘s proposals for settlement were prematurely filed. Frosti, 943 So. 2d at 1023-24.2 The Second District relied on its decision in Bottcher, which held that a motion for attorney fees and cоsts pursuant to
Frosti now appeals the Second District‘s decision to this Court, arguing that the Second District erred in denying on the basis of Bottcher her timely motion for attorney fees and costs. Creel cоntends that the Second District correctly denied Frosti‘s motion for attorney fees and costs because Frosti filed her proposals for settlement before judgment was entered. Creel also argues that Frosti is not entitled to attorney fees and costs because she did not obtain a judgment that meets the statutory threshold for an award. These are legal issues subject to de novo review. See Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. 2007).
ANALYSIS
As for the certified confliсt issue, Frosti is correct that neither
After reviewing
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court erred in denying Frosti‘s motion for attorney fees and costs on the basis that she prematurely filed her proposals for settlement. We further hold that the trial court erred in dеnying Frosti‘s motion for attorney fees and costs on the basis that her motion was premature. This Court recently held that the version of
Because we hold that Frosti is not precluded from recovering attorney fees and costs due to the timing of the filing of her proposals for settlement or of her motions for attorney fees, it is necessary to consider whether she obtained a judgment sufficient to merit an awаrd of attorney fees and costs. Creel argues that Frosti is not entitled to an award of fees and costs pursuant to
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we quash the Second District‘s decision that аffirmed the trial court‘s denial of Frosti‘s motion for attorney fees and costs. We hold that a motion for attorney fees and costs predicated upon a valid, rejected proposal for settlement need not be denied because the proposal was filed with the trial court before judgment was entered. We remand this case to the district court and direct that this case be remanded to the trial court for a determination of reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by Frosti through this appeal. We approve the Fifth District‘s decision in Mills on the issue of the premature filing of the proposal fоr settlement.
It is so ordered.
LEWIS, C.J., and ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.