[¶ 1] James and Linda Palmer appeal from an order of the Superior Court (Aroos-took County, Pierson, J.) affirming a summary judgment entered in the District Court (Houlton, Griffiths, J.) in favor of Frost Va-cationland Properties, Inc. (Vаeationland) in its forcible entry and detainer (FED) action pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 6001 (Supp.1998). 1 The Palmers argue that Vacationland’s FED action is precluded because they are dissei-sors that have acquired a claim by possession and improvement. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
[¶ 2] The facts in the light most favorable to the Palmers are as follows. In July 1992, Linda Palmer and Robert B. Fryer, Jr., President of Vaeationland, signed a purchase and sale agreement for parcel A of the Peek-A-Boo Mountain Estates in Weston. Linda submitted a partial down payment of $250 and agreed to pаy the total down payment of $1,000 at the closing, which the parties scheduled for some time in August. Linda further agreed to pay the balance of the purchase price or $10,000 after the clоsing.
[¶ 3] On signing the purchase and sale agreement, Fryer told Linda and her husband, James, that they could begin improvements on the land immediately. As a result, the Palmers provided a water hook-up, cleаred the lot, and installed a driveway and septic system. Fryer also told the Palmers that they could place a mobile home on the parcel.
[¶ 4] Fryer delayed the closing date without an explanation. During this delay, the Palmers applied to the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) and the Town of Weston for permission to improve the lot and install a mobile homе. Later that fall, Fryer told the Palmers that there was a problem with the title to parcel A, but he never indicated that he could not complete the sale. The Palmers continued to improve parcel A and arranged, with Fryer’s knowledge and consent, for an expensive electrical hookup on the lot in early 1993. The Palm-ers made $14,000 worth of improvements to parcеl A.
[¶ 5] In April 1993, the Palmers’ attorney conducted a title search and discovered that parcel A is a common area of the subdivision that cannot be conveyed without a deed of relеase from all owners and an amendment to the DEP subdivision approval plan. The parties never completed the sale for parcel A, and Fryer never accepted any рayments from the Palmers other than the initial payment of $250. The Palmers, however, continued to use parcel A.
[¶ 6] In February 1997, after serving a notice of termination on Linda Palmer pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002 (Supp.1998), Vaca-tionland brought an FED action against the Palmers pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 6001 (Supp.1998). The District Court granted a summary judgment in favor of Vaeationland and the Palmers appealed to the Superior Court, seeking a jury trial pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80(D)(j) and the issuance of a stay pending the appeal. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court. This appeal followed.
[¶ 7] A trial court must enter a summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, referred to in the statements required by [M.R. Civ. P.] 7(d) show that there is no
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genuine issue as to any materiаl fact set forth in those statements and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” M .R. Civ. P. 56(c). “On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonprevail-ing party, and review the trial court decision for errors of law.”
Greenvall v. Maine Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
[¶8] An FED action is a summary proceeding to determine the single issue: who is entitled to the immediate possession of the property.
See Tozier v. Tozier,
[¶ 9] A party seeking a writ of possession pursuant to an FED action must comply with section 6001(1).
See Rubin v. Josephson,
Process of forcible entry and detainer may be maintained against a disseisor who has not acquired any claim by possession and improvement; [and] ... against a tenant at will, whose tenancy has been terminated as provided in [14 M.R.S.A. § 6002] _
14 M.R.S.A. § 6001(1) (Supp.1998). The Palmers argue they are (1) not tenants at will and (2) are disseisors who have acquired a claim by possession and improvement. We disagrеe.
[¶ 10] A tenant at will is “[o]ne who holds possession of premises by permission of owner or landlord, but without fixed term.” Black’s Law DictionaRY 1466 (6th ed.1990). A tenancy-at-will relationship may arise even if the partiеs do not agree to the payment of rent or a landlord and tenant relation does not exist.
See Fraser,
[¶ 11] Additionally, the Palmers are not disseisors. A disseisor is one who enters another’s land “intending to usurp the possession and to oust another of his freehold.”
Sweeney v. Dahl,
[¶ 12] Here, the Palmers have not demonstrated an “actual, visible, and exclusive appropriation” of parcel A. See id. The Palmers entered the land in contemplation of purchasing the land pursuant to a purchase and sale agreement, not with a “manifest intention to oust the real owner.” See id. The Palmers continued to stay on the land in *422 reliance on Fryer’s promises, not because of a declared “claim of right” for the appropriation of parcel A. Consequently, the Palmers were not disseisors pursuant to section 6001.
[¶ 13] Finally, even if they had been disseisors, the Palmers did not establish a “claim by possession and improvement” that would have precluded Vacationland from bringing an FED action against them. A claim by possession and improvement occurs when a party establishes a claim for betterments pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 6956 (1980)
2
or by adverse possession.
See United States v. Burrill,
[¶ 14] Vacationland can maintain an FED action against the Palmers either because they are tenants at will or because they are not disseisors who have acquired a claim by possession and improvement.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. Title 14 M.R.S.A. § 6001 provides in pertinent part:
Persons against whom process may be maintained. Process of forcible entry and dеtainer may be maintained against a disseisor who has not acquired any claim by possession and improvement; against a tenant holding under a written lease or contract or person hоlding under such a tenant; against a tenant where the occupancy of the premises is incidental to the employment of a tenant; at the expiration or forfeiture of the term, without notice, if commenced within 7 days from the expiration or forfeiture of the term; against a tenant at will, whose tenancy has been terminated as provided in [14 M.R.S.A. § 6002] ....
14 M.R.S.A. § 6001 (Supp.1998).
. Title 14 M.R.S.A. § 6956 provides:
Betterments allowed after 6 years’ possession
When the demanded premises havе been in the actual possession of the defendant or of those under whom he claims for 6 successive years or more before commencement of the action, such defendаnt shall be allowed a compensation for the value of any buildings and improvements on the premises made by him or by those under him whom he claims, to be ascertained and adjusted as providеd.
14 M.R.S.A. § 6956 (1980).
. The Palmers may pursue any equitable or legal claims to title against Vacationland in a real action.
See Fraser,